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ALIYEV AND OTHERS v. AZERBAIJAN - 28736/05 [2008] ECHR 1733 (18 December 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1733.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 1733
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF ALIYEV AND OTHERS v. AZERBAIJAN
(Application
no. 28736/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18 December 2008
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to
editorial revision.
In the case of Aliyev and Others
v. Azerbaijan,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina
Vajić,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dean
Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens,
Giorgio
Malinverni,
George Nicolaou, judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 27 November 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 28736/05) against the Republic
of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by ten Azerbaijani nationals,
Messrs Intiqam Aliyev, Rashid Hajili, Annagi Hajibeyli, Shahbaz
Aliyev, Farman Huseynov, Alovsat Aliyev, Ayyub Kerimov, Vidadi
Mirkamal, Akif Alizade and Namizad Safarov (“the applicants”),
on 30 July 2005. Mr I. Aliyev, the first applicant, who was a lawyer
practicing in Baku, represented the other nine applicants.
The
Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr C. Asgarov.
The
applicants alleged that the significant delay in the state
registration of the association of which they were founders had
amounted to a violation of their right to freedom of association,
that the domestic proceedings had been unreasonably lengthy, and that
the domestic courts were not independent and impartial in lawsuits
against the Ministry of Justice of Azerbaijan.
On
9 November 2006 the President of the First Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
On
24 May 2003 the applicants founded an association named “Azerbaijani
Lawyers Forum” (“Azərbaycan Hüquqşünaslarının
Forumu” İctimai Birliyi). This was a non-profit
organisation established with the purpose of carrying out various
activities aimed at further democratisation of society, the formation
of a state governed by the rule of law, liaison between lawyers, and
the protection of their professional interests.
On
23 June 2003 the applicants lodged a request for the association's
state registration with the Ministry of Justice (hereafter also
referred to as “the Ministry”), the government authority
responsible for the state registration of legal entities. In
accordance with the domestic law, a non governmental
organisation acquired the status of legal entity only upon its state
registration by the Ministry of Justice.
Under
the Law on State Registration of Legal Entities of 6 February 1996
(“the Old State Registration Act”), applicable at that
time, the Ministry was obliged to respond to the applicants'
registration request within ten days after receipt of the request.
However, the applicants did not receive any response for several
months.
In
March 2004 the applicants lodged an action with the Yasamal District
Court, complaining that the Ministry had “evaded”
registering their organisation and asking the court to compel the
Ministry to register it. They claimed that the delay in state
registration constituted a violation of their right to freedom of
association under Article 58 of the Constitution and Article 11 of
the Convention, and demanded compensation for non pecuniary
damage.
In
its pleadings submitted to the court in reply to the applicants'
claim, the Ministry of Justice argued that on 18 February 2004 it had
sent an official response to the association's legal address.
However, the postal service had not been able to deliver it because
there had been a mistake in the recipient's address printed on the
envelope. The Ministry re-sent the official response to the correct
address on 28 June 2004. In that response, the Ministry noted that it
was returning the registration documents to the applicants “without
taking any action”, that is to say without issuing a state
registration certificate or an official refusal to register the
association. The reason was the applicants' failure to include the
description of the association's activity in its name, as required by
Article 3.1 of the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations
(Associations and Funds), and to approve the association's charter,
by signing it, as required by Article 47.1 of the Civil Code.
On
24 January 2005 the Yasamal District Court dismissed the applicants'
claim. The court found that the Ministry had issued a formal response
to the applicants' registration request on 18 February 2004, although
the applicants did not receive it at that time owing to an
unintentional mistake in the recipient's address. The court further
dismissed the applicants' claim that the Ministry had failed to
comply with the ten-day time-limit laid down by the Old State
Registration Act. The court noted that, in the meantime, on 9 January
2004 a new Law on State Registration and the State Register of Legal
Entities (“the New State Registration Act”) had
entered into force and superseded the Old State Registration Act. In
accordance with the New State Registration Act, the time-limit for
the Ministry's formal response to a registration request was extended
to 40 working days after the receipt of the request. The court
reasoned that, since the Old State Registration Act was no longer in
force, the time-limits set by it no longer applied, and that a new
time-limit of 40 days had been applicable since 9 January 2004, the
date of entry into force of the New State Registration Act.
