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VARNAVA AND OTHERS v. TURKEY - 16064/90 [2008] ECHR 30 (10 January 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/30.html
Cite as:
(2010) 50 EHRR 21,
[2008] ECHR 30,
50 EHRR 21
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF
VARNAVA AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Applications nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90,
16069/90,
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 January
2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
President,
Elisabet Fura-Sandström,
Alvina
Gyulumyan,
Egbert Myjer,
David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
judges,
Gönül Başaran Erönen, ad hoc
judge,
and Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 6 December 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in nine applications (nos. 16064/90, 16065/90,
16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and
16073/90) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the European
Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under
former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by
Cypriot nationals, Andreas and Giorghoulla Varnava no. 16064/90),
Andreas and Loizos Loizides
(no. 16065/90), Philippos Constantinou and Demetris K. Peyiotis
(16066/90), Demetris Theocharides and Elli Theocharidou
(no. 16068/90), Panicos and Chrysoula Charalambous (no. 16069/90),
Eleftherios and Christos Thoma (no. 16070/90),
Savvas and Androula Hadjipanteli (no. 16071/90), Savvas and Georghios
Apostolides (no. 16072/90) and Leontis Demetriou and Yianoulla Leonti
Sarma (16073/90) on 25 January 1990.
The
applicants were represented by Mr A. Demetriades and Dr Kypros
Chrystomides, respectively, lawyers practising in Nicosia.
The Turkish Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent.
The
applicants alleged that the first applicants in the above
applications had been detained by Turkish military forces from 1974
and that the Turkish authorities had not accounted for them since.
They invoked Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14 of the
Convention.
The
applications were joined by the Commission on 2 July 1991 and
declared admissible on 14 April 1998. They were transmitted to the
Court on 1 November 1999 in accordance with Article 5 § 3,
second sentence, of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the Commission
not having completed its examination of the case by that date.
The
applications were allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court
(Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that
Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 §
1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
Mr Türmen, the judge elected in respect of Turkey, withdrew from
sitting in the case (Rule 28). The Government accordingly appointed
Ms G. Erönen to sit as an ad hoc judge in his place
(Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1).
The
applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits
(Rule 59 § 1).
On
17 February 2000 the Cypriot Government informed the Court that they
wished to participate in the proceedings. They submitted observations
on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
On
1 November 2003 the Court changed the composition of its Sections
(Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed
Third Section (Rule 52 § 1).
On
17 February 2005, the applicants’ representative informed the
Court that the second applicant, Christos Thoma, father of the first
applicant in application no. 16070/90, had died on 12 April 1997 and
enclosed letters of authority from his wife, Chrystalleni Thoma, and
his daughter, Maria Chrystalleni Thoma who stated their intention of
continuing the application.
On
13 November 2006, the applicants’ representative informed the
Court that the second applicant, Elli Theocharidou, mother of the
first applicant in application no. 16068/90, had died on 1 April 2005
and that his heirs (Ourania Symeou, Kaiti Constantinou, Yiannoulla
Kari, Eleni Papayianni, Andreas G. Theocharides, Dimitris G.
Theocharides and Marios G. Theocharides) wished to continue the
application. On the same date, it was communicated that the second
applicant, Georghios Apostolides, father of the first applicant in
application no. 16072/90 had died on 14 April 1998 and that his heirs
(Panayiota Chrysou, Chrystalla Antoniadou, Aggela Georgiou, Avgi
Nicolaou and Kostas Apostolides) intended to continue the
application.
On
11 January 2007, the applicants’ representative informed the
Court that the second applicant, Loizos Loizides, father of the first
applicant in application no. 16065/90 had died on 14 September 2001
and that his granddaughter, Athina Hava, intended to continue with
the application on behalf of all the heirs of the deceased (Markos
Loizou, Despo Demetriou, Anna-Maria Loizou, Elena Loizidou and Loizos
Loizides).
The
Chamber decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the
merits was required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine). It found that
the heirs of the deceased applicants had the requisite interest and
standing to continue the applications.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. General context
The
complaints raised in this application arise out of the Turkish
military operations in northern Cyprus in July and August 1974 and
the continuing division of the territory of Cyprus. At the time of
the Court’s consideration of the merits of the Loizidou v.
Turkey case in 1996, there was a Turkish military presence of
more than 30,000 personnel throughout the whole of the occupied area
of northern Cyprus which was constantly patrolled and had checkpoints
on all main lines of communication (Loizidou v. Turkey,
judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1996 VI).
In
November 1983 there was the proclamation of the “Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”) and the
subsequent enactment of the “TRNC Constitution” on 7 May
1985, which was condemned by the international community. On 18
November 1983 the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 541 (1983) declaring the proclamation of the
establishment of the “TRNC” legally invalid and calling
upon all States not to recognise any Cypriot State other than the
Republic of Cyprus. In November 1983 the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe decided that it continued to regard the
government of the Republic of Cyprus as the sole legitimate
government of Cyprus and called for respect of the sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of
Cyprus.
According to the respondent Government, the “TRNC”
is a democratic and constitutional State which is politically
independent of all other sovereign States including Turkey, and the
administration in northern Cyprus has been set up by the
Turkish-Cypriot people in the exercise of its right to
self-determination and not by Turkey. Notwithstanding this view, it
is only the Cypriot government which is recognised internationally as
the government of the Republic of Cyprus in the context of diplomatic
and treaty relations and the working of international organisations.
United Nations peacekeeping forces (“UNFICYP”)
maintain a buffer-zone. A number of political initiatives have been
taken at the level of the United Nations aimed at settling the Cyprus
problem on the basis of institutional arrangements acceptable to both
sides.
Furthermore, and of relevance to the instant
application, in 1981 the United Nations Committee on Missing Persons
(“CMP”) was set up to “look into cases of persons
reported missing in the inter-communal fighting as well as in the
events of July 1974 and afterwards” and “to draw up
comprehensive lists of missing persons of both communities,
specifying as appropriate whether they are still alive or dead, and
in the latter case approximate times of death”. The CMP has not
yet completed its investigations (see further below paragraph 101).
B. The previous inter-State applications Cyprus v.
Turkey
The
events of July and August 1974 and their aftermath gave rise to four
previous applications by the applicant Government against the
respondent State under former Article 24 of the Convention.
1.
and 2. The first (no. 6780/74) and second (no.
6950/75) applications were joined by the Commission and led to the
adoption on 10 July 1976 of a report under former Article 31 of the
Convention (“the 1976 report”) in which the Commission
expressed the opinion that the respondent State had violated Articles
2, 3, 5, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.
1.
3.
The third application (no. 8007/77) lodged by the applicant
Government was the subject of a further report under former Article
31 adopted by the Commission on 4 October 1983 (“the 1983
report”). In that report the Commission expressed the opinion
that the respondent State was in breach of its obligations under
Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
On 2 April 1992 the Committee of Ministers adopted Resolution DH (92)
12 in respect of the Commission’s 1983 report. In its
resolution the Committee of Ministers limited itself to a decision to
make the 1983 report public and stated that its consideration of the
case was thereby completed.
4.
The fourth application, Cyprus v. Turkey [GC] (no. 25781/94,
ECHR 2001 IV) concerned four broad categories of complaints:
alleged violations of the rights of Greek-Cypriot missing persons and
their relatives; alleged violations of the home and property rights
of displaced persons; alleged violations of the rights of enclaved
Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus; alleged violations of the rights
of Turkish Cypriots and the Gypsy community in northern Cyprus. As
regarded the missing persons and their relatives, the Court adopted
the findings of fact of the Commission bearing in mind the latter’s
careful analysis of all material evidence including the findings
reached by it in its 1976 and 1983 reports (Comm. Rep., 4 June 1999,
annexed to the Court’s judgment). Like the Commission, the
Court did not consider it
appropriate to estimate the number of persons who fell
into the category of “missing persons”. The Commission’s
findings had been summarised as follows;
“25. The Commission found that the evidence
submitted to it in the instant case confirmed its earlier findings
that certain of the missing persons were last seen in Turkish or
Turkish-Cypriot custody. In this connection, the Commission had
regard to the following: a statement of Mr Denktaş, “President
of the TRNC”, broadcast on 1 March 1996, in which he admitted
that forty-two Greek-Cypriot prisoners were handed over to
Turkish-Cypriot fighters who killed them and that in order to prevent
further such killings prisoners were subsequently transferred to
Turkey; the broadcast statement of Mr Yalçin Küçük,
a former Turkish officer who had served in the Turkish army at the
time and participated in the 1974 military operation in Cyprus, in
which he suggested that the Turkish army had engaged in widespread
killings of, inter alia, civilians in so-called cleaning-up
operations; the Dillon Report submitted to the United States Congress
in May 1998 indicating, inter alia, that Turkish and
Turkish-Cypriot soldiers rounded up Greek-Cypriot civilians in the
village of Asha on 18 August 1974 and took away males over the age of
15, most of whom were reportedly killed by Turkish-Cypriot fighters;
the written statements of witnesses tending to corroborate the
Commission’s earlier findings that many persons now missing
were taken into custody by Turkish soldiers or Turkish-Cypriot
paramilitaries.
26. The Commission concluded that,
notwithstanding evidence of the killing of Greek-Cypriot prisoners
and civilians, there was no proof that any of the missing persons
were killed in circumstances for which the respondent State could be
held responsible; nor did the Commission find any evidence to the
effect that any of the persons taken into custody were still being
detained or kept in servitude by the respondent State. On the other
hand, the Commission found it established that the facts surrounding
the fate of the missing persons had not been clarified by the
authorities and brought to the notice of the victims’
relatives.”
The
Court held that there had been no breach of Article 2 of the
Convention by reason of an alleged violation of a substantive
obligation under that Article in respect of any of the missing
persons (paragraph 130); that there had been a continuing
violation of Article 2 of the Convention on account of the failure of
the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective
investigation into the whereabouts and fate of Greek-Cypriot missing
persons who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances (paragraph
136); that no breach of Article 4 of the Convention had been
established (paragraph 141); that there had been a continuing
violation of Article 5 of the Convention by virtue of the failure of
the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective
investigation into the whereabouts and fate of the Greek-Cypriot
missing persons in respect of whom there was an arguable claim that
they were in Turkish custody at the time of their disappearance
(paragraph 150); that no breach of Article 5 of the Convention had
been established by virtue of the alleged actual detention of
Greek-Cypriot missing persons (paragraph 151); and that it was not
necessary to examine the applicant Government’s complaints
under Articles 3, 6, 8, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention in respect of
the Greek-Cypriot missing persons (paragraph 153); that there
had been a continuing violation of Article 3 of the Convention in
respect of the relatives of the Greek-Cypriot missing persons
(paragraph 158); and that it was not necessary to examine
whether Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention had been violated in
respect of the relatives of the Greek-Cypriot missing persons, having
regard to the Court’s conclusion under Article 3 (paragraph
161).
C. The facts of these cases
The
facts are disputed by the parties.
1. The applicants’ submissions on the facts
a. Application no. 16064/90: Andreas
Varnava
The first applicant, an ironmonger, was born in 1947;
he has been considered missing since 1974, having been taken into
captivity by the Turkish Army during their military action in Cyprus
in 1974. His wife, the second applicant, was born in 1949 and resided
in Lymbia.
The applicants were represented by Mr. Achilleas
Demetriades, a lawyer practising in Nicosia, under an authority
signed by the second applicant in her own name and on behalf of the
first applicant.
In July 1974 the first applicant, responding to the
declared general mobilisation, enlisted as a reservist in the 305
Reservists Battalion which had its headquarters in Dhali village. He
continued his service at the outposts of Lymbia until 8 9 August
1974. On 8 9 August 1974 all the reserve soldiers of
the 305 Reservists Battalion, among them the applicant, were brought
to the area of Mia Milia and undertook the manning of Cypriot
outposts along the front line with the Turkish military forces which
extended between Mia Milia and Koutsovendis.
On the morning of 14 August 1974, Turkish military
forces, supported by tanks and having air cover, launched an attack
against the Cypriot area where the applicant and his battalion were
serving, in order to capture the area from them. The Cypriot area
line of defence was broken through and the Turkish military forces
began advancing towards the area of Mia Milia and as a result the
Cypriot forces began retreating. During the retreat that followed,
the Cypriot forces dispersed in all directions. After a while the
area around was captured by the Turkish military forces and the
applicant was cut off in it. As a result the trace of the applicant
was lost and he is today still considered to be missing.
Mr. Christakis Ioannou of Pano Dhikomo and now of
Stavros Refugee Camp Strovolos, who had been a prisoner of the
Turkish Military Forces and/or Turkish authorities and was freed,
stated that at Adana prison in Turkey, where he had been taken on 31
August 1974 and held, there were another 40 persons in the same room
for 3 4 days. Among them was the applicant. After the said
period they were split up and ever since then he has not seen the
applicant again.
b. Application no. 16065/90: Andreas
Loizides
The first applicant, a student, was born in 1954; he
has been considered missing since 1974, having been taken into
captivity by the Turkish Army during their military action in Cyprus
in 1974. His father, the second applicant, was born in 1907 and
resided in Nicosia.
The applicants are represented by Dr. Kypros
Chrysostomides, a lawyer practising in Nicosia, under an authority
signed by the second applicant in his own name and on behalf of the
first applicant.
In July 1974 the first applicant was serving as a
Second Lieutenant in the 1st Company of the 256 Infantry Battalion
stationed at Xeros, which took part in various operations against the
Turkish forces. On about 30 July 1974 the battalion moved up to the
Lapithos area in order to support the Greek Cypriot forces there. The
soldiers were split up into various groups and the applicant was in
charge of one of these. The applicant’s group, consisting of
ten men in all, including Stelios Christofi Onoufriou and Xenophon
Christoforou (both now missing), as well as Nakis Nicolaou and Petros
A. Hadjiyianni, was ordered to take up positions on the Lapithos
heights. During their stay at Lapithos the Greek Cypriot forces were
continuously attacked by the Turkish forces from all sides. The Greek
Cypriot forces remained at their posts defending them until 5 August
1974.
On 5 August 1974 Turkish forces launched a strong
attack from all sides against the Greek Cypriot forces’
positions while other Turkish troops managed to encircle Lapithos.
