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TADEVOSYAN v. ARMENIA - 41698/04 [2008] ECHR 1565 (2 December 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1565.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 1565
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF TADEVOSYAN v. ARMENIA
(Application
no. 41698/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
2 December
2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Tadevosyan v.
Armenia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Elisabet Fura-Sandström,
Corneliu
Bîrsan,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Alvina
Gyulumyan,
Egbert Myjer,
Luis López
Guerra, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 13 November 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 41698/04) against the Republic
of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by an Armenian national, Mr Myasnik Tadevosyan
(“the applicant”), on 5 November 2004.
The applicant was represented by Mr M. Muller, Mr T.
Otty, Mr K. Yildiz and Ms L. Claridge, lawyers of the
Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) based in London, Mr T.
Ter-Yesayan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan, and Mr A. Ghazaryan. The
Armenian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan, Representative of the Republic of
Armenia at the European Court of Human Rights.
On
24 January 2006 the President of the Third Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1944 and lives in the village of Mrgashat,
Armenia.
The
applicant is the Chairman of the Armavir regional branch of the
National Unity party, one of the opposition parties. Prior to his
retirement the applicant had worked in law enforcement for 30 years,
including ten years as chief of police of the Metsamor Police
Department (ՀՀ
ոստիկանության
Մեծամորի բաժին).
A
series of demonstrations were held from March to May 2004 in Yerevan,
organised by the opposition parties in protest against the alleged
irregularities that had taken place at the February-March 2003
presidential election, challenging the legitimacy of the re-elected
President. It appears that the applicant participated in some of
these demonstrations.
A. The first set of administrative proceedings against the
applicant
On
4 April 2004 the applicant was visited at his home by two police
officers who asked him to accompany them to the Metsamor Police
Department. It appears from the materials of the case that the
applicant showed some resistance while being taken to the police
station. The applicant denied this fact.
At
the police station an administrative case was initiated against the
applicant on the grounds that he had disobeyed the lawful orders of
the police officers and had used foul language. The applicant alleged
that the chief of police had told him that he had been arrested in
order to prevent him from participating in the political
demonstration due to be held the following day in Yerevan.
On
5 April 2004 the applicant was taken to the Armavir Regional Court
(Արմավիրի
մարզի առաջին
ատյանի դատարան)
where he was brought before Judge A. who sentenced him to ten days of
administrative detention for “disobeying the lawful order of
the police officers and using foul language for about five minutes,
when asked to come to the Metsamor Police Department on suspicion of
having committed a robbery”.
The
applicant was then taken to the Temporary Detention Facility at the
Ejmiatsin Police Department to serve his sentence.
The
applicant alleged that, following his release from detention on 14
April 2004, he had been subjected to frequent police visits to, and
searches of, his home. He had been forced to hide when such visits
took place, fearing that he would be taken to the police station
again.
On
20 April 2004 the applicant wrote to the Ombudsman (ՀՀ
մարդու իրավունքների
պաշտպան),
complaining about the above events, including the alleged frequent
visits by the police officers. It appears that this complaint was
forwarded by the Ombudsman to the regional prosecutor's office by a
letter of 17 May 2004.
B. The second set of administrative proceedings against the
applicant
The
applicant alleged that on 20 May 2004 at around 8 a.m. he had been
visited at his home by three police officers who had informed him
that the Chief of the Metsamor Police Department (ՀՀ
ոստիկանության
Մեծամորի բաժնի
պետ) wanted to talk to him. He had then
been taken to the police station.
It
appears from the materials of the case that the applicant was
arrested at around 9 a.m. on that day. According to the Government,
the reason for his arrest was an argument that had erupted between
him and the police officers who had stopped his car for a check.
At
the police station an administrative case was initiated against the
applicant, who was apparently charged under Article 182 of the Code
of Administrative Offences (Վարչական
իրավախախտումների
վերաբերյալ
ՀՀ օրենսգիրք
– “the CAO”) with maliciously disobeying the lawful
orders of police officers and using foul language. It appears that a
record of an administrative offence was drawn up which was signed by
the applicant. A third person, S., made a statement corroborating the
charge against the applicant.
The
applicant alleged that at the police station he had been asked to
sign a statement that he had used offensive language when stopped by
police officers while driving his car. He had refused to sign this
statement, claiming that the charge against him was false. The
officers responded by stating that they had been instructed to write
such a statement by the chief of police.
The
applicant further alleged that at around 12 noon he had been taken to
meet the chief of police, who had informed him that he was to be
detained for a further ten days. In reply the applicant denied the
charges. The chief of police then used insulting language towards the
applicant. Shortly thereafter he was taken to a court.
The
Government contested the above allegations and claimed that the
applicant had been informed by the police officers of his procedural
rights, including his right to have a lawyer, but the applicant did
not wish to have a lawyer.
