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HASSLUND v. DENMARK - 36244/06 [2008] ECHR 1677 (11 December 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1677.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 1677
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF HASSLUND v. DENMARK
(Application
no. 36244/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11
December 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Hasslund v. Denmark,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Rait Maruste, President,
Peer
Lorenzen,
Karel Jungwiert,
Volodymyr
Butkevych,
Renate Jaeger,
Mirjana Lazarova
Trajkovska,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges,
and
Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 18 November 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 36244/06) against the
Kingdom of Denmark lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Danish national, Mr Henrik
Hasslund (“the applicant”), on 31 August 2006.
The
applicant was represented by Mr Tyge Trier, a lawyer
practising in Copenhagen. The
Danish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Ms Nina Holst-Christensen of the Ministry of Justice.
On
5 September 2007 the
Acting President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Les Salles Sur Verdon,
France.
At the beginning of the 1990s a new concept called “tax
asset stripping cases” (selskabstømmersager)
came into existence in Denmark. It covered a criminal activity by
which the persons involved committed aggravated debtor fraud by
buying up and selling numerous inactive, solvent private limited
companies within a short period and, for the sake of their own
profit, “stripping” the companies of assets, including
deposits earmarked for payment of corporation tax. The persons
involved were usually intricately interconnected and collaborated in
their economic criminal activities, which concerned very large
amounts of money. According to surveys made by the customs and tax
authorities, approximately one thousand six hundred companies with a
total tax debt exceeding two billion Danish kroner (DKK)
were stripped in the period from the late 1980s until 1994. Following
a number of legislative amendments, the trade in inactive, solvent
companies largely ceased in the summer of 1993.
In
1994, the applicant learnt via a local newspaper that he was the
subject of an investigation, as was a private limited stockbrokers
company, of which he was part owner.
By
letter of 9 June 1994 he informed the police that he was available
for an interview, if required. By letter of 14 June 1994 the police
confirmed that they were in the process of investigation and informed
the applicant that they would talk to him at a later stage.
From
November 1994 to September 1995, six discovery orders were issued
against two banks, four search warrants were issued and numerous
interviews were held.
On
19 September 1995 the applicant was arrested and charged, inter
alia, with aggravated debtor fraud. On the same day he was
detained in solitary confinement, which was prolonged at regular
intervals until he was released on 22 December 1995.
On
the latter date, an oral hearing took place before the Copenhagen
City Court (Københavns Byret - hereafter “the
City Court”), during which the prosecution stated that the
investigation was concluded and that the indictment could be expected
at the beginning of 1996.
From
January 1996 to June 1998 various investigative steps were taken,
notably relating to five co-accused in the case, for example searches
in Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden, numerous interviews in Denmark
and abroad, international letters of request, a request to Interpol,
fifteen discovery orders and an order prohibiting the disclosure of
the applicant’s name. Moreover, on 19 March 1997 a
request for an accountant’s report was made and material for
that purpose was obtained, including statements of account,
cheque vouchers and so on.
On
25 June 1998, the indictment was submitted to the City Court
according to which the applicant (and five co-accused: A, B, N, M and
R) were charged of “tax asset stripping” committed
jointly. The applicant was charged with fifteen counts out of a total
of fifty-nine committed between March 1992 and May 1993. His
responsibility related to an amount of DKK 9,890,000
(approximately 1,300,000 euros (EUR)) out of the total amount of tax
evaded in the case which came to approximately EUR 19,000,000.
Between
14 August 1998 and 10 March 1999, fifteen pre-trial hearings were
held and the draft of the accountant’s reports was submitted.
On the former date, the case was set down for trial on 15 March 1999.
Between
15 March 1999 and 31 January 2001, a total of 119
hearings were held. The applicant, the five co-accused and
more than seventy witnesses were heard, including state-registered
public accountants. Statements of accounts and a considerable amount
of other documentary evidence were also produced. The
court records comprised 1,330 pages. The closing speeches were held
over ten days in November 2000 and January 2001.