Because of Turkish superiority in manpower and armour the Greek
Cypriot forces were ordered to retreat towards the centre of the
village where the Company base was. The applicant arrived with his
comrades at the centre of the village and was informed by the
inhabitants that Lapithos was surrounded by Turkish troops. Then they
hid their weapons in an orchard and subsequently put on civilian
clothes which they found in various houses. In the afternoon of 5
August 1974 the applicant with some comrades attempted to break
through the Turkish lines and arrive at the Cypriot Government
controlled areas. This attempt was unsuccessful and with the
exception of Nakis Nicolaou they all returned to Lapithos again where
they spent the night. At about 09.00 hours on 6 August 1974 Turkish
troops entered Lapithos and started extensive searches from house to
house. The applicant and all his comrades were warned by the
inhabitants of the village about the searches and they dispersed in
order to avoid capture. Since then none of the members of the group
has seen the applicant again.
Nicos Th. Tampas of the 256 Infantry Battalion and
leader of the first group which was manning the Lapithos heights at
about 5 August 1974 in a statement mentioned that at
approximately 21.00 hours on 6 August 1974, while he was walking in
Lapithos looking for his comrades, he entered a warehouse. In it he
found the applicant looking after Georghios Allayiotis who was
wounded in the head. After talking for a little while with the
applicant he went away leaving him and Georghios Allayiotis there.
That was the last time that he saw the applicant. He was arrested by
the Turks on 9 August 1974 while he was in Lapithos. He was
detained in various prisons in Cyprus and Turkey and was released on
22 October 1974.
Christodoulos Panyi of Vatyli, now of Strovolos, in
his statement declared that while he was a prisoner in the Adana
prison he saw and recognised the applicant whom he had known earlier.
c. Application no. 16066/90: Philipos
Constantinos
The first applicant, a student, was born in 1954; he
has been considered missing since 1974, having been taken into
captivity by the Turkish Army during their military action in Cyprus
in 1974. His father, the second applicant, was born in 1929 and
resided in Nicosia.
The applicants are represented by Dr. Kypros
Chrysostomides under an authority signed by the second applicant in
his own name and on behalf of the first applicant.
In July 1973 the first applicant enlisted with the
National Guard in order to do his national service. He was posted
with the 70 Engineers Battalion which was stationed at the site of
the former British Military Hospital (B.M.H.) in Nicosia. On 5 August
1974, a section of the battalion consisting of 48 men, including the
applicant, was sent to Lapithos on a specific mission in the Lapithos
and Karavas area (Kyrenia district). The mission began at about noon
and finished at about 18.00 hours on the same day. After receiving
instructions from the group leader the men spent the night at
Lapithos and intended to complete the mission the following morning.
At about 04.30 hours on 6 August 1974, the Turkish
Army launched a full scale attack from all sides in the Karavas
and Lapithos area. The applicant’s group leader ordered his men
to split up into three groups and to withdraw towards Vasilia (also
Kyrenia district) where they would all meet. The soldiers split up
into three groups under the respective command of the platoon
leaders. The applicant was in one of the groups which intended to
withdraw following a route along the coast.
The men first reached the main Nicosia Kyrenia
road near the "Airkotissa" restaurant. While they were
having a short rest, they heard shouting and the group leader sent
the applicant and another soldier to investigate. As they had not
returned after about 15 minutes the remainder of the group left for
Panagra (also in the Kyrenia district). On their way there, they were
ambushed by Turkish soldiers and amidst the fighting and confusion
that followed, the remaining group dispersed. Three soldiers from
this group, Petros Constantinou (of Morphou, now of Moniatis,
Limassol), Panayiotis Alexandrou (of Pera Chorio Nisou, Nicosia) and
Manolis Manoli (of Lapithos, now of Engomi, Nicosia), managed to
reach their destination. Until that time when the group dispersed,
none of its members including the applicant, had been killed, injured
or captured by the Turks.
Costas A. Sophocleous, of Nicosia, stated that, when
he was a prisoner in Turkey from 30 July until 28 October 1974, he
met the applicant. They were together in the same prison in Turkey
and were subsequently transferred to Cyprus whereupon the said Costas
A. Sophocleous was released but not the applicant.
Alexandros Papamichael, of Limassol, who was a
prisoner in Adana, Turkey, stated that he recognised the first
applicant from a photograph that was shown him by the second
applicant and he had been with him in the same prison.
Finally, the second applicant mentioned in a signed
statement that he identified his missing son in a photograph
published in "Athinaiki", a Greek newspaper, on 28
September 1974. In this photograph Greek-Cypriot prisoners were shown
on a boat en route to Turkey.
d. Application no. 16068/90: Demetris Theocharides
The first applicant, a photographer, was born in 1953;
he has been considered missing since 1974, having been taken into
captivity by the Turkish Army during their military action in Cyprus
in 1974. His mother, the second applicant, was born in 1914 and
resided in Nicosia.
The applicants are represented by Mr. Achilleas
Demetriades under an authority signed by the second applicant in her
own name and on behalf of the first applicant.
On 20 July 1974 the first applicant enlisted as a
reservist in Nicosia. He was posted in the 1st Company of the 301
Infantry Battalion commanded by Mr. Costas Papacostas. On 21 July he
telephoned his mother and told her that he was well and that he was
going to be moved to the Kyrenia district. Indeed the whole battalion
was ordered to move on the following day to the area of Ayios
Ermolaos. The 1st Company took up defensive positions at a height
called "Kalambaki", near the Turkish Cypriot village of
Pileri.
At about 04.30 hours on 26 July 1974 the 1st Company
came under attack from the Turkish Cypriot villages of Krini Pileri.
The Turkish military forces that carried out the attack consisted of
a paratroops battalion, twenty tanks, as well as high angle
guns. They succeeded in breaking through the Greek Cypriot lines and
infiltrated the right flank of the 1st Company in order to encircle
it and enclave its men. The commander ordered the Company to regroup
at the Greek Cypriot village of Sysklepos. There they were ordered by
their battalion to regroup again at Kontemenos where they arrived at
about 15.00 hours. After a roll call they found out that six
soldiers of the 1st Company were absent, including the applicant. The
area in which the 1st Company had been initially stationed was
captured by the Turkish military forces.
Mr. Nicos Nicolaou of Strovolos, who was a prisoner at
Adana prison (Turkey) in September 1974, stated that one day, when
the prisoners were in the yard, a Turk was calling their names. Among
other names, he heard the name of the applicant. He saw the applicant
whom he happened to know previously. As the applicant was going back
to his cell Mr. Nicolaou noticed that he was lame in one leg. On
11 September 1974 Mr. Nicolaou was taken to Antiyiama
prison (Turkey) and since then he has not seen the applicant again.
e. Application no. 16069/90: Panicos Charalambous
The first applicant, a student, was born in 1955; he
has been considered missing since 1974, having been taken into
captivity by the Turkish Army during their military action in Cyprus
in 1974. His mother, the second applicant, was born in 1935 and
resided in Limassol.
The applicants are represented by Dr. Kypros
Chrysostomides under an authority signed by the second applicant in
her own name and on behalf of the first applicant.
In 1972 the first applicant enlisted in the National
Guard to do his military service. He was subsequently promoted to
sergeant.
On 14 July 1974 the applicant visited his relations at
Polemidhia and told them that he would be demobilised on 20 July. He
returned to his unit on the same day. On 19 July 1974 he telephoned
his father and told him that he would not be released after all
because of the coup that had taken place in the meantime. On 22 July
1974 the applicant’s father was informed by Nicos Hadjicosti, a
Limassol factory owner, that he had seen his son at the company’s
headquarters at Synchari and that he was well. On 23 July 1974 the
father of the applicant was informed by Andreas Komodromos that the
applicant had left Synchari with the men of the Headquarters Company
and had gone to Aglandjia.
On 24 July 1974 Nikiforos Kominis with 17 soldiers,
including the applicant and Efthymios Hadjipetrou, set out from
Aglandjia in two vehicles to reconnoitre the ground of the
Koutsoventis Vounos area. Among them were Phaedros Roussi and
Yiannis Melissis. After Kominis had marked the Turkish positions on
paper, he went at about 12.00 hours to the headquarters of one of the
Commando Units in order to relay by telephone the results of the
reconnaissance mission. After twenty minutes three buses were seen
driving on a street from the direction of Vounos village. At about
the same time a Greek officer by the name of Votas accompanied by
three other soldiers went near the men of the reconnaissance patrol.
The officer ordered three or four soldiers to come down on the street
and search the buses. The buses were full of Turkish soldiers who
started firing at the Greek-Cypriot men as soon as they became aware
of their nationality. The applicant was wounded in the right hand and
on the left side of his ribs. Mr. Andreas Komodromos cleaned his
wounds with water, loaded his gun and told him to go back, which he
did. After that the applicant was not seen again by his unit.
According to the statement of Yiannis Melissis, who
had been a prisoner of the Turks at Adana and Amasia in September
1974, he happened to meet the applicant during his captivity. They
both stayed with others in Cell No. 9 until 18 September. They were
chatting together every day and became friends. On 18 September
Yiannis Melissis was brought back to Cyprus and was released on 21
September 1974. The applicant had given him a letter to the
applicant’s father which he forgot in his pocket in the clothes
that he changed at the Hotel and Catering School in Nicosia. All
those clothes belonging to the prisoners were burned.
The second applicant in her statement mentioned that
she had recognised her son in a photograph that was published in the
Greek newspaper "Athinaiki" on 28 September 1974. The
photograph shows Cypriot prisoners transported to Turkey on a Turkish
destroyer in July 1974.
f. Application no. 16070/90: Eleftherios Thoma
The first applicant, a car mechanic, was born in 1951;
he has been considered missing since 1974, having been taken into
captivity by the Turkish Army during their military action in Cyprus
in 1974. His father, the second applicant, was born in 1921 and
resided in Strovolos.
The applicants are represented by Mr. Achilleas
Demetriades under an authority signed by the second applicant in his
own name and on behalf of the first applicant.
In July 1974, in response to the general mobilisation,
the first applicant enlisted as a reserve sergeant in the
Headquarters Company of the 251 Infantry Battalion stationed at
Glykiotissa, Kyrenia, with Captain Michael Polycarpos in charge.
On the morning of 20 July 1974 Turkish military
forces, supported by naval units and having air cover, succeeded in
landing with their armour. All the men of the Headquarters Company,
including the applicant, were trying during the whole of the day to
prevent the Turkish landing which was taking place in the area of
"Pikro Nero", Kyrenia. At around 12.00 hours on 21 July the
Turkish military forces which had landed, supported by tanks and
having air cover, attacked the Cypriot forces that were defending the
area. Owing to the superiority of the Turkish military forces in men
as well as in weapons the 251 Infantry Battalion was ordered to
retreat towards Trimithi village. The applicant was present during
the regrouping of the battalion. Two hours after the regrouping the
commander of the battalion (who went missing with 40 50 other
soldiers, including the applicant serving as the commander’s
driver) led his men out of Trimithi village, reaching a ravine
between the villages of Ayios Georghios and Templos where they took
up battle positions. A number of commandos of the 33rd Battalion
arrived in the same ravine. At around 15.00 hours on 22 July 1974,
Turkish military forces surrounded the Cypriot forces in the ravine
(between Ayios Georghios and Templos) and opened fire against them
with all their guns. Then the commander ordered a counter attack
intending to break through the Turkish military forces’ lines
and at the same time to retreat towards Kyrenia. During the
counter attack and the retreat the applicant’s trace was
lost.
On 4 September 1974 the "Special News Bulletin"
a daily issue of the Turkish Cypriot administration
published a photograph of Greek-Cypriot prisoners of war
under the caption "Greek Cypriot prisoners of war
having their lunch. Yesterday they were visited by a representative
of the Turkish Red Crescent. He toured all the prisoners of war
camps in the area of the island under the Turkish control, in order
to ascertain the needs of the prisoners." In that photograph
four of the prisoners were identified. Among them was the first
applicant who was identified by the second applicant.
A former prisoner, Mr. Efstathios Selefcou, of Elio,
now at Eylenja, in a signed statement to the Cypriot Police said that
during his transportation from Cyprus to Turkey he saw and talked to
the first applicant whom he knew very well since they had been
together at secondary school.
All above mentioned prisoners had been taken to
Adana prison and since that time the applicant had been missing.
g. Application no. 16071/90: Savvas
Hadjipanteli
The first applicant,
a bank employee, was born in 1938 and lived at Yialousa; he has been
considered missing since 1974, having been taken into captivity by
the Turkish Army during their military action in Cyprus in 1974. His
wife, the second applicant, was born in 1938 and resided in Nicosia.
The applicants are represented by Dr. Kypros
Chrysostomides under an authority signed by the second applicant in
her own name and on behalf of the first applicant.
On 18 August 1974 about three or four saloon cars as
well as a bus and two tanks, all full of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
soldiers turned up at Yialousa and stopped near the police station,
along the main road. The soldiers got out of their vehicles and
ordered all those who were there to gather at the nearby coffee house
of Christos Malakounas. About 35 persons gathered there.
Subsequently, a Turkish officer told them that from that time they
would be under Turkish administration and ordered them to make a
census of the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the village starting from
the age of 7 to 70 and that he would be back on the following day to
collect the lists. On the following day, the same civilian and
military vehicles (tanks) returned and parked near the police
station. A number of Turks got off, marched to Malakounas
coffee house and asked for the lists. Another group of Turkish
soldiers were carrying out a house to house search. They
imposed a curfew and, having taken the lists, they took with them for
questioning nine persons, including the first applicant. They put
them on a bus and drove them outside the village in the direction of
Famagusta. The said Greek Cypriots were still missing.
On the same day, the village of Yialousa was visited
by United Nations men to whom the arrest of the nine Greek Cypriots
was reported by their co villagers.
According to the applicants, Representatives of the
International Red Cross in Cyprus visited Pavlides Garage in the
Turkish occupied sector of Nicosia and on 28 August 1974
recorded the names of 20 Greek Cypriots held there, including the
nine persons from Yialousa (citing document EZY284D).
Costas M. Kaniou, Sofronios Mantis, Ioannis D. Constantis also saw
the said detainees at the Pavlides Garage, during the same period
that they were detained there; they were released later.
