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MKHITARYAN v. ARMENIA - 22390/05 [2008] ECHR 1564 (2 December 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1564.html
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[2008] ECHR 1564
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF MKHITARYAN v. ARMENIA
(Application
no. 22390/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
2 December 2008
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Mkhitaryan v.
Armenia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Josep Casadevall,
President,
Elisabet Fura-Sandström,
Corneliu
Bîrsan,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Alvina
Gyulumyan,
Egbert Myjer,
Luis López
Guerra, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 13 November 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 22390/05) against the Republic
of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by an Armenian national, Mr Arman Mkhitaryan (“the
applicant”), on 15 September 2003.
The applicant was represented by Mr M. Muller, Mr T.
Otty, Mr K. Yildiz and Ms L. Claridge, lawyers of the
Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) based in London, Mr T.
Ter-Yesayan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan, and Mr A. Ghazaryan. The
Armenian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan, Representative of the Republic of
Armenia at the European Court of Human Rights.
On
12 September 2005 the President of the Third Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1965 and lives in the village of Karakert,
Armenia.
A. Administrative proceedings against the applicant
The
applicant has been a member of the Armenian Communist Party since
1998.
In
February and March 2003 a presidential election took place in
Armenia. Following the first and second rounds of the election, a
series of protest rallies were organised in Yerevan by the opposition
parties, alleging irregularities.
On
21 March 2003 the applicant participated in a rally in Yerevan which
was part of a nationwide public demonstration. Following the
demonstration the applicant returned to his home in the village of
Karakert.
On
22 March 2003 two police officers from the Baghramyan Police
Department (ՀՀ
ոստիկանության
Բաղրամյանի
բաժին) visited the applicant
at his home.
The
applicant alleged that this visit had taken place at 7 a.m. The
police officers told him that he was required to accompany them to
the police station as the chief wished to see him regarding matters
unrelated to the demonstration the day before.
The
Government contested this allegation and submitted that the police
officers had visited the applicant at 9 a.m. because they suspected
him of having participated in an unauthorised demonstration the
previous day.
It
appears from the materials of the case that the applicant was asked
by the police officers to accompany them to the police station. He
showed resistance but was nevertheless taken to the police station.
According
to the Government, at the police station the arresting police
officers drew up a record of the applicant's arrest (արձանագրությաւն
բերման ենթարկելու
մասին) in which the reasons
for his arrest were indicated. This record was allegedly signed by
the applicant.
In
his application form, the applicant alleged that at the police
station he had discovered that the real reason for his detention was
his participation in the demonstration the previous day. Contrary to
what he had been told, the chief of police did not want to see him.
His requests to have a lawyer were ignored. In a later submission,
the applicant alleged that the chief of police had in fact met him
and told him that he would be detained since there were instructions
from the Minister of the Interior to arrest temporarily all political
activists.
According
to a written statement (արձանագրություն
բացատրություն
վերցնելու
մասին) made by the applicant
at the police station, on 22 March 2003 he had participated in a
rally in Yerevan and the same evening he had returned home to his
village. The next morning at 9 a.m. the police officers had
visited him at home and asked him to accompany them to the police
station. An argument had erupted, during which the applicant admitted
having disobeyed the lawful orders of the police officers. The
applicant had regretted his actions, asked for forgiveness and
promised that it would never happen again.
The
applicant alleged that he had made the above statement since the
police officers had led him to believe that his arrest was not in
relation to serious matters and that he would not face any serious
consequences.
The
Government contested the above allegations and submitted that the
applicant had made the above statement voluntarily. The police
officers had informed the applicant of his procedural rights and had
advised him to avail himself of his right to have a lawyer but he had
not wished to do so.
The
police officers drew up a record of an administrative offence
(վարչական
իրավախախտման
արձանագրություն)
in which it was stated that the applicant “had used foul
language and had maliciously disobeyed the lawful orders of the
police officers”. The applicant was charged under Article 182
of the Code of Administrative Offences (Վարչական
իրավախախտումների
վերաբերյալ
ՀՀ օրենսգիրք
– “the CAO”). The applicant's signature
did not appear on this record.
About
two hours after his arrest the applicant was brought before Judge S.
of the Armavir Regional Court (Արմավիրի
մարզի առաջին
ատյանի դատարան).
Judge
S., after a brief hearing, sentenced the applicant under Article 182
of the CAO to ten days of administrative detention. The judge's
entire finding amounted to the following sentence:
“On 22 March 2003 at 9 a.m. in the village of
Karakert of the Armavir Region [the applicant] maliciously refused to
obey the lawful order of the officers of the Baghramyan Police
Department acting in pursuance of their duties of preserving public
order; in particular, while being taken to the police station, he
disobeyed the police officers, used foul language and prevented them
from performing their duty.”