By
a judgment of 6 April 2001, which ran to 220 pages, the City Court
convicted the applicant in accordance with the indictment, but on one
count he was acquitted. The co-accused were also convicted. The
applicant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. In
addition, an amount of DKK 2,200,000 was seized, and he was
deprived for an indefinite period of his right to establish a private
limited company or a company or an association requiring public
approval, or to become a manager and/or member of a director’s
board of such companies.
The
City Court dismissed the applicant’s claim that the length of
the proceedings had been at variance with Article 6 of the
Convention, stating the following:
“The City Court finds no reason to criticise the
prosecution’s decision to join the criminal proceedings against
the [applicant and the five co accused]. Accordingly, and having
regard to the mutual connection between the cases and their
character, the City Court finds no violation of Article 6 of the
Convention, although there were longer periods of inactivity during
one part of the case, while investigation was going on in another
part of the case. In this connection [the City Court] notes that the
complexity of the acts carried out by [the applicant and the five
co-accused] partly when buying and “stripping” the
companies for assets, partly when writing off projects abroad,
necessitated an investigation of an extraordinary scope. In the City
Court’s opinion there were no longer periods, whether before
the police, the prosecution or the City Court, during which no part
of the case proceeded. It must be emphasised that due to the nature
and scope of the charges, the cases against [M] and [the co-accused B
and R] could not proceed before the cases against [the applicant, N
and A] [had been heard]. [Finally], in view of the character and
complexity of the case, [the City Court] considers that the total
length of the proceedings did not in itself constitute a breach of
the said provision of the Convention.”
On
15 May 2001 the applicant and the five co-accused appealed against
the judgment to the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre
Landsret - “the High Court”).
After
that date, twelve preparatory hearings were held, including one on 13
September 2001 during which the trial was scheduled with
numerous fixed dates to commence on 24 September 2002. Counsel
for the applicant and the co-defendants jointly replied that they
only had very limited possibilities to appear during the autumn of
2002.
19. Thus,
although the trial commenced on 24 September 2002, most of the
hearings took place in 2003 and 2004. A total of about 90 hearings
were held in the case. In February and March 2004 the appeal hearings
had to be postponed because the applicant fell ill. For the same
reason the High Court changed the order of some of the hearings. The
Court records comprised 861 pages. The closing speeches were held
over ten days in April, May, and June 2004.
On
28 September 2004 the High Court upheld the City Court’s
judgment. As regards the length of the proceedings, it stated:
“In the assessment of whether the proceedings have
been concluded within a reasonable time, the starting point ...
concerning the [applicant] was on 19 September 1995, when
he was charged ...
[The High Court] upholds the City Court’s judgment
and its reasoning with regard to the question of whether Article 6 of
the Convention has been violated ...
The appeal proceedings were scheduled and carried out
without any unreasonable delay. On 13 September 2001 the trial
was scheduled to take place on fixed dates as from 12 August
2002. A number of hearing dates in the autumn 2002 and the beginning
of 2003 had to be cancelled because some counsel were occupied [with
other cases], for which reason the [present] case was delayed. To
avoid any further delay caused by impossibilities to appear, the
trial, which commenced on 24 September 2002, proceeded in a
proper, but not completely suitable order.”
In
the period from 7 to 12 October 2004, the applicant and the
co defendants requested that the Leave to Appeal Board
(Procesbevillingsnævnet) grant them leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court (Højesteret). Three of the defendants
stated in their petitions that they would submit supplementary
comments, which were received on 17 December 2004. In
January 2005 the cases were sent to the prosecution, which gave its
opinion on 29 March 2005. The applicant and the
co defendants gave their comments in reply and at a meeting on
5 August 2005 the Leave to Appeal Board decided to refuse
the requests. Letters of refusal were not sent out, however, as on 9
August 2005 counsel for one of the co-defendants stated that he
wanted to submit supplementary comments in the light of a recent
judgment in a similar case.
