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SZILVASSY v. HUNGARY - 17623/04 [2008] ECHR 242 (1 April 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/242.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 242
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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF SZILVÁSSY v. HUNGARY
(Application
no. 17623/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
1
April 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Szilvássy v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise Tulkens,
President,
Antonella Mularoni,
Ireneu Cabral
Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Dragoljub
Popović,
András Sajó,
Nona
Tsotsoria, judges,
Sally
Dollé, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 11 March 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 17623/04) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Hungarian national, Mr Béla Szilvássy.
The
Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
On
10 September 2007 the
Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Budapest.
In
May 1989 a private individual brought an action against Mr M.M.
before the Pest Central District Court, asking the court to establish
that she was the owner of certain movable property and real estate.
Between
May 1989 and November 1992, the District Court held eleven hearings,
heard several witnesses and appointed a real-estate expert.
On
5 November 1992 the plaintiff requested the District Court to hold a
hearing. Subsequently, the District Court appointed a forensic
psychiatric expert, in order to examine the defendant's mental state.
The expert submitted her opinion on 23 June 1993, establishing that
the defendant's capacity to conduct legal acts was limited.
On
2 July the District Court ordered the competent authority to appoint
an ad hoc guardian for the defendant.
On
9 December and 18 January 1994 the District Court held hearings. On
19 January 1994 the ad hoc guardian was discharged from his
duties.
On
28 February 1994 the defendant died. On 7 March 1994 the District
Court established that the proceedings were interrupted.
On
28 April 1995 the applicant entered the proceedings as the
defendant's heir.
On
24 October 1995, 4 July 1996, 21 November 1996, 23 January 1997,
14 March 1997 and 14 May 1997, the District Court held hearings and
heard witnesses.
On
16 June 1997 the plaintiff modified her action.
On
15 September 1997, 25 November 1997, 23 March 1998, 26 June 1998
and 3 November 1998, the District Court held further hearings and
heard witnesses.
On
1 February 1999, upon the District Court request, the plaintiff
submitted a preparatory paper which contained a question to be
answered by the real-estate expert.
On
19 February 1999 and 22 February 1999, the District Court appointed
real-estate and movable property experts. The real-estate expert
attempted to carry out an on-site inspection. Since the applicant
failed to appear, the inspection had to be repeated on 28 September
1999. The real-estate expert submitted her opinion on 4 October 1999.
Subsequently,
the case was transferred to another judge of the District Court.
On
8 October and 11 November 1999 the parties filed observations.
On
22 March 2002 the District Court informed the parties that they could
submit further written observations on the expert's opinion. On
30 May 2002 the District Court held a hearing. Both parties
submitted preparatory documents to the District Court.
On
26 July 2002 the District Court ordered the real-estate expert to
supplement her opinion. The expert complied with the order on
25 November 2002.
On
8 April and 24 June 2003 the District Court held a hearing. On 23
April 2003 the District Court requested the movable property expert
to supplement his opinion. Since the expert failed to comply with the
Court's request, it fined him. On 29 August 2003 the District Court,
upon his request, released the expert from his mandate. On 9
September the plaintiff requested the District Court to appoint
another movable property expert.
On
23 August 2003 the District Court appointed another expert who
submitted his opinion on 24 January 2004.
On
16 September 2003 and 18 February, 30 March and 25 October 2004,
14 February, 11 April and 20 May 2005 the District Court held
hearings.
On
30 May 2005 the District Court delivered its decision. The plaintiff
appealed.
On
6 April 2006 the Budapest Regional Court partly modified the
first-instance decision.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began only on 5 November 1992,
when the recognition by Hungary of the right of individual petition
took effect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the length
of the proceedings after that date, account must be taken of the
stage which they had reached beforehand. The Court notes that the
proceedings had already been pending for three years and six months
on that date.
The
period in question ended on 6 April 2006. It thus lasted thirteen
years and five months for two levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject,
the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 18,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested these claims.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 12,800
for non-pecuniary damages.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 31,000 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the national instances as well as those incurred before the
Court.
The
Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. The Court notes that the applicant's costs
claim has not been substantiated by any relevant documents and must
therefore be rejected.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 12,800
(twelve thousands eight hundreds euros) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, which sum is to be
converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the
rate applicable at the date of the settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 1 April 2008, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Sally Dollé Françoise Tulkens
Registrar President