On 27 August 1974 a group of Turkish Cypriot civilians
came to Yialousa looking for Pentelis Pantelides, Loizos Pallaris,
Michael Sergides and Christakis Panayides. Having found them,
they led them to the Savings Bank in order to search and seal the
building. They all entered the building. After having emptied two
safes they ordered that the third one should be opened, but they were
told that the keys were with the applicant. Subsequently they left,
after having shut and sealed the outside door. After 10 12 days
the same group looked for the same persons and went again to the bank
building. They had the two keys for the safe which the applicant
always carried with him. Loizos Pallaris opened the safe. The
keys were in a leather case which the applicant had, but his personal
keys were not included. The Turkish Cypriots took the contents of the
safe, sealed the gate and left.
h. Application no. 16072/90: Savvas
Apostolides
The first applicant, a moulder, was born in 1955; he
has been considered missing since 1974, having been taken into
captivity by the Turkish Army during their military action in Cyprus
in 1974. His father, the second applicant, was born in 1928 and
resided in Strovolos.
The applicants are represented by Mr. Achilleas
Demetriades under an authority signed by the second applicant in his
own name and on behalf of the first applicant.
In 1974 the first applicant was doing his national
service in the 70 Engineers Battalion stationed at the site of the
former British Military Hospital (B.M.H.) in Nicosia. On 5 August
1974 a section of the battalion consisting of 48 men, including the
applicant, was sent to Lapithos on a specific mission in the Karavas
and Lapithos area. The mission began at about noon and was completed
at about 18.00 hours the same day. After receiving instructions from
the section leader, Efstratios Katsoulotou, the men spent the night
at Lapithos and intended to complete their mission the following
morning. At about 04.30 hours on 6 August 1974 the Turkish military
forces launched a full scale attack from all sides in the area
of Karavas and Lapithos. The Commander of the Engineers ordered his
men to split up into three groups, withdraw towards Vasilia and meet
there. The three groups set off intending to reach the prearranged
point. On their way they were ambushed by the Turkish military
forces. Because of the Turkish military forces’ fire and the
confusion that followed all the Engineers dispersed. Up to the time
of the dispersion no member of the group had been killed, injured or
captured by the Turkish military forces.
Later on Mr. Costas Themistocleous of Omorphita, now
of Nicosia, who was taken as a prisoner to Adana prison in Turkey,
saw the applicant there on or about 17 October 1974, while he was
about to return to Cyprus. They did not speak to each other but
waved. Mr. Themistocleous recognised the applicant since he had known
him since they were children.
i. Application no. 16073/90: Leontis
Demetriou Sarma
The first applicant, a worker, was born in 1947; he
has been considered missing since 1974, having been taken into
captivity by the Turkish Army during their military action in Cyprus
in 1974. His wife, the second applicant, was born in 1949 and resided
in Limassol.
The applicants are represented by Mr. Achilleas
Demetriades under an authority signed by the second applicant in her
own name and on behalf of the first applicant.
On 20 July 1974, following the general mobilisation,
the first applicant enlisted as a reservist in the 399 Infantry
Battalion stationed at Bogazi, Famagusta. He was put in the Support
Company of the Battalion (B.C.S.C.). On 20 July the battalion
captured the Turkish Cypriot village of Chatos. On 22 July the
battalion moved to the Mia Milia area to reinforce the Greek Cypriot
forces there and to man the Greek-Cypriot outposts on the front line.
On the morning of 14 August 1974 Turkish military
forces, supported by tanks and having air cover, launched a heavy
attack against the Greek- Cypriot forces in the area, where the
applicant was with his battalion, intending to occupy the area. Owing
to the superiority of the Turkish military forces the Greek-Cypriot
defence line was broken, the Turkish military forces began to advance
towards the Mia Milia area, and the Greek Cypriot forces began to
retreat. The area was, in a short while, occupied by the Turkish
military forces and the applicant was enclaved in it. His trace was
lost.
The ex prisoner of war, Mr. Costas Mena of
Palaekythro, now at Koracou, stated that during his detention at
Antiyama, Turkey, he saw the applicant who was detained in cell block
No. 9. On 18 October 1974 all the prisoners at Antiyama were taken to
Adana. There they were all lined up in four rows. A Turkish military
officer walked in front of the line and picked out some of the
prisoners, who were taken away from the line. From the first row the
applicant was picked out and taken away. Since then Mr. Mena has not
seen the applicant ever again and he has been missing until today.
2. The respondent Government’s submissions on the
facts
The
respondent Government disputed that the applicants had been taken
into captivity by the Turkish army during the military action in
Cyprus in 1974. They considered that the inevitable conclusion from
the information provided in the application forms was that all the
alleged "missing persons", except for Savvas Hadjipanteli,
were military personnel who died in action in July-August 1974.
The
Government noted that, since the introduction of these applications,
files relating to the same “missing persons” had been
submitted by the Government of Cyprus to the Committee on Missing
Persons (CMP) in Cyprus during 1994 and 1995. In these files there
were no assertions that these people had been seen in any of the
alleged prisons in Turkey. The names of the alleged witnesses listed
in application nos. 16064/90 (Christakis Iannou), 16065/90
(Christodoulos Panayi), 16066/90 (Costa Sophocleous), 16068/90 (Nicos
Nicolaou), 16069/90 (Yiannis Melissis), 16070/90 (Efstathios
Selefcou), 16073/90 (Costas Themisthocleous) and 16073/90 (Costas
Mena) were not cited in support. The alleged sightings were therefore
without foundation.
As
regarded Savvas Hadjipanteli (no. 16071/90), who was a civilian, the
Government noted that the International Red Cross had visited the
Pavlides Garage where he had allegedly been held but his name,
contrary to the applicants’ assertion, did not appear in the
list of Greek Cypriots held. In any event, it was a transit centre
where people were not held for more than a few days before being
released or moved elsewhere. In the file submitted to the CMP, there
is only a reference to witnesses seeing the key case which he was
alleged to carry continually on his person. The materials of the ICRC
who paid regular visits to prisoners and internees in Turkey also
showed that none of the alleged missing persons had been brought to
Turkey or detained. All prisoners that had been taken to Turkey were
repatriated between 16 September 1974 and 28 October 1974 and lists
of those concerned were handed over to the Greek-Cypriot authorities.
As
concerned the alleged identification of the missing persons in
photographs, the Government pointed out that a scientific
investigation of certain published photographs and documentary film
had been carried out by Professor Pierre A. Margot of the Institute
of Forensic Science and Criminology of the Law Faculty of the
University of Lausanne at the request of the Third Member of the CMP.
This had shown that it was extremely dubious that anyone could be
identified from these documents and that any alleged identification
by relatives was unreliable given the quality of the material and
their emotional feelings.
3. The submissions of the intervening Government
The
Government of Cyprus submitted that the first applicants went missing
in areas under the control of the Turkish forces.
a. Varnava 16064/90 and Sarma 16073/90
These
two applicants had been brought with their units to the area of Mia
Milia to man Cypriot outposts along the front line. On 14 August
Turkish armed forces launched the attack which gained them control
over the whole of northern and eastern Cyprus by 16 August. The
attack on Mia Milia involved ground forces supported by tanks and air
cover. When the Turkish forces broke through the Cypriot line of
defence and advanced on Mia Milia, the Cypriot forces retreated and
dispersed in all directions. The Turkish forces rapidly controlled
the entire surrounding area. Many Greek Cypriot soldiers, including
the two applicants, were cut off and completely surrounded. They
could not have escaped as the intervening Government would have known
of their fate. If they were either killed or wounded in the area
under Turkish control, the respondent Government was under an
obligation to explain what happened to them.
b. Loizides 16065/90
This
first applicant was in charge of soldiers amongst those defending
Lapithos. After the Turkish forces encircled Lapithos, the
Greek-Cypriot forces were ordered to retreat. The applicant’s
group hid their weapons, put on civilian clothing and unsuccessfully
tried to break out of the village. When the Turkish forces entered
the village next morning, the applicant’s group dispersed to
avoid capture. At about 21.00 hours on 6 August, the applicant
was seen by Nicos Th. Tampas in a warehouse tending a soldier injured
in the head (George Allayiotis, also still missing). Tampas was later
captured and detained. His was the last reported sighting of the
first applicant. It was most likely that the first applicant had
remained with the injured man and was taken into detention by the
Turkish forces who were in control of the entire area. Only one man
was known to have escaped from the village and he, unlike the first
applicant, had local knowledge of the terrain.
c. Constantinou 16066/90
Under
attack from the Turkish army, the first applicant’s unit was
ordered to split into three group’s and withdraw westwards. The
applicant’s group reached the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, 200 metres
from the Airkotissa restaurant where they had a short rest. The
applicant and another man were sent to investigate shouting coming
from the restaurant. After 15 minutes when they did not return, the
group left for Panagra. They were ambushed en route – six of
them managed to escape and the rest were all missing. At the time
that the applicant and the other soldier were sent to the restaurant,
there were clearly Turkish forces in the area. The most plausible
explanation for the two men not returning, in the absence of any
sound of fighting or shooting, was that they had been detained,
either to prevent them giving away the Turkish positions, for
information or as prisoners of war.
d. Theocarides 16068/90
On
26 July 1974 the first applicant was discovered to be missing from
his unit at roll call after they had broken through an encircling
manœuvre by Turkish forces. The area in which his unit had been
stationed was captured by Turkish forces. It was not known whether
the applicant was injured and detained or injured and died of
injuries or killed at once. Whatever happened to him however occurred
in an area controlled by the Turkish forces. The respondent
Government had been under an obligation to notify the Cypriot
Government as to what had happened to him but had not done so.
e. Charalambous 16069/90
This
applicant was seen wounded in his right hand and the left side of the
ribs after a clash between Greek-Cypriot forces and three buses full
of Turkish soldiers coming from Vounos village. His wounds were
cleaned by a witness Komodromos and he was told to make his way
uphill with two other men, one of whom was also injured, to the
monastery where the Greek Cypriot forces were. The other two men were
later found by the same man who went to get help. The Greek Cypriot
forces could not however reach them due to the presence of Turkish
forces. The other two men were discovered dead two days later when
the Turkish forces withdrew. It was clear that the applicant was
found either dead by the Turkish forces or else found and detained in
an injured condition. The latter was more likely. However the
respondent Government had not provided information about either the
finding of a dead combatant or the detention of a wounded prisoner of
war.
f. Thoma 16070/90
This
applicant was amongst those attempting to prevent the invasion of
Kyrenia. Some individuals were identified as killed in the operation;
the applicant was not amongst them. The respondent Government had not
provided information that the applicant was found dead or otherwise
and the intervening Government had no evidence that this applicant
was dead. It had to be assumed that the applicant had been detained
alive.
This
was further corroborated by the photograph published in the "Special
News Bulletin" issued daily by the Turkish Cypriot
administration on 4 September, of Greek Cypriot prisoners-of-war
having their lunch. Four prisoners in the photograph had been
identified. The first applicant was identified by his father, the
second applicant. This identification took place at the time, not
with the benefit of hindsight and no other person has suggested that
the photograph was of someone else.
g. Hadjipanteli 16071/90
By
16 August Turkish forces were in control of the northern and eastern
Cyprus including the Karpas peninsula where the first applicant
worked as general cashier in the Savings Bank in Yialousa. On 18
August Turkish and Turkish Cypriot soldiers arrived in the village
and a Turkish officer ordered a census of the Greek Cypriots between
7 and 70 years of age. The next day, the lists were handed over and
Turkish soldiers carried out searches. They left, taking with them on
a bus, nine individuals, including the first applicant. This was
reported by fellow villagers.
On
27 August, after the applicant had been detained nine days, Turkish
Cypriot civilians came to the village asking for four named
individuals, two of whom worked at the Savings Bank. They took the
four men to the bank and searched it. They emptied two safes and were
told that the applicant had the keys to the third. After 10-12 days
the Turkish Cypriots returned, looking for the two bank employees.
They had the two keys for the remaining safe which the first
applicant had always carried with him: the keys were in a leather
case belonging to the applicant although his own personal keys had
been removed. The Turkish Cypriots took the contents of the safe. It
was highly probable that the Turkish Cypriots had obtained the keys
by informing those holding the first applicant, showing that he was
alive and in detention for at least nine days. There was some
evidence that he was detained after those nine days, at least until
28 August, at the Pavlides garage.
h. Apostolides 16072/90
This
first applicant withdrew with his section from Lapithos towards
Vasilia. They were ambushed by Turkish military forces and dispersed
on account of the fighting and confusion. There has been no news of
the applicant since. The Turkish forces were in sufficient control of
the area to undertake a successful ambush. The intervening Government
had no knowledge of the first applicant, which meant that he had not
escaped. Nor was there any evidence that he was killed in the ambush.
It was overwhelmingly likely that he had been detained by the Turkish
armed forces.
4. Recent developments
In
2007, in the context of the activity of the Committee of Missing
Persons (see below paragraphs 90-102) human remains were exhumed from
a mass grave near the Turkish Cypriot village of Galatia in the
Karpas area. After anthropological and genetic analyses, the remains
of applicant, Savvas Hadjipanteli (application no. 16071/90, see
paragraphs 59-64, 76, 86-87 above) were identified, along with the
remains of the other eight missing persons from Yialousa village and
two other missing Greek Cypriots. The bodies of the nine missing
persons from Yialousa were lined up next to each other in the grave,
with two other bodies on top at a shallower depth. Several bullets
from firearms were found in the grave. The medical certificate issued
on 12 July 2007 in regard to Savvas Hadjipanteli, indicated a bullet
wound to the skull, a bullet wound in the right arm and a wound on
the right thigh. His family was notified and a religious funeral took
place on 14 July 2007.
II. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
The United Nations Committee on Missing Persons (“CMP”)
1. Background
The
following paragraphs are taken from the Commission’s Report in
the interstate case (paragraphs 181-190):
The
CMP was set up in 1981. According to its terms of reference, it
“shall only look into cases of persons reported missing in the
intercommunal fighting as well as in the events of July 1974 and
afterwards.” Its tasks have been circumscribed as follows: “to
draw up comprehensive lists of missing persons of both communities,
specifying as appropriate whether they are alive or dead, and in the
latter case approximate time of the deaths.” It was further
specified that “the committee will not attempt to attribute
responsibility for the deaths of any missing persons or make findings
as to the cause of such deaths” and that “no disinterment
will take place under the aegis of this committee. The committee may
refer requests for disinterment to the ICRC for processing under its
customary procedures.” “All parties concerned” are
required to co-operate with the committee to ensure access throughout
the island for its investigative work. Nothing is provided as regards
investigations in mainland Turkey or concerning the Turkish armed
forces in Cyprus.
The
CMP consists of three members, one “humanitarian person”
being appointed by the Greek-Cypriot side and one by the
Turkish-Cypriot side and the third member being an “official
selected by the ICRC... with the agreement of both sides and
appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations”.