The
applicant was brought before Judge H. of the Armavir Regional Court
(Արմավիրի
մարզի առաջին
ատյանի դատարան).
Judge H., after a brief hearing, sentenced the applicant under
Article 182 of the CAO to ten days of administrative detention. The
judge's entire finding amounted to the following:
“On the night from 19 to 20 May 2004 [a car] was
continually driving through the village of Mrgashat, which raised the
suspicion of police officers on duty who, for the purpose of a check,
at around 9 a.m. attempted to stop the car and to dispel their
suspicion. The driver of the car [the applicant] started to swear at
the police officers, obstructed their work, used foul language and
disobeyed their lawful orders, for which he was brought to the
Metsamor Police Department.
In his submissions [the applicant] did not admit to
having committed the offence, stating that he had not done anything
wrong. He understood that he had to serve a sentence, therefore, he
would go and serve a sentence. He was grateful to everybody, knew the
law well and did not need defence counsel.
The witnesses, District Inspector [G.] and Operative
Officer on Juvenile Crimes [A.] of the Metsamor Police Department,
stated that [the applicant] had disobeyed their lawful orders, used
foul language and sworn at them.
Witness [S.] stated that he had been present when [the
applicant] swore at and argued with the police officers.
The commission of the offence by [the applicant] is
corroborated by the record of an administrative offence, the reports,
[the record of the arrest] and witness statements.”
According
to the record of the court hearing, the hearing was held in public at
4 p.m. The judge informed the applicant of his right to challenge the
judge and the clerk and to have a lawyer. The applicant did not wish
to lodge any challenges or to have a lawyer. The judge then proceeded
with examination of evidence. It appears that the judge heard the
applicant, the relevant police officers and then witness S. The judge
departed to the deliberation room, after which he returned and
announced the decision.
The
applicant alleged that the record of the court hearing did not
adequately reflect what had taken place in reality. The judge had
failed to question or take any evidence from the applicant and to
provide him with the necessary time to call defence witnesses and to
cross-examine the police officers and the prosecution witnesses. His
submissions as to the falseness of the police reports had been
ignored. He had never been informed of his right to have a lawyer.
The hearing had lasted only a few minutes.
On
21 May 2004 the applicant wrote to the Armavir Regional Prosecutor
(Արմավիրի
մարզի դատախազ),
complaining about the alleged police visits, claiming that the
administrative cases against him had been fabricated, asking the
Prosecutor to act upon his complaints and asking to be released. He
also alleged that the chief of police had insulted him.
On
26 May 2004 the competent prosecutor's office refused to institute
criminal proceedings in the absence of a criminal act. No appeal was
lodged against this decision.
C. The applicant's detention
The
applicant served his second ten-day sentence at the Temporary
Detention Facility at the Ejmiatsin Police Department.
The
applicant alleged, and the Government did not dispute, that during
that period he had been kept in a cell which measured 10 sq. m
together with nine other inmates, of whom several held multiple
criminal convictions, despite his age, his position as a former chief
of police and his lack of previous convictions. There were no beds
and the detainees had to sleep on plywood on the floor. The cell was
poorly ventilated and there was not enough fresh air. All the
detainees except the applicant smoked in the cell. The cell was half
dark, with a small window which measured 0.32 sq. m and was
practically closed. The applicant's access to the toilet facilities
and to drinking water was limited to twice per day. He received only
one meal per day. Since he was a former chief of police, he felt
grossly humiliated and was fearful for his safety during his
detention.
The
applicant alleged that after his release from detention on
30 May 2004 he continued to suffer from anxiety and
insomnia.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Code of Administrative Offences
For
a summary of the relevant provisions of the CAO see the judgment in
the case of Galstyan v. Armenia (no. 26986/03, § 26,
15 November 2007). The provisions of the CAO which were not
cited in the above judgment, as in force at the material time,
provide:
Article 182: Maliciously disobeying a lawful order or
demand of a police officer or a member of the voluntary police
“Maliciously disobeying a lawful order or demand
of a police officer or a member of the voluntary police made in the
performance of his duties of preserving public order shall result in
the imposition of a fine of between 50% and double the fixed minimum
wage, or of correctional labour for between one and two months with
the deduction of 20% of earnings or, in cases where, in the
circumstances of the case, taking into account the offender's
personality, the application of these measures would be deemed
insufficient, of administrative detention not exceeding 15 days.”
B. The Law on Conditions for Holding Arrested and
Detained Persons («Ձերբակալված
և կալանավորված
անձանց պահելու
մասին» ՀՀ օրենք)
The
relevant provisions of the Law, as in force at the material time,
read as follows:
Section 13: Rights of arrested and detained persons
“An arrested or detained person is entitled: ...
