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YAKYMENKO v. UKRAINE - 19142/03 [2008] ECHR 463 (29 May 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/463.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 463
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF YAKYMENKO v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 19142/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
29 May 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Yakymenko v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Peer Lorenzen, President,
Rait
Maruste,
Karel Jungwiert,
Volodymyr
Butkevych,
Mark Villiger,
Mirjana Lazarova
Trajkovska,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges,
and
Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 6 May 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 19142/03) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Ukrainian national, Mr Petro Kalenikovych Yakymenko (“the
applicant”), on 26 May 2003.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev.
On
7 March 2007 the Court
decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of the
proceedings to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the
application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Kyiv.
In 1986, while being employed by the Municipal Cargo
Department of the Ministry of Automobile Transport
(Київське
міське управління
вантажного
автомобільного
транспорту),
the applicant was engaged in emergency operations at the Chernobyl
disaster site. Subsequently the applicant was employed by “A.T.E.”,
an automobile transportation company.
A. Civil proceedings concerning compensation for health damage
On 30 March 1994 the applicant instituted civil
proceedings in the Radyansky District Court of Kyiv (Радянський
районний суд
м. Києва)
against the Municipal Department of Automobile Transport
(Київське
міське територіальне
виробниче
об’єднання
автомобільного
транспорту)
claiming compensation for health damage sustained in Chernobyl. On 10
January 1995 the court decided to leave the applicant’s claims
without consideration for having been lodged against an improper
defendant. On 15 March 1995 the Kyiv City Court (Київський
міський суд)
quashed this ruling and remitted the case for an examination
to the first-instance court.
On 14 July 1995 the first-instance court found in part
for the applicant. On 27 September 1995 the Kyiv City Court quashed
this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration.
On 28 February 1997 the first-instance court found
against the applicant. On 9 April 1997 the Kyiv City Court quashed
this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration.
On 19 September 1997 the first-instance court found in
part for the applicant. This judgment became final.
On an unspecified date the Kyiv Department of Justice
(Управління
юстиції в м. Києві)
initiated an investigation into the absence of the verbatim record of
the hearing of 19 September 1997 from the case-file. In January 1998
they informed the applicant that contrary to the requirements of
applicable law the verbatim record had never been finalised.
On numerous occasions the applicant sought the
issuance of the writ of execution in respect of the judgment of 19
September 1997. However, he was informed by the Department of Justice
that the writ could not be issued due to the investigation.
On 6 April 1998 the Kyiv City Court quashed the
judgment of 19 September 1997 upon the supervisory protest
of its President lodged under the extraordinary review procedure and
remitted the case for a fresh consideration.
On 2 October 1998 the court replaced the defendant in
the case by the “A.T.E.”.
On 23 October 1998 the first-instance court found
against the applicant.
On 18 November 1998 the Kyiv City Court quashed this
judgment following the applicant’s appeal in cassation and
remitted the case for a fresh consideration.
On 3 February 1999 the Radyansky Court
decided to transfer the case to the Starokyivsky District Court
of Kyiv (Старокиївський
районний суд
м. Києва).
On 14 April 1999
the Kyiv City Court, upon the protest of its Vice-President, quashed
this ruling under the extraordinary review procedure and remitted the
case back to the Radyansky Court.
On 8 June 1999 the Radyansky Court replaced
the defendant in the case by the Kyiv City Department of the Social
Security Fund.
On 15 July 1999 the Radyansky Court ordered
the Kyiv City Bureau of Court Experts (Київський
науково-дослідний
інститут судових
експертиз)
to carry out an assessment of the damage allegedly sustained
by the applicant.
On 25 May 2000 the Bureau delivered its
assessment to the court.
On 8 June 2000 the Radyansky Court found in
part for the applicant. The applicant appealed in cassation.
On 26 July 2000 the Kyiv City Court quashed
this judgment in part concerning the payment of court fees and
remitted this part of the case for a fresh consideration.
