FOURTH SECTION
FINAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no.
28057/02
by Frederick PEACOCK
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 11 March 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Lech
Garlicki,
President,
Nicolas
Bratza,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Stanislav
Pavlovschi,
Ljiljana
Mijović,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ledi
Bianku, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 24 October 2001,
Having regard to the partial decision of 12 November 2002,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Frederick Peacock, is a British national who was born in 1944 and lives in County Durham. He was represented before the Court by Royds Rdw, solicitors in London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Whomersley of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant’s wife died on 11 February 2001. The applicant alleged that on 21 April 2001 he applied for widows’ benefits. The Government contested the above date. According to the copy of the application form submitted to the Court by the Government it appears that the benefits claim was signed by the applicant on 25 May 2001 and was date stamped as received by the Department of Works and Pensions on 29 May 2001.
On 30 May 2001 the applicant was informed that his claim had been disallowed as he was not a woman.
The applicant did not appeal further as he considered or was advised that such a remedy would be bound to fail since no such social security benefit was payable to widowers under United Kingdom law.
The applicant was not in receipt of child benefit at the time of his claim.
B. Relevant domestic law
The domestic law relevant to this application is set out in Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, §§ 14 26, ECHR 2002-IV and Runkee and White v. the United Kingdom, no. 42949/98, §§ 40-41, 25 July 2007.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complained that British social security legislation discriminated against him on grounds of sex, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with both Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
THE LAW
The Court recalls that a widow was not automatically entitled to survivors’ benefits, but had to claim them from the relevant authority. Various time-limits applied: after 1997, a widow had to make a claim for Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”) within three months of her husband’s death; a claim for Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”) or Widow’s Pension (“WP”) could be made outside that time-limit, but would be back-dated only three months. To be eligible for WMA, a woman had to be entitled to child benefit.
The Court observes that the applicant’s wife died on 11 February 2001 but that he introduced his claim for benefits only on 25 May 2001, therefore more than three months after her death. The Court considers, that unless or until a man has made a claim to the domestic authorities for bereavement benefits, he cannot be regarded as a “victim” of the alleged discrimination involved in the refusal to pay such benefits, because a woman in the same position would not automatically be entitled to widows’ benefits until having made a claim. Similarly, a man who failed to apply within the time-limits as they applied to women could not, in most cases, claim to be a victim of discrimination, since a woman in the same position would not have been entitled to the benefit in question (see Rogan v. the United Kingdom, no. 57946/00, decision of 8 September 2001). Thus, the applicant cannot claim to have been a victim of a violation of his rights under the Convention and First Protocol, and the complaint in respect of Wpt is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
In relation to the complaint in respect of WMA, the Court observes that the applicant was not at the time of his claim in receipt of child benefit and therefore he can not claim to be a victim of discrimination, since a woman in the same position would not have been entitled to the benefit in question (see, mutatis mutandis, Rogan v. the United Kingdom, no. 57946/00, decision of 8 September 2001). Thus, the applicant cannot claim to have been a victim of a violation of his rights under the Convention and First Protocol, and the complaint in respect of WMA is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
In relation to the claim for WP, the Court held in its lead judgment regarding WP that at its origin, and until its abolition in respect of women whose spouses died after 9 April 2001, WP was intended to correct “factual inequalities” between older widows, as a group, and the rest of the population and that this difference in treatment was reasonably and objectively justified. Moreover, the Court considered that the United Kingdom could not be criticised for not having abolished WP earlier and that it was not unreasonable of the legislature to decide to introduce the reform slowly (see Runkee and White v. the United Kingdom, no. 42949/98, §§ 40-41, 25 July 2007). The Court, consequently, considering it was not necessary to examine separately the complaint in respect of Article 8, did not find a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the non-payment to the applicants of WP or equivalent (ibid § 42).
Consequently, the complaint in respect of WP is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
In view of the above it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application.
Lawrence Early Lech Garlicki
Registrar President