According
to the record of the court hearing, the hearing was held in public
with the participation of the judge, a clerk and the applicant. The
judge informed the applicant of his right to challenge the judge and
the clerk and to have a lawyer. The applicant did not wish to lodge
any challenges or to have a lawyer. The judge then proceeded with
examination of evidence. The applicant submitted that the police
officers of the Armavir Police Department had visited him at home at
9 a.m. that day and asked him to come to the police station. He had
tried to find out why he was being taken to the police station but it
turned out that he had used foul language. His attempts to find out
the reasons remained unanswered. Thereafter, the judge examined the
materials prepared by the police. No further evidence was produced or
requests made by the applicant. The judge departed to the
deliberation room, after which he returned and announced the
decision.
According
to the applicant, the hearing was conducted in the judge's office,
without examination of any witnesses, and lasted only a few minutes.
No charges were presented prior to the hearing. The judge explained
that he was in no position to help the applicant or to make any
decision other than that which he had made as he was acting on
instructions from higher authorities. He also explained that it was
not possible to call a lawyer because he had many cases to examine
and could not afford to spend more time on the applicant's case.
The
applicant was taken to the Armavir Temporary Detention Facility at
the Armavir Regional Department of Internal Affairs to serve his
sentence.
The
applicant alleged that, at the detention facility, he had been asked
to sign the above record of an administrative offence without reading
it, which he refused to do.
The
Government contested this allegation and claimed that the applicant
had actually signed this document while in police custody prior to
the court hearing.
B. The applicant's detention
The
applicant alleged, and the Government did not dispute, that at the
Armavir Temporary Detention Facility he had been placed with nine
other people in a cell measuring 7.5 sq. m. There were no beds in the
cell so the detainees had to sleep on the floor. They had no bed
linen, blankets or pillows.
On
24 March 2003 the applicant and three others were transferred to
another cell, as a result of constant oral complaints. The applicant
alleged, and the Government did not dispute, that the new cell also
measured 7.5 sq. m and was designed for two persons. There
were only two metal beds in the cell, each 40-50 cm wide, so the
applicant had to share a bed with another detainee. There was no bed
linen, blankets or pillows. Two days later, after repeated oral
complaints, the applicant was given bedding which was in a very dirty
condition. The water provided to the detainees was of such bad
quality that he refused to drink it. He had to acquire mineral water
from the outside, using the money that he had, with the help of the
staff of the detention facility. Food was provided only once a day
and it was always buckwheat of poor quality without salt.
The
applicant further alleged – but the Government disputed –
that while in detention he had developed an allergy resulting in a
big swelling on his face which had continued to recur from time to
time following his release. His health deteriorated as a result of
his detention.
The
applicant finally alleged that, during the entire stay at the
detention facility, he had been prevented from having any contact
with his family members and had not been permitted to receive
newspapers or magazines.
On
31 March 2003 the applicant was released from detention after fully
serving his sentence.
On
23 September 2003 the applicant was diagnosed with a chronic
infection of unknown origin.
In
May 2004 the applicant underwent a medical examination and was
diagnosed with suspected tuberculosis of the left lung. According to
a medical certificate of 9 August 2005, the applicant was suffering
from liver problems.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Code of Administrative Offences
For
a summary of the relevant provisions of the CAO see the judgment in
the case of Galstyan v. Armenia (no. 26986/03, § 26,
15 November 2007). The provisions of the CAO which were not
cited in the above judgment, as in force at the material time,
provide:
Article 182: Maliciously disobeying a lawful order or
demand of a police officer or a member of the voluntary police
“Maliciously disobeying a lawful order or demand
of a police officer or a member of the voluntary police made in the
performance of his duties of preserving public order shall result in
the imposition of a fine of between 50% and double the fixed minimum
wage, or of correctional labour for between one and two months with
the deduction of 20% of earnings or, in cases where, in the
circumstances of the case, taking into account the offender's
personality, the application of these measures would be deemed
insufficient, of administrative detention not exceeding 15 days.”
B. The Law on Conditions for Holding Arrested and
Detained Persons («Ձերբակալված
և կալանավորված
անձանց պահելու
մասին» ՀՀ օրենք)
The
relevant provisions of the Law, as in force at the material time,
read as follows:
Section 13: Rights of arrested and detained persons
“An arrested or detained person is entitled: ...
(3) to lodge, himself or through his lawyer or lawful representative,
applications and complaints alleging a violation of his rights and
freedoms with the administration of the facility for arrested or
detained persons, their superior authorities, a court, a prosecutor's
office, the Ombudsman, the bodies of public administration and local
self-governance, non-governmental unions and [political] parties,
mass media and international institutions and organisations
protecting human rights and freedoms.”
Section 20: Ensuring the material and living
conditions of arrested and detained persons
“...The living space afforded to arrested and
detained persons must comply with the building and sanitary-hygienic
norms established for general living spaces. The area of the living
space afforded to arrested and detained persons shall not be less
than 2.5 sq. m for each individual.
Arrested and detained persons must be provided with
individual bedding and bed linen.”