The
CMP has no permanent chairman, the presidency rotating on a monthly
basis between all three members. Decisions are to be taken by
consensus to the extent possible. According to the procedural rules
agreed upon in 1984, the procedure is to be conducted as follows:
"1. Individual or collective cases will be
presented to the CMP with all possible information. The CMP will
refer each case to the side on whose territory the missing person
disappeared; this side will undertake a complete research and present
to the CMP a written report. It is the duty of the CMP members
appointed by each side, or their assistants, to follow the enquiries
undertaken on the territory of their side; the third member and/or
his assistants will be fully admitted to participate in the
enquiries.
2. The CMP will make case decisions on the basis of the
elements furnished by both sides and by the Central Tracing Agency of
the ICRC: presumed alive, dead, disappeared without visible or other
traceable signs.
3. If the CMP is unable to reach a conclusion on the
basis of the information presented, a supplementary investigation
will be undertaken at the request of a CMP member. The third CMP
member and/or his assistants will participate in each supplementary
investigation, or, as the case may be, investigators recruited by the
CMP with the agreement of both sides."
The
1984 rules state as “guiding principles” that
“investigations will be conducted in the sole interest of the
families concerned and must therefore convince them. Every possible
means will be used to trace the fate of the missing persons.”
The families of missing persons may address communications to the
committee which will be passed on to its appropriate member. That
member will eventually provide the family with "final
information as to the fate of a particular missing person", but
no interim information must be given by any member of the committee
to the family of a missing person during the discussion of a
particular case.
The
committee’s entire proceedings and findings are strictly
confidential, but it can issue public statements or reports without
prejudice to this rule. According to the 1984 procedural rules, a
press release will be issued at the close of a meeting or series of
meetings and occasional progress reports will also be published.
Individual members may make additional statements to the press or the
media, provided they comply with the rule of confidentiality, avoid
criticism or contradiction to the joint statement and any kind of
propaganda.
Due
to the strict confidentiality of the CMP’s procedure, no
detailed information about the progress and results of its work is
available. However, from the relevant sections of the regular
progress reports on the UN Operation in Cyprus submitted by the UN
Secretary-General to the Security Council it appears that the
committee’s work started in May 1984 with a limited, equal
number of cases on both sides (Doc. S/16596 of 1.6.1984, para. 51);
that by 1986 an advanced stage had been reached in the investigation
of the initial 168 individual cases, supplementary investigations
being started in 40 cases in which reports had been submitted (Doc.
S/18102/Add. 1, of 11 June 1986, para. 15); and that, while no
difficulties were encountered as regards the organisation of
interviews or visits in the field, real difficulties then arose by
the lapse of time and, even more importantly, lack of cooperation by
the witnesses.
This
prompted the committee to issue a lengthy press release on 11 April
1990 (Doc. S/21340/Annex). There the committee stated that it
considered the co-operation of the witnesses as absolutely
fundamental, but that the witnesses were often reluctant, unwilling
or unable to give full information as to their knowledge about the
disappearance of a missing person. However, the committee could not
compel a witness to talk. The explanation of the witnesses’
reluctance to testify was that they were afraid of incriminating
themselves or others in disappearances, and this despite the
witnesses being told by the committee that the information given
would be kept strictly confidential and being reassured that they
would “not be subject to any form of police or judicial
prosecution”. The committee appealed to the parties concerned
to encourage the witnesses to give the very fullest information in
their knowledge. It further stated:
"In order to further allay the fears of the
witnesses, the Committee, so as to give the strongest guarantees to
the witnesses, is examining measures that could be taken to ensure
that they would be immune from possible judicial and/or police
proceedings solely in connection with the issue of missing persons
and for any statement, written or oral, made for the Committee in the
pursuit of activities within its mandate."
In
the same press release, the committee pointed out that it considered
as legitimate the desire of the families to obtain identifiable
remains of missing persons. However, despite systematic enquiries on
burial places of missing persons, on both sides, it had not been
successful in this respect. It recalled that according to its terms
of reference it could not itself order disinterments. Moreover, while
there was access to all evidence available, the committee had not
reached the stage of finding a common denominator for the
appreciation of the value of this evidence. Finally, the committee
stated that it was considering the possibility of requesting that the
two sides furnish it with basic information concerning the files of
all missing persons, so as to allow it to have a global view of the
whole problem.
In
December 1990, the UN Secretary-General wrote a letter to the leaders
of both sides observing that so far the committee had been given
details on only about 15 % of the cases and urging them to submit all
cases. He further emphasised the importance of reaching consensus on
the criteria that both sides would be ready to apply in their
respective investigations. Moreover, the committee should consider
modalities for sharing with affected families any meaningful
information available (Doc. S/24050, of 31 May 1992, para. 38). On 4
October 1993, in a further letter to the leaders of both communities
the UN Secretary-General noted that no improvement had been made and
that the international community would not understand that the
committee, nine years after it had become operational, remained
unable to function effectively. Only 210 cases had been submitted by
the Greek-Cypriot side and only 318 by the Turkish-Cypriot side. He
again urged both sides to submit all cases without further delay and
the committee to reach a consensus on the criteria for concluding its
investigations (Doc. S/26777, of 22 November 1993, paras. 88 -
90).
On
17 May 1995 the UN Secretary-General, on the basis of a report of the
CMP’s third member and proposals by both sides, put forward
compromise proposals on criteria for concluding the investigations
(Doc. S/1995/488, of 15 June 1995, para. 47), which were subsequently
accepted by both sides (Doc. S/1995/1020, of 10 December 1995, para.
33). By December 1995, the Greek Cypriot side submitted all their
case files (1493). However, the committee’s third member
withdrew in March 1996 and the UN Secretary-General made it a
condition for appointing a new one that certain outstanding
questions, including classification of cases, sequence of
investigations, priorities and expeditious collection of information
on cases without known witnesses, be settled beforehand (Doc.
S/1996/411, of 7 June 1996, para. 31). After being repeatedly
urged to resolve these issues (Doc. S/1997/437, of 5 June 1997,
paras. 24 -25), both parties eventually came to an agreement on 31
July 1997 on the exchange of information on the location of graves of
missing persons and return of their remains. They also requested the
appointment of a new third member of the CMP (Doc. S/1997/962, of 4
December 1997, paras. 21 and 29-31). However, by June 1998, no
progress had been made towards the implementation of this agreement.
The UN Secretary-General noted in this context that the
Turkish-Cypriot side had claimed that victims of the coup d’état
against Archbishop Makarios in 1974 were among the persons listed as
missing and that this position deviated from the agreement (Doc.
S/1998/488, of 10 June 1998, paras. 23).
A
new third member of the CMP had, by the time of the Commission’s
report, been appointed (ibid. para. 24). The Committee has not
completed its investigations and accordingly the families of the
missing persons have not been informed of the latter’s fate.
2. Recent developments
In
2006 the CMP began a substantial exhumation project on identified
burial sites with a view to identifying the remains of bodies and
ensuring their return to their families. A special unit to provide
information to families had also been set up. Some 160 sets of bones
had been submitted for analysis and identifications of missing
persons, including Savvas Hadjipanteli, had been made and were likely
to continue.
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
A. Objection ratione temporis
1. The parties’ submissions
a. The respondent Government
The
Government submitted that Turkey had recognised the competence of the
Commission to receive individual petitions as from 28 January
1987. Their recognition of the competence of the Court ran from 22
January 1990 and included a temporal clause limiting it to matters
raised in respect of facts which occurred subsequent to the Turkish
declaration. They submitted that the complaints in these applications
were in essence related to spontaneous acts which had occurred more
than 15 years before their acceptance of jurisdiction, in particular
the deaths of eight of the nine alleged missing persons in military
action in July-August 1974. The ninth applicant, a non-combatant, had
unfortunately lost his life as a result of the intercommunal
hostilities and reprisals which reached their peak during that
period, and in which the Turkey had been in no way involved.
The
Government submitted that there was no question of a "continuing
violation" and it was illogical and unrealistic to base such
claims on imaginary suppositions concerning continuing captivity for
which there was no concrete proof and in respect of which the
applicants’ accounts were flagrantly contradictory. Referring
in particular to Blečić v. Croatia ([GC] no.
59532/00, ECHR 2006-...), they argued that temporal competence could
not be derived from the consequences flowing from facts which
occurred beforehand, nor from any unsuccessful procedures seeking
redress for those facts. Where death occurred prior to the acceptance
of the right of individual petition, no procedural obligation could
arise subsequently (Moldovan and Others v. Romania,
nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, (dec.) 13 March 2001). They argued
that the same held true in this case, in particular as there was no
reason why the first applicants in this case were not presumed to be
dead as in other disappearance cases (e.g. Akdeniz and Others v.
Turkey, no. 23954/94, 31 May 2001). Further, they pointed
out, citing Markovic and Others v. Italy ([GC], no. 1398/03,
§ 111, ECHR 2006 ...) that the procedural obligation
was first applied in the Court’s jurisprudence in McCann and
Others v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 27 September 1995,
Series A no. 324) and argued that it should not be
retroactively applied to the events in this case.
b. The applicants
The
applicants disputed that there was any temporal bar. They stated that
there was no evidence that the first applicants had died in 1974 or
since
and accordingly they had to be presumed to be alive. Although the
first applicants did disappear in 1974, the violations arising from
and/or in connection with these disappearances have continued since
then. They refuted the argument that their complaints were based on
instantaneous acts in 1974 but were cases of a continuance nature
which survived the temporal restrictions. They relied on the Court’s
reasoning as regarded the disappearances in 1974 in the inter-State
case (paragraph 18(4) and (5) above).
c. The Government of Cyprus
They
submitted that the obligation to carry out a thorough and effective
investigation into a complaint of a disappearance while in the
custody of security forces continued until an explanation as to what
happened to the missing detainees was forthcoming. The respondent
Government was under a continuing obligation therefore to clarify
what happened to the relatives of the second applicants. This was
based on the effective control exercised over the victims by the
respondent Government and the need to ensure effective accountability
for the exercise of such control and to avoid impunity. The same
rationale applied to the obligation to provide an effective
investigation under Article 2 as the applicants were clearly in a
life-threatening situation. They referred to evidence that the
Turkish security forces on occasion killed civilians and detained
fighters and that Turkish Cypriot militia tended to kill those
prisoners handed over to them (ibid, paragraph 155) or leave the
injured to die. The State’s obligation to protect the right to
life under Article 2 was engaged in these circumstances, and this was
also a continuing obligation. Even if there was insufficient evidence
to conclude that one or more of the first applicants were detained by
the respondent Government that Government were still responsible as
they were under the effective control of their forces or forces for
which they were responsible and the situation was life-threatening.
The
second applicants’ complaints that they were victims of inhuman
treatment was also based on the continuing lack of information as to
what happened to their relatives and the continuing lack of
co-operation with investigative mechanisms on the part of the Turkish
authorities, including the authorities in northern Cyprus.
2. The Court’s assessment
The
Court recalls that, in declaring these applications admissible on 14
April 1998, the Commission reserved the final determination of the
question of whether the applications relate to facts covered by the
temporal limitation in the Turkish declaration under former Article
25 of the Convention for a later stage in the proceedings.
It
would note that the objection to temporal jurisdiction is closely
connected with the objection raised as to compliance with the six
month rule (see below) and is principally based on the argument that,
as the first applicants must be presumed to have died at the time of
the hostilities in 1974, at which time they were last seen, the
complaints concerned instantaneous acts that occurred long before
Turkey ratified the right of individual petition and which therefore
are not subject to the Court’s temporal jurisdiction. The Court
accepts that it is not competent to examine applications alleging
violations which are based on facts having occurred before the
critical date (Blečić, cited above, § 72) and
that where killings of persons occur before the date of ratification
it had no competence ratione temporis to examine those deaths.
However
the question arises in the present applications whether the alleged
violations are of a continuing nature and thus have subsisted, and
continue to subsist, since the date of ratification by Turkey of the
right of individual petition on 28 January 1987.
The
Grand Chamber has already had occasion to consider whether complaints
raised by Cyprus concerning 1,485 Greek Cypriot missing persons
disclosed a continuing violation. In its Cyprus v. Turkey
judgment (cited above), it found that the evidence bore out the claim
that many persons now missing had been detained either by Turkish or
Turkish Cypriot forces during the conduct of military operations and
in a situation which could be described as life-threatening and that
the missing persons had disappeared against that background. It held
that the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to
conduct an effective investigation aimed at clarifying the
whereabouts and fate of the Greek-Cypriot missing persons who
disappeared in such life-threatening circumstances (see paragraphs
133-136) disclosed such a continuing violation.
The
inter-State case concerned the phenomenon of disappearances, which,
although linked to a specific point of time when the missing person
was last seen and the surrounding circumstances, may be distinguished
from conventional cases of use of lethal force or unlawful killings
which are dealt with under Article 2. In the latter cases, the fate
of the victim is known; the former are characterised by an ongoing
situation of uncertainty and, not infrequently, callous inaction,
obfuscation and concealment (see, amongst many examples, Kurt v.
Turkey, judgment of 25 May 1998, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1998 III, §§ 127-128, Timurtaş
v. Turkey, no. 23531/94, §§ 84,97, ECHR 2000 VI
§ 84, 97, Akdeniz and Others v. Turkey, no. 23954/94,
§ 93, 31 May 2001, Taş v. Turkey, no. 24396/94,
§§ 80, 90, 14 November 2000; Imakeyeva v. Russia,
§§ 150 165, 9 November 2006, Baysayeva v.
Russia, §§ 119,127 April 2007). The Court is therefore
not persuaded that the principles set out in Blečić
and Moldovan exclude its temporal jurisdiction in the present
cases or were intended as amending the approach taken in the
inter-State case to disappearances. Nor does it find that the
respondent Government is assisted by reliance on a passage in the
Markovic case (cited above) which concerned the existence of a
right in domestic or international law for the purposes of the
application of Article 6 of the Convention. Further, while it may be
true that the procedural obligation under Article 2 was first
elucidated in the McCann case in 1995 (cited above), it was
nonetheless applied in that case to events in 1988. However, even
assuming therefore that an interpretation of a Convention provision
cannot be retrospective in its application, this argument does not
prevent an obligation of a continuing nature from being recognised as
existing after that date.
Accordingly,
on this aspect, the Court finds no reason to differ from the
conclusions reached in the inter-State case as concerns the present
applications. To the extent therefore that the facts of these cases
disclose a continuing obligation under Article 2, it has competence
ratione temporis. It therefore rejects the respondent
Government’s preliminary objection on this ground and will
examine further the existence of any continuing obligation below.