(3) to lodge, himself or through his lawyer or lawful representative,
applications and complaints alleging a violation of his rights and
freedoms with the administration of the facility for arrested or
detained persons, their superior authorities, a court, a prosecutor's
office, the Ombudsman, the bodies of public administration and local
self-governance, non-governmental unions and [political] parties,
mass media and international institutions and organisations
protecting human rights and freedoms.”
Section 20: Ensuring the material and living
conditions of arrested and detained persons
“...The living space afforded to arrested and
detained persons must comply with the building and sanitary-hygienic
norms established for general living spaces. The area of the living
space afforded to arrested and detained persons shall not be less
than 2.5 sq. m for each individual.
Arrested and detained persons must be provided with
individual bedding and bed linen.”
C. Decree no. 8 of the Chief of Armenian Police of
11 September 2003 Approving the Internal Rules of
Facilities under the Armenian Police for Holding Arrested Persons
The
relevant provisions of the Decree read as follows:
“Special sections of the [facilities for holding
arrested persons] shall be reserved for persons who have been
subjected to administrative detention for periods prescribed by [the
CAO]...”
III. RELEVANT REPORTS CONCERNING CONDITIONS OF DETENTION
A. The Report of the Committee for the Prevention of
Torture (CPT) on its Visit to Armenia in 2002 – CPT/Inf(2004)25
The
relevant part of the Report reads as follows:
“4. Conditions of detention
a. introduction
43. At the outset, the CPT wishes to
highlight the criteria which it applies when assessing police
detention facilities.
All police cells should be clean, of a reasonable size
for the number of persons they are used to accommodate, and have
adequate lighting (i.e. sufficient to read by, sleeping periods
excluded) and ventilation; preferably, cells should enjoy natural
light. Further, cells should be equipped with a means of rest (for
example, a chair or bench) and persons obliged to stay overnight in
custody should be provided with a clean mattress and clean blankets.
Persons in custody should be able to satisfy the needs
of nature when necessary, in clean and decent conditions, and be
offered adequate washing facilities. They should have ready access to
drinking water and be given food at appropriate times, including at
least one full meal (that is, something more substantial than a
sandwich) every day. Persons held in
custody for 24 hours or more should, as far as possible, be offered
one hour of outdoor exercise every day.
b. temporary detention centres
44. During the visit, the CPT's delegation
visited temporary detention centres in Yerevan, Akhurian, Hrazdan,
Maralik and Sevan. Establishments of this type are used to hold two
categories of detainees: criminal suspects and persons under
administrative arrest.
Conditions of detention in the temporary detention
centres visited varied from acceptable (at the Hrazdan Department of
Internal Affairs) to poor (e.g. at the Akhurian and Sevan Departments
of Internal Affairs).
45. As regards occupancy levels, a
consultation of registers and the number of sleeping places per cell
suggested that the minimum standard of 2.5 m² of living space
per person, as stipulated by the Law on [Conditions for Holding
Arrested and Detained Persons], was respected as concerns criminal
suspects. However, the CPT must add that this minimum standard is too
low. As concerns the cells for administrative detainees, the
information gathered during the visit indicated that conditions could
become extremely cramped, e.g. up to 6 detainees in a cell of 9 m²
in Hrazdan and Sevan.
All the centres visited presented deficiencies
concerning the in-cell lighting and ventilation. With the
exception of the Hrazdan centre, access to natural light was poor
(small windows, sometimes - as in Yerevan - covered by metal
shutters) or inexistent (e.g. in Akhurian). Artificial lighting was
invariably dim, with some cells (e.g. in Yerevan, Akhurian and
Maralik) submerged in near darkness. As to ventilation, it left
something to be desired at Yerevan and Sevan.
As to the state of repair and hygiene of the
detention areas, it ranged from quite acceptable at the Hrazdan
Department of Internal Affairs to poor at the Sevan establishment.
Cells at the Temporary detention centre in Yerevan were in a
reasonably good state of repair; however, their level of cleanliness
left something to be desired. Detention areas in Akhurian and Maralik
were dilapidated but clean.
46. Cells were furnished with beds or wooden
sleeping platforms. The delegation noted that mattresses, sheets,
pillows and blankets were available for criminal suspects at all
the temporary detention centres visited; however, this was not the
case for administrative detainees.
The delegation did not hear any complaints from persons
who were - or had recently been - detained at the centres visited as
regards access to a toilet. However, with the notable
exception of the Hrazdan Department of Internal Affairs, the communal
toilet and washing facilities were dilapidated and dirty.
The centres in Yerevan and Hrazdan possessed shower
facilities, which could apparently be used by newly-arrived detainees
(upon recommendation of a feldsher/doctor) and by those
administrative detainees who stayed in the respective establishments
for longer than a week. In both centres, the shower facilities were
in an acceptable state of repair and cleanliness, and hot water was
available. However, the only personal hygiene item that was
distributed to detainees was a small piece of soap.
