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BALSYTE-LIDEIKIENE v. LITHUANIA - 72596/01 [2008] ECHR 1195 (4 November 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1195.html
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[2008] ECHR 1195
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF
BALSYTĖ-LIDEIKIENĖ v. LITHUANIA
(Application
no. 72596/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
4 November
2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Balsytė-Lideikienė v. Lithuania,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Josep
Casadevall,
President,
Elisabet
Fura-Sandström,
Corneliu
Bîrsan,
Boštjan
M. Zupančič,
Alvina
Gyulumyan,
Egbert
Myjer,
judges,
Ineta
Ziemele, appointed
to sit in respect of Lithuania,
and Stanley Naismith, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 7 October 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 72596/01) against the
Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Mrs
Danutė Balsytė-Lideikienė (“the applicant”),
on 23 May 2001.
The
applicant was initially represented before the Court by
Mr
A. Vallieres; later she revoked her authorisation and appointed
Mr F. Ruhlmann, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg, as her
representative. On 14 February 2006 the applicant again revoked
her authorisation and from that date had no representation. The
Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agents, Ms D. Jočienė and
Ms E. Baltutytė.
The
applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
in that her case had been examined by the first-instance court
without experts having been summoned to the hearing despite the fact
that their conclusions had central value for the merits of the case.
She also asserted that she had been unable to state her case before
the Supreme Administrative Court because the latter had not held a
hearing on appeal.
Relying
on Article 10 of the Convention the applicant alleged that her right
to freedom of expression had been violated because the State
authorities had confiscated a calendar she had published and banned
its further distribution.
The
application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52
§ 1 of the Rules of Court). The Government designated John
Hedigan, the judge elected in respect of Ireland, to sit as a
national judge in this case. As John Hedigan left the Court, the
Government accordingly appointed Ineta Ziemele, the judge elected in
respect of Latvia, to sit in his place (Article 27 § 2 of the
Convention and Rule 29 § 1).
By
a decision of 24 November 2005 the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1). The parties replied in writing to each other's
observations.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant, Mrs Danutė Balsytė-Lideikienė,
is a Lithuanian national, who was born in 1947. At present she lives
in Lithuania.
The
applicant is the founder and owner of a publishing company
“Metskaitliai”. Since 1995 the company has published
“Lithuanian calendar” (Lietuvio kalendorius), a
yearly calendar with notes by the applicant and other contributors
describing various historic dates from the perspective of its
authors. The calendar could be purchased in bookstores. It was
distributed in Lithuania and among Lithuanian immigrants living
abroad.
On
4 January 2000 a Member of the Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas)
distributed a public announcement, stating that the texts published
in “Lithuanian calendar 2000” insulted persons of Polish,
Russian and Jewish origin. The relevant parts of “Lithuanian
calendar” read as follows:
[First page of the calendar]: “Lietuva – the
land of the Lithuanians, as each footprint here bears traces of our
Nation's blood”
15 February: “In 1998, on the eve of the 80th
anniversary of the restoration of the independence of Lithuania, a
Pole insidiously killed nine Lithuanians living in Širvintų
district's Draučių
village – all the inhabitants of the village were shot. (...)
The Nation was informed about the tragedy after thirty six hours –
during this time Lithuanian [high society] were celebrating and
enjoying themselves, hugged the Polish president, put flowers [on the
monuments] to Pilsudski's army, drank and danced their ghastly dance
on the freshly spilled blood of Lithuanians whose whole village had
been murdered.”
17 March: “The new Lithuanian government
(...) puts on trial the Lithuanian nation for the extermination of
the Jews (...) but is not interested in the genocide of the
Lithuanians and dances Jewish foxtrots to the music of the
Wiesenthals and Zurroffs.”
26 April: “In 1944 in the vicinity of Rodūnia
the Polish Krajova Army killed 12 Lithuanians for the sole
reason that they were Lithuanians.”
15 June: “The soviet occupying power, with
the help of the communist collaborators, among whom, in particular,
were many Jews, for half a century ferociously carried out the
genocide and colonisation of the Lithuanian nation.”
23 June: “In 1944 in Dubingiai and its
surrounding area the Polish Krajova Army brutally killed more than a
hundred Lithuanians (...) among whom were women, little children,
even babies and old people. This was the way the Poles, in war
conditions, carried out ethnic cleansing. In the whole territory of
Lithuania [the members of the Krajova Army] killed about 1 000,
and in the ethnic Lithuanian lands about 3 000 more innocent
people, for the sole reason that they were Lithuanians. The Dubingiai
events should be regarded as the genocide of the Lithuanian nation.
But the Lithuanian authorities [who associate themselves with the
Poles] ignore obvious facts and do not even attempt to evaluate these
war crimes.”
15 July: “Through the blood of our ancestors
to the worldwide community of the Jews”
18 July: “In 1999 the monument to the victims
of the Polish Krajova Army was put up and consecrated in Dubingiai.
(...) In 1944 in the environs of Dubingiai the Polish Krajova Army
plundered and killed innocent people solely because they were
Lithuanians. The killings of 8 March and 23 June 1944 are
horrible [acts of] ethnic cleansing and cruel war crimes that cannot
be solved by simply constructing a monument to the victims. There is
no statutory time-limit on prosecution of war crimes, the war
criminals should be identified and tried. (...)”