C. Decree no. 8 of the Chief of Armenian Police of
11 September 2003 Approving the Internal Rules of
Facilities under the Armenian Police for Holding Arrested Persons
The
relevant provisions of the Decree read as follows:
“Special sections of the [facilities for holding
arrested persons] shall be reserved for persons who have been
subjected to administrative detention for periods prescribed by [the
CAO]...”
III. RELEVANT REPORTS CONCERNING CONDITIONS OF DETENTION
A. The Report of the Committee for the Prevention of
Torture (CPT) on its Visit to Armenia in 2002 – CPT/Inf(2004)25
The
relevant parts of the Report read as follows:
“4. Conditions of detention
a. introduction
43. At the outset, the CPT wishes to
highlight the criteria which it applies when assessing police
detention facilities.
All police cells should be clean, of a reasonable size
for the number of persons they are used to accommodate, and have
adequate lighting (i.e. sufficient to read by, sleeping periods
excluded) and ventilation; preferably, cells should enjoy natural
light. Further, cells should be equipped with a means of rest (for
example, a chair or bench) and persons obliged to stay overnight in
custody should be provided with a clean mattress and clean blankets.
Persons in custody should be able to satisfy the needs
of nature when necessary, in clean and decent conditions, and be
offered adequate washing facilities. They should have ready access to
drinking water and be given food at appropriate times, including at
least one full meal (that is, something more substantial than a
sandwich) every day. Persons held in
custody for 24 hours or more should, as far as possible, be offered
one hour of outdoor exercise every day.
b. temporary detention centres
44. During the visit, the CPT's delegation
visited temporary detention centres in Yerevan, Akhurian, Hrazdan,
Maralik and Sevan. Establishments of this type are used to hold two
categories of detainees: criminal suspects and persons under
administrative arrest.
Conditions of detention in the temporary detention
centres visited varied from acceptable (at the Hrazdan Department of
Internal Affairs) to poor (e.g. at the Akhurian and Sevan Departments
of Internal Affairs).
45. As regards occupancy levels, a
consultation of registers and the number of sleeping places per cell
suggested that the minimum standard of 2.5 m² of living space
per person, as stipulated by the Law on [Conditions for Holding
Arrested and Detained Persons], was respected as concerns criminal
suspects. However, the CPT must add that this minimum standard is too
low. As concerns the cells for administrative detainees, the
information gathered during the visit indicated that conditions could
become extremely cramped, e.g. up to 6 detainees in a cell of 9 m²
in Hrazdan and Sevan.
All the centres visited presented deficiencies
concerning the in-cell lighting and ventilation. With the
exception of the Hrazdan centre, access to natural light was poor
(small windows, sometimes - as in Yerevan - covered by metal
shutters) or inexistent (e.g. in Akhurian). Artificial lighting was
invariably dim, with some cells (e.g. in Yerevan, Akhurian and
Maralik) submerged in near darkness. As to ventilation, it left
something to be desired at Yerevan and Sevan.
As to the state of repair and hygiene of the
detention areas, it ranged from quite acceptable at the Hrazdan
Department of Internal Affairs to poor at the Sevan establishment.
Cells at the Temporary detention centre in Yerevan were in a
reasonably good state of repair; however, their level of cleanliness
left something to be desired. Detention areas in Akhurian and Maralik
were dilapidated but clean.
46. Cells were furnished with beds or wooden
sleeping platforms. The delegation noted that mattresses, sheets,
pillows and blankets were available for criminal suspects at all
the temporary detention centres visited; however, this was not the
case for administrative detainees.
The delegation did not hear any complaints from persons
who were - or had recently been - detained at the centres visited as
regards access to a toilet. However, with the notable
exception of the Hrazdan Department of Internal Affairs, the communal
toilet and washing facilities were dilapidated and dirty.
The centres in Yerevan and Hrazdan possessed shower
facilities, which could apparently be used by newly-arrived detainees
(upon recommendation of a feldsher/doctor) and by those
administrative detainees who stayed in the respective establishments
for longer than a week. In both centres, the shower facilities were
in an acceptable state of repair and cleanliness, and hot water was
available. However, the only personal hygiene item that was
distributed to detainees was a small piece of soap.
47. According to information provided by
police officers in the majority of the temporary detention centres
visited, detainees were offered food three times per day,
including one hot meal. However, this was not the case at the Sevan
Department of Internal Affairs, where food was only delivered once
per day, reportedly due to the limited budget set aside for this
purpose (320 AMD - i.e. some 50 euro cents - per detainee per day).
In this situation, the provision of food was to a large extent
ensured by detainees' families. Detained persons without family
contacts had to rely on the generosity of other detainees or
individual police officers for food.
48. All the temporary detention centres
visited possessed outdoor exercise areas, where detainees were
apparently allowed to take exercise for one hour per day (in the case
of women and juveniles - for two hours per day). However, at the
Temporary Detention Centre of the City Department of Internal Affairs
in Yerevan, the delegation was informed that detainees could be
deprived of outdoor exercise as a form of punishment for violation of
the centre's internal regulations.
