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FLUX (No. 4) v. MOLDOVA - 17294/04 [2008] ECHR 149 (12 February 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/149.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 149
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF
FLUX (No. 4) v. MOLDOVA
(Application
no. 17294/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12
February 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Flux (no. 4) v. Moldova,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas
Bratza,
President,
Josep
Casadevall,
Giovanni
Bonello,
Kristaq
Traja,
Stanislav
Pavlovschi,
Ján
Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
judges,
and Fatoş Aracı,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 22 January 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 17294/04) against the Republic
of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by Flux (“the applicant newspaper”),
a newspaper based in Chişinău, on 5 April 2004.
The
applicant newspaper was represented by Mr V. Gribincea, a lawyer
practising in Chişinău and a member of the non-governmental
organisation Lawyers for Human Rights. The Moldovan Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr V. Pârlog.
The
applicant newspaper alleged, in particular, a breach of its right to
freedom of expression on account of having been found guilty of
defamation of a politician.
On
27 March 2006 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court
decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Under
the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was
decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as
its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
On
6 December 2002 Flux published an article entitled “The
Sabbath of the parvenus”. It reported the alleged overnight
enrichment of the Speaker of Parliament, the President of the
Parliamentary Communist faction and the son of the President of
Moldova. The idea of the article was that before becoming public
figures they had all been simple citizens without any significant
fortune; however, their fortunes had considerably increased after the
Communist Party had won the elections and they had become public
figures.
The
summary reads as follows:
“The other day I was editing a news item
concerning the two luxury cars used by the Speaker of Parliament, E.
O., and I became more and more convinced that the term 'parvenu' had
Moldovan origins. Our political scene is full of examples.
For example, the first thing done by E .O. after
becoming Speaker of Parliament, was to solve her housing problem. By
abusing her position she was able to lay her hands on a huge
apartment in downtown Chişinău, paid for by public money.
Who was E. O. before becoming Speaker? A modest baker with a modest
work history. Who is she now? A big boss! She cannot fit into a BMW
and so she also needs a Mercedes Benz. Let's take another example.
Who was Victor Stepaniuc before becoming an MP? A simple
schoolteacher in the village of Costeşti
with a modest IQ and a little bit hysterical. Who is he now? He is
not only a Sulla of the Parliament, namely a dictator without whose
approval even the flies do not fly in the Parliament building, but
also a prosperous businessman. He is an agent at the Chişinău
tobacco factory, he has made enormous profits from the sale of
cigarettes, he owns buses, he controls the Chişinău-Ialoveni
bus route, and in general he looks like a genuine Moldovan dandy with
a silk tie, Italian suits, German shoes and dirt under his nails.
Who was O. V. before his father Vladimir Voronin became
the President of Moldova? A novice businessman specialised in the
milking of profits from sugar plants in the north of the country. Who
is he now? He is the most prosperous businessman in the country. He
is the majority shareholder of bank F., the owner of construction
company M, has contracts with the State worth millions and does
business with Chişinău tobacco factory. He is a star and a
VIP of the financial press and is held up as an example to young
businessmen....”
On 12 December 2006 Mr Stepaniuc, the leader of the
Communist parliamentary faction which had, at the time, 71 votes out
of a total of 101 in Parliament, lodged an action against the
applicant newspaper. He did not pay any court fee when lodging his
complaint, nor did he appear in court at any stage of the proceedings
or delegate anyone to represent him. He argued, inter alia,
that:
“...the defendants disseminated false and
defamatory information about me ...
... Both in the title and in the body of the article I
am described as follows: 'a dictator without whose approval even the
flies do not fly in the Parliament building, but also a prosperous
businessman. He is an agent at the Chişinău tobacco
factory, he has made enormous profits from the sale of cigarettes, he
owns buses, controls the Chişinău-Ialoveni bus-line, and in
general he looks like a genuine Moldovan Dandy with a silk tie,
Italian suits, German shoes and dirt under his nails.'
None of these accusations is true and they are nothing
more than dirty slander.”
Mr
Stepaniuc asked the court to declare the above statements defamatory,
to make the defendants publish a retraction on the same page of the
newspaper and pay him compensation in the amount of the maximum
provided for by the Civil Code.
The
case was put before Judge I.M., the President of the Buiucani
District Court at the time for examination.
In its defence the applicant newspaper presented the
court with copies of open letters addressed to the President of
Moldova by a transport company in which Mr Stepaniuc was accused of
appropriating several of its bus routes.