31 August: “occupying Russian army”,
“Russian occupants”
10 September: “The March of the Beggars. In
1997 (...) about fifty Lithuanian beggars demonstrated in front of
the Parliament. They were joined by a few thousand Vilnius residents.
The purpose of this act was to attract the Parliament's and the
Government's attention to poverty (...) in Lithuania. Unfortunately,
the public gathering of the beggars did not receive any attention
from the heads of the Lithuanian State. At the same time a banquet
for the Jews took place in Vilnius. The banquet cost Lithuania a
million litas. A feast during the plague. (...) The Jews were
managing the Parliament; from the tribune of the Parliament the Jews
were insulting and scolding the Lithuanian nation, asking for
Lithuanian blood and Lithuanian property. The majority of the ruling
Conservative party (...) greeted the swearing Jews with standing
ovations.”
24 November: “The Lithuanian nation will only
survive by being a nationalist nation – no other way exists!”
5 December: “In 1991 the Supreme Council
(Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania (...) adopted the “zero”
citizenship law, proposed by V. Landsbergis. The law illegally
gave citizenship to occupants and colonists and the Lithuanians
became worthless.”
22 December: “The politicians adopted
legislation demonstrating their anti-Lithuanian attitude. This way,
the conservative neo-Bolsheviks took their revenge on the Lithuanian
nation, executing the will of the Jewish extremists. ”
24 December: “21 Lithuanians were brutally
killed during the Christmas of 1944. Half a century passed and on
Christmas Eve the Pharisees (...) who took power started new
executions against the Lithuanians and the Lithuanian nation,
carrying out pro-Jewish politics.”
The
back cover of “Lithuanian calendar 2000” contained a map
of the Republic of Lithuania. The neighbouring territories of the
Republic of Poland, the Russian Federation and the Republic of
Belarus were marked as “ethnic Lithuanian lands under temporary
occupation”.
On
10 January 2000 a Seimas committee requested the Office of the
Prosecutor General to investigate whether the publication was
compatible with the Lithuanian Constitution and other legal acts.
On
12 January 2000 the Prime Minister wrote a letter to the State
Security Department, requesting it to examine whether “the
contents of 'Lithuanian calendar 2000' contained the elements of
violations of ethnic and racial equality”.
On
the same date the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry also received a note
from the Russian Embassy, expressing its dissatisfaction with the
publication's map describing certain territories of the Russian
Federation as “ethnic Lithuanian lands under temporary
occupation”.
On
13 January 2000 a similar note was received from the Embassy of
Belarus.
On
14 January 2000 the State Security Department requested Vilnius
University to submit an experts' opinion as to whether “Lithuanian
calendar 2000” promoted ethnic, racial or religious hostility.
In this regard the security intelligence authorities requested the
experts to examine whether “Lithuanian calendar 2000”
contained anti-Semitic, anti-Polish, anti-Russian expressions, or
assertions of the superiority of Lithuanians vis-à-vis
other ethnic groups.
On
20 January 2000 two experts, history and political science professors
at Vilnius University, found that “Lithuanian calendar 2000”
could be characterised as promoting the radical ideology of
nationalism, which rejected the idea of the integration of civil
society, incited ethnocentrism, contained xenophobic and offensive
statements, in particular with regard to the Jewish and Polish
populations, and promoted territorial claims and national superiority
vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. The experts nonetheless
noted that the calendar did not directly incite violence against the
Jewish population, nor did it advocate implementing discriminatory
policy against this ethnic group.
At
the end of January 2000 the security intelligence authorities seized
a number of copies of “Lithuanian calendar 2000” in
various bookstores in Lithuania. The distribution of the publication
was stopped.
By
a letter of 31 January 2000 the Prosecutor General informed the Prime
Minister that, following the examination of the content of
“Lithuanian calendar 2000”, no elements of a criminal
offence (instigation of ethnic or racial hatred) had been found in
the applicant's releasing of the publication. However, the Prosecutor
General held that in this respect the applicant should have been
punished by way of the administrative procedure under Article 21412
of the Code on Administrative Law Offences (Production, storage and
distribution of information materials promoting ethnic, racial or
religious hatred). He stated that the security intelligence
authorities had applied to an administrative court for a penalty to
be imposed on the applicant under the domestic provision. The
Prosecutor General also informed the Prime Minister that the
distribution of the calendar had been suspended pending the
determination of the case by a court.
On
14 February 2000 the officers of the State Security Department held
that the applicant should be punished by the administrative procedure
provided by Article 21412
of the Code on Administrative Law Offences.
On
28 June 2000 the Vilnius City Second District Court found that the
applicant had produced 3,000 copies of “Lithuanian calendar
2000”, 588 of which had been sold. By reference mostly to the
experts' conclusion of 20 January 2000, the court held that the
applicant thereby intended to distribute material promoting ethnic
hatred in breach of Article 21412
of the Code of Administrative Law Offences. The Court imposed an
administrative fine in the amount of 1,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL) on
the applicant and ordered confiscation of all copies of “Lithuanian
calendar 2000” seized in the bookstores.
The
court examined the case in the absence of the applicant or her
lawyer. It was noted however that she had been duly informed of the
date and place of the hearing, but that she had not submitted a
request to postpone the examination or an explanation of the reasons
for her absence. Therefore the court had concluded that the case
could be examined without the applicant being present.