47. According to information provided by
police officers in the majority of the temporary detention centres
visited, detainees were offered food three times per day,
including one hot meal. However, this was not the case at the Sevan
Department of Internal Affairs, where food was only delivered once
per day, reportedly due to the limited budget set aside for this
purpose (320 AMD - i.e. some 50 euro cents - per detainee per day).
In this situation, the provision of food was to a large extent
ensured by detainees' families. Detained persons without family
contacts had to rely on the generosity of other detainees or
individual police officers for food.
48. All the temporary detention centres
visited possessed outdoor exercise areas, where detainees were
apparently allowed to take exercise for one hour per day (in the case
of women and juveniles - for two hours per day). However, at the
Temporary Detention Centre of the City Department of Internal Affairs
in Yerevan, the delegation was informed that detainees could be
deprived of outdoor exercise as a form of punishment for violation of
the centre's internal regulations.
49. The CPT recommends that the
Armenian authorities take steps at temporary detention centres to:
- ensure that all detainees are offered
adequate living space; the objective should be at least 4 m² per
person;
- provide adequate in-cell lighting
(including access to natural light) and ventilation;
- maintain the cells and common sanitary
facilities in a satisfactory state of repair and hygiene;
- ensure that all detainees (including those
held for administrative violations) are offered a mattress and
blankets at night;
- ensure that administrative detainees are
able to take a hot shower at least once a week during their period of
detention;
- ensure that all detainees are offered food
- sufficient in quantity and quality - at normal meal times;
- put an end to deprivation of outdoor
exercise as a disciplinary punishment.”
B. The CPT Report on its Visit to Armenia in 2004 –
CPT/Inf(2006)38
The
relevant part of the Report reads as follows:
“4. Conditions of detention
a. Temporary detention centre of the
Department of Internal Affairs of the City of Yerevan
20. Conditions of detention in this facility
remained basically the same as those observed during the 2002 visit,
i.e. poor. One positive change was that persons under administrative
arrest were now provided with bedding (pursuant to Order No. 8 of the
Head of the National Police of 20 August 2003). Further, the
delegation was informed that the food entitlement for detainees had
been increased by Government decision of May 2003. Otherwise, no
refurbishment or major repairs had taken place since the previous
visit.
Consequently, the CPT reiterates the recommendations
made in paragraph 49 of the report on the 2002 visit, in particular
as regards living space, in-cell lighting, ventilation, state of
repair and hygiene.”
C. The CPT Report on its Visit to Armenia in 2006 –
CPT/Inf(2007)47
The
relevant part of the Report reads as follows:
“4. Conditions of detention
a. police holding areas
28. At the beginning of the 2006 visit, the
delegation was informed that, pursuant to Order NK–328–NG
of the President of the Republic of Armenia, dated 28 December 2004,
a large-scale refurbishment programme had been initiated in all
police holding areas. The CPT welcomes this. It should also be noted
that a recent amendment to the [Law on Conditions for Holding
Arrested and Detained Persons] increased the official standard of
living space per detained person in police holding areas to 4 m².
This can be considered as acceptable when applied to multi-occupancy
cells; however, 4 m² is not an adequate size for a single
occupancy cell.
29. During the visit, the delegation could
observe the impact of the above-mentioned programme. Some of the
police holding areas (e.g. in Charentsavan, Gavar and Hrazdan) were
still undergoing refurbishment and were to reopen shortly. As regards
the already refurbished holding areas, conditions in them were
overall of a high standard.”
THE LAW
I. THE FIRST SET OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND THE
RESULTING DETENTION
The
applicant complained under numerous Articles of the Convention about
the administrative proceedings of 5 April 2004 and the conditions of
his detention after that sentence.
The
Court notes that the proceedings of 5 April 2004 terminated with the
decision of the Armavir Regional Court taken on that date and that
there were no effective remedies to exhaust (see Galstyan,
cited above, §§ 40-42). Furthermore, the applicant was
released from his detention after fully serving his sentence on 14
April 2004. The present application was, however, lodged only on 5
November 2004.
It
follows that this part of the application was lodged out of time and
must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4
of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained about the conditions of his detention and about
allegedly having been subjected to degrading treatment while in
police custody on 20 May 2004. He invoked Article 3 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
1. The conditions of detention
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust
domestic remedies. It was open to him to complain about the
conditions of his detention under section 13 of the Law on Conditions
for Holding Arrested and Detained Persons, which he had failed to do.
The
applicant submitted that as he had not had the benefit of legal
advice during his detention he had not been aware of any appeal
procedure against conditions of detention, since bringing such
complaints was not general practice. In any event, this was an
ineffective remedy since any complaint was likely only to result in
him being moved to a different cell with the same conditions.