Accordingly, the court ruled that the Ministry had responded within
the statutory time-limit and that the applicants could re apply
for state registration after rectifying the deficiencies found by the
Ministry in their registration documents.
On
19 April 2005 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court's
judgment.
On
29 June 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's judgment.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. State registration of associations
Article
58 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 12 November
1995 provided as follows:
“I. Everyone has a right to freedom of
association with others.
II. Everyone has the right to form any
association, including political parties, trade unions or other
public associations, or join existing associations. Free functioning
of all associations shall be guaranteed. ...”
Article
47.1 of the Civil Code of 2000 provided as follows:
“The charter of a legal entity approved by its
founders is the legal entity's foundation document. ...”
Article
9 of the Law on State Registration of Legal Entities of 6 February
1996, in force until 9 January 2004, provided as follows:
“Upon receipt of an application for state
registration from a legal entity or a branch or representative office
of a foreign legal entity, the authority responsible for state
registration [i.e. the Ministry of Justice] shall:
– accept the documents for review;
– within ten days, issue the applicant
with a state registration certificate or a written notification of
refusal to register; or
– review the documents re-submitted
after rectification of the deficiencies previously existing therein
and, within five days, take a decision on state registration.”
Article
8.1 of the Law on State Registration and the State Register of Legal
Entities of 12 December 2003, effective from 9 January 2004, provided
as follows:
“State registration of a non-commercial
organisation wishing to obtain legal-entity status, or of a branch or
representative office of a foreign legal entity, shall, as a rule, be
carried out within 40 days. ...”
Article
3.1 of the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations (Public Associations
and Funds) of 13 June 2000 provided as follows:
“The non-governmental organisation shall have a
name indicating its organisational legal form and the nature of
its activities. ...”
B. Non-retrospective effect of law
The
general presumption under Azerbaijani law is that new legal acts
apply prospectively and not retrospectively, subject to specified
exceptions. In particular, Article 149 (VII) of the Constitution
provides that only legal acts improving the legal situation of
individuals and legal entities or eliminating or mitigating their
legal responsibility can have retrospective effect; other legal acts
have no retrospective effect.
Article
42 of the Law on Normative Legal Acts of 26 November 1999 provides
that the retrospective application of legal acts is regulated by
Article 149 (VII) of the Constitution. Article 7.1 of the Civil Code
provides that, except in the situations provided for by Article 149
(VII) of the Constitution, provisions of civil legislation have no
retrospective effect and apply prospectively to events taking place
after their entry into force.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that the failure by the
Ministry of Justice to register their association in a timely manner
constituted a violation of their right to freedom of association. As
the Ministry had evaded registering the organisation by significantly
delaying the examination of their registration request and breaching
the statutory time-limit for the official response, their
organisation could not acquire legal status. Moreover, they
complained that the founders' failure to include the description of
the association's activity in its name, as well as to sign its
charter, could not be a ground for refusal to register the
association. Article 11 of the Convention provides as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the
exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration
of the State.”
A. Admissibility
The Government submitted that the applicants had not
specifically complained of an infringement of their right to freedom
of association under Article 11 of the Convention. Moreover, they had
failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies because they had
not lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court challenging the
Supreme Court's final decision of 29 June 2005.
The applicants maintained that they had exhausted all
ordinary domestic remedies.
The
Court finds that the applicants' court action against the Ministry of
Justice, in which they complained of an unlawful delay in the state
registration of the association, amounted in substance to a complaint
of an alleged violation of their right to freedom of association.
Moreover, they had specifically relied on Article 11 of the
Convention in their appeals.
Furthermore,
the Court refers to its previous finding, made in a similar case
concerning delays in state registration of an association, that a
complaint to the Constitutional Court was not one of the remedies to
be exhausted prior to lodging an application with the Court.
Specifically, the Constitutional Court lacked adequate accessibility
because, in order to exercise a right of individual petition before
the Constitutional Court, individuals were required on a domestic
level to have had recourse to another remedy (additional cassation
procedure before the Plenum of the Supreme Court) which was
ineffective within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention (see Ismayilov v. Azerbaijan, no. 4439/04, §§
39-40, 17 January 2008). The Court finds no reason to depart
from that finding in the present case.