On 17 February 2003 the applicant newspaper informed
the court that the information concerning Mr Stepaniuc's involvement
in illegal activities in the tobacco business had been obtained from
sources in the Moldovan secret service and submitted that the secret
service had prepared a report about the alleged involvement of
high-ranking officials in illegal activities at the Chişinău
tobacco factory. The applicant newspaper informed the court that it
had officially requested a copy of the report and asked that the case
be adjourned until the secret service had provided the court with
such a copy.
On
19 February 2003 Judge I. M. rejected the request to adjourn the case
until after the secret service had provided the court with a copy of
its report; however, he did order that the examination be postponed
until 24 March 2003.
On 24 March 2003 the applicant newspaper informed the
court that the secret service had failed to reply to its request and
that consequently it had commenced a court action seeking an order to
provide it with a copy of the report. The applicant newspaper
requested that the defamation proceedings be adjourned pending the
conclusion of those proceedings.
On
24 and 26 March and on 15 April 2003 Judge I. M. held hearings in the
case and rejected the request for adjournment pending the conclusion
of the other set of proceedings. He decided though to postpone the
examination of the case until 30 April 2003.
On 30 April 2003 Judge I. M. examined the case in the
absence of the parties and ruled in favour of Mr Stepaniuc. He found
the statements complained of by the plaintiff (see paragraph 7 above)
to be defamatory and ordered the newspaper and the author of the
article to pay Mr Stepaniuc 3,600 Moldovan lei (MDL) (228 euros (EUR)
at the time) and MDL 1,800 (EUR 114 at the time) respectively.
He also ordered the newspaper to issue an apology within fifteen
days. The defendants were also ordered to pay the court fees.
Judge
I.M. gave the following reasons for his findings:
“In the court's view, the title, the text and the
meaning of the published information should be qualified as
defamatory of the plaintiff because the defendants made statements of
facts without adducing any evidence. In particular they submitted
that V. Stepaniuc, contrary to the provisions of Article 70 of the
Constitution, practises activities which are incompatible with his
status of deputy and that he is an agent of the tobacco factory,
makes enormous profits from trading cigarettes, and that he controls
the Chişinău-Ialoveni bus route.
During the examination of the case, the court had given
the defendants the opportunity to present evidence... however,
neither the newspaper, nor the author brought any evidence to confirm
the truthfulness of the published information. Nor in the article
itself did the defendants adduce any evidence.
[a reproduction of Article 10 of the Convention follows]
In the present case the information disseminated by the
defendants cannot be treated as a value judgment and accordingly it
cannot be protected by the provisions of the Convention stated above.
The court also takes into consideration the fact that Mr Stepaniuc
is a public figure and that in respect of such persons a higher
degree of tolerance is required when it comes to defamation. However,
the information spread by the defendants clearly exceeds the limits
of any reasonable criticism against public persons in a democratic
society.”
The
applicant newspaper appealed against this judgment, arguing, inter
alia, that Judge I. M. had lacked independence and
impartiality on the ground of his close ties with Mr Stepaniuc and
the Communist Party and his behaviour in other defamation cases
between Mr Stepaniuc and Flux. The applicant newspaper also
argued that the first-instance court had totally disregarded its
arguments, namely the letters addressed to the President of Moldova
(see paragraph 9 above) and refused to give it a chance to bring
evidence concerning Mr Stepaniuc's involvement in the tobacco
business, by refusing to adjourn the case until after the end of the
proceedings between Flux and the secret service. The applicant
newspaper also argued that its characterisation given to Mr Stepaniuc
in the impugned article was a value judgment and that it could not be
required to prove its truth.
On
26 June 2003 the Chişinău Court of Appeal dismissed the
appeal and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court while
repeating that the applicant newspaper had not adduced any evidence
in support of its statements about Mr Stepaniuc. It did not refer to
any of the arguments referred to in the applicant newspaper's appeal.
The applicant newspaper lodged an appeal on points of
law. It argued, inter alia, that Judge I.M. lacked
independence and impartiality and that the lower courts had refused
to adjourn the proceedings until after the end of the proceedings
between Flux and the secret service, thus affecting the
fairness of the proceedings. The applicant newspaper informed the
Supreme Court that it had finally managed to obtain a copy of an
annex to the report concerning illegal activities at the Chişinău
tobacco factory from the secret service and had attached it to its
appeal. The annex was entitled “scheme of the criminal
interactions between the tobacco gangs” and presented by means
of a chart, the alleged interactions between the administration of
the Chişinău tobacco factory, two criminal gangs, several
companies and various high-ranking officials, including Mr Victor
Stepaniuc.