B. Six months’ rule (Article 35 § 1 of the Convention)
1. The parties’ submissions
a. The respondent Government
Referring
in particular to the cases of Karabardak v. Cyprus
(no. 76575/01, (dec.) 22 October 2002) and Baybora v. Cyprus
(no. 77116/01, (dec.) 22 October 2002), the respondent
Government considered that the applications should be rejected as out
of time. In those cases, no issue of a continuing situation arose and
the applicants had waited too long before bringing their cases before
either the CMP or Strasbourg. These applicants had also delayed too
long. They should have brought their applications to Strasbourg
within six months of 27 January 1987, but did not do so for some four
years.
b. The applicants and the intervening Government
They
considered that the violations were of a continuing nature to which
the six month rule did not apply. They also distinguished the cases
relied on by the Government, noting, inter alia, that the
present allegations had been brought to the attention of the
respondent Government from 1974 onwards in the inter-State cases, as
well as in lists notified to it by the end of 1974 at the latest, and
that in any event the CMP had been largely inoperative until 1990.
The Court’s assessment
The
Court notes that the respondent Government’s arguments are
based on the applications introduced by Turkish Cypriots against the
Government of Cyprus claiming that their relatives had disappeared in
life-threatening circumstances These cases were rejected as having
been submitted out of time. In Karabardak, for example,
although the first applicant had disappeared in 1964, the matter had
not been brought to the attention of the respondent Government until,
in 1989, a complaint was lodged with the CMP and then another 12
years elapsed before the application was lodged with the Court. It is
true that the Court in reaching this decision, as with the other
similar applications, made no mention of a “continuing
situation” in its analysis in reaching the conclusion that the
case had been introduced out of time.
The
Court would observe that there are differing types of “continuing
situations”; there are cases where an applicant is subject to
an ongoing violation, due for example, to a legislative provision
which intrudes, continuously, on his private life (see e.g.
Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981,
Series A no. 45); and there are cases, such as
disappearances, where the continuing situation flows from a factual
situation arising at a particular point in time. In the latter, it
cannot be the case that the relatives of a person that has gone
missing at a specific point in time can wait indefinitely before
bringing the matter either to the attention of the domestic
authorities or this Court. As has often been said, the object of the
six month time limit under Article 35 § 1 is to promote
legal certainty, by ensuring that cases raising issues under the
Convention are dealt with in a reasonable time (e.g. Worm v.
Austria, judgment of 29 August 1997, Reports 1997–V,
at p. 1547, §§ 32-33). It
marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by the Court
and signals to both individuals and State authorities the period
beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (Walker
v. the United Kingdom, (dec.), no. 34979/97, ECHR
2000 I). It is not in the interests of the practical and
effective functioning of the Convention system, which is of crucial
importance to the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms,
that the Court be called upon to deal with stale complaints. The
greater the lapse of time the more problematic any attempted
examination of the facts and issues becomes. The effect on the
evidence and the availability of witnesses inevitably risks rendering
a belated assessment unsatisfactory or inconclusive, by failing to
establish important facts or put to rest doubts and suspicions (see,
mutatis mutandis, Finucane v. the United Kingdom,
no. 29178/95, § 89, ECHR 2003 VIII)..
The
Court therefore considers that applicants, even in disappearance
cases, must act with reasonable expedition in bringing their cases
before it for examination and have sufficient explanation, consonant
with the purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and the
effective implementation of the Convention guarantees, for long
periods of delay. In the Karabardak and other cases, the delay
of over thirty years was not accounted for. In contrast, as concerns
the present cases, the Court recalls that they were introduced on 25
January 1990, some three years after the right of individual petition
became applicable to Turkey on 27 January 1987. It is evident that,
meanwhile, the disappearances had been made known to the relevant
authorities from 1974 onwards in the series of inter-State cases
brought by Cyprus concerning the missing persons as a whole. The
reports of the Commission in these cases, although subject to
discussion before the Committee of Ministers, were not made public
throughout this period and the relatives of missing persons were
unaware of the findings which were being made. The Court notes that
it was not until 22 January 1990 that Turkey recognised the
jurisdiction of the old Court to examine applications, with the
possibility that entailed of a public hearing and a binding judgment
in which an award of just satisfaction might be made. The present
applications were introduced three days after this. Accordingly,
there is, in the Court’s opinion, no element of unreasonable
delay in bringing these individual applications to Strasbourg in the
circumstances. Whether applications introduced at a later date, in
particular, long after the Court’s inter-State judgment had
made public findings on the disappearances as whole, would comply
with the requirement for due expedition remains to be decided in such
cases as may arise.
The
Court rejects the respondent Government’s preliminary objection
under this head.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
2 of the Convention provides:
“1. Everyone’s right to life
shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded
as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from
the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful
violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to
prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose
of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
The parties’ submissions
1. The applicants
The
applicants did not accept that any of the first applicants had died
(save in the case of Savvas Hadjipanteli), raising no complaint of a
substantive violation of Article 2.
They submitted that the respondent Government was
under a positive obligation to carry out an investigation into their
fate since they were threatened with life-threatening circumstances
during the military operations in which they were last seen and which
were initiated by the respondent Government. Given that the first
applicants were taken into custody, there was an additional
obligation on Turkey to account for the continued existence of these
people. This was a continuous obligation broader than the obligation
to investigate. Given the lapse of time and the absence of any
information about these missing persons who must be presumed to be
alive as there was no evidence to the contrary, the obligation to
conduct an effective investigation was even more pressing. They did
not consider that any recent developments as regarded the CMP were
relevant, since the exhumations had not concerned them, save very
recently in one case, and there was still no possibility of the CMP
investigating effectively the circumstances of any death or
disappearance. Insofar as the remains of Savvas Hadjipanteli
(application no. 16071/90) had been discovered, they maintained their
arguments that a violation arose.
The respondent Government
The
Government submitted that no issue arose under Article 2 as none of
the applicants were detained by the Turkish military or other
authorities. The evidence, including the files submitted to the CMP,
showed that eight of the first applicants were military personnel who
died in action, while the ninth was a civilian in respect of whom
there was no evidence that he had been taken into custody. Insofar as
recent developments indicated that his body had been exhumed in the
Karpas area, they considered that this showed events had taken place
outside their responsibility.
They
further submitted that the procedural obligation under Article 2 did
not apply to killings which occurred as a result of acts of war
inside fighting zones. There also had to be credible evidence that
agents of the State were involved, which was not the case in these
applications. Furthermore, the possibility of obtaining help through
an investigating body such as the CMP, which was the most appropriate
body for such investigations, could also fulfil the duty to
investigate. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots had both agreed to the
CMP procedure and it was not practical or logical, if not futile, to
expect Turkey to carry out its own independent investigations in
addition. No credible investigation could be expected to be carried
out unilaterally without the co-operation of the other concerned
parties.
Concerning
recent developments, the Government stated that in the previous two
years the CMP had become an effective investigative body, with
financial, moral and logistical support, pointing to the progress
made in locating and identifying bodies of those who had been missing
on both sides.
3. The Government of Cyprus
The
intervening Government submitted that the respondent Government had
been responsible for protecting the right to life of the first
applicants as they were under the actual or effective control of the
forces of the respondent Government and the situation in which the
applicants found themselves was life-threatening. There was, in their
view, an obligation to ensure that systems were in place to seek
without delay the wounded, sick and dead, to investigate a killing
where there was reason to believe it had not occurred during combat
and to account for all detainees in the power of their own forces or
of other forces over whom they exercised control.
Where
it was concluded beyond reasonable doubt that a person had been
detained (as they considered was the case concerning applicants Thoma
and Hadjipanteli) and had been taken to a place of detention in the
control of the authorities the State was required to produce the
detainee alive or to provide a plausible explanation as to how he met
his death, failing which there was a violation of the obligation to
protect life. There was no evidence that any of the applicants were
killed during the fighting. The evidence showed that all the first
applicants were in areas under the actual or effective control of the
Turkish security forces or of other forces for whom they were
responsible. As these forces and the Turkish Cypriot militia failed
to treat the wounded and often killed those who came under their
control, there is no doubt that if they were detained the applicants
were in a life-threatening situation (see inter alia Comm.
Rep. § 180, concerning killings by Turkish-Cypriot fighters and
the Turkish army during so-called cleaning-up operations). The
respondent Government should have ensured operational mechanisms of
protection to avoid the risk of unlawful activities and to provide
for the proper handling, medical treatment and recording of prisoners
of war and civilians, as well as an effective system of investigation
to enable military judicial personnel to investigate allegations of
unlawful conduct and effective measures, such as court martial
proceedings, to enforce the rules governing treatment of prisoners of
war and civilians. The inaction of the respondent Government in the
face of serious allegations indicated that such violations occurred
as a matter of practice.
The
Government further submitted that the respondent Government had
failed to carry out a thorough and effective investigation into the
disappearances of the missing persons in life-threatening
circumstances. There was no evidence that any investigation had been
undertaken by the Turkish authorities into the fate of the missing
applicants e.g. no evidence of any questioning of the
Turkish-Cypriot militia in the relevant areas at the relevant time.
The scope of the UN CMP was too narrow to constitute an investigation
for the purposes of Article 2. This failure also disclosed a
practice. As regarded the finding of the remains of Savvas
Hadjipanteli, they submitted that did not bring to an end the
continuing obligation to provide an effective investigation, since
the circumstances around the death and the identity of any
perpetrators had still not been elucidated.
B. The Court’s assessment
128. The
fate of the nine missing men, and whether they have been unlawfully
killed, is largely unknown. While the remains
of Savvas Hadjipanteli have been found very recently, the
circumstances surrounding the death remain unclarified.
Nonetheless, a procedural obligation arises upon proof of an arguable
claim that an individual, who was last seen in the custody of agents
of the State, subsequently disappeared in a context which may be
considered life-threatening. The Court recalls that it was
established in the inter-State case that the evidence bore out the
applicant Government’s claim that many persons who went missing
in 1974 were detained either by Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot forces.
Their detention occurred at a time when the conduct of military
operations was accompanied by arrests and killings on a large scale.
This was found to disclose a life-threatening situation. The clear
indications of the climate of risk and fear obtaining at the material
time, and of the real dangers to which detainees were exposed, was
found to disclose a life-threatening situation.
The
nine missing persons in the present case disappeared against this
same background. The Court notes that the eight combatants were last
seen in areas surrounded or about to be overrun by Turkish forces,
one of them, Panicos Charalambous, in a wounded condition. Statements
from several witnesses attested to seeing the civilian missing
person, Savvas Hadjipanteli, taken away by Turkish-Cypriot fighters.
Given previous findings and the circumstances of the disappearances
at a time and at locations which were, or very shortly thereafter
were, under the control of the forces of the respondent State or
those acting under their aegis, the Court considers that an
obligation arises for the respondent State to account for their fate
(see, mutatis mutandis, Akkum and Others v. Turkey,
no. 21894/93, § 211, ECHR 2005 II (extracts).
While
it may be noted that in the context of the individual cases arising
out of events in south-east Turkey and the conflict in the Chechen
Republic, where there were, at the relevant times, numerous reported
instances of forced disappearances, individual applicants have
nonetheless been required to give an evidential basis for finding
that their relatives were taken into some form of custody by agents
of the State (see e.g. Kurt v. Turkey, judgment of 25
May 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 III,
§ 99, Akdeniz and Others v. Turkey, no. 23954/94,
§ 84, 31 May 2001, Sarli v. Turkey, 24490/94, 22 May
2001; Imakayeva v. Russia, no. 7615/02, § 141,
ECHR 2006 ... (extracts)), the Court considers that the
situation in the present case may be distinguished. A zone of
international conflict where two armies are engaged in acts of war
per se places those present in a situation of danger and
threat to life. Circumstances will frequently be such that the events
in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge
of the military forces in the field, and it would not be realistic to
expect applicants to provide more than minimal information placing
their relative in the area at risk. International treaties, which
have attained the status of customary law, impose obligations on
combatant States as regards care of wounded, prisoners of war and
civilians;
Article 2 of the Convention certainly extends so far as to require
Contracting States to take such steps as may be reasonably available
to them to protect the lives of those not, or no longer, engaged in
hostilities (see, mutatis mutandis, Ertan Özkan v.
Turkey, no. 47311/99, §§ 301, 307-308, 9 October
2003). Disappearances in such circumstances thus attract the
protection of that provision.
As
regards the compliance with the obligation under Article 2 in respect
of the disappearances, the Court recalls its previous findings that
it cannot be discharged through the respondent State’s
contribution to the investigatory work of the CMP. Whatever its
humanitarian usefulness, the CMP does not provide procedures
sufficient to meet the standard of an effective investigation
required by Article 2 of the Convention, especially in view of the
narrow scope of that body’s investigations (Cyprus v.
Turkey, §§ 134-136). There have been no developments,
legal or factual, which change this assessment.
While
it is true that the remains of Savvas Hadjipanteli have recently been
discovered, this does not demonstrate that the CMP has been able to
take any meaningful investigative steps beyond the belated location
and identification of remains. Nor, given the location of Savvas
Hadjipanteli’s remains in an area under TRNC control after a
lapse of some thirty-two years, has this event displaced the
respondent Government’s accountability for the investigative
process during the intervening period.
The
Court concludes that there has been a continuing violation of Article
2 on account of the failure of the authorities of the respondent
State to conduct an effective investigation aimed at clarifying the
whereabouts and fate of the nine men who went missing in 1974.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
3 provides:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The applicants
The
second applicants submitted that they had been waiting for news of
their loved ones for over 25 years which had caused them daily
anguish and distress, well above any level of severity required to
disclose inhuman and degrading treatment. Particular cruelty was
shown in the case of the second applicant in no. 16071/90 who was
married with three children and did not marry again because of the
uncertainty of her husband’s fate.
2. The respondent Government
The
Government submitted that none of the first applicants had been
subjected to forcible detention and no issue arose.
3. The Government of Cyprus
All
the second applicants had, in their view, been victims of inhuman
treatment. Three were wives of the missing men, and six the mothers
or fathers (though other relatives have taken over as applicants in
some cases). They have all lived with uncertainty and anguish for
over 25 years. The wives have never remarried as they do not see
themselves as widows. They have never given up trying to find out
what happened and their anguish is worsened by the fact that there
are people with information who are not revealing what they know
(citing Comm. Rep, § 157, where it was stated that information
about former Turkish Cypriot commanders was being concealed) and the
lack of co-operation of the Turkish forces with attempts to obtain
information (Dillon Commission, p. 18, second para.). This all
produced helplessness and frustration in the second applicants.