Thereafter,
due to an error, nothing happened in the case until 2 May 2006,
when the police telephoned the Leave to Appeal Board and drew
attention to the case. Subsequently, on his request, counsel for the
relevant co-defendant who had wanted to submit supplementary comments
did so on 2 and 13 June 2006. The applicant and the co-defendant were
informed on 21 June 2006 that their requests for leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court had been refused.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
applicant submitted that, due to the police investigation and the
media coverage, the proceedings had commenced in June 1994.
The
Court considers that the applicant was not substantially affected by
the proceedings until 19 September 1995, when he was charged and
arrested. The proceedings ended on 21 June 2006, when the
Leave to Appeal Board refused the applicant’s request for leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court against the High Court’s
judgment. Thus, the criminal proceedings lasted ten years and nine
months.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
From
a general point of view the reasonableness of the length of the
proceedings must be assessed with reference to the complexity of the
case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the authorities before
which the case was brought (see Pélissier and Sassi v.
France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
(a) Complexity of the case
The
Government submitted that the criminal proceedings were
extraordinarily complex as concerns the facts, law and procedural
issues.
The
applicant disagreed and maintained that the case was simple and
straightforward.
The Court reiterates that the scale and complexity of
a criminal case concerning fraud, which is often compounded further
by the involvement of several suspects, may justify the extensive
length of proceedings (see, among other authorities, C.P. and
Others v. France, no. 36009/97, § 30, 1 August 2000;
Hozee v. the Netherlands, judgment of 22 May 1998, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, p. 1102, § 52;
Wejrup v. Denmark
(dec.), no. 49126/99, ECHR 2002-IV,
Petersen v. Denmark
(dec.), no. 6315/02, 13 May 2004;
and Frederiksen v. Denmark
(dec.), 23012/02, 16 September 2004).
32. In
the present case the applicant and five co-accused were convicted of
tax asset stripping of numerous private limited companies and
corporate groups. The applicant and the co-accused were intricately
interconnected and had collaborated in the economic crime.
The
applicant was found guilty on fourteen counts out of a total
of fifty-nine and his responsibility related to an amount of
approximately EUR 1,300,000 of the total amount of tax evaded in
the case, which came to approximately EUR 19,000,000.
The
court records before the City Court and the High Court ran to 1,330
pages and 861 pages respectively, and the
City Court judgment ran to 220 pages.
The
Court points out that the City Court, in its judgment of
6 April 2001, noted that the complexity of the acts carried
out by the applicant and the five co-accused partly when buying and
“stripping” the companies of assets, partly when writing
off projects abroad, necessitated an investigation of an
extraordinary scope. It found no reason to criticise the
prosecution’s decision to join the criminal proceedings against
the applicant and the five co accused and it emphasised that,
due to the nature and scope of the charges, the cases against M and
the co-accused B and R could not proceed before the cases against the
applicant, N and A had been heard.
Furthermore,
the Court observes that the investigation was carried out in Denmark
and abroad and necessitated the issuing of numerous search warrants
and discovery orders.
Having
regard to these circumstances, the Court finds that the
investigations and the court proceedings were relevant,
time-consuming and difficult. Thus, for the purposes of Article 6 of
the Convention the case was particularly complex.
(b) The applicant’s conduct
In the Government’s opinion the applicant’s
conduct contributed to some extent to the length of the proceedings,
firstly because the crimes that he had committed rendered it
necessary to carry out comprehensive and time-consuming
investigations in Denmark and abroad, in
addition to thorough reviews of large quantities of accounting
material, secondly because the applicant’s counsel was unable
to appear before the High Court in the autumn of 2002, and thirdly
because the applicant fell ill in the spring of 2004.
The
applicant disagreed and contended that his conduct had not given rise
to any significant delay.
It is true that the use by the applicant and the
co-accused in the present case of intricate corporate structures,
several of which were domiciled in or connected with foreign
countries, obviously had the purpose of concealing the tax asset
stripping, but this has already been taken into account in the
assessment of the complexity of the case. Moreover, the Court finds
that the applicant, during the criminal proceedings against him, did
not act in a way that inappropriately prolonged those proceedings
(see, for example, Petersen v. Denmark
(dec.), no. 6315/02, 12 May 2004).