Furthermore, the existence of an appeal procedure in law did not
absolve the authorities from their obligation to ensure adequate
conditions of detention.
The
Court reiterates that the only remedies to be exhausted are those
which are effective. It is incumbent on the Government claiming
non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective
one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that
is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of
providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and
offered reasonable prospects of success. Once this burden of proof
has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the
remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted, or was for
some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular
circumstances of the case, or that there existed special
circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see
Kalashnikov v. Russia (dec.), no. 47095/99, 18 September 2001,
and Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01, § 67, 28
March 2006).
The
Court further emphasises that Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention must be applied with some degree of flexibility and
without excessive formalism. Moreover, the rule of exhaustion of
domestic remedies is neither absolute nor capable of being applied
automatically. In reviewing whether the rule has been observed, it is
essential to have regard to the existence of formal remedies in the
legal system of the State concerned, the general legal and
political context in which they operate, as well as the
particular circumstances of the case and whether the applicant did
everything that could reasonably be expected in order to exhaust
available domestic remedies (ibid.).
In
the present case, the Government claimed that the applicant had had a
remedy at his disposal, namely that he could have lodged a complaint
under section 13 of the Law on Conditions for Holding Arrested and
Detained Persons. The Court observes, however, that the Government
did not produce any evidence to demonstrate that the remedy relied on
was sufficient and effective. They failed even to specify to which of
the numerous authorities mentioned in that provision the applicant
was supposed to apply and what specific measures could have been
taken by them to provide redress for the applicant's complaints,
especially taking into account that the issues raised by the
applicant were apparently of a structural nature and did not only
concern the applicant's personal situation (see the relevant CPT
reports at paragraphs 30-32 above). The Government's objection as to
non-exhaustion must therefore be dismissed.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
2. The alleged ill-treatment in police custody
The
applicant alleged that he had been subjected to degrading treatment
while in police custody. In particular, he submitted that the fact
that he had been arrested by police officers who knew him to be the
former chief of police, that he had been taken to a police station
where he had served for ten years, that he had been charged with
offences which those officers allegedly admitted to be falsified and
that he had been insulted by the chief of police amounted to
degrading treatment.
The
Court observes at the outset that Article 3 enshrines one of the most
fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute
terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
irrespective of the victim's conduct (see, among other authorities,
Labita v. Italy [GC], no 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV).
It reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The
assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and
context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its
execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some
instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among
other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65,
§ 162).
Even
assuming that the applicant has exhausted the domestic remedies in
respect of these complaints, taking into account that he did not
lodge an appeal against the decision of 26 May 2004, the Court does
not consider that the fact that the applicant was arrested and
charged by his former colleagues can be regarded as attaining the
minimum level of severity required by Article 3. Furthermore, the
applicant's allegation that the police officers had admitted that the
charges had been falsified was not supported by any evidence. Lastly,
as regards the applicant's allegation of verbal abuse, there is
similarly no evidence in the case file that could corroborate this
allegation, which, moreover, lacked detail in both the applicant's
complaint to the domestic authorities and his submissions before the
Court. In sum, there is no evidence to support the applicant's
allegations of ill-treatment in police custody.
This
part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that there had been no breach of the
requirements of Article 3. The applicant had failed to submit any
proof of damage caused to his mental or physical health. His
allegations that his health had deteriorated as a result of his
detention were not supported by any evidence. Finally, the
authorities had not intended to humiliate or debase the applicant.
The Government also added that substantial changes have taken place
in the penitentiary system in Armenia in terms of both improving the
general conditions and the regime applied within prisons
notwithstanding the existing socio-economic problems.
The
applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had amounted
to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3. He argued
that he had not been able to obtain a doctor's certificate concerning
the deterioration of his health because the doctors involved feared
persecution for providing such a certificate. Furthermore, even
though the authorities were aware of his status as a former chief of
police, they had put him in a cell with other criminals and thus
placed him at risk of an attack. Despite the fact that no such attack
had taken place, he had nevertheless suffered mental anguish as a
result of fearing for his safety. This, coupled with the general
conditions of detention, amounted to a violation of Article 3.
The
Court reiterates the basic principles established in its case-law
concerning the prohibition of ill-treatment under Article 3 (see
paragraph 44 above). It further observes that treatment has been held
by it to be “degrading” because it was such as to arouse
in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of
humiliating and debasing them (see Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, § 92, ECHR 2000 XI). Furthermore,
in considering whether a particular form of treatment is “degrading”
within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will have regard to
whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned
and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely
affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article
3 (see Raninen v. Finland, judgment of 16 December 1997,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 VIII,
pp. 2821-22, § 55). However, the absence of any
such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of
Article 3 (see, for example, Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95,
§ 74, ECHR 2001 III). In order for a punishment or
treatment associated with it to be “degrading”, the
suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that
inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given
form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see V. v. the United
Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, § 71, ECHR 1999 IX).