Further, the situation disclosed inhuman treatment inflicted as a
matter of practice.
B. The Court’s assessment
The
Court refers to the principles set out and the findings in the
inter-State case (cited above, §§ 155-158). No point of
distinction arises in the present case. The silence of the
authorities of the respondent State in the face of the real concerns
of the second applicants, relatives of the nine missing men, attains
a level of severity which can only be categorised as inhuman
treatment within the meaning of Article 3. It therefore concludes
that, during the period under consideration, there has been a
continuing violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
5 of the Convention provides as relevant:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after
conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in
order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ...
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed
promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his
arrest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which
the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest
or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The applicants
All
the first applicants were last seen alive in an area which soon
thereafter came under the control of the respondent Government. There
was therefore a presumption of Turkish responsibility for their fate
and the unaccounted disappearance of such detained persons amounted
to a grave breach of Article 5. There was an obligation on the
Government to conduct a “prompt and effective investigation”
in respect of any persons for whom an arguable claim had been brought
forward that they were in Turkish detention at the time of their
disappearance in 1974. The failure to provide such an investigation
disclosed a continuing breach.
The
applicants, referring to the Commission’s report 8007/70,
considered that the while the CMP was useful for humanitarian
purposes it was not by itself sufficient to meet the standard of an
effective investigation due to the narrow scope of its investigations
and the delay.
2. The respondent Government
The
Government submitted that none of the first applicants were taken, or
remained in custody and that the allegations of the applicants were
purely hypothetical. There was nothing to suggest, and it was
extremely illogical to assume that any missing Greek Cypriot was
still detained by Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot authorities.
3. The Government of Cyprus
They
submitted that the first applicants had been detained by Turkish
security forces, which detention did not fall within any of the
specified grounds in Article 5 § 1; that they had not been
brought before a judicial officer as required by Article 5 § 3;
and that the refusal to acknowledge the detention rendered nugatory
the fundamental safeguards of Article 5 § 2. There was a wide
practice of unlawful detention without safeguards against
“disappearances” which was an aggravated violation.
The
evidence established an arguable claim that the first applicants had
been detained by or had been within the effective and exclusive
control of the Turkish security forces or forces for whom they were
responsible, on the last occasion on which they were seen.
Clarification as to what happened to them depended on the respondent
Government and persons within their control. They referred to the
need for the respondent State to provide a credible and substantiated
explanation of what happened to them. There was no evidence of any
system of recording those who were detained. (Rep., § 178) or
indication that there was even an official or complete list of
prisoners (none was provided to the ICRC). Nor has there been any
prompt or effective investigation into the fate of the first
applicants. The investigation by the CMP did not qualify for reasons
given in the Commission Report (§§ 210-211). Further the
evidence in the four inter-State cases concerning missing persons
established that there was an arguable claim that large numbers of
Greek Cypriots had been unlawfully detained and that there was
routine failure to record those detentions and total failure to carry
out any prompt or effective investigations.
B. The Court’s assessment
Referring
to its findings above and those in the inter-State case (paragraphs
148-151), the Court observes that it has not been established that
during the period under consideration in this application the nine
missing men were actually being detained by the Turkish or
Turkish Cypriot authorities and no breach has thereby been
established in that respect. However, there has been a continuing
violation of Article 5 of the Convention by virtue of the failure of
the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective
investigation into the whereabouts and fate of the nine first
applicants, in respect of whom there is an arguable claim that they
had been deprived of their liberty at the time of their
disappearance.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13 AND
14 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicants originally invoked Articles 4 (prohibition of slavery and
forced labour, 6 (right to fair trial), 8 (right to respect for
family and private life), 10 (freedom of expression) 12 (the right to
marry and found a family), 13 (effective remedy for arguable
Convention breaches) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination in
enjoyment of Convention rights).
The
Court notes that the applicants have not maintained, or pursued in
their recent submissions their complaint under Article 4. Having
regard also to the approach adopted in the inter-State case
concerning complaints under the above provisions (Cyprus v.
Turkey, cited above, §§ 141, 153 and 161) and the
violations found in the present case, the Court does not consider it
necessary to examine these matters further.
VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
1. The parties’ submissions
a. The applicants’ claims
The
applicants reserved the right to file a claim for pecuniary damages
until such time as the Court issued findings of violations.
For
non-pecuniary damage, the applicants claimed under this head 341,550
euros (EUR) converted in Cyprus pounds (CYP) for the first
applicants, such sums to be held by the second applicants on their
behalf and the behalf of their heirs; and EUR 455,400 for the second
applicants or their successors (namely EUR 5,692.5 for every year of
violation between 1987-2007 in respect of each violation). They also
claimed additional damages to reflect the special circumstances of
the violations (the grave systematic nature of the breaches and their
duration), namely CYP 225,000 to 1,450,000 respectively.
They
also requested that the Court direct the respondent Government to
take specific remedial measures so as to ensure that they conformed
to their obligations under the Convention and that the Government be
required to pay CYP 24 for every day between the date on which the
judgment became final and the implementation of the said remedial
measures, such rate doubling every twelve months.
b. The respondent Government’s response
The
respondent Government submitted that it was not appropriate to make
any award for pecuniary damage.
Concerning
non-pecuniary damage, the respondent Government considered that it
was inappropriate to make any award as the allegations were basically
presumptive, there being no corroboration in the CMP files that the
men were taken into custody and all but one of them had gone missing
in a situation of conflict which inevitably entailed a certain risk
to life. They also submitted that there had been substantial progress
in the activities of the CMP and that as the issue of disappearances
concerned both communities, awards to Greek Cypriot families would
deepen the wounds of Turkish Cypriot families with missing relatives
and not help in the process of conciliation. Further, the damages
claimed were excessively and unprecedently high.
c. The intervening Government’s comments
They
submitted that the Court should seek to make an order that ensured
compliance by the respondent Government with their obligations and
that the continuing nature of the violation should be taken into
account in any award.
2. The Court’s assessment
In
light of the breaches of the procedural aspects of Articles 2 and 5,
the Court finds no basis for any pecuniary award and declines to
adjourn this matter.
As
concerns non-pecuniary damages for these breaches and that under
Article 3 as concerned the second applicants, the amounts claimed are
very high. While the Court notes the applicants’ concern to
induce the respondent Government to take action as promptly as
possible under pain of increased damages, it finds no precedent for
such an ongoing, indefinite and prospective award in its case-law and
perceives no basis of principle on which to embark on such a course
in the present case. The Court would also emphasise that Article 41
of the Convention does not provide a mechanism for compensation in a
manner comparable to domestic court systems nor for imposing punitive
sanctions on respondent Governments (Orhan v. Turkey,
no. 25656/94, § 448, 18 June 2002). Although the
trigger for the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 34 of the
Convention is that an individual or private body can claim to be a
victim of a breach of their rights, the Court serves a purpose beyond
the individual interest in the setting and applying of minimum human
rights standards for the legal space of the Contracting States. The
individual interest is subordinate to the latter, as shown by the
Court’s competence to continue the examination of an
application, even if the applicant no longer wishes to pursue his
case, where respect for human rights so requires (Article 37 § 1
in fine).
The
issues in this case have already been subject to thorough examination
in the inter-State case in which it may be noted that the Grand
Chamber adjourned consideration of the issue of the possible
application of Article 41. The Court cannot but be sensitive to the
fact that the present individual applications derive from a situation
in which over 1,400 people were declared missing on the Greek-Cypriot
side and some 500 claimed missing on the Turkish-Cypriot side. In the
context of the inter-State case it must also take cognisance of the
ongoing execution function being performed by the Committee of
Ministers (see interim resolution ResDH(2007)25 adopted on 4 April
2007), in which respect the crucial element will be the provision,
finally, of measures which enable light to be shed on the fate of as
many of the missing men, women and children as may be possible.
In
light of the above, the Court does not find it appropriate or
constructive, or even just, to make additional specific awards or
recommendations in regard to individual applicants.
In
the unique circumstances of these cases therefore, the Court finds
that the finding of violations constitutes in itself sufficient just
satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the
applicants.
B. Costs and expenses
1. The parties’ submissions
The
representatives for the applicants Andreas and Giorghulla Varnava
(no. 16064/90), Demetris Theocharides and the heirs of Elli
Theocharidou (no. 16068/90), Eleftherios and the heirs of Christos
Thoma (no. 16070/90), Savvas and Georghios Apostolides (no. 16072/90)
and Leontis Demetriou and Yianoulla Leonti Sarma (16073/90) claimed
CYP
4,322. 66 for each of the applications, plus CYP 548.40 for
value-added tax (VAT).
The
representatives for Andreas and the heirs of Loizos Loizides (no.
16065/90), Philippos Constantinou and Demetris K. Peyiotis (16066/90)
Panicos and Chrysoula Charalambous (no. 16069/90) and Savvas and
Androula Hadjipanteli (no. 16071/90) claimed CYP 4,596.66 for each of
the applications plus 589.59 for VAT.
The
respondent Government stated that these claims were exaggerated and
excessive. The applications were all of a similar nature and the
submissions contained profuse citations and reproduction of earlier
material.
The
Court observes that the applicants’ observations were on each
occasion submitted in two batches, from the two separate legal
representatives. They were however largely identical and it appears
that that there was considerable overlapping and co-ordination of
work. Given the lack of any oral procedure but taking into account
the varying rounds of written observations, it awards the applicants’
representatives EUR 4,000 in respect of each application.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Dismisses by six votes to one the Government’s
preliminary objections;
Holds by six votes to one that there has been a
continuing violation of Article 2 of the Convention on account of the
failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an
effective investigation into the whereabouts and fate of the nine
first applicants who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances ;
Holds by six votes to one that there has been a
continuing violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the
second applicants, the relatives of the nine missing men;
Holds by six votes to one that there has been a
continuing violation of Article 5 of the Convention by virtue of the
failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an
effective investigation into the whereabouts and fate of the nine
first applicants in respect of whom there is an arguable claim that
they had been deprived of their liberty at the time of their
disappearance;
Holds unanimously that no breach of Article 5 of
the Convention has been established by virtue of the alleged
detention of the nine first applicants;
Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to
examine the complaints under Articles 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14 of
the Convention;
Holds by six votes to one that the finding of a
violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the
non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants;
Holds by six votes to one
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicants within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,000 (four
thousand euros) per application in respect of costs and expenses,
plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the
applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 January 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Boštjan M. Zupančič
Registrar President
In
accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 §
2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinion of Judge
Gönül Başaran Erönen is annexed to this judgment.
B.M.Z.
S.Q.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE GÖNÜL BAŞARAN
ERÖNEN
A. I
voted against the finding of the majority in the Chamber rejecting
the respondent Government’s preliminary objection that the
Court did not have jurisdiction ratione temporis to entertain
the case. Recent judgments and decisions have developed the case-law
on jurisdiction ratione temporis, especially in
disappearance cases. One such case is Blečić v. Croatia
([GC], no. 59532/00, ECHR 2006 ...), a judgment of the
Grand Chamber. Having read the reasoning behind the preference not to
apply that precedent to the case before us, I unfortunately found
myself unable to agree that it did not apply or could not be followed
in the present case, even in spite of the findings in the fourth
inter-State case on the issue. As the justifications used by the
majority of my colleagues to support their conclusions of continued
violations of Articles 2, 3, and 5 can only be valid if the case
falls within the temporal jurisdiction of this Court, I do not
propose to commit myself to giving an opinion on the merits of the
case, since I do not consider that the case falls within the Court’s
competence. I prefer to follow the recent case-law on the matter
before us, and moreover, in the light of recent judgments, I do not
agree that the allegations of violations were of a “continuing
nature”. Additionally under this head, considering the lapse of
time from 1974 to the date of the application, the more logical
presumption of death, not the illogical “presumption of being
alive”, should have been adopted in the present case and, that
being so, the disappearance could not be considered to be of a
continuing nature, creating a continuing obligation under Article 2
to conduct effective investigations. This view is in line with recent
Court judgments.
B.
Alongside my opinion on the ratione temporis objection, I
voted against the majority’s rejection of the respondent
Government’s preliminary objection under the six-month rule. It
is my view that the Court does not have competence to adjudicate on
the merits of the present case. I shall expand further on this
opinion below.
C. In
conformity with my opinion that the Court does not have temporal
jurisdiction, I voted against the finding that there has been a
continuing violation of Article 2 on account of the failure of the
authorities of the respondent State to conduct effective
investigations aimed at clarifying the whereabouts and fate of the
nine men. As a result, I do not feel it correct or ethical to express
any comments on the merits of these allegations or on the majority
view stated in the judgment regarding the other alleged violations.
D. It
follows therefore that for the very same reason I did not consider it
in accordance with my opinion on a lack of competence
ratione temporis to
commit myself to voicing any views on the findings of a violation
under Article 3 and of a continuing violation of Article 5, by virtue
of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct
an effective investigation into the whereabouts and fate of the nine
applicants, in respect of whom it has been found that there is an
arguable claim that they had been deprived of their liberty at the
time of their disappearance.
E. I
voted with my colleagues with regard to the alleged violation of
Article 5, in that there has been no breach by virtue of the alleged
detention of the first nine applicants, for the sake of consistency.
I do not deem this to contradict in any way my opinion on the
preliminary objections.
F.
Similarly, in line with the approach adopted in the Cyprus v.
Turkey decision, the reason I voted with my colleagues (despite
my opinion that the Court does not have temporal jurisdiction to deal
with the merits of this application) in finding that it was not
necessary to examine the matters relating to alleged violations under
Articles 4, 6, 8, 10,12,13 and 14 of the Convention, was simply
because the applicants did not pursue or maintain these complaints
and not because I accept the “violations found in the present
case” (paragraph 147).
G.
For the same reason, in view of my opinion that the Court does not
have temporal jurisdiction and since I do not find that there is a
continuing obligation, I voted against any conclusion relating to the
question of what does or does not constitute just satisfaction under
Article 41 of the Convention.
H. I
voted with my colleagues with regard to the remainder of the
applicants’ claim for just satisfaction, with the same motive
and belief as stated in (E) above.