49. The CPT recommends that the
Armenian authorities take steps at temporary detention centres to:
- ensure that all detainees are offered
adequate living space; the objective should be at least 4 m² per
person;
- provide adequate in-cell lighting
(including access to natural light) and ventilation;
- maintain the cells and common sanitary
facilities in a satisfactory state of repair and hygiene;
- ensure that all detainees (including those
held for administrative violations) are offered a mattress and
blankets at night;
- ensure that administrative detainees are
able to take a hot shower at least once a week during their period of
detention;
- ensure that all detainees are offered food
- sufficient in quantity and quality - at normal meal times;
- put an end to deprivation of outdoor
exercise as a disciplinary punishment.”
B. The CPT Report on its Visit to Armenia in 2004 –
CPT/Inf(2006)38
The
relevant part of the Report reads as follows:
“4. Conditions of detention
a. Temporary detention centre of the
Department of Internal Affairs of the City of Yerevan
20. Conditions of detention in this facility
remained basically the same as those observed during the 2002 visit,
i.e. poor. One positive change was that persons under administrative
arrest were now provided with bedding (pursuant to Order No. 8 of the
Head of the National Police of 20 August 2003). Further, the
delegation was informed that the food entitlement for detainees had
been increased by Government decision of May 2003. Otherwise, no
refurbishment or major repairs had taken place since the previous
visit.
Consequently, the CPT reiterates the recommendations
made in paragraph 49 of the report on the 2002 visit, in particular
as regards living space, in-cell lighting, ventilation, state of
repair and hygiene.”
C. The CPT Report on its Visit to Armenia in 2006 –
CPT/Inf(2007)47
The
relevant parts of the Report read as follows:
“4. Conditions of detention
a. police holding areas
28. At the beginning of the 2006 visit, the
delegation was informed that, pursuant to Order NK–328–NG
of the President of the Republic of Armenia, dated 28 December 2004,
a large-scale refurbishment programme had been initiated in all
police holding areas. The CPT welcomes this. It should also be noted
that a recent amendment to the [Law on Conditions for Holding
Arrested and Detained Persons] increased the official standard of
living space per detained person in police holding areas to 4 m².
This can be considered as acceptable when applied to multi-occupancy
cells; however, 4 m² is not an adequate size for a single
occupancy cell.
29. During the visit, the delegation could
observe the impact of the above-mentioned programme. Some of the
police holding areas (e.g. in Charentsavan, Gavar and Hrazdan) were
still undergoing refurbishment and were to reopen shortly. As regards
the already refurbished holding areas, conditions in them were
overall of a high standard.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the conditions of his detention were
incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention,
which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust the
domestic remedies. It was open to him to complain about the
conditions of his detention under section 13 of the Law on Conditions
for Holding Arrested and Detained Persons, which he had failed to do.
The
applicant submitted that as he had not had the benefit of legal
advice during his detention he had not been aware of any appeal
procedure against conditions of detention, since bringing such
complaints was not general practice. Thus, no appeal procedure was
sufficiently accessible to him. In any event, the existence of an
appeal procedure in law did not absolve the authorities from their
obligation to ensure adequate conditions of detention.
The
Court reiterates that the only remedies to be exhausted are those
which are effective. It is incumbent on the Government claiming
non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective
one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that
is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of
providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and
offered reasonable prospects of success. Once this burden of proof
has been satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that the
remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted, or was for
some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular
circumstances of the case, or that there existed special
circumstances absolving him or her from this requirement (see
Kalashnikov v. Russia (dec.), no. 47095/99, 18 September 2001,
and Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01, § 67, 28
March 2006).
The
Court further emphasises that Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention must be applied with some degree of flexibility and
without excessive formalism. Moreover, the rule of exhaustion of
domestic remedies is neither absolute nor capable of being applied
automatically. In reviewing whether the rule has been observed, it is
essential to have regard to the existence of formal remedies in the
legal system of the State concerned, the general legal and
political context in which they operate, as well as the
particular circumstances of the case and whether the applicant did
everything that could reasonably be expected in order to exhaust
available domestic remedies (ibid.).
In
the present case, the Government claimed that the applicant had had a
remedy at his disposal, namely that he could have lodged a complaint
under section 13 of the Law on Conditions for Holding Arrested and
Detained Persons. The Court observes, however, that the Government
did not produce any evidence to demonstrate that the remedy relied on
was sufficient and effective. They failed even to specify to which of
the numerous authorities mentioned in that provision the applicant
was supposed to apply and what specific measures could have been
taken by them to provide redress for the applicant's complaints,
especially taking into account that the issues raised by the
applicant were apparently of a structural nature and did not only
concern the applicant's personal situation (see the relevant CPT
reports at paragraphs 35-37 above). The Government's objection as to
non-exhaustion must therefore be dismissed.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that there had been no breach of the
requirements of Article 3. The applicant had failed to submit any
proof of damage caused to his mental or physical health. His
allegations that his health had deteriorated as a result of his
detention were not supported by any evidence. Furthermore, access to
medication had been provided for the applicant during his detention.