On
5 November 2003 the Supreme Court of Justice reduced the compensation
to be paid to Mr Stepaniuc by the newspaper and the author of the
article to MDL 1,350 and MDL 180 respectively. It argued that
Mr Stepaniuc was a public figure and therefore had to be more
tolerant towards the press and, moreover, had failed to appear before
the courts. The Supreme Court did not, however, depart from the
findings of the first two instances in respect of the merits of the
case and did not examine any of the applicant newspaper's arguments.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
relevant provisions of the Civil Code in force at the material time
read:
Article 7. Protection of honour and dignity
“(1) Any natural or legal person shall
be entitled to apply to the courts to seek the withdrawal of
statements which are damaging to his or her honour and dignity and do
not correspond to reality, as well as statements which are not
damaging to honour and dignity, but do not correspond to reality.
(2) Where the media body which circulated
such statements is not capable of proving that these statements
correspond to reality, the court shall compel the publishing office
of the media body to publish, not later then 15 days after the entry
into force of the judicial decision, a withdrawal of the statements
in the same column, on the same page or in the same programme or
series of broadcasts.”
Article 7/1. Compensation for non-pecuniary damage
“(1) Non-pecuniary damage caused to a
person as a result of circulation through the media or by
organisations or persons of statements which do not correspond to
reality, as well as statements concerning his or her private or
family life, without his or her consent, shall be compensated by way
of a pecuniary award. The amount of the award shall be determined by
the court.
(2) The amount of the award shall be
determined by the court in each case as an amount equal to between 75
and 200 months' minimum wages if the information has been circulated
by a legal person and between 10 and 100 months' minimum wages if the
information has been circulated by a natural person.”
THE LAW
The
applicant newspaper complained under Article 10 of the Convention
that the domestic courts' decisions had entailed interference with
its right to freedom of expression that could not be regarded as
necessary in a democratic society. Article 10 reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CASE
In
its initial application, the applicant newspaper also submitted a
complaint under Article 6 of the Convention concerning the lack of
independence and impartiality of Judge I. M. and about the lack of
reasons given for the domestic courts' decisions. However, in its
observations on admissibility and merits it asked the Court not to
proceed with the examination of this complaint. The Court finds no
reason to examine it.
In
so far as the applicant newspaper's complaint under Article 10
of the Convention is concerned, the Court considers that it raises
questions of fact and law which are sufficiently serious that its
determination should depend on an examination of the merits, and that
no grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established. The
Court therefore declares it admissible. In accordance with its
decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention (see
paragraph 4 above), the Court will immediately consider the merits of
this complaint.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
A. The arguments of the parties
1. The applicant newspaper
The
applicant newspaper agreed that the interference was prescribed by
law and had pursued a legitimate aim. However, it was not necessary
in a democratic society because the impugned articles had merely
disseminated statements made by third parties and had been part of a
debate on an issue of distinct public importance, namely the
management of public transport and the alleged illegal activities of
public officials. The applicants had acted in good faith when
publishing the article and verified the statements made by the third
parties. They had considered the source to be reliable, since it was
a letter addressed to the President of the country, contained many
details, and official reports emanating from State transport
authorities were attached to it.
As
to the report of the secret service concerning the involvement of Mr
Stepaniuc in illegal activities in the tobacco business, the
applicant newspaper pointed out that the truthfulness of that
document has not been disputed by either the domestic courts or the
Government. However, the domestic courts did not make any assessment
of the above evidence.
The
domestic courts had also ignored the fact that Mr Stepaniuc was a
high-ranking politician and that therefore the limits of criticism in
his respect were wide.
2. The Government
The
Government agreed that the facts of the case disclosed an
interference with the applicants' right to freedom of expression. The
interference was nevertheless justified under Article 10 § 2 of
the Convention. The applicants had been ordered to pay non-pecuniary
damages for defamation on the basis of Articles 7 and 7/1 of the
Civil Code. The interference had thus been “prescribed by law”
and the law was accessible and foreseeable. It had served the
legitimate aim of protecting the dignity of Mr Stepaniuc;
furthermore, the measure had been necessary in a democratic society.