The
applicant appealed, claiming in particular a violation of Article 10
of the Convention. She also argued that she had been tried in
absentia.
On
16 August 2000 the Vilnius Regional Court quashed the first-instance
judgment on the ground that the applicant had been in hospital
from
27 June to 3 July 2000 and could not take part in the first-instance
hearing. The case was remitted for a fresh examination at first
instance.
On
28 September 2000 a judge of the Vilnius City Second District Court
ordered another expert examination to be carried out. The court
requested Vilnius University to form a group of experts representing
various fields of social science in order to produce a conclusion on
whether “Lithuanian calendar 2000” promoted ethnic,
racial or religious hatred, whether it contained anti-Semitic,
anti-Polish, anti-Russian expressions, or assertions of the
superiority of Lithuanians vis-à-vis other ethnic
groups.
In
reply to the court's decision, four separate expert opinions were
produced, reflecting the point of view of Vilnius University
professors specialising in the following fields: history, psychology,
political science and library science.
On
12 March 2001 the applicant submitted a written request,
received by the Vilnius City Second District Court the following day,
by which she asked the court to postpone the hearing as the experts
had not appeared at the hearing for the third time in a row. The
applicant also asked the court to determine the reasons behind the
experts' absence and to sanction them. The court did not grant the
applicant's requests.
On
13 March 2001 the Vilnius City Second District Court found that by
publishing and distributing “Lithuanian calendar 2000”
the applicant had breached Article 21412
of the Code on Administrative Offences. The court imposed an
administrative penalty in the form of a warning on her, while the
unsold copies of the calendar and the means to produce it were
confiscated.
By
reference to the conclusions of the experts in the field of political
science the court stated that a one-sided portrayal of relations
among nations obstructed the consolidation of civil society and
promoted ethnic hatred. The court also noted that “Lithuanian
calendar 2000” had caused negative reactions from part of
society as well as from the diplomatic representations of some
neighbouring States, including Poland, Belarus and Russia, who had
expressed their concerns about the map denoting some of the
territories of those countries as “ethnic Lithuanian lands
under temporary occupation”. Relying on the conclusion of the
bibliographic expert report the Vilnius City Second District Court
noted that the publication did not meet the prescribed standards
because, among other things, the calendar contained no indication of
the sources and literature that had been used, and the name of the
author of each statement in the calendar was not provided. The court
concluded that the applicant had prepared, published and distributed
the calendar and was therefore responsible for its content.
By
reference to the conclusions of the experts in the fields of history
and psychology the court held that the applicant's actions had not
been deliberate, but reckless. The court relied on the psychological
experts' report that “Lithuanian calendar 2000”
represented the personal character, values and emotions of the
applicant. The court noted the conclusion of the experts in
psychology that the publication did not contain expressions of hatred
against the Polish population, the superiority of the Lithuanians
over other nationals was not emphasised, and the negative statements
about the Jewish population were not to be seen as anti-Semitic.
However the Vilnius City Second District Court concluded that the
psychology experts' conclusion did not refute the other evidence
collected and the remaining evidence confirmed that there had been a
violation of administrative law.
The
court emphasised that the breach of the administrative law committed
by the applicant was not serious, and that it had not caused
significant harm to society's interests. The court also noted the
applicant's disability and absence of previous convictions.
In
view of those circumstances and given the negligent nature of the
offence, the court decided to impose an administrative warning under
Article 301 of
the Code on Administrative Law Offences, which was a milder
administrative penalty than the fine of between LTL 1,000 and LTL
10,000 prescribed by Article 21412.
The
case was examined in the presence of the applicant and a
representative of the security intelligence authorities. The
applicant left the hearing in the course thereof. At the hearing she
was not represented by a lawyer.
The
applicant appealed, claiming in particular that Article 10 of the
Convention had been violated. She also complained that the
first-instance court had not called the experts to the hearing,
thereby violating her defence rights.
On
4 May 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court reviewed the case under
written procedure. The applicant relied on the conclusion of the
psychological experts' report, arguing that “Lithuanian
calendar 2000” did not promote hatred against the Poles, Jews
or Russians, nor did it claim the superiority of the Lithuanians over
other nations. According to the appellate court, these were the
conclusions of experts in one field only, whereas the rest of the
evidence, namely the political science and bibliographical experts'
reports, attested that the comments in the calendar were based on the
ideology of extreme nationalism, which rejected the idea of civil
society's integration and endorsed xenophobia, national hatred and
territorial claims.
The
court disagreed with the applicant's argument that her defence rights
had been violated because the first-instance court had failed to call
the experts to have them challenged at the hearing. The Supreme
Administrative Court stated:
“The [applicant's] argument that the
[first-instance] court violated procedural legal norms because the
experts were not present at the court hearing, is not valid. The
first- instance court, relying on its inner belief, evaluated the
experts' conclusions both as to their reasonableness and as to their
comprehensiveness. Article 277 § 1 of the Code on Administrative
Law Offences provides for a possibility to summon the experts if
there is a need to explain the conclusions the latter had presented.
The fact, that this possibility had not been used, cannot be regarded
as a violation of procedural legal norms.”