Finally, the authorities did not have the intention of humiliating or
debasing the applicant: he had simply been kept in the general
conditions which prevailed in the prison. The Government also added
that substantial changes have taken place in the penitentiary system
in Armenia in terms of both improving the general conditions and the
regime applied within prisons notwithstanding the existing
socio-economic problems.
The
applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention at the
Armavir Temporary Detention Facility amounted to degrading treatment
within the meaning of Article 3. He further argued that he had in
fact submitted medical proof that his health had deteriorated as a
result of his conditions of detention.
The
Court observes at the outset that Article 3 enshrines one of the most
fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute
terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
irrespective of the victim's conduct (see, among other authorities,
Labita v. Italy [GC], no 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV).
According
to the Court's case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of
severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The
assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and
context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its
execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some
instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among
other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65,
§ 162).
Treatment
has been held by the Court to be “degrading” because it
was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see Kudła
v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 92, ECHR 2000 XI).
Furthermore, in considering whether a particular form of treatment is
“degrading” within the meaning of Article 3, the Court
will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the
person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are
concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner
incompatible with Article 3 (see Raninen v. Finland, judgment
of 16 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1997 VIII, pp. 2821-22, § 55). However, the
absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of
a violation of Article 3 (see, for example, Peers v. Greece,
no. 28524/95, § 74, ECHR 2001 III). In order for
a punishment or treatment associated with it to be “degrading”,
the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond
that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a
given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see V. v. the
United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, § 71, ECHR
1999 IX).
Measures
depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element.
However, it is incumbent on the State to ensure that a person is
detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his
human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the
measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention
and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and
well-being are adequately secured (see Kalashnikov v. Russia,
no. 47095/99, § 95, ECHR 2002 VI). When assessing
conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative
effects of those conditions, as well as the specific allegations made
by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98,
§ 46, ECHR 2001 II).
In
the present case, the applicant was kept in detention for a total of
ten days. Initially he was kept for about two days in a cell
measuring 7.5 sq. m with nine other inmates, in other
words, he was afforded about 0.75 sq. m of personal space. In
this respect the applicant's situation was even worse than that in
the Kalashnikov case, in which the applicant had been confined
to a space measuring about 0.9-1.9 sq. m. In that case the Court held
that such a severe degree of overcrowding raised in itself an issue
under Article 3 of the Convention (see, among other authorities,
Kalashnikov, cited above, §§ 96-97). Furthermore,
there were no sleeping facilities or bedding in the cell.
The
Court notes that on the third day of his detention the applicant was
transferred to another cell which led to a slight improvement in his
detention conditions in terms of overcrowding: the new cell, which
was the same size as the previous one, was shared by a total of four
inmates, thus affording the applicant about 1.8 sq. m of personal
space. Even so, this space was still comparable to the one to which
the applicant in the above Kalashnikov case had been confined.
Furthermore, it was significantly smaller than the 4 sq. m minimum
requirement for a single inmate in multi-occupancy cells according to
the CPT standards (see the relevant CPT reports at paragraphs 35-37
above) and even smaller than the 2.5 sq. m minimum required at the
material time under the domestic law. Nothing suggests that in either
case the applicant was allowed any out-of-cell activities that could
compensate for this serious lack of space (see Cenbauer v.
Croatia, no. 73786/01, § 49, ECHR 2006 III;
Malechkov v. Bulgaria, no. 57830/00, § 141,
28 June 2007, and, by contrast, Nurmagomedov v. Russia
(dec.), no. 30138/02, 16 September 2004). Furthermore, while
the second cell provided some sleeping facilities, there were half as
many beds as inmates, so the inmates were forced to share beds
designed for single use. Moreover, initially no bed linen or blankets
were provided and those provided after repeated complaints were in an
insanitary condition.
The
Court further notes that the water provided to the detainees was
allegedly of undrinkable quality and food was provided only once per
day. The Court reiterates that it is unacceptable for a person to be
detained in conditions in which no provision has been made for
meeting his or her basic needs (see, mutatis mutandis, Riad
and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787/03 and 29810/03, §§ 106,
ECHR 2008 (extracts), and Shchebet v. Russia,
no. 16074/07, § 93, 12 June 2008).
The
Court observes that the Government did not contest the applicant's
account of the conditions of his detention (see paragraphs 25 and 26
above). It further observes that the applicant's description
corresponds to a large extent to the findings of the CPT which,
during its 2002 visit to Armenia, inspected a number of police
temporary detention centres where administrative detainees were held
(see for other examples of the Court's reliance on the CPT reports,
Kehayov v. Bulgaria, no. 41035/98, § 66, 18 January
2005, and Ostrovar v. Moldova, no. 35207/03, § 80,
13 September 2005). Even if this visit predated the
circumstances of the present case, it appears from the CPT materials
that no significant improvements had taken place in this field before
a large-scale refurbishment programme was launched in December 2004.