Measures
depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element.
However, it is incumbent on the State to ensure that a person is
detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his
human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the
measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention
and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and
well-being are adequately secured (see Kalashnikov v. Russia,
no. 47095/99, § 95, ECHR 2002 VI). When assessing
conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative
effects of those conditions, as well as the specific allegations made
by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98,
§ 46, ECHR 2001 II).
In
the present case, the applicant was kept in detention for a total
period of ten days. During this period he was kept in a cell
measuring 10 sq. m with nine other inmates; in other words,
he was afforded 1 sq. m of personal space. In this respect the
applicant's situation was comparable to that in the Kalashnikov
case, in which the applicant had been confined to a space
measuring about 0.9-1.9 sq. m. In that case the Court held that such
a severe degree of overcrowding raised in itself an issue under
Article 3 of the Convention (see Kalashnikov, cited above, §§
96-97). Furthermore, the space afforded to the applicant in the
present case was significantly smaller than the 4 sq. m minimum
requirement for a single inmate in multi-occupancy cells according to
the CPT standards (see the relevant CPT reports at paragraphs 30-32
above) and even smaller than the 2.5 sq. m minimum required at the
material time under the domestic law. Nothing suggests that the
applicant was allowed any out-of-cell activities that could
compensate for this serious lack of space (see Cenbauer v.
Croatia, no. 73786/01, § 49, ECHR 2006 III;
Malechkov v. Bulgaria, no. 57830/00, § 141,
28 June 2007, and, by contrast, Nurmagomedov v. Russia
(dec.), no. 30138/02, 16 September 2004).
The
Court further notes that there were no sleeping facilities or bedding
in the cell so the detainees had to sleep on the floor. Other inmates
were allowed to smoke while the cell was equipped with a very small
window which was apparently closed most of the time, preventing fresh
air and natural light from entering the cell.
The
Court finally notes that at no time during his stay in the detention
facility was the applicant allowed unrestricted access to the toilet
or drinking water, his visits to the toilet or drinking water
facilities being limited to only twice a day. Only one meal per day
was provided. The Court reiterates that it is unacceptable for a
person to be detained in conditions in which no provision has been
made for meeting his or her basic needs (see, mutatis mutandis,
Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787/03 and 29810/03, §§ 106,
ECHR 2008 (extracts), and Shchebet v. Russia,
no. 16074/07, § 93, 12 June 2008).
The
Court observes that the Government did not contest the applicant's
account of the conditions of his detention (see paragraph 25 above).
It further observes that the applicant's description corresponds to a
large extent to the findings of the CPT, which, during its 2002 visit
to Armenia, inspected a number of police temporary detention centres
where administrative detainees were held (see, for other examples of
the Court's reliance on the CPT reports, Kehayov v. Bulgaria,
no. 41035/98, § 66, 18 January 2005, and Ostrovar v.
Moldova, no. 35207/03, § 80, 13 September
2005). Even if this visit predated the circumstances of the present
case, it appears from the CPT materials that no significant
improvements had taken place in this field before a large-scale
refurbishment programme was launched in December 2004. The Court
therefore does not have reasons to doubt the veracity of the
applicant's submissions.
The
Court also notes that the length of the applicant's detention was
relatively short, amounting to a total of ten days. However, it
observes that conditions of detention of comparable and even of much
shorter length have previously been found to be incompatible with the
requirements of Article 3 (see Riad and Idiab, cited above,
§§ 100-11, in which the applicants were kept in
detention for fifteen and eleven days, and Fedotov v. Russia,
no. 5140/02, §§ 66-70, 25 October 2005, in which
the applicant was detained for twenty-two hours with no food or water
or access to a toilet). Therefore, while the length of a detention
period may be a relevant factor in assessing the gravity of suffering
or humiliation caused to a detainee by the inadequate conditions of
his detention (see, for example, Kalashnikov, cited above, §
102, and Dougoz, cited above, § 48), the relative brevity
of such a period alone will not automatically exclude the treatment
complained of from the scope of Article 3 if all other elements are
sufficient to bring it within the scope of that provision.
The
Court agrees with the Government that there is not sufficient proof
in the materials of the case linking the health problems allegedly
experienced by the applicant to his stay at the detention facility.
However, it considers that, while evidence of damage caused to a
detainee's health by the conditions of his detention may be a
relevant factor to be considered (see, for example, Labzov v.
Russia, no. 62208/00, § 47, 16 June 2005), the
existence of such consequences is by no means a precondition for
finding a violation of Article 3 (see, for example, Dougoz,
cited above, §§ 45-49; Cenbauer, cited above, §§
45-53; Shchebet, cited above, §§ 86-96, and Fedotov,
cited above, §§ 66-70).