(c) Conduct of the national authorities
The
Government found, taking into consideration the nature, scope and
complexity of the case, that no criticism could be made of the time
spent on the investigation, and that the proceedings before the
courts were accomplished within a reasonable time and without any
periods of inactivity. The only “inactive”
period in the case occurred before the Leave to Appeal Board due
to a regrettable error and lasted for approximately eight months. In
the Government’s view, however, that period could not be
considered so grave in proceedings lasting a total of ten years in
such a highly complex case that a violation of Article 6 §
1 should be found on that ground.
The
applicant maintained that the case should have been handled with
urgency and particular diligence, which did not happen. Instead, he
contended, the proceedings lay dormant several times, notably from
December 1995 until early 1999; during the summer of 2001; from
July 2004 to April 2005; and before the Leave to Appeal Board
from August 2005 to May 2006.
At
the outset, the Court observes that due to the mutual connection
between the cases and their character the investigations and
subsequently the criminal trials of the applicant and the five
co-accused were joined. The City Court found no reason to criticise
this decision although admittedly it caused longer periods of
inactivity during one part of the case, while investigation was going
on in another part of the case. Noting that the accuseds’ roles
were closely interconnected and that a substantial part of the
evidence procured was relevant to all of the accused, the Court can
agree that the decision to join the investigations and the trials was
appropriate.
Moreover,
the facts of the case do not disclose failure on the part of the
investigating authorities or the prosecution to perform their duties
with due diligence in the period from 19 September 1995, when the
applicant was charged, to 25 June 1998, when the indictment was
submitted to the City Court.
Likewise,
as to the proceedings before the City Court, which lasted from 25
June 1998 to 6 April 2001, thus almost two years and ten months, and
those before the High Court, which lasted from 15 May 2001
to 28 September 2004, thus almost three years and five months,
in the light of the complexity of the case and the unavoidable
difficulties which have to be taken into consideration in a trial of
that size involving six co-accused, the Court finds that the length
of those proceedings cannot be criticised (see, inter alia,
Petersen, cited above; Frederiksen v. Denmark,
(dec.), application no. 23012/02, 16 September 2004;
and Wallin Karlsen v. Denmark (dec.), 23523/02),
1 February 2005).
The
Court cannot ignore, however, that after more than nine years of
criminal proceedings, it took the Leave to Appeal Board approximately
one year and eight months to decide whether the applicant and the
co-defendants should be granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court,
and that it is not in dispute that the main reason for that was that
the case lay dormant by mistake for approximately eight months from 5
August 2005 to 2 May 2006.
(d) Overall assessment
In the light of the above, notably the above-mentioned
period of inactivity before the Leave to Appeal Board and the overall
length of the proceedings, the Court concludes that the requirement
of a “reasonable time” laid down in Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention was
not complied with in the present case. There has accordingly been a
breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant relied, lastly, on Article 13 of the Convention and
maintained that in Denmark there was no court to which an application
could be made to complain of the excessive length of proceedings.
The
Government contested that argument.
The
Court reiterates that in respect of the length of criminal
proceedings it has affirmed that different types of remedies may
redress a violation, including taking into account the length of the
proceedings when reducing the sentence in an express and measurable
manner (see Beck v. Norway, no. 26390/95, § 27,
26 June 2001). Moreover, some States, such as Austria, Croatia,
Spain, Poland and the Slovak Republic, have combined two types of
remedy, one designed to expedite the proceedings and the other to
afford compensation. However, States can also choose to introduce
only a compensatory remedy, as Italy has done, without that remedy
being regarded as ineffective (see, among other authorities, Scordino
v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 186-187,
ECHR 2006-...).
As
regards Denmark, the Court has found effective the remedy provided
for by Danish case-law, whereby the courts in case of a finding of a
failure to observe the reasonable-time requirement, may grant redress
therefor by, for example, exempting a convicted person from paying
legal costs or reducing the sentence (see Ugilt Hansen v. Denmark
(dec.), 11968/04, 26 June 2006).