For
these reasons, the Court rejects the Government's objection.
The
Court further notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that
it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
The
Government argued that there had been no interference with the
applicants' freedom of association, noting that the Ministry had not
formally refused to register the association. Instead, it had merely
returned the association's foundation documents to the founders so
that the latter could rectify the deficiencies and ensure that they
complied with the requirements of the domestic law. The Government
contended that, although “a refusal to register a public
association might be regarded as a violation of the right to freedom
of association, a delayed response to [an application for state
registration] is not a violation of that right”. Even if the
Ministry had committed procedural errors, they had not amounted to a
violation of the applicants' rights under Article 11.
Moreover,
the Government argued that the lack of the status of legal entity did
not prevent the association from continuing its activities.
Lastly,
the Government submitted that the founders “did not comply with
the duty of diligence” during the registration process, as the
association's constituent documents had not been prepared in
accordance with the requirements of the law. The applicants could
have rectified those deficiencies and re-submitted their registration
request.
The
applicants argued that the delay in responding to the founders'
registration request, which had been significantly outside the
time-limits laid down by the domestic law, had constituted an
interference with, and a violation of, their right to freedom of
association. The applicants maintained that such a delay was in
breach of the domestic law.
The
applicants further argued that the grounds cited by the Ministry for
refusal to register the association had been unlawful. They also
noted that, without acquiring the status of legal entity through
state registration, the association had been unable to function
properly and to engage in its primary activities, as it was unable to
obtain funding, enjoy tax benefits and engage in a number of
financial and other activities.
2. The Court's assessment
The
Court notes that the present case is essentially similar to
Ramazanova and Others v. Azerbaijan (no. 44363/02, 1 February
2007), Nasibova v. Azerbaijan (no. 4307/04, 18 October 2007)
and Ismayilov (cited above).
In
particular, in those cases the Court found that the failure by the
Ministry of Justice to reply, within the statutory time-limits, to
requests for state registration of an association established in
Azerbaijan, amounted to a de facto refusal to register the
association. Without the state registration the association lacked
the status of legal entity and, as such, its legal capacity was not
identical to that of state-registered non-governmental organisations,
even assuming that it could engage in certain limited activities. The
significant delays in the registration procedure, if attributable to
the Ministry of Justice, amounted to an interference with the
exercise of the right of the association's founders to freedom of
association (see, for example, Ramazanova and Others, cited
above, §§ 54-60, with further references). Accordingly, in
the present case, where the applicants were the founders of the
association, there has been an interference with the exercise of
their right to freedom of association.
Such
interference will not be justified under the terms of Article 11 of
the Convention unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued
one or more of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 of that
Article and was “necessary in a democratic society” for
the achievement of that aim or aims (see, for example, Chassagnou
and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95,
§ 104, ECHR 1999-III).
The
Court reiterates that the expression “prescribed by law”
requires that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic
law and refers to the quality of the law in question. The law should
be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient
precision to enable them – if need be, with appropriate advice
– to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see,
for example, Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30,
ECHR 2004-I; Adalı v. Turkey, no. 38187/97, § 272,
31 March 2005; and Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no.
25390/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-III). For domestic law to meet these
requirements, it must afford a measure of legal protection against
arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights
guaranteed by the Convention. In matters affecting fundamental rights
it would be contrary to the rule of law, one of the basic principles
of a democratic society enshrined in the Convention, for a legal
discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an
unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate with sufficient
clarity the scope of any such discretion and the manner of its
exercise (see Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no.
30985/96, § 84, ECHR 2000-XI, and Maestri, cited above, §
30).
One
notable difference between the present case and the Ramazanova and
Others, Nasibova and Ismayilov cases is that, in
the present case, several months after the applicants had made their
request for state registration, the New State Registration Act
entered into force on 9 January 2004 and superseded the old
rules on state registration of legal entities. Therefore, to assess
whether the interference was “prescribed by law”, it is
necessary to determine what domestic law regulated the registration
proceedings in the present case.