It
is true that during his detention the applicant did not complain that
he was at any time threatened by his cellmates who were allegedly
convicted criminals. Nevertheless, having regard to the cumulative
effects of the conditions of the applicant's detention as described
above, the Court considers that the hardship the applicant endured
appears to have exceeded the unavoidable level inherent in detention
and finds that the resulting suffering and feelings of humiliation
and inferiority went beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3
of the Convention.
As
regards the Government's submission that the authorities had no
intention to debase him, as already indicated above, the absence of
any purpose to humiliate or debase the victim cannot exclude a
finding of a violation of Article 3 (see paragraph 49 above). The
Court therefore concludes that the conditions of the applicant's
detention amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of
Article 3.
Accordingly,
there has been a violation of that provision.
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTION AS TO NON-EXHAUSTION IN
CONNECTION WITH THE APPLICANT'S CONVICTION OF 20 MAY 2004
The
Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust the
domestic remedies in respect of the decision of 20 May 2004 by not
lodging an appeal with the President of the Criminal and Military
Court of Appeal under Article 294 of the CAO.
The
applicant contested the Government's objection.
The
Court notes that it has already examined this issue and found that
the review possibility provided by Article 294 of the CAO was not an
effective remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention (see Galstyan, cited above, § 42). The
Government's preliminary objection must therefore be rejected.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the
Convention about his administrative detention. The relevant
provisions of Article 5 read as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after
conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in
order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order
for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention
for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the
prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of
unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the
country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view
to deportation or extradition.
...
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which
the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant's administrative detention
had been permissible under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention
as “the lawful detention of a person after conviction by the
competent court”. His case had been examined by the trial
court, which was the sole competent authority to do so. As to the
judicial supervision required by Article 5 § 4, this had been
incorporated in the trial court's decision.
The
applicant submitted that his administrative detention had been
arbitrary, in violation of Article 5 § 1. He further submitted
that he had been denied effective access to the appeal court to
challenge his detention as required by Article 5 § 4.
The
Court observes that it has already examined a similar complaint under
Article 5 § 1 and found that the administrative detention had
been imposed on the applicant after a “conviction by a
competent court” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a)
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law (see Galstyan,
cited above, §§ 47-49). It sees no reasons to depart from
that finding in the present case. Furthermore, the Court reiterates
that, where a sentence of imprisonment is pronounced after a
“conviction by a competent court” within the meaning of
Article 5 § 1 (a), the supervision required by Article 5 §
4 is incorporated in that decision (see Galstyan, cited above,
§ 51).
This
part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant made several complaints about the administrative
proceedings against him under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b)-(d)
of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provide:
“1. In the determination ... of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal...
...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence
has the following minimum rights:
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for
the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing...
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him...”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds.
They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that the applicant had had a fair and public
hearing. He had failed to submit any proof in support of his
allegation that the judge had not been impartial. The applicant had
been provided with an opportunity to call witnesses, submit evidence
and to lodge requests and challenges, which he had failed to do. The
court had issued a reasoned decision which was based on various
materials, including a witness statement. Both the police officers
and the judge had advised the applicant to avail himself of his right
to have a lawyer but he had not wished to do so. Lastly, the
applicant had been afforded adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence.
The
applicant submitted that the trial had not been fair and the tribunal
had not been independent and impartial. Furthermore, it had not been
public since it had been held in camera in a judge's office. The
court had failed to provide a reasoned decision. Moreover, this
decision had been based solely on the materials prepared by the
police. He had not been allowed to call or to cross-examine any
witnesses on his behalf. No time was afforded to him to collect
evidence and to prepare his defence. He had neither been informed of
his right to have a lawyer, nor ever refused to have one. Lastly, he
had been arrested at 4 p.m. while the trial had taken place at 6 p.m.
Thus, he had been afforded only two hours to prepare his defence,
which was insufficient.
The
Court notes from the outset that similar facts and complaints have
already been examined in a number of cases against Armenia, in
which the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 3 (b) taken
together with Article 6 § 1 (see Galstyan, cited above,
§§ 86-88, and Ashughyan v. Armenia, no.
33268/03, §§ 66-67, 17 July 2008). The
circumstances of the present case are practically identical. The
administrative case against the applicant was examined in an
expedited procedure under Article 277 of the CAO. The applicant was
similarly taken to and kept in a police station – without any
contact with the outside world – where he was presented with a
charge and in several hours taken to a court and convicted. The Court
therefore does not see any reason to reach a different finding in the
present case and concludes that the applicant did not have a fair
hearing, in particular on account of not being afforded adequate time
and facilities for the preparation of his defence.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 3 taken together
with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
In
view of the finding made in the preceding paragraph, the Court does
not consider it necessary to examine also the other alleged
violations of Article 6.