In my
view, the best course would have been to declare the application
inadmissible under Article 35 of the Convention.
Jurisdiction
ratione temporis
My
colleagues’ whole line of reasoning basically follows and is
sustained by the Court’s findings in the fourth inter-State
case on the question of missing persons. I was not persuaded by the
argument made in arriving at their rejection of the preliminary
objection of the respondent Government as to jurisdiction ratione
temporis. While it is true that it is not a contradiction to
reach a different conclusion in respect of individual applicants from
that reached on the collective complaints in the inter-State cases
(see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January
1978,
Series A no. 25), I do not feel that the majority of my
learned colleagues have delved as deeply as they should have done
into the proof of the factual allegations in these individual
applications, especially when considering the recent development of
pertinent case-law on the ratione temporis principle in
disappearance cases.
The
conclusions drawn on the missing persons issue at the close of the
present case seem to stem from the perspective of the inter-State
case position. In other words, in line with the reasoning in the
fourth inter-State case, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the
presumption of being alive has been the basis for the Court’s
hypothesis in the present application (see, in this respect,
paragraphs 111 and 113).
Whilst,
in paragraph 136 of the Cyprus v. Turkey judgment, the Court
held that
“[h]aving regard to the above considerations, ...
there ha[d] been a continuing violation of Article 2 on account of
the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an
effective investigation aimed at clarifying the whereabouts and fate
of Greek-Cypriot missing persons who disappeared in life-threatening
circumstances”
it
nevertheless refrained from concluding that those persons had to be
presumed dead (§§ 127-29).
The
Grand Chamber in the Cyprus v. Turkey case, in view of the
failure by the respondent Government to participate and appear in
those proceedings, quite properly “decided to proceed with the
hearing, being satisfied that such a course was consistent with the
proper administration of justice” (§ 12; see also §
58). In the context of that application, the fact remains that when
considering and assessing what facts and evidence on the missing
persons’ issue was before it at the time, whilst doing all that
it could to ensure fairness, the Court was nonetheless faced with one
party’s absence from the proceedings and oral hearings, albeit
by the respondent Government’s own choice. In accepting,
however, that there was no “equality of arms” the
Court noted in paragraph 106 of the Cyprus v. Turkey judgment
as follows:
“The
Court observes that where it was impossible to guarantee full respect
for the principle of equality of arms in the proceedings before the
Commission, for example on account of the limited time available to a
party to reply fully to the other’s submissions, the Commission
took this factor into account in its assessment of the evidential
value of the material at issue. Although the Court must scrutinise
any objections raised by the applicant Government to the Commission’s
findings of fact and its assessment of the evidence, it notes that,
as regards documentary materials, both parties were given a full
opportunity to comment on all such materials in their pleadings
before the Court, including the above-mentioned aide-mémoire,
which was admitted to the file by virtue of a procedural decision
taken by the Court on 24 November 1999.”
Understandably,
the Court in Cyprus v. Turkey reached the conclusions it did
on the basis of other evidence before it, which included the Report
of the Commission of 4 June 1999. Nevertheless, and with a period
of over six years having elapsed since that judgment, I feel that
such a situation as the one the Court faced in that case alone made
it all the more imperative in the present application today to
interpret the decision of the Court in the Cyprus v. Turkey
case in line with contemporary case-law of a similar value and
weight, thereby assisting the Court in expounding and developing the
findings and inferences that have been made previously.
I
must admit that I am not satisfied as to why recent settled Court
precedents were not followed in the present application. While
accepting that it is not competent “to examine applications
alleging violations which are based on facts having occurred before
the critical date (Blečić, cited above, § 72)
and that where killings of persons occur before the date of
ratification it had no competence ratione temporis to examine
those deaths” (paragraph 109) the question the Court poses is
whether the alleged violations in the present application are of a
continuing nature, subsisting from ratification to the present date.
My
colleagues proceeded from the point of view that the Grand Chamber
judgment in Blečić, dealing with the altogether
different issue of what has been termed an “instantaneous act”,
could not apply since the sui generis position of
“disappearances” in Cyprus invoked a situation which was
continuing in nature and hence still subsisted – thus effective
investigation obligations subsisted and hence a violation or
procedural obligation under Article 2 subsisted.
However,
I found Blečić quite clear in its findings. The
Court stated in paragraph 75 of that judgment:
“In Moldovan and
Others and Rostas and Others v. Romania ((dec.), nos.
41138/98 and 64320/01 (joined), 13 March
2001) the applicants complained inter alia, under Article 2 of
the Convention, that the Romanian authorities had failed to conduct
an effective investigation into the killings of their relatives,
which had taken place before ratification. The Court held that the
alleged obligation to conduct an effective investigation was derived
from the aforementioned killings whose compatibility with the
Convention could not be examined. It therefore declared that
complaint incompatible with the Convention ratione temporis.”
The
“appropriate test” as enunciated in Blečić
is stated in paragraph 77:
“It follows from the above case-law that the
Court’s temporal jurisdiction is to be determined in relation
to the facts constitutive of the alleged interference. The
subsequent failure of remedies aimed at redressing that interference
cannot bring it within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction.”
(emphasis added).
The
Court, further clarifying the principle, emphasised as follows:
“81. In conclusion, while it is true that from the
ratification date onwards all of the State’s acts and omissions
must conform to the Convention (see Yağcı and Sargın
v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A no. 319 A, p.
16, § 40), the Convention imposes no specific obligation on the
Contracting States to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused
prior to that date (see Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], no.
44912/98, § 38, ECHR 2004 IX). Any other approach
would undermine both the principle of non-retroactivity in the law of
treaties and the fundamental distinction between violation and
reparation that underlies the law of State responsibility.
82. In order to establish the Court’s
temporal jurisdiction it is therefore essential to identify, in
each specific case, the exact time of the alleged interference.
In doing so the Court must take into account both the facts of which
the applicant complains and the scope of the Convention right alleged
to have been violated.” (emphasis added)
The
Court then went on to apply this “appropriate test” to
the Blečić facts.
A
more recent judgment confirming and implementing the Blečić
position, where the Court declared an application inadmissible,
is that of Kholodovy v. Russia ([dec], no. 30651/05, 14
September 2006):
“Admittedly, the investigation into R. Kholodov’s
death and the trial of putative perpetrators continued long after the
ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation. However,
the Court’s temporal jurisdiction is to be determined in
relation to the facts constitutive of the alleged interference. The
subsequent failure of remedies aimed at redressing that interference
cannot bring it within its temporal jurisdiction.”
Even
leaving aside Moldovan, there is the recent Teren
Aksakal v. Turkey judgment (no. 51967/99, ECHR 2007 ...
(extracts)) where, in the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Türmen
and Mularoni, the Blečić principle has been once
again been followed:
“It is true that the Blečić
judgment concerns Article 8 of the Convention. However, in the
above-cited paragraphs the Court has established a general principle
regarding its temporal jurisdiction that encompasses all the Articles
of the Convention including Articles 2 and 3. ...
Therefore, the majority’s reasoning in the present
case, separating the investigation from the constitutive fact, i.e.
the killing of the deceased, and concluding that the investigation
remained within the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, is clearly in
contradiction with the finding of the Grand Chamber in Blečić.”
How
should the “appropriate test” in Blečić
have been applied in this present case?
What
is the “constitutive element” in this case? The date of
the disappearance is the constitutive element. It is the
instantaneous act that created the interference. This is so because
it is the only fact that has been evidentially proved to exist. In
other words this is the factual situation as it stands. We see before
us as a fact that since the disappearances of the applicants occurred
before the date of ratification the Court has no competence ratione
temporis to examine either the disappearances or the alleged
failure to comply with an obligation to conduct an effective
investigation which is derived from those disappearances.
The
principle enunciated was not limited to the facts of the Blečić
case alone but was of general application and was one which I feel
could easily have been applied in the present case.
Each
case is based and decided upon relative facts pertinent to that case
alone. Unless ruled to be otherwise, the principles enunciated can be
applied or modified in determining the specific case, but the legal
principles enunciated by the Court do not change simply because the
facts are different. The law is applied in accordance with all proven
facts before the Court in a given case.
Noting
that the Grand Chamber in Silih v. Slovenia (no. 71463/01)
will hopefully soon be giving a decision on the ratione temporis
principle, my stance on the issue in relation to the present
application remains as it is and is what I feel it should be, in
accordance with recent case-law.
In
order to complete the reasoning in my opinion on jurisdiction ratione
temporis, I now turn to the judgments of the Court relating to
the presumption of death. The Court, in the case of İpek v.
Turkey (no. 25760/94, § 168, ECHR 2004 II
(extracts)), concluded as follows:
“For the above reasons, and taking into account
that no information has come to light concerning the whereabouts of
the applicant’s sons for almost nine and a half years, the
Court is satisfied that Servet and İkram İpek must be
presumed dead following their unacknowledged detention by the
security forces.” (emphasis added)
In
the case of Çiçek v. Turkey (no. 25704/94,
27 February 2001) the Court concluded there was a presumption of
death as there had been no information on the whereabouts of the
applicant’s son for almost six and a half years. Similarly, in
the more recent Akdeniz v. Turkey case (no. 25165/94, 31
May 2005), the Court again concluded that a period of 11 years
was sufficient to accept the presumption of death.
In
the Timurtaş judgment (Timurtaş v. Turkey,
no. 23531/94, § 83, ECHR 2000 VI) the Court gave
the following assessment:
“In this respect the period of time which has
elapsed since the person was placed in detention, although not
decisive in itself, is a relevant factor to be taken into account. It
must be accepted that the more time goes by without any news of the
detained person, the greater the likelihood that he or she has died.”
This
being so, and in the light of the general principle in Blečić
with regard to temporal jurisdiction, the most recent case-law
confirms that a person missing in a life-threatening situation about
whom there has been no information for a substantial period of time
is to be “presumed dead”. This is a presumption
that the Court is now able to draw following the authoritative Grand
Chamber precedent.
In
the present case, the period since the applicants disappeared in
life-threatening conditions, that is to say, during the war in 1974,
is 33 years. It follows that the disappeared first applicants must be
presumed to have died long before 28 January 1987, the date from
which the Turkish Government authorised the Commission to receive
individual petitions. Similarly, therefore, since the presumption
of death situation occurred before the date of ratification, the
Court has no competence ratione temporis to examine the
alleged failure to comply with an obligation to conduct an effective
investigation which is derived from the date of this presumption
of fact, prior to ratification. Any investigation conducted
before ratification but continued after ratification does not change
the lack of competence (see Blečić, § 77). In
short, with a presumption of death established prior to 1987,
no allegation of a violation of a continuing nature subsisting up to
the date of ratification can be upheld.
My
conviction is that the only logical inference that could be drawn
from the facts that have actually been proven is the existence of the
presumption of death. Simple lack of evidence as to what
actually happened to the missing persons does not preclude this
inference from being drawn. Considering the circumstances that
existed at the time of their disappearance, unless rebutted by proof
of their being alive, the only inference that should have been drawn
was one of ‘presumed dead’. This has not been the case. I
am sure that my colleagues will agree with me that it is not
contradictory to reach a different conclusion in respect of
individual applicants from that reached on the collective complaints
in the inter-State case. Equally so, the onus and degree of proof in
individual applications is much more demanding than in the
inter-State cases. With the actual facts as presented and proved, and
also in line with recent case-law, the Court is now able to draw a
different inference or presumption than the one drawn in the fourth
inter-State case. I cannot find myself agreeing with the presumption
made by the majority in the Chamber, although I perceive that it
stems perhaps from an admirable intention to assuage the feelings of
loss.
The
inter-State case judgment of 2001, while of general application on
the missing persons’ issues and concerning the “phenomenon
of disappearances”, in no way precludes us from benefiting also
from more recent case-law on how to approach and solve issues in
disappearance cases which carry an “ongoing situation of
uncertainty” (see paragraph 111). The fourth inter-State case
provided guidance in reaching the decision arrived at in the present
application. This, of course, I accept. But one must not forget that
in such individual cases as those before us where the element of
personal, subjective views in the applicants’ assertions is
prevalent, discharging the onus of proof of such alleged obligations
is all the more exacting and stringent in application than it would
be in inter-State cases. I also humbly concede that it is probably
easier to follow the inter-State case reasoning on missing persons,
than create a new precedent in the Cyprus missing persons issue as a
whole.
The
facts on which precedent-making decisions are based may be different,
yet I am of the opinion that, unless there are compelling reasons not
to do so, new precedent-creating case-law relevant to the subject
should have been followed here. I am not convinced that there are
such reasons in the present cases not to follow the principles
enunciated in Blečić.
On
the whole, I am not satisfied there was substantial evidence beyond
reasonable doubt which raised and supported the improbable
assertion that the applicants could still be alive. In Ireland v.
the United Kingdom (cited above), Judge Zekia, in a separate
opinion, dealt briefly with the principle underlying the onus of
proof and the discharge of such onus in a case where a Contracting
State is alleged to have violated its obligation under an Article of
the Convention:
“On whom lies the burden to discharge the onus of
proof.
When a Contracting State is alleged to have committed a
violation of a specific Article or Articles of the Convention by
disregarding its obligation under it and such allegation is denied,
surely there is a burden of proof to be discharged in some way or
other in order to substantiate such accusation before an authorised
organ of the Convention. What is material here is not whether a
burden of proof does exist or not - it is an elementary rule of
justice that it does exist and the fact that the presumption of
innocence is codified by Article 6 para. 2 (art. 6-2) of the
Convention is a strong indication of it - but by whom and how such
onus should be discharged. ... I would say that, at the end of
proceedings, the Commission or the Court has, on the totality of
evidence and material before them, to decide whether the burden of
proof required to substantiate an allegation of contravention of the
Convention by the respondent State has been discharged or not.”
Similarly,
the Court in the Cyprus v. Turkey judgment noted in paragraphs
112-13 (see also §§ 114-17):
“112. The Court also observes that in
its assessment of the evidence in relation to the various complaints
declared admissible, the Commission applied the standard of proof
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ as enunciated by the Court in
its Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978
(Series A no. 25), it being noted that such proof may follow from the
coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences
or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (ibid., pp. 64-65, §
161).
113. The Court, for its part,
endorses the application of this standard, all the more so since it
was first articulated in the context of a previous inter-State case
and has, since the date of the adoption of the judgment in that case,
become part of the Court’s established case-law (for a recent
example, see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100,
ECHR 2000-VII).”