Turning to this specific case, the Court notes that
the Danish courts, at two levels of jurisdiction, examined and
dismissed the applicant’s complaint about the length of
proceedings, and that the Supreme Court could have reviewed those
decisions had the Leave to Appeal Board granted the applicant leave
to appeal. Thus, although the domestic authorities found against the
applicant, he did have an effective remedy for the purposes of
Article 13 of the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed EUR 8,000 in compensation for the violation of his
right to a fair trial within a reasonable time, combined with the
distress and frustration, which he alleged was directly linked to the
uncertainty and frustration endured owing to the excessive length of
the proceedings.
Subject
to the Court finding a violation, the Government agreed that
generally compensation should be awarded. They found, however, that
the applicant’s claim was excessive and disproportionate.
The
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non pecuniary
damage. Having regard to its finding above, notably as to the main
reason for its finding a violation, and ruling on an equitable basis,
it awards him EUR 2,000.
B. Costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings
The
applicant claimed reimbursement of costs and expenses amounting to
DKK 660,000 (approximately EUR
88,500) plus VAT of DKK 450,000. He alleged that the
criminal proceedings against him should have been determined no later
than 1999 and therefore estimated that his loss, due to the
protraction of the case, was one third of the legal expenses imposed
on him by the City Court and the High Court, namely DKK 600,000
for the accounting report, DKK 1,374,500 plus VAT for defence
counsel before the City Court, and DKK 750,000 for the defence
counsel before the High Court.
The
Government contested the claim and submitted that the applicant had
failed to substantiate either that the said amount had been incurred
due to the protraction of the proceedings or that the case “should
have been determined no later than 1999”. In any event, since
the applicant had not submitted any supporting documents or vouchers
proving that he had actually suffered a loss in the said amount, the
Government maintained that the claim should be refused.
The Court reiterates that only legal costs and
expenses found to have been actually and necessarily incurred and
which are reasonable as to quantum are recoverable under Article 41
of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Nikolova v.
Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, § 79, ECHR 1999-II). The
Court further notes that the costs of the domestic proceedings may be
awarded if they are incurred by an applicant in order to try to
prevent the violation found by the Court or to obtain redress
therefor (see, among other authorities, Le Compte,
Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium (Article 50), judgment of 18
October 1982, Series A no. 54, p. 8, § 17). However, in so
far as the applicant had expenses in the proceedings before the
domestic courts which were actually and necessarily incurred in order
to prevent or to have redressed a breach of the Convention, he has
failed to submit relevant supporting documents as required by Rule 60
§ 2 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the Court makes no award
in respect of the costs of the domestic proceedings.
C. Costs and expenses before the Court
The
applicant also requested reimbursement of legal fees and expenses
incurred in the proceedings before the Court, without specifying an
exact amount.
The
Government submitted that the applicant had already received
DKK 40,000 under the Legal Aid Act (Lov
1999-12-20 nr. 940 om retshjælp til indgivelse og førelse
af klagesager for internationale klageorganer i henhold til
menneskerettighedskonventioner),
which in their view was sufficient to cover his costs and expenses
before the Court.
The Court notes the existence in
Denmark of
a Legal Aid Act according to which applicants may be granted free
legal aid for the lodging of complaints before international
institutions under human rights conventions and for the procedure.
The applicant has received EUR 5,365 (equal to DKK 40,000) by
virtue of the said Act. In these circumstances, and having regard to
the nature of the present case, the Court is satisfied that the
applicant has been reimbursed sufficiently under domestic law, and it
sees no reason to award him further compensation for costs and
expenses (see, among others, Vasileva
v. Denmark,
no. 52792/99, § 50, 25 September 2003).
D. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declared
the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Held
that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention;
3. Held
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,000 (two
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage plus any tax that
may be chargeable on this amount, which is to
be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismissed unanimously the remainder of the
applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 December 2008,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Rait Maruste Registrar President