Relying
on the above arguments, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed
the appeal.
On
an unspecified date the applicant left Lithuania. She applied for
political asylum in Switzerland. Later the applicant returned to
Lithuania. She lives in Vilnius.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as relevant in this case,
provides as follows:
Article 25
“Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
and freely express them.
No one may be prevented from seeking, receiving and
imparting information and ideas.
Freedom of expression, freedom to receive and impart
information may not be restricted in any way other than by law and
when it is necessary for the protection of health, dignity, private
life, and morals, or for the defence of the constitutional order.
Freedom of expression and freedom to impart information
shall be incompatible with criminal actions - incitement of national,
racial, religious, or social hatred, violence or discrimination,
slander or disinformation.”
The
Code on Administrative Law Offences (“the Code”) punishes
with administrative penalties various minor offences which are not
provided for in the domestic substantive criminal law.
Article 1
of the Code provides that all citizens must ensure respect for legal
rules and the rights of other citizens. Article 9 of the Code defines
an administrative offence as a wrongful act which causes danger to
public order, citizens' rights and the established order of
administration.
Article
20 of the Code provides that administrative punishment is a form of
establishing responsibility that has the aim of punishing offenders,
educating them to observe the law and preventing them reoffending.
An
administrative warning is a penalty under Article 301
and it can be used to replace a harsher penalty the Code prescribes
for a particular offence; the administrative warning is also intended
to serve as a preventive measure, in the same way as a suspended
sentence in criminal law.
Article
21412 of the
Code punishes the production, storage and distribution of information
material promoting national, racial or religious hatred by a fine of
between LTL 1,000 and LTL 10,000 with the confiscation of the
material, with or without confiscation of its main means of
production.
Article
256 provides that an expert's conclusion can be considered as
evidence. Pursuant to Article 277, an expert can be appointed when
special knowledge is required for solving the case.
Under
Article 272 of the Code, a person who is liable for an administrative
sanction has the right to familiarise himself with the material of
the case and to submit explanations and evidence, as well as to lodge
requests.
Article
314 of the Code stipulates that if a fine has been imposed on a
person and the latter does not possess the means to pay it, a court
can substitute the fine with administrative arrest of up to 30 days.
Article
53 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings (LAP), as in force at the
material time, provided that, among other procedural rights, the
parties were entitled to question other participants in the process,
including witnesses and experts, to take part in the examination of
evidence and to present explanations.
Under
Article 130 of the LAP, parties had the right to bring an appeal
against a decision of a first-instance court. The appeal should
indicate, among other things, evidence to support its grounds.
Article
144 of the LAP stipulated that appeal proceedings against a decision
or ruling in cases relating to administrative law offences were
conducted in writing. Upon the decision of the chamber of judges, an
oral hearing of a specific case could be held.
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article
20 § 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in force in the Republic of Lithuania since 20 February
1992, provides:
“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law”.
The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, ratified by the Republic of Lithuania on 9 January
1999, provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:
Article I
“1. In this Convention, the term “racial
discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on ... national or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.”
Article 2
“1. States Parties condemn racial discrimination
and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means ... of eliminating
racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding
among all races, and, to this end:
...
(d) Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end,
by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by
circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or
organization ...”
Article 3
“States Parties particularly condemn racial
segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and
eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their
jurisdiction.”
Article 4
“States Parties condemn all propaganda and all
organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of
one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed
to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and,
to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set
forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence
or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of
another colour or ethnic origin ...”
According
to Article 6 § 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities, signed within the framework of the Council of
Europe and in force in the Republic of Lithuania since 1 July 2000:
“The Parties undertake to take appropriate
measures to protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of
discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their ethnic,
cultural, linguistic or religious identity.”
The
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance General Policy, in
its Recommendation no. 1: Combating racism, xenophobia,
anti-Semitism and intolerance, recommends that the Governments of the
member States, insofar as relevant, “ensure that national
criminal, civil and administrative law expressly and specifically
counter racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance”.
Appendix
to Recommendation no. R (97) 20 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States on “Hate speech”, drafted
within the framework of the Council of Europe, provides, insofar as
relevant, as follows:
Scope
“The principles set out hereafter apply to hate
speech, in particular hate speech disseminated through the media.
For the purposes of the application of these principles,
the term “hate speech” shall be understood as covering
all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify
racial hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism or other forms of hatred
based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive
nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against
minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.”
Principle 2
“The governments of the member states should
establish or maintain a sound legal framework consisting of civil,
criminal and administrative law provisions on hate speech which
enable administrative and judicial authorities to reconcile in each
case respect for freedom of expression with respect for human dignity
and the protection of the reputation or the rights of others.”
Principle 3
“The governments of the member states should
ensure that ... interferences with freedom of expression are narrowly
circumscribed and applied in a lawful and non-arbitrary manner on the
basis of objective criteria. Moreover ... any limitation of or
interference with freedom of expression must be subject to
independent judicial control. This requirement is particularly
important in cases where freedom of expression must be reconciled
with respect for human dignity and the protection of the reputation
or the rights of others.”
Principle 4
“National law and practice should allow the courts
to bear in mind that specific instances of hate speech may be so
insulting to individuals or groups as not to enjoy the level of
protection afforded by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights to other forms of expression. This is the case where hate
speech is aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid
down in the Convention or at their limitation to a greater extent
than provided therein.”