The
Government pointed to the national authorities' margin of
appreciation in assessing the need for interference and submitted
that where the Convention referred to domestic law it was primarily
the task of the national authorities to apply and interpret that
domestic law. They contended that in the present case the domestic
authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation and had
made use of it in good faith, carefully and reasonably.
The
Government further submitted that the reasons given to
justify the interference were “relevant and sufficient”.
B. The Court's assessment
It
is common ground between the parties, and the Court agrees, that the
decisions of the domestic courts and the award of damages made
against the applicant newspaper amounted to “interference by
[a] public authority” with the applicant's right to freedom of
expression under the first paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention.
It is also undisputed that the interference was “prescribed by
law” and pursued a legitimate aim. The Court's task is to
establish whether the interference was “necessary in a
democratic society”.
The
test of whether the interference complained of was “necessary
in a democratic society” requires the Court to determine
whether it corresponded to a “pressing social need”,
whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and
whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it
are relevant and sufficient. In assessing whether such a “need”
exists and what measures should be adopted to deal with it, the
national authorities are left a certain margin of appreciation. This
power of appreciation is not, however, unlimited but goes hand in
hand with European supervision by the Court, whose task it is to give
a final ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable with freedom
of expression as protected by Article 10 (for the recapitulation of
the relevant principles in more detail, see Giniewski v. France,
no. 64016/00, §§ 43-54, ECHR 2006 ...; Aydın
Tatlav v. Turkey, no. 50692/99, §§ 22-27, 2 May 2006;
Gündüz v. Turkey, no. 35071/97, § 38, ECHR
2003 XI; and Murphy v. Ireland, no. 44179/98,
§§ 65-69, ECHR 2003 IX (extracts), with further
references).
In
addition, the Court recalls that in Lingens v. Austria
(judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, § 42) it held
that:
“[the politician] inevitably and knowingly lays
himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both
journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display
a greater degree of tolerance. No doubt Article 10 para. 2
enables the reputation of others – that is to say, of all
individuals – to be protected, and this protection extends to
politicians too, even when they are not acting in their private
capacity; but in such cases the requirements of such protection have
to be weighed in relation to the interests of open discussion of
political issues.”
The
Court notes that the article was written by a journalist and
reiterates that the pre-eminent role of the press in a democratic
society is to impart ideas and opinions on political matters and on
other matters of public interest (see Sunday Times v. the
United Kingdom (no. 1), judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A
no. 30, § 65). The impugned article had a bearing on
issues such as the allegedly illegal conduct of high-ranking
politicians and public figures and the alleged mismanagement of
public funds. There is no doubt that these are very important matters
in a democratic society which the public has a legitimate interest in
being informed about and which fall within the scope of political
debate.
The
Court also reiterates that States enjoy a very narrow margin of
appreciation in cases concerning politicians (see paragraph 32 above)
and notes that Mr Stepaniuc was a very high-ranking politician at the
time of the events.
The
applicant newspaper was found liable in damages on the grounds that
it was unable to prove the truth of several statements concerning Mr
Stepaniuc (see paragraph 7 and 14 above). In the Court's opinion the
impugned statements could be divided into three groups: the statement
concerning Mr Stepaniuc's involvement in the transport business, the
statement concerning his alleged involvement in illegal activities in
the tobacco business and the description given of Mr Stepaniuc's
character at the beginning and at the end of the impugned passage.
In
so far as the first statement is concerned, it is a clear statement
of fact and thus the applicant newspaper could have been required to
prove its truth. Indeed, the applicant newspaper presented the
domestic courts with copies of open letters addressed to the
President by a transport company accusing Mr Stepaniuc of abuse of
power (see paragraph 9 above); however, the national courts did not
pay any attention to these pieces of evidence and did not seek to
assess them, apparently treating them as irrelevant.
As
to the second statement, the Court also considers it to be a
statement of fact and notes that the applicant newspaper requested an
adjournment of the proceedings on several occasions in order to be
able to produce a copy of the secret service report concerning Mr
Stepaniuc's alleged involvement in illegal activities in the tobacco
business (see paragraphs 10, 12 and 18 above). In spite of this, not
only did the domestic courts reject the applicant's requests without
giving any reasons (see paragraphs 11 and 14 above), but even after
receiving a copy of the annex to the secret service' report (see
paragraph 18 above), the Supreme Court of Justice failed to even
mention it in its judgment or assess it or dismiss it on any ground.