Leaving
aside the recent case-law on the issue for the moment, in my
respectful opinion and in all honesty, I fail to understand how under
any circumstance, let alone in Cyprus in 1974, even by applying
simple logic, persons who have disappeared in a life-threatening
situation or have gone missing and have not been heard of for a
period of over 33 years, can be presumed or accepted to be still
“legally” alive. Even if one were to take Turkey’s
ratification date of 1987, a time-period of 13 years would still have
elapsed.
Accordingly,
I reiterate that I perceive no justifiable reason why a presumption
of death (in the light of the most recent development in the Court’s
case-law), unless for reasons of sensitivity on the issue, could not
have been adjudicated and acted upon accordingly. The Blečić
principle as applied to the present case, relieves, to a certain
extent, the findings on the presumption of being alive and continuing
violation as expressed in the Cyprus v. Turkey decision on
missing persons, thereby excluding the presence of an obligation of a
continuing nature. I find that the disappearances and the presumption
of the applicants’ being dead existed as a fact before the
respondent Government recognised the right of individual application
to the Commission. That is to say, the facts constitutive of the
alleged interference, and as proven, had taken place before
ratification and therefore this Court is not competent ratione
temporis to examine the effective investigation issue or any
other issues pertinent to the actual merits of this case.
In
short, I feel that there is no violation of a “continuing
nature”, and hence no obligation of a continuing nature. The
findings of the Cyprus v. Turkey judgment with regard to a
“continuing violation of Article 2 on account of the failure of
the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective
investigation” needs to be interpreted in line with recent
case-law, which necessitates that such a “continuing
obligation” and all consequent requirements of such an
obligation, if an obligation does exist, only exists if the
case falls within the competence of this Court ratione temporis –
and, in my view, the present case does not.
Given
that the facts constitutive of the alleged interference
(disappearance and subsequent presumed deaths) occurred before 28
January 1987, I do not feel that the Court can examine the complaints
concerning the ineffectiveness of the investigation into the
disappearance of the Greek Cypriots, for lack of jurisdiction ratione
temporis.
Six-month
rule
As I
stated for the above reasons, I do not agree that there is a
continuing violation.
Since
I am of the opinion that a “presumption of death” should
be the presumption drawn in the case before us, I do not concur with
my colleagues when they observe that the present case before us is
one “where the continuing situation flows from a factual
situation arising at a particular point in time” (paragraph
116), thereby bringing it within the six-month rule. I find that a
continuing situation does not “flow”. The presumption of
death excludes this possibility.
Another
point about the majority’s assessment in this connection, which
I feel I must make here simply because of a possible paradox that I
notice may exist, is that while in the present application a finding
is made that there is a “continuing violation”, in
contrast to a previous judgment concerning Turkish Cypriot missing
persons who had gone missing under similar life-threatening
circumstances in 1964, at the time of inter-communal strife, the
majority accept that the Court “in reaching th[at] decision, as
with the other similar applications, made no mention of a ‘continuing
situation’ in its analysis in reaching the conclusion that the
case had been introduced out of time” (paragraph 116).
I
note that the explanation given is that in the Karabardak case
(Karabardak and Others v. Cyprus, (dec.) no. 76575/01, 22
October 2002) the “long delay” of over thirty years in
bringing the matter to examination pursuant to Article 35(1) of the
Convention was not accounted for and that: “[i]t is not in the
interests of the practical and effective functioning of the
Convention system, which is of crucial importance to the protection
of the fundamental rights and freedoms, that the Court be called upon
to deal with stale complaints” (see paragraph 117). Whereas in
the present application the applicants applied to the Commission
three days after Turkey had recognised the jurisdiction of the old
Court on 22 January 1990.
In
view of the majority’s decision in the present application I
have found it difficult to understand how the decisions in Karabardak
and Baybora were reached. I cannot seem to find this
assessment consistent with the jurisprudence of the Court. Observing
that the Karabardak and Others case also concerned
disappearances occurring in a strife-ridden Cyprus where
life-threatening circumstances prevailed, and bearing in mind the
reasoning followed by the majority of my colleagues in the present
application as to a “continuing situation” or violation,
can one assume, even at the risk of appearing speculative, that a
decision on the merits in the Karabardak and Others
case would have been similar to the one reached in the present
application? Hence, with great respect and modesty, merely for the
sake of completeness, were I to apply the majority view (I merely
reiterate, but do not adopt it) mutatis mutandis to the
Karabardak and Others case, it too might have been
found admissible as maintaining continuing violations which generated
a continuing obligation of effective investigation. Yet, I perceive
an anomaly in the approach in the present applications and feel that
a consistency of logic in conformity with, and no different from, the
Karabardak and Others case should have been adopted.
I
wholeheartedly agree that in the interests of the “practical
and effective functioning of the Convention system, the greater the
lapse of time the more problematic any attempted examination of the
facts and issues”. However, this observation applies to the
present case and was also the main issue in the admissibility stages
of Baybora and Karabardak.
With
due respect to my colleagues adjudicating in the cases of both
Baybora and Karabardak (on perusal of the Observations
of the Government of Turkey of 1 March 2007, § 27) it may have
been a more positive step to have communicated or have invited the
respondent Government to give their views so as to present before the
Court a more balanced view of the case and thus aid the Court on the
issue of jurisdiction ratione temporis, as they have done in
the present case.
I
merely mention that I feel there may be some frailty in the reasoning
here in rejecting the respondent Government’s whole argument
under this head; for the applicants, on the introduction of the
present application, applied to the Commission, not to the Court, for
redress. The important factor, or date, for consideration, is the
date when Turkey recognised the right of individual application to
the Commission that is 1987; it is not 1990, the date when Turkey
recognised the Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, I was not able
to concur in this assessment. In addition, I make note of the fact
that:
(a)
The intervening Government of Cyprus recognised the right to
individual petition to the Commission on 1 January 1989. The Turkish
Cypriot applicants could not have applied earlier for redress in
respect of their claims. Similarly Greek Cypriot applicants could not
have applied, until Turkey’s ratification in 1987, to the
Commission and, in January 1990, to the Court.
(b)
The applicants in the present case, as well as those in the
Karabardak and Others case, could not have known of the
decisions taken in the inter-State cases. The first, second or third
inter-State cases did not really deal with the issues of continuing
violation. It was in 2001, in the fourth inter-State case, that the
notion of continuing violation in disappearance cases was first
expounded. In any event, no applicant could have applied until 1989
or 1990, respectively. The present applicants lodged their
application in 1990. The Karabardak applicants made their
application in 2001, probably after obtaining legal advice on the
issue. The legal positions, in both cases, are the same.
(c)
As pointed out in the Akdivar case (Akdivar and Others v.
Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p.
1210) prevailing “special circumstances” need to be taken
into account when considering whether remedies are actually
available. Considering the climate in Cyprus in both 1963-4 and 1974,
one cannot say with certainty that such redress was readily available
to trace the disappearances (see also Cyprus v. Turkey, §
99).
(d)
The CMP did not start functioning until 1981. The CMP was concerned
with collecting files on both Greek and Turkish missing persons’
families, so reliance was probably placed on the outcome of the CMP
investigations and no other redress claimed. Understandably, such
families of missing persons were not aware of the mandate of the CMP
as it stood at the time and perhaps only became aware of its
functions and views on its work following the fourth inter-State
judgment in May 2001.
It
follows then that the fact that the applicants in the present case
applied to the Commission three days after Turkey recognised the
Court’s jurisdiction is, with all due respect to my colleagues,
immaterial. Legally there is no difference between the delays
of the Karabardak applicants and the present applicants in
their applications to the Court and the Commission, respectively. If
the Karabardak and Baybora applications were rejected
for being introduced out of time under Article 35, so too should the
present applications have been. The fact that the events they
complained of took place during the inter-communal strife of the
1960s and not in 1974 makes no difference to the legal
situation. I refer in support of this view to comments of Judge Fuad
in the Cyprus v. Turkey judgment: “With great respect,
in my view the majority has not given sufficient weight to the causes
and effects of the ugly and catastrophic events which took place in
Cyprus between 1963 and 1974 (which literally tore the island apart)”
(Partly dissenting opinion, § 2).
Accordingly,
since the present application has been found admissible, I would like
to note that I am unable to regard this decision as sustaining a
justification as to why the Karabardak and Others case was
treated differently on the issue of jurisdiction ratione temporis
and why those applicants’ claims for redress were not accepted.
Therefore, I conclude that the respondent Government’s
preliminary objection under this head should have been accepted, and
a judgment in conformity with the Baybora and Karabardak
decisions recorded (followed in preceding cases of Şemi
and Others v. Cyprus, no. 13212/02, and Hüseyin and Göçer
v. Cyprus, no. 28280/02).
It is
here, also, that I again find myself in agreement with my colleague
Judge Kutlu Fuad, who in his partly dissenting opinion in the
Cyprus v. Turkey case said (§ 25):
“Here the position is not simple. The events which
the majority of the Court held to have given rise to an obligation to
conduct effective investigations occurred in July and August 1974.
This was some fifteen years before the operative date of Turkey’s
declaration. Neither the Commission nor the Court found sufficient
evidence to hold that the missing persons were still in the custody
of the Turkish authorities at the relevant time. In my opinion, it
cannot be right to treat the Convention obligation which arises in
certain circumstances to conduct a prompt and effective investigation
as having persisted for fifteen years after the events which required
investigation so that, when Turkey did become bound by the
Convention, her alleged failure to date to conduct appropriate
investigations can be regarded as a violation of the Convention. In
my view, the concept of continuing violations cannot be prayed in aid
to reach such a result. It seems to me that such an approach would be
to apply an obligation imposed by the Convention retrospectively and
to divest the time limitation in the declaration of its effect.”
Accordingly,
the case is inadmissible under Article 35(3) and (4) of the
Convention.
Committee
of Missing Persons (CMP)
Without
committing myself to comments on the merits of this case I find it
important to make some reference to the developments regarding the
facts relating to the Committee of Missing Persons (CMP).
In the information we have before us (Further submissions of
Turkey 21 August 2007, § 20) we note that the last few years
have seen the CMP’s role in ascertaining the whereabouts of
missing persons increase in a substantial and successful manner. So
without prejudice to the rest of my opinion, I would also like to
make some brief remarks before concluding.
We
see that the CMP since 2004 has been activated in a substantial
manner. It is assisted by well-known international experts and has
developed several programmes in order to start exhumations to
identify remains with anthropological and genetic tests, with a view
to returning the remains to the families. Exhumation, identification
and burial procedures are implemented not only with respect to
scientific criteria, but also with respect to the dignity of the
deceased and their families. With international financial support
provided, and forthcoming, this shows that the CMP has become an
international experimented model for similar investigations in other
parts of the world.
Exhumations
are producing concrete and convincing results. There is
much more which prima facie shows that the CMP’s work
today may in the future represent more of an effective investigation
into the circumstances surrounding the disappearances, despite the
terms of reference. There is a clear movement towards complying with
Article 2 and I feel that views in line with the fourth inter-State
ruling may be excessive in light of the CMP’s present day
activities and functions. If there was no effective investigation I
do not think it possible that the remains of the missing could have
been found or the findings and discoveries made. While the work of
the CMP is conducted in secrecy, this does not mean that it is not
the most effective method of tracing the disappearances.
Regrettably,
I simply cannot agree with my colleagues’ opinion on the
ineffectiveness of CMP investigations into the fate of the missing
persons. While it may have been the case in 2001 (Cyprus v.
Turkey), the present activities and events relating to the CMP’s
work and findings, as I have described above, today, cannot go
unnoticed.
In
light of what I have said above in regard to the present-day CMP
investigations and the disclosures that they have made, I do not
agree with the view that there are “no developments, legal
or factual” which change the assessment of the Court with
regard to the CMP’s work. There is significant proof of the
developments and width of CMP activities. I do not find it correct to
say that the fact that the “...remains of Savvas Hadjipanteli
have recently been discovered...does not demonstrate that the CMP has
been able to take any meaningful investigative steps beyond the
belated location and identification of remains.” (paragraph
132).
If
the scope of the CMP’s work had not been sufficiently enlarged
so as to be effective or investigative, the remains and evidence of
bullet-wounds would not have been revealed in the first place. The
“recent developments” (paragraphs 89 and 102) reveal how
remarkably the work of the CMP is steadily advancing today.
I ask
for indulgence as I express my sensitivities in the following views:
A
period of almost 33 years has passed. I find myself asking such
questions as: The missing persons issue in Cyprus as it stands today,
would any other form be an “effective investigation”
sufficient to satisfy Article 2 in the upholding and protection of
human rights? Would it be more successful than the CMP, especially in
discoveries of the whereabouts of the missing? Would it interfere or
hamper the work of the CMP?
The
CMP has been built up to its present strength over long years of
trial and error, and continues to build in potency. Dedicated
persons, scientists, from both sides, and internationally, strive
endlessly to diminish the loss of loved ones of both Greek and
Turkish Cypriots alike. To find and give the remains of the missing
back to loved ones; thus not prolonging the anguish for those
directly concerned. The events of 1974 in all its aspects, created
many separations, sadness, confusion and uncertainties for all
concerned. What is left and what I feel is wanted by the people of
Cyprus today, is to find their missing loved ones. Memories have
faded, become distorted, persons have passed on. What if the
successful work of the CMP is undermined by any other form of
investigation, where sensitivity and secrecy is the operating factor?
As far as I am concerned, it is this aspect that has gained
precedence in today’s Cyprus. Here, I leave aside the fact that
the CMP has gone far beyond the purpose for which it was set up.
I am
therefore of the view that the CMP is capable of effectively doing
all that can reasonably and possibly be done. I find that the CMP
satisfies the criteria of effective investigation as is necessary in
the events and developments in Cyprus today. This is my view of the
work and purpose of CMP, and nothing I can see in the present case
has convinced me otherwise.
Damages
and costs
I
have found the respondent Government justified in their preliminary
objections and the applications inadmissible. Therefore, I do not see
any purpose in giving my opinion as to whether any of the
“significant distress, frustration, uncertainty and anguish”
that may have been suffered by the second applicants can be
attributable to actions or non-action of the respondent Government in
violation of the Convention.
Since
I do not concur on the findings that the applications are admissible
on their merits, I cannot possibly agree with the majority’s
assessment under Article 41 on the issue of just satisfaction claims,
whether in whole or in part. In consideration of all of the above, I
find also that there should be no award as to costs since the case is
inadmissible ratione temporis and time-barred by the six-month
rule.