Principle 5
“National law and practice should allow the
competent prosecution authorities to give special attention, as far
as their discretion permits, to cases involving hate speech. In this
regard, these authorities should, in particular, give careful
consideration to the suspect's right to freedom of expression given
that the imposition of criminal sanctions generally constitutes a
serious interference with that freedom. The competent courts should,
when imposing criminal sanctions on persons convicted of hate speech
offences, ensure strict respect for the principle of
proportionality.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
A. The parties' submissions
1. The applicant
The
applicant alleged a breach of Article 6 of the Convention, which
provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law ... .
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence
has the following minimum rights:
...
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ... .”
The
applicant submitted that her case had been examined by the
first-instance court without the experts having been summoned, even
though their conclusions were essential to the determination of the
merits of the case. In view in particular of the fact that some of
the expert conclusions were controversial, the applicant should have
been given the opportunity to have the experts examined at a hearing.
The applicant also claimed that she had been unable to state her case
properly before the Supreme Administrative Court, as it had not held
a hearing on appeal.
2. The Government
The
Government stated at the outset that in the present case Article 6
was not applicable under either its “civil” or “criminal”
head. With regard to the non-applicability of Article 6 under the
civil head the Government stressed the public-law nature of the
dispute. The imposition of the administrative punishment –
warning with confiscation of the calendars – had exclusively
concerned relations between the citizens and the state. In any event,
even assuming that Article 6 applied under its civil head, there had
been no need for the domestic courts to call and examine witnesses or
experts at a hearing. The Government submitted that at no stage of
the proceedings had the applicant requested the examination of the
experts. Moreover, there was no reason to doubt the objectivity of
the experts' conclusions. The applicant had been able to familiarise
herself with the material of the case, including the conclusions, and
comment on them either by submitting written explanations or orally
at the hearing.
Regarding
the examination of the applicant's appeal by the written procedure at
the Supreme Administrative Court, the Government relied on Article
137 § 2 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, which
prescribed that proceedings on appeal against court rulings in cases
of administrative law offences were normally conducted in writing.
Moreover, even if the applicant had made a request for an oral
hearing, which she failed to do, the court would not have been
obliged to grant such a request. The Government also noted that in
line with the practice of the Supreme Administrative Court, an oral
hearing is held in cases where the court decides that not enough
evidence has been gathered, or that it is controversial, and thus
that it is necessary to hear submissions from the parties in person.
In the present case the Supreme Administrative Court took into
account the clarity of the factual circumstances and the clarity of
the applicant's submissions as well as the fact that Vilnius City
Second District Court had duly and thoroughly examined the questions
of fact and law. Therefore the Government concluded that there had
been no breach of Article 6 under its civil head.
As
to the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention under its
“criminal” head the Government turned to the criteria
developed in the Engel case: the legal classification of the
offence in domestic law, the nature of the offence and the nature and
degree of severity of the possible penalty (Engel and Others v.
the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22,
§ 82). It observed that the offence which the applicant
committed under Lithuanian law was administrative, while admitting
that the criterion had limited relevance. More importantly,
elaborating on the scope of the violated legal norm, the Government
acknowledged that it had a general effect. Nonetheless, on the
question of the purpose of the penalty for breach of Article 21412
of the Code on Administrative Law Offences, the Government contended
that it was more preventive than punitive.
As
to the nature and severity of the penalty, the Government stressed
that, having taken into consideration the degree of the applicant's
guilt and extenuating circumstances, the latter received only a
warning under Article 301
of the Code as opposed to a fine of between 1,000 LTL (approximately
EUR 290) and 10,000 LTL (approximately EUR 2,900) which Article 21412
of the Code prescribes. Moreover, the administrative punishment
imposed could not be converted into a prison sentence. Therefore the
Government maintained that the severity of the punishment imposed in
no way attained the level required for it to be considered criminal
for the purpose of Article 6 of the Convention.
According
to the Government, even assuming that Article 6 applied under its
“criminal” head, the requirement of fairness of the
proceedings had been respected. The Convention does not give the
defence an absolute right to question every witness it wishes to
call. The Vilnius City Second District Court had exercised its
discretion and rightly decided that in view of the clarity of the
submitted information there was no need to call the experts to the
hearing. The first-instance court had then based its decision not
only on the experts' conclusions, but also on other evidence, such as
the protocol of the administrative law offence and the submissions of
the applicant. The Government stressed that at no stage of the
proceedings had the applicant, either in writing or during the
hearing, explicitly requested the examination of the experts.
On
the issue of the fact that a hearing on appeal had not been held
before the Supreme Administrative Court, the Government maintained
that the applicant had not lodged any request for a hearing to be
held. Moreover, the applicant's rights under Article 6 had been fully
respected by the
first-instance court, thus the appellate court
could have reasonably considered that there had been no need for a
hearing and had been right to decide the case under the written
procedure as the national law prescribed.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Applicability of Article 6 of the Convention
Having
regard to the fact that the applicant was sanctioned with an
administrative warning and the confiscation of the unsold copies of
“Lithuanian calendar 2000” , the question arises whether
the proceedings were “criminal” within the autonomous
meaning of Article 6 and thus attracted the guarantees under that
head. In determining whether an offence qualifies as “criminal”,
three criteria are to be applied: the legal classification of the
offence in domestic law, the nature of the offence and the nature and
degree of severity of the possible penalty (see, among other
authorities, Engel and Others, cited above, § 82,
and Lauko v. Slovakia, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions
1998-VI, p. 2504, § 56).
