British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
IGOR KOLYADA v. RUSSIA - 19097/04 [2008] ECHR 1732 (18 December 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1732.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 1732
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF IGOR KOLYADA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 19097/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
18
December 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Igor Kolyada v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina
Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dean
Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens, judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 27 November 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 19097/04) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Igor Aleksandrovich
Kolyada (“the applicant”), on 21 April 2004.
The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Ms V. Milinchuk, former Representative of the Russian Federation
at the European Court of Human Rights.
On
21 February 2007 the Court decided to communicate the complaints
concerning non-enforcement and supervisory review of binding
judgments to the Government. It also decided to examine the merits of
the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 §
3).
THE FACTS
The
applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Volsk, a town in the Saratov
Region.
In
2001–2006 the applicant participated in three actions.
In
his first action the applicant applied to a court for the
status as a Chernobyl victim. On 4 December 2002 the Volsk Town Court
rejected this claim. The applicant did not lodge an ordinary appeal
against this judgment.
In
his second action the applicant sued his former employer, the Tax
Police, for an extension of his working record, which would result in
an increase of his pension. On 4 February 2004 the Oktyabrskiy
District Court of Saratov obliged the defendant to formally include
in the applicant's working record his employment preceding the
service in the Tax Police. This judgment became binding on 20
February 2004, but the Tax Police failed to update the applicant's
working record. The applicant sought the assistance of bailiffs in
the enforcement of this award, but on 4 November 2004 bailiffs
stopped the enforcement proceedings because in July 2004 the Tax
Police had been disbanded.
In
his third action the applicant resubmitted his previous claim against
the successor of the Tax Police – the Saratov Regional Police.
He asked to formally include in his working record his employment
preceding the service in the Tax Police. On 27 May 2005 the
Frunzenskiy District Court of Saratov granted this claim, and obliged
the defendant to formally include in the applicant's working record
his employment preceding the service in the Tax Police and to
recalculate his pension accordingly. This judgment became binding on
18 July 2005.
On
the Regional Police's request, the President of the Saratov Regional
Court applied for a supervisory review of this judgment. The
supervisory-review hearing was fixed for 3 April 2006.
According to the Government, on 21 March 2006 the court mailed
to the applicant a summons and left a telephone message with his
wife.
On
3 April 2006 the Presidium of Regional Court quashed the judgment on
the ground that the courts below had misinterpreted material laws.
This hearing was chaired by the President of the Regional Court. The
applicant was absent from this hearing.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
The
applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 about the non-enforcement of the judgments of
4 February 2004 and 27 May 2005, as well as, in substance, about
the quashing of the judgment of 27 May 2005 and the unfairness of the
supervisory-review proceedings. Insofar as relevant, these Articles
read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
The
Government argued that the application was inadmissible.
The
periods of enforcement had been reasonable. The bailiffs had faced
difficulties caused by the disbandment of the Tax Police, but
they had not idled and had done all they could to enforce the
judgment. Under domestic law, a liquidated organisation's debts could
not have been transferred to another organisation. To protect his
rights, it had remained open to the applicant to bring a new action
against the Tax Police's successor.
The
supervisory review had been meant to correct a judicial error. The
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had been satisfied
that Russia's supervisory-review procedure had been improved
(ResDH(2006)1, 8 February 2006). The supervisory review had not
interfered with the applicant's existing possessions, because the
proceedings had revealed that the applicant's claim had been
unfounded.
As to
the fairness of the proceedings, the President's examination of his
own application for supervisory review had not breached the
applicant's rights. The courts had properly notified the
applicant of the supervisory-review hearing, but he had failed to
appear for no good reason.
The
applicant argued that his complaint was admissible. The liquidation
board of the Tax Police could have enforced the judgment within the
next few months following the judgment. The court could have mailed
the writ of enforcement directly to the defendant to speed up the
enforcement. The Regional Police should have assumed the debt without
new proceedings.
As to
the fairness of the proceedings, under domestic law, summons had had
to be served against signature, and the applicant he had never signed
any summons.
The
Court notes that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court notes that the applicant's initial claim, the one that resulted
in the judgment of 4 February 2004 was redirected against the
successor of the Tax Police, and in its turn resulted in the judgment
of 27 May 2005. This judgment became binding but was quashed on
supervisory review.
The
Court has earlier found a violation of Article 6 § 1 and Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 where, like in the present case, supervisory
review was used to quash a binding judgment on the ground of an
alleged misinterpretation of material law (see,
for example, Kot v. Russia,
no. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007). There is no reason
to depart from that finding in the present case.
Furthermore,
the Court notes that the enforcement of the judgments was made
impossible by this quashing. Given that the quashing was incompatible
with the Convention, it cannot serve as a justification for the
non-enforcement (see Sukhobokov v. Russia, no. 75470/01,
§§ 25–26, 13 April 2006).
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this respect.
As
to the alleged unfairness of the supervisory-review proceedings, the
Court considers that given the finding of a violation by the
very use of supervisory review, it is unnecessary to examine this
complaint (see Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99,
§ 59, ECHR 2003 IX).
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Lastly,
the applicant complained under Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention
that he had been sent to serve in the hazardous area of the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster. He complained under Articles 6 and 8 of the
Convention that the proceedings in his first action had been
unfair. He also complained under Article 6 of the Convention about
the findings of the Presidium of the Regional Court.
However,
in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as
the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds
that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and
4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage alone.
The
Government argued that this claim had been excessive,
disproportionate, and unsubstantiated. If the Court had been to find
a violation, a mere finding would have been sufficient
just satisfaction.
The
Court accepts that the applicant might have been distressed by the
quashing of the binding judgment. Making its assessment on an
equitable basis, the Court awards EUR 3,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant made no claim under this head. Accordingly, there is no
call to award any sum on that account.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning
non-enforcement and supervisory review admissible and the remainder
of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
Holds that there is no need to examine the
allegation of procedural unfairness of the supervisory review;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance
with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,000
(three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 December 2008,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President