The Court therefore does not have reasons to doubt the veracity of
the applicant's submissions.
The
Court also notes that the length of the applicant's detention was
relatively short, amounting to a total of ten days. However, it
observes that conditions of detention of comparable and even of much
shorter length have been previously found to be incompatible with the
requirements of Article 3 (see Riad and Idiab, cited above,
§§ 100-111, in which the applicants were kept in
detention for fifteen and eleven days, and Fedotov v. Russia,
no. 5140/02, §§ 66-70, 25 October 2005, in which
the applicant was detained for twenty-two hours with no food and
water or access to a toilet). Therefore, while the length of a
detention period may be a relevant factor in assessing the gravity of
suffering or humiliation caused to a detainee by the inadequate
conditions of his detention (see, for example, Kalashnikov,
cited above, § 102, and Dougoz, cited above, § 48),
the relative brevity of such a period alone will not automatically
exclude the treatment complained of from the scope of Article 3 if
all other elements are sufficient to bring it within the scope of
that provision.
The
Court agrees with the Government that there is not sufficient proof
in the materials of the case linking the health problems experienced
by the applicant to his stay at the detention facility. However, it
considers that, while evidence of damage to a detainee's health
caused by the conditions of his detention may be a relevant factor to
be considered (see, for example, Labzov v. Russia,
no. 62208/00, § 47, 16 June 2005), the existence of
such consequences is by no means a precondition for finding a
violation of Article 3 (see, for example, Dougoz, cited above,
§§ 45-49; Cenbauer, cited above, §§ 45-53;
Shchebet, cited above, §§ 86-96, and Fedotov,
cited above, §§ 66-70).
Against
this background, and having regard to the cumulative effects of the
conditions of the applicant's detention as described above, the Court
considers that the hardship the applicant endured appears to have
exceeded the unavoidable level inherent in detention and finds that
the resulting suffering and feelings of humiliation and inferiority
went beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3 of the
Convention.
As
regards the Government's submission that the authorities had no
intention to debase him, as already indicated above, the absence of
any purpose to humiliate or debase the victim cannot exclude a
finding of a violation of Article 3 (see paragraph 49 above). The
Court therefore concludes that the conditions of the applicant's
detention amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of
Article 3.
Accordingly,
there has been a violation of that provision.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 2 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPLICANT'S ARREST
The
applicant complained that he had not been informed of the legal or
factual grounds for his arrest. He invoked Article 5 § 2 of the
Convention which provides:
“2. Everyone who is arrested shall be
informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons
for his arrest and of any charge against him.”
Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had been informed by the
police officers about the reasons for his arrest. Furthermore, on
arrival at the police station a record of arrest and a record of an
administrative offence had been drawn up, in which the reasons for
the applicant's arrest were indicated. These records had been signed
by the applicant. Therefore the applicant had been informed promptly
about the reasons for his arrest and his denial of this fact
contradicted the materials of the case.
The
applicant submitted that he had never been informed of the legal or
factual grounds for his arrest. Furthermore, the existence of written
records did not absolve the authorities from the necessity of giving
reasons for arrest orally.
The
Court reiterates that paragraph 2 of Article 5 contains the
elementary safeguard that any person arrested should know why he is
being deprived of his liberty. This provision is an integral part of
the scheme of protection afforded by Article 5: by virtue of
paragraph 2 any person arrested must be told, in simple,
non-technical language that he can understand, the essential legal
and factual grounds for his arrest, so as to be able, if he sees fit,
to apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance with
paragraph 4. Whilst this information must be conveyed “promptly”,
it need not be related in its entirety by the arresting officer at
the very moment of the arrest. Whether the content and promptness of
the information conveyed were sufficient is to be assessed in each
case according to its special features (see Fox,
Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 30 August
1990, Series A no. 182, p. 19, § 40, and
Murray v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1994,
Series A no. 300 A, p. 31, § 72).
In
the present case, it is not clear whether any reasons were given to
the applicant by the arresting officers at the time of his arrest.
Furthermore, the Government have failed to submit a copy of the
record of arrest in which the reasons for the applicant's arrest were
allegedly indicated and which was allegedly signed by the applicant.
The Court further notes that, contrary to the Government's claim, the
applicant's signature does not appear on the record of an
administrative offence which contained the charge against the
applicant, nor is there any indication that the applicant was
presented with this document but refused to sign it. On the other
hand, it is evident from the written statement made by the applicant
at the police station following his arrest that he was aware of the
charge against him and consequently of the reasons why he had been
brought to the police station. In such circumstances, the applicant's
assertion to the contrary is not supported by the materials of the
case.