As
to the first criteria the Court acknowledges, and it was not disputed
by the parties, that the Code on Administrative Law Offences is not
characterised under domestic law as “criminal”. However,
the indications furnished by the domestic law of the respondent State
have only a relative value (see Öztürk v. Germany,
judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A no. 73,
p. 19, § 52).
In
addition, it is the Court's established jurisprudence that the second
and third criteria are alternative and not necessarily cumulative:
for Article 6 to be held applicable, it suffices that the offence in
question is by its nature to be regarded as “criminal”
from the point of view of the Convention, or that the offence made
the person liable to a sanction which, by its nature and degree of
severity, belongs in general to the “criminal” sphere
(see Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC],
nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98, § 86, ECHR 2003 X).
This does not exclude that a cumulative approach may be adopted where
the separate analysis of each criterion does not make it possible to
reach a clear conclusion as to the existence of a “criminal
charge” (see Lauko, cited above, § 57).
On
the question of the nature of the offence committed by the applicant,
the Court recalls that she was sanctioned for the production and
distribution of “Lithuanian calendar 2000” under Articles
301 and 21412 of the Code on Administrative Law
Offences. The latter provision regulates administrative law offences
against the established order of administration (Administraciniai
teisės paZeidimai,
kuriais kėsinamasi į nustatytą valdymo tvarką).
Accordingly, this legal rule is directed towards all citizens and not
towards a given group possessing a special status. The general
character of the legal rule in question is further confirmed by
Chapter 1 of the Code on Administrative Law Offences, which refers to
the fact that all citizens must ensure respect for legal rules and
the rights of other citizens, as well as by Article 9 of the Code,
which defines an administrative offence as a wrongful act which
causes danger to public order, citizens' rights and the established
order of administration. It follows that the legal norm in question
is of general effect and therefore falls under the second Engel
criterion (Lauko, cited above, § 58).
The
Court now has to look at the third criterion – the nature and
severity of the penalty. The domestic courts found the applicant
guilty under Article 21412 of the Code on Administrative
Law Offences, which stipulates a fine of between 1,000 LTL and 10,000
LTL, although, taking into consideration that there were mitigating
circumstances, the fine was substituted by a warning under Article
301 of the Code.
As
to the nature of the penalty the Court attaches particular
significance to Article 20 of the Code on Administrative Law
Offences, which stipulates that the aim of administrative punishment
is to punish offenders and to deter them from reoffending. The Court
recalls that a punitive character is the customary distinguishing
feature of a criminal penalty (see the above-mentioned Öztürk
judgment, § 53).
As
to the degree of severity of the penalty the Court reiterates that
the actual penalty imposed on the applicant is relevant to its
determination but cannot diminish the importance of what was
initially at stake (see Ezeh and Connors, cited above,
§ 120, and the jurisprudence cited therein).
Thus,
even though in the present case the national courts issued only a
warning under Article 301
of the Code on Administrative Law Offences, the applicant was
punished under Article 21412, which stipulates a fine of
between 1,000 LTL and 10,000 LTL. The Court has particular regard to
the fact that if a fine has not been paid, Article 314 of the Code
provides a possibility to substitute the fine with administrative
arrest of up to 30 days. It should not be forgotten that in addition
to the warning, the published and undistributed copies of the
calendar were confiscated, and confiscation is often regarded as a
criminal punishment.
In
sum, the general character of the legal provision infringed by the
applicant together with the deterrent and punitive purpose of the
penalty, as well as the severity of the punishment the applicant
risked incurring, suffice to show that the offence in question was,
in terms of Article 6 of the Convention, criminal in nature.
Therefore the Court considers that Article 6 § 3
(d) is applicable in the instant case.
2. Opportunity to examine the experts
The
Court recalls that the requirements of paragraph 3 of Article 6 of
the Convention are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a
fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 (see Doorson v.
the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1996, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1996 II, § 66). In
this respect the Court has previously held that all the evidence must
normally be produced in the presence of the accused at a public
hearing with a view to adversarial argument (Van Mechelen and
Others v. the Netherlands, judgment of 23 April 1997, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1997 III, § 51).
However, the use as evidence of statements obtained at the pre-trial
stage is not in itself inconsistent with paragraphs 3 (d) and 1 of
Article 6, provided the rights of the defence have been respected. As
a rule, these rights require that the defendant be given an adequate
and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against
him, either when he was making his statements or at a later stage of
the proceedings (see, among many authorities, Isgrò v.
Italy, judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A
no. 194-A, p.
12, § 34, and Lüdi v. Switzerland, judgment of 15
June 1992, Series A no. 238, p. 21, § 47).
The corollary of that, however, is that where a conviction is based
solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been made by
a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to
have examined, whether during the pre-trial stage or at the trial,
the rights of the defence are restricted to an extent that is
incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6 (see the
following judgments: Unterpertinger v. Austria, 24 November
1986, Series A no. 110, §§ 31-33, and Saïdi v.