On 24 April 2001 the Kyiv City Court upon
the protest of its Vice-President quashed the rulings of 8 June
and 26 July 2000 under the extraordinary review procedure
and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh
consideration.
In November 2001 the defendant in the case was
replaced by the “A.T.E.” and the Municipal Chernobyl
Affairs Department (Управління
у справах захисту
населення від
наслідків
аварії на
Чорнобильській
АЕС Київської
міської державної
адміністрації).
On 18 April 2002 the court found in part for
the applicant and awarded him a lump sum in compensation from the
Chernobyl Affairs Department. Both parties appealed.
On 18 June 2002 the Kyiv City Court upheld this
judgment. The applicant appealed in cassation. According to the law
in force at the material time, the cassation appeal was filed with
the first-instance court, which was to verify its compliance with
procedural rules.
On 26 November 2002, after the applicant
rectified procedural shortcomings of his cassation appeal, the
first-instance court transferred it to the Supreme Court.
On 5 March 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected
the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation.
B. Other proceedings
The applicant also submitted a large number of other
court decisions adopted in different cases against his former
employers and various State bodies in 1994-2001.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in his case
concerning compensation for health damage had been incompatible with
the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article
6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court notes that the proceedings at issue started in March 1994.
However, the period to be taken into consideration began only on
11 September 1997, when the recognition by Ukraine of the
right of individual petition took effect. Nevertheless, in assessing
the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account
must be taken of the state of proceedings at the time.
The
Court further finds that the period between the taking of the final
judgment on 19 September 1997 and its quashing on
6 April 1998 should not be excluded from calculation, as
during this period the authorities were refusing to issue the
applicant with the writ of enforcement referring to some official
investigation into the case by the Department of Justice (see,
mutatis mutandis, Vyrovyy v. Ukraine, no. 28746/03,
§ 36, 12 July 2007).
The
period in question ended on 5 March 2004. It thus lasted
six and a half years. During this period the applicant’s claims
were examined by three levels of jurisdiction.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court finds that the proceedings concerning compensation for health
damage were of considerable importance for the applicant. It further
finds that the complexity of the case and the applicant’s
conduct alone cannot explain the overall length of the proceedings at
issue. It considers that a number of delays (in particular,
repetitive remittals of the case for a fresh consideration including
after a judgment in it became final and prolonged periods of
procedural inactivity in connection with pending expert assessment,
the issuance of the writ of enforcement and handling by the Supreme
Court of the applicant’s cassation appeal (see paragraphs 11,
18-19 and 26-27 above) should be attributed to the domestic
authorities.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the
present case (see e.g. Pavlyulynets v. Ukraine,
no. 70767/01, §§ 49-50, 6 September 2005; Moroz
and Others v. Ukraine, no. 36545/02, § 60, 21
December 2006; and Golovko v. Ukraine, no. 39161/02,
§ 50, 1 February 2007).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant further complained about the
non-enforcement and the eventual quashing of the final judgment of 19
September 1997 and the unfairness of the proceedings in his cases, in
particular, about the ultimate refusal of the judicial authorities to
recognise the entirety of his claims. He invoked Article 6 § 1
of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Having carefully examined the applicant’s
submissions in the light of all the material in its possession, and
insofar as the matters complained of are within its competence, the
Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation
of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article
35 §§1, 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 1,960,200 hryvnias (UAH) in various compensatory
payments allegedly due to him under domestic law in respect of
pecuniary damage. In addition, he claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it finds that the applicant must have suffered
non-pecuniary damage on account of the length of proceedings in his
case concerning compensation for health damage. Ruling on an
equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,400 under that
head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed UAH 1,755 in postal, printing,
translation and similar expenses. He presented relevant receipts.
The
Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 260 under
this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,400
(one thousand four hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage
and EUR 260 (two hundred sixty euros) in respect of costs and
expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant on the
above amounts, to be converted into the national currency at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 May 2008, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President