This
part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTION AS TO NON-EXHAUSTION IN
CONNECTION WITH THE APPLICANT'S CONVICTION
The
Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust the
domestic remedies in respect of the decision of 22 March 2003 by not
lodging an appeal with the President of the Criminal and Military
Court of Appeal under Article 294 of the CAO.
The
applicant contested the Government's objection.
The
Court notes that it has already examined this issue and found that
the review possibility provided by Article 294 of the CAO was not an
effective remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention (see Galstyan, cited above, § 42). The
Government's preliminary objection must therefore be rejected.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION ON
ACCOUNT OF THE APPLICANT'S ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the
Convention about his administrative detention. The relevant
provisions of Article 5 read as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after
conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in
order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order
for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention
for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the
prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of
unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the
country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view
to deportation or extradition.
...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph1.c of this article shall
be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law
to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trail within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial...
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which
the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant's administrative detention
had been permissible under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention
as “the lawful detention of a person after conviction by the
competent court”. His case had been examined by the trial
court, which was the sole competent authority to do so. The trial had
been conducted in compliance with the guarantees of Article 5 §
3. As to the judicial supervision required by Article 5 § 4,
this had been incorporated in the trial court's decision.
The
applicant submitted that his administrative detention was arbitrary
in violation of Article 5 § 1. He further submitted that the
manner in which the trial was conducted fell short of the
requirements of Article 5 §§ 3 and 4.
The
Court observes that it has already examined a similar complaint under
Article 5 § 1 and found that the administrative detention had
been imposed on the applicant after a “conviction by a
competent court” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a)
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law (see Galstyan,
cited above, §§ 47-49). It sees no reasons to depart from
that finding in the present case. The Court further reiterates that
the guarantees of Article 5 § 3 apply only to detention imposed
under Article 5 § 1 (c) (see Ječius v. Lithuania,
no. 34578/97, § 75, ECHR 2000 IX). It follows that the
guarantees of that provision are not applicable to the applicant's
administrative detention, which, as already indicated above, was
imposed under Article 5 § 1 (a). Lastly, the Court reiterates
that, where a sentence of imprisonment is pronounced after a
“conviction by a competent court” within the meaning of
Article 5 § 1 (a), the supervision required by Article 5 §
4 is incorporated in that decision (see Galstyan, cited above,
§ 51). However, as already indicated above, no issue arises in
the present case under Article 5 § 1 (a).
This
part of the application is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant made several complaints about the administrative
proceedings against him under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a)-(d)
of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provide:
“1. In the determination ... of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal...
...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence
has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for
the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing...
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him...”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds.
They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that the applicant had had a fair and public
hearing. He had failed to submit any proof in support of his
allegation that the judge had not been impartial. The applicant had
been provided with an opportunity to call witnesses, submit evidence
and to lodge requests and challenges, which he had failed to do. The
judge had advised the applicant to avail himself of his right to have
a lawyer but he did not wish to do so. The applicant's argument that
the materials of the administrative case against him had not been
revealed to him prior to the hearing contradicted the materials of
the case: both the record of arrest and the record of an
administrative offence had been signed by the applicant after he was
taken to the police station. Thus, taking into account that the
applicant had signed the record of an administrative offence without
any objections, had refused to have a lawyer, had not lodged any
requests and had not availed himself of other procedural rights, the
police officers had considered two hours to be sufficient for the
preparation of the applicant's defence.
The
applicant submitted that the trial had not been fair and the tribunal
had not been independent and impartial. Furthermore, it had not been
public since it had been held in camera in a judge's office. The
speed with which the proceedings had been conducted, the failure to
provide him with adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence
and the fact that he had been denied the right to call or examine
witnesses or give evidence in his defence had put him at a
significant disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent. The materials
of the case against him had not been revealed to him prior to the
hearing and the court had failed to provide a reasoned decision. The
hearing had taken place immediately after his questioning at the
police station and he had been denied access to a lawyer prior to and
during the trial.
The
Court notes from the outset that similar facts and complaints have
already been examined in a number of cases against Armenia, in
which the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 3 (b) taken
together with Article 6 § 1 (see Galstyan, cited above,
§§ 86-88, and Ashughyan v. Armenia, no.
33268/03, §§ 66-67, 17 July 2008). The
circumstances of the present case are practically identical. The
administrative case against the applicant was examined in an
expedited procedure under Article 277 of the CAO. The applicant was
similarly taken to and kept in a police station – without any
contact with the outside world – where he was presented with a
charge and in a matter of hours taken to a court and convicted. The
Court therefore does not see any reason to reach a different finding
in the present case and concludes that the applicant did not have a
fair hearing, in particular on account of not being afforded adequate
time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 3 taken together
with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
In
view of the finding made in the preceding paragraph, the Court does
not consider it necessary to examine also the other alleged
violations of Article 6.