France, 20 September 1993, Series A no. 261-C, §§
43-44). With respect to statements of witnesses who proved to be
unavailable for questioning in the presence of the defendant, the
Court recalls that paragraph 1 of Article 6 taken together with
paragraph 3 requires the Contracting States to take positive steps,
in particular to enable the accused to examine or have examined
witnesses against him (see Sadak and Others v. Turkey, nos.
29900/96, 29901/96, 29902/96 and 29903/96, § 67, ECHR
2001-VIII).
In
the present case the Court notes that sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph
3 of Article 6 relates to witnesses and not experts. However the
Court would like to recall that the guarantees contained in paragraph
3 are constituent elements, amongst others, of the concept of a fair
trial set forth in paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) (see, inter alia,
Artico v. Italy, judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, p.
15, § 32; Goddi v. Italy, judgment of 9 April 1984,
Series A no. 76, p. 11, § 28; and Colozza and Rubinat v.
Italy, judgment of 12 February 1985, Series A no. 89, p. 14, §
26). In the circumstances of the instant case, the Court, whilst also
having due regard to the paragraph 3 guarantees, including those
enunciated in sub-paragraph (d), considers that it should examine the
applicant's complaints under the general rule of paragraph 1 (see the
above-mentioned Colozza judgment, loc. cit.).
In
the circumstances of the case in issue the Court disagrees with the
Government's claim about the lack of significance of the experts'
conclusions vis-à-vis the other pieces of evidence. The
Court takes into consideration the fact that the first-instance court
appointed experts to produce political science, bibliographical,
psychological and historical reports with the aim of establishing
whether “Lithuanian calendar 2000” posed a danger to
society, which was the precondition of an administrative law offence.
The Court draws particular attention to the fact that when finding
the applicant guilty, the national courts of both instances
extensively quoted the experts' conclusions. In particular, the
Vilnius City Second District Court quoted the conclusions of the
political science experts' report that a biased and one-sided
portrayal of relations between the nations obstructed the
consolidation of civil society and propagated national hatred. The
first-instance court also directly relied on the bibliographical
experts' report that “Lithuanian calendar 2000” did not
meet the generally applied bibliographical standards as to the
sources and literature quoted. In determining guilt and coming to the
conclusion that the administrative offence had been committed due to
the applicant's negligence,
the first-instance court relied on
the conclusion of psychological experts. From all the foregoing, the
Court concludes that in the instant case the conclusions provided by
the experts during the pre-trial stage had a key place in the
proceedings against the applicant. It is therefore necessary to
determine whether the applicant expressed a wish to have the experts
examined in open court and, if so, whether she had such an
opportunity.
Relying
on the documents at its disposition the Court draws attention to the
applicant's written request of 12 March 2001, received by the
Vilnius City Second District Court the following day, by which the
applicant asked the court to postpone the hearing as the experts had
not appeared at the hearing for the third time in a row (see § 26
above). The applicant also asked the court to determine the reasons
behind the experts' absence and to sanction them. Furthermore, in her
appeal the applicant referred to her request to have the experts
present at the hearing at the first-instance court and the refusal of
that court to summon them. However, the Supreme Administrative Court
rejected the applicant's request, noting that under the circumstances
of the case her inability to question the experts did not violate any
of the procedural legal norms.
Having analysed all the material submitted to it, the Court considers
that neither at the pre-trial stage nor during the trial was the
applicant given the opportunity to question the experts, whose
opinions contained certain discrepancies, in order to subject their
credibility to scrutiny or cast any doubt on their conclusions.
Relying on its case-law on the subject, the Court concludes that in
the instant case the refusal to entertain the applicant's request to
have the experts examined in open court failed to meet the
requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. Taking into consideration the above conclusion, the
Court finds it unnecessary to separately examine the question of the
absence of a public hearing before the Supreme Administrative Court.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
A. The parties' submissions
1. The applicant
The
applicant alleged a breach of Article 10 of the Convention, the
relevant part of which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. (...)
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others
(...).”
The
applicant argued that the interference with her freedom of expression
had been disproportionate within the meaning of Article 10 § 2
of the Convention in view of the minor threat posed by the
publication to the interests of the Lithuanian State or any ethnic
groups living in Lithuania or the neighbouring countries. In this
connection the applicant emphasised that “Lithuanian calendar”
had been edited and officially distributed by her for 6 years in the
whole territory of Lithuania, attracting no great attention from the
public or from State institutions. Similarly, the 2,000 edition of
“Lithuanian calendar” had been released in a very limited
print run of 3,000 in the second half of the year 1999, and for the
following five months had caused no significant interest or
exaggerated reactions, up until the State authorities' intervention
in January 2000 after they received a note from the embassy of the
Russian Federation. The applicant likewise noted that the Prosecutor
General had refused to start criminal proceedings against her as the
publication had not had the elements of the criminal offence of
instigation of ethnic or racial hatred. She also observed that the
information published in “Lithuanian calendar 2000” had
already been made public in other historical documents. The applicant
also relied on the fact that the publication had contained mainly the
expression of her own opinions on and assessment of various
historical events, and the State had presented no evidence proving
the necessity of such a serious interference. As a result of the
proceedings, she had not only received an administrative penalty in
the form of a warning, but had also lost the main source of her
income, in view of the confiscation and destruction of all the unsold
items of “Lithuanian calendar 2000” and her resultant
inability to continue editing the publication she had created. The
applicant further submitted that the authorities could have pursued
means other than halting the distribution of the calendar, such as
giving her the opportunity to make certain rectifications or
announcements, if necessary, on the cover of the remaining, unsold,
versions of the publication. Finally, the domestic courts' finding of
a lack of intent on the part of the applicant, as well as the minor
danger which the publication represented, were also to be taken into
account in discarding the argument that the interference had been
necessary in a democratic society.
