European Court of Human Rights
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URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/369.html
Cite as: [2008] ECHR 369
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FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no.
36344/05
by Terence Roy MURRAY
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 27 March 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Lech
Garlicki,
President,
Nicolas
Bratza,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi
Bianku, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 October 2005,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Terence Roy Murray, is a British national who was born in 1967 and lives on the Isle of Wight. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr D. Walton of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant received a notice of intended prosecution pursuant to section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, requiring him to name the driver of his car on 28 September 2005. He confirmed that he had been driving his car at that time.
On 6 October 2005 the police made a conditional offer of a fixed penalty amounting to GBP 60 and a three penalty point endorsement on his licence, which the applicant accepted and paid.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
The relevant domestic law and practice is set out in O’Halloran and Francis v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, §§ 25 31, ECHR 2007 ...
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained first under Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention that he had been subject to compulsion to give incriminating evidence in violation of the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination. Second, he complained that he had paid the fine and accepted the three penalty point endorsement because, by contesting the matter in the Magistrates’ Court, he risked a heavier penalty. He was thus denied the opportunity to plead mitigation. Third, he complained that speed cameras were not reliable but, for the same reason, he did not risk going to court to challenge their accuracy. Finally, he claimed he should have been informed of the speed limit on the road on which he was speeding. Article 6 of the Convention provides, so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
THE LAW
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
The Government submitted that the present case was indistinguishable from the case of O’Halloran and Francis, cited above, and in particular the facts of O’Halloran, since the conditional offer of a fixed penalty was made after the police had obtained the identity of the driver of the vehicle from a demand made under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. In respect of the applicant’s second complaint, they observed that the notice of intended prosecution the applicant received stated that if he wished to contest the matter, the court would consider any mitigating circumstances. He would also have been able to contest the reliability of the speed cameras in the course of the proceedings and, moreover, raise any argument relating to the speed limit in the area in which he was driving, either as a defence to the charge or by way of mitigation. The decision to accept a fixed penalty was a free, informed and voluntary choice.
2. The applicant
The applicant noted the Court’s judgment in O’Halloran and Francis but stated that the judgment did not address the question of his inability to plead mitigation because he did not wish to risk a more severe penalty if the case came to trial. He submitted that his inability to make any arguments in respect of mitigation was compounded by the fact that he could not receive legal aid. He maintained his argument that speed cameras were unreliable and that there were no signs alerting him to the speed limit.
B. The Court’s assessment
The Court has previously examined cases raising issues similar to those raised by the applicant’s first complaint in O’Halloran and Francis, cited above, where it found there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and that no separate issue arose to be considered under Article 6 § 2. The Court has examined the present case and finds that there are no facts or arguments from the applicant which would lead to any different conclusion in this instance. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
Having examined the remainder of the applicant’s complaints, the Court finds that there is nothing in the case file which discloses an appearance of a violation of the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention and thus the remainder of the application must also be rejected as being manifestly ill founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Lawrence Early Lech Garlicki
Registrar President