The
Court notes, first of all, that the applicants submitted their
registration request on 23 June 2003, at the time when the Old State
Registration Act was in force. Article 9 of that act set a ten-day
time-limit for the Ministry to issue a decision on the state
registration of a legal entity or refusal to register it. In the
event the legal entity's foundation documents contained rectifiable
deficiencies, the Ministry could return the documents to the founders
within the same ten-day time-limit with instructions to rectify those
deficiencies. After the registration request was re-submitted
following such rectification, the law provided for a five-day
time-limit for an official response. It therefore follows that,
pursuant to the Old State Registration Act, the Ministry had to issue
at least an initial decision on the applicants' request by 3 July
2003, long before the entry into force of the New State Registration
Act. However, in the present case, the Ministry delayed its response
by almost eight months.
The
domestic courts decided that, since at the time of examination of the
applicants' court claim against the Ministry the Old State
Registration Act was no longer in force, only the procedural
requirements of the New State Registration Act applied. They also
found that the new time-limit of 40 days started to run from 9
January 2004, the date of entry into force of the New State
Registration Act. Since the Ministry of Justice sent its formal
response to the applicants on 18 February 2004, the courts concluded
that it was sent within the time-limit currently applicable under the
New State Registration Act.
However,
such a conclusion, in its essence, constituted an implicit finding
that the mere fact of entry into force of a new act superseding the
previous act somehow absolved the Ministry of Justice from
responsibility for breaches of procedural requirements of the
superseded law committed at the time when the latter was still in
force. In the Court's view, such a finding is arbitrary and
incompatible with the interests of justice and legal certainty. The
domestic courts failed to make any legal assessment of the Ministry's
lengthy failure to act during the period from 23 June 2003, when the
registration request was submitted by the applicants, until 9 January
2004, when the New State Registration Act entered into force.
The
domestic courts have not established, and it has not been argued by
the Government, that the provisions of the New State Registration Act
had any retrospective effect. Having regard to the relevant
provisions of the domestic law concerning the retrospective effect of
legal acts (see paragraphs 18-19 above), the Court is also of the
opinion that the New State Registration Act had no retrospective
effect. Therefore, since in the present case the applicants submitted
their registration request on 23 June 2003, the applicable state
registration procedure was as provided in the Old State Registration
Act, which was in force at that time.
As
noted in paragraph 37 above, the Court cannot but conclude that, by
failing to take any action in response to the applicants'
registration request for almost eight months, the Ministry breached
the ten-day procedural time-limit set by the Old State Registration
Act. There was no basis in the domestic law justifying such an
unreasonable delay in the registration proceedings. Moreover, in the
circumstances of the present case, the Ministry's alleged heavy
workload cannot be considered a good excuse for such a long delay, as
there is no evidence as to whether, during the relevant period, any
remedial measures had been taken by the State in order to allow the
Ministry's practices to be brought into compliance with the
time-limits imposed by the State's own law (see Ramazanova,
cited above, §§ 64-65).
Furthermore,
as to the quality of the Old State Registration Act, the Court
reiterates its finding that it did not establish with sufficient
precision the consequences of the Ministry's failure to take action
within the statutory time-limits. In particular, the law did not
provide for an automatic registration of a legal entity or any other
legal consequences in the event the Ministry failed to take any
action in a timely manner, thus effectively defeating the very object
of the procedural deadlines. Without such safeguards, the Ministry
was able arbitrarily to prolong the whole registration procedure for
an indefinite period of time. Accordingly, the law did not afford the
applicants sufficient legal protection against the arbitrary actions
of the Ministry of Justice (ibid, § 66).
Having
found that the Ministry of Justice breached the statutory time-limit
for issuing the formal response to the applicants' state registration
request and that the domestic law applicable at the relevant time did
not afford sufficient protection against this type of delay, the
Court concludes that the interference was not “prescribed by
law” within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the
Convention.
Having
reached that conclusion, the Court does not need to satisfy itself
that the other requirements of Article 11 § 2 (legitimate aim
and necessity of the interference) have been complied with.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicants complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that
the domestic judicial proceedings had not complied with the
“reasonable time” requirement and that the domestic
courts lacked independence and impartiality in the proceedings
involving the Ministry of Justice as a party.
In
the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the
matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that
they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It
follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
applicants did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly,
the Court considers that there is no call to award them any sum on
that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the
applicants' right to freedom of association admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
11 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 December 2008,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President