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL NO. 7
The
applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had
no right to contest the decision of 22 March 2003. The Court
considers it necessary to examine this issue under Article 2 of
Protocol No. 7 which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“1. Everyone convicted of a criminal
offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or
sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right,
including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed
by law.”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that the applicant had had the right to have his
conviction reviewed, this right being prescribed by Article 294 of
the CAO.
The
applicant submitted that all the legal provisions regarding the right
to appeal were inadequate and confused.
The
Court notes that the applicant in the present case was convicted
under the same procedure as in the above-mentioned case of Galstyan,
in which the Court concluded that the applicant did not have at his
disposal an appeal procedure which would satisfy the requirements of
Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (see Galstyan, cited above, §§
124-27). The Court does not see any reasons to depart from that
finding in the present case.
Accordingly,
there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7.
VII. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION AND ITS
PROTOCOLS
Lastly,
the applicant complained that his conviction violated his rights
guaranteed by Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention and Article 3
of Protocol No. 1 and that he had not been allowed any contact with
his family while in detention, in violation of the guarantees of
Article 8 of the Convention.
Having
regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these
complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that they do
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part
of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
VIII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The
Government submitted that, if the Court were to find a violation,
that would be sufficient just satisfaction. In any event, the amount
claimed was excessive.
The
Court considers that the applicant has undoubtedly suffered
non-pecuniary damage as a result of being sanctioned through unfair
proceedings and having no possibility to appeal against this
sanction, which resulted in his detention for a period of ten days in
degrading conditions. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the
applicant EUR 4,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed USD 3,666 (approximately EUR 2,495) and
6,809.98 pounds sterling (GBP) (approx. EUR 8,445) for the costs
and expenses incurred before the Court. These claims comprised:
(a) USD 3,600
for the fees of his domestic lawyer (35 and 18 hours at USD 150 and
100 per hour respectively);
(b) USD 66
for translation costs;
(c) GBP 6,724.98
for the fees of his three United Kingdom-based lawyers, including two
KHRP lawyers and one barrister (totals of about 18 and 40 hours
at GBP 150 and 100 per hour respectively); and
(d) GBP 85
for administrative costs incurred by the KHRP.
The
applicant submitted detailed time sheets stating hourly rates in
support of his claims.
The
Government submitted that the claims in respect of the domestic and
foreign lawyers were not duly substantiated with documentary proof,
since the applicant had failed to produce any contracts certifying
that there was an agreement with those lawyers to provide legal
services at the alleged hourly rate, while the submitted time sheets
and invoice lacked any signatures or seals. Furthermore, the
applicant had used the services of an excessive number of lawyers,
despite the fact that the case was not so complex as to justify such
a need. Moreover, the hourly rate allegedly charged by the domestic
lawyer was excessive. As to the cost of translating the application
form and the enclosed documents, these expenses were not necessary
since it was open to the applicant to submit such documents in
Armenian.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court notes at the
outset that no invoice has been submitted to substantiate the
translation costs. As regards the lawyers' fees, it considers that
not all the legal costs claimed were necessarily and reasonably
incurred, including some duplication in the work carried out by the
foreign and the domestic lawyers, as set out in the relevant time
sheets. Furthermore, a reduction must also be applied in view of the
fact that a substantial part of the initial application and
communicated complaints was declared inadmissible. Making its own
estimate based on the information available and deciding on an
equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,000 in respect
of costs and expenses, to be paid in pounds sterling into his
representatives' bank account in the United Kingdom.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints under Article 3 and
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (a)-(d) of the Convention and Article
2 of Protocol No. 7 admissible, and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant's
detention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 taken together with Article 6 § 3 (b) of the
Convention in that the applicant did not have a fair hearing, in
particular on account of the fact that he was not afforded adequate
time and facilities for the preparation of his defence in the
administrative proceedings against him;
Holds that there is no need to examine the other
complaints under Article 6 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
2 of Protocol No. 7;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:
(i) EUR
4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into
the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement;
(ii) EUR
3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to
the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into
pounds sterling at the rate applicable at the date of settlement and
to be paid into his representatives' bank account in the United
Kingdom;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 December 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Josep Casadevall
Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the concurring opinion of Judge
Fura-Sandström is
annexed to this judgment.
J.C.M.
S.H.N.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE FURA-SANDSTRÖM
The
Court found a violation of Article 6 paragraph 1 taken together with
Article 6 paragraph 3 (b) of the Convention in that the applicant did
not have a fair hearing, in particular on account of the fact that he
was not afforded adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence (paragraph 78) following the case-law established in the
cases of Ashughyan and Galstyan. While accepting this
approach, I would have preferred to examine separately the complaints
relating to the lack of legal assistance. The applicant submitted
having been denied access to a lawyer prior to and during the trial
(paragraph 78). For the same reasons expressed in my partly
dissenting opinion in the Galstyan case, to which I refer, I
find that there has been a violation of Article 6 paragraph 1 taken
together with Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) also in this respect.