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL NO. 7
The
applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had
had no right to contest the decision of 20 May 2004. The Court
considers that this issue falls to be examined under Article 2 of
Protocol No. 7 which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“1. Everyone convicted of a criminal
offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or
sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right,
including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed
by law.”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that the applicant had had the right to have his
conviction reviewed, this right being prescribed by Article 294 of
the CAO.
The
applicant submitted that all the legal provisions regarding the right
to appeal were uncertain and confused.
The
Court notes that the applicant in the present case was convicted
under the same procedure as in the above-mentioned case of Galstyan,
in which the Court concluded that the applicant did not have at his
disposal an appeal procedure which would satisfy the requirements of
Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (see Galstyan, cited above, §§
124-27). The Court does not see any reasons to depart from that
finding in the present case.
Accordingly,
there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7.
VII. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION AND ITS
PROTOCOLS
Lastly,
the applicant complained that his conviction violated his rights
guaranteed by Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention and that he
had not been allowed any contact with his family or lawyer while in
detention, in violation of the guarantees of Article 8 of the
Convention.
Having
regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these
complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that they do
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part
of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
VIII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The
Government submitted that, if the Court were to find a violation,
that would be sufficient just satisfaction. In any event, the amount
claimed was excessive.
The
Court considers that the applicant has undoubtedly suffered
non-pecuniary damage as a result of being sanctioned through unfair
proceedings and having no possibility to appeal against this
sanction, which resulted in his detention for a period of ten days in
degrading conditions. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the
applicant EUR 4,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed USD 3,050 (approximately EUR 2,075) and
3,537.49 pounds sterling (GBP) (approximately EUR 5,200) for the
costs and expenses incurred before the Court. These claims comprised:
(a) USD 3,050
for the fees of his two domestic representatives (16 and 13 hours at
USD 150 and 50 per hour respectively);
(b) GBP 3,437.49
for the fees of his two KHRP lawyers (about 10 and 13 hours
respectively at GBP 150 per hour); and
(d) GBP 100
for administrative costs incurred by the KHRP.
The
applicant submitted detailed time sheets stating hourly rates in
support of his claims.
The
Government submitted that the claims in respect of the domestic and
foreign lawyers were not duly substantiated with documentary proof,
since the applicant had failed to produce any contracts certifying
that there was an agreement with those lawyers to provide legal
services at the alleged hourly rate. Furthermore, the applicant had
used the services of an excessive number of lawyers, despite the fact
that the case was not so complex as to justify such a need. Moreover,
the hourly rates allegedly charged by the domestic lawyers were
excessive.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court considers
that not all the legal costs claimed were necessarily and reasonably
incurred, including some duplication in the work carried out by the
foreign and the domestic representatives, as set out in the relevant
time sheets. Furthermore, a reduction must also be applied in view of
the fact that a substantial part of the initial application and
communicated complaints was declared inadmissible. Making its own
estimate based on the information available and deciding on an
equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,000 in
respect of costs and expenses, to be paid in pounds sterling into his
representatives' bank account in the United Kingdom.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints under Article 3 and
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b)-(d) of the Convention and Article
2 of Protocol No. 7 in respect of the applicant's conviction of 20
May 2004 and the resulting conditions of his detention admissible,
and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant's
detention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 taken together with Article 6 § 3 (b) of the
Convention in that the applicant did not have a fair hearing, in
particular on account of the fact that he was not afforded adequate
time and facilities for the preparation of his defence in the
administrative proceedings against him;
Holds that there is no need to examine the other
complaints under Article 6 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
2 of Protocol No. 7;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:
(i) EUR
4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into
the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement;
(ii) EUR
3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to
the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into
pounds sterling at the rate applicable at the date of settlement and
to be paid into his representatives' bank account in the United
Kingdom;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 December 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Josep Casadevall
Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the concurring opinion of Judge
Fura-Sandström is
annexed to this judgment.
J.C.M.
S.H.N.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE FURA-SANDSTRÖM
The
Court found a violation of Article 6 paragraph 1 taken together with
Article 6 paragraph 3 (b) of the Convention in that the applicant did
not have a fair hearing, in particular on account of the fact that he
was not afforded adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence (paragraph 72) following the case-law established in the
cases of Ashughyan and Galstyan. While accepting this
approach, I would have preferred to examine separately the complaints
relating to the lack of legal assistance. The applicant alleges that
he had neither been informed of his right to have a lawyer nor
refused to have one (paragraph 71). For the same reasons expressed in
my partly dissenting opinion in the Galstyan case, to which I
refer, I find that there has been a violation of Article 6 paragraph
1 taken together with Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) also in this respect.