The
Court reiterates that, to require an applicant newspaper to prove the
truth of his or her statements, while at the same time depriving him
or her of an effective opportunity to adduce evidence or ignoring the
evidence adduced, constitutes a disproportionate interference with
the right to freedom of expression (see, for example, Busuioc v.
Moldova, no. 61513/00, § 88, 21 December 2004, and
Savitchi v. Moldova, no. 11039/02, § 59, 11 October
2005).
As
regards the third impugned statement, the Court notes that the
applicant newspaper was found liable in damages for the following
assertion: “[Mr Stepaniuc is] a dictator without whose approval
even the flies do not fly in the Parliament building ...and in
general he looks like a genuine Moldovan dandy with a silk tie,
Italian suits, German shoes and dirt under his nails.” In the
Court's view this statement clearly amounts to a value judgment.
The
Court reiterates that the existence of facts can be demonstrated,
whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. The
requirement to prove the truth of a value-judgment is impossible to
fulfil and infringes the freedom of opinion itself, which is a
fundamental part of the right secured by Article 10 (see Jerusalem
v. Austria, no. 26958/95, § 42, ECHR 2001 II,
and Busuioc, cited above, § 61). Moreover, it has to be
recalled that the journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse
to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation (see Prager and
Oberschlick v. Austria, judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A
no. 313, § 38).
Finally,
the Court recalls that considerations concerning the fairness of
proceedings can be taken into account in examining a case of
interference with the exercise of Article 10 rights (see, Stoll v.
Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, § 137, 10 December
2007). The Court cannot but observe the peculiarity of the manner in
which the proceedings were conducted before the domestic courts.
Indeed, the Court notes a series of elements which, examined
cumulatively, leads it to such a conclusion. In particular,
Mr Stepaniuc's action was examined despite the fact that he had
failed to pay court fees, which fact, by itself, should normally have
rendered the action procedurally inadmissible. Moreover, not only did
he fail to appear before the courts but he was not even represented.
At the same time, the applicant's requests for adjournment were
rejected without any reasons being given while the evidence presented
by it was entirely disregarded by the judges. The Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court of Justice failed even to examine the applicant's
submissions concerning Judge I. M.'s alleged lack of independence and
impartiality.
Bearing
in mind the above circumstances, the fact that the impugned
statements were made by a journalist in a debate on an issue of
public interest, and that the plaintiff in the domestic proceedings
was a high-ranking politician, the Court concludes that the
interference did not correspond to a pressing social need and thus
that it was not necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly, there
has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Pecuniary damage
The applicant newspaper claimed EUR 100 for pecuniary
damage, representing the damages paid by it to Mr Stepaniuc and the
court fees which it had to pay for the examination of the appeals.
The
Government disagreed with the amount claimed and argued that the
applicant newspaper should not be entitled to recover it because the
proceedings had been fair and ample reasons had been given for the
judgments. They asked the court to dismiss the applicant newspaper's
claim in respect of pecuniary damage.
The
Court considers the applicant's claim in respect of pecuniary damage
to be well-founded and awards it in full.
B. Non-pecuniary damage
The
applicant newspaper claimed EUR 8,000 for non-pecuniary damage caused
to it by the breach of its Convention rights. In substantiating its
claim, the applicant newspaper argued that it had been obliged to
publish a retraction of the impugned statements and relied on
previous case-law.
The
Government contested the claim and argued that it was ill-founded and
excessive.
Having
regard to the violation of Article 10 of the Convention found above,
the Court considers that an award of compensation for non-pecuniary
damage is justified in this case. Making its assessment on an
equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant newspaper EUR 3,000.
C. Costs and expenses
The
applicant newspaper's lawyer claimed EUR 2,050 for the costs and
expenses incurred before the Court. He submitted a detailed
time-sheet. The calculation in the time sheet also included the time
spent on the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention.
The
Government disputed the amount claimed for representation. They
considered it excessive and argued that the amount claimed by the
lawyer was not the amount actually paid to him by the applicant
newspaper. They disputed the number of hours worked by the
applicant's lawyer and the hourly rate he charged.
In
the present case, regard being had to the itemised list submitted,
the complexity of the case, and also to the fact that the complaint
under Article 6 has been withdrawn by the applicant, the Court
awards the applicant newspaper newspaper's lawyer EUR 1,800 for
costs and expenses.
D. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
10 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant newspaper, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
100 (one hundred euros) in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
3,000 (three thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR
1,800 (one thousand eight hundred euros) in respect of costs and
expenses;
(iv) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant
newspaper's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 February 2008,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President