2. The Government
The
Government argued that Article 10 of the Convention had not been
violated. According to them it is of essential importance that the
freedom of expression not only stipulates the right to hold opinions,
but also imposes duties and responsibilities, and therefore cannot be
interpreted as allowing the promotion or dissemination of the ideas
of ethnic hatred, hostility and the superiority of one nation
vis-à-vis
other ethnic groups. The Government admitted that by imposing an
administrative punishment there was interference with the applicant's
freedom of expression; however it had been justified by the necessity
to protect the democratic values on the basis of which Lithuanian
society is based. Stressing the sensitivity of the questions related
to national minorities and territorial integrity after the
re-establishment of independence on 11 March 1990, the
Government submitted that “Lithuanian calendar 2000” was
clearly promoting the extreme ideology of nationalism, which rejected
the idea of the integration of civil society, incited ethnic hatred
and intolerance, and questioned territorial integrity and promoted
national superiority, which had been proved by the notes sent by the
embassies of the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Belarus and the
Russian Federation. By withdrawing the publication from distribution
and imposing an administrative warning on the applicant, the
authorities had sought to prevent the spreading of ideas which might
violate the rights of ethnic minorities living in Lithuania as well
as endanger Lithuania's relations with its neighbouring countries. In
view of the clear threat to these legitimate interests posed by the
publication, as well as the minor nature of the penalty ordered
against the applicant, the Government considered that the
interference had been compatible with the second paragraph of Article
10 of the Convention.
B. The Court's assessment
70. The
Court finds it clear, and this has not been disputed, that there has
been an interference with the applicant's freedom of expression on
account of the administrative penalty and the confiscation of the
publication, which were applied under Articles 301
and 21412 of the
Code on Administrative Law Offences.
71. The
above-mentioned interference contravened Article 10 of the Convention
unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of
the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 10 and was
“necessary in a democratic society” for achieving such
aim or aims. The Court will examine each of these criteria in turn.
1. Prescribed by law
The
applicant and the Government did not question that the interference
was in accordance with the law. Taking into consideration that the
interference was prescribed by Articles 301
and 21412 of the
Code on Administrative Law Offences, the Court sees no reason to
depart from the position of the parties.
2. Legitimate aim
The
Court agrees with the Government's submissions that the punishment
imposed aimed to protect the values laid out in Article 10 § 2
of the Convention, in particular the reputation and rights of the
ethnic groups living in Lithuania and referred to in “Lithuanian
calendar 2000”. It remains to be determined whether the
interference was necessary in a democratic society.
“Necessary in a democratic society”
According
to the Court's well-established case-law, freedom of expression
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society
and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each
individual's self-fulfilment (see, among other authorities, Lingens
v. Austria, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 26, §
41). Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only
to “information” or “ideas” that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such
are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without
which there is no “democratic society” (see Jersild v.
Denmark, judgment of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298,
pp. 23-24, § 31 and Steel and Morris v. the United
Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 87, ECHR 2005 II).
The Court also acknowledges that, as set forth in
Article 10, freedom of expression is subject to exceptions, which
must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any
restrictions must be established convincingly (see Handyside v.
the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 49, Series A
no. 24; Lingens, cited above, § 41; Jersild
v. Denmark, cited above, § 37; Piermont v. France,
27 April 1995, § 26, Series A no. 314;
Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998, § 55,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VII; Fressoz
and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 45, ECHR
1999 I; Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93,
§ 43, ECHR 1999-VIII).
The
adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 §
2, implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. The
Court recognises that the Contracting States have a certain margin of
appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes
hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the
legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an
independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final
ruling on whether a “restriction” or “penalty”
is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10
(see Lingens, cited above, p. 25, § 39, and Janowski
v. Poland [GC], no. 25716/94, § 30, ECHR 1999-I).
In
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court must look at the
impugned interference in the light of the case as a whole, including
the content of the remarks held against the applicant and the context
in which she made them. In particular, it must determine whether the
interference in issue was “proportionate to the legitimate aims
pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by the national
authorities to justify it were “relevant and sufficient”
(see The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), judgment
of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 38, § 62; Lingens,
cited above,
pp. 25-26, § 40; Barfod v. Denmark,
judgment of 22 February 1989, Series A no. 149, p. 12, §
28; Janowski, cited above; and News Verlags GmbH & CoKG
v. Austria, no. 31457/96, § 52, ECHR 2000-I). In doing
so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities
applied standards which were in conformity with the principles
embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based themselves
on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see Jersild,
cited above, § 31).
(a) “Pressing social need”
Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court
notes that the applicant was sanctioned on the basis of the
statements she had made in her capacity as an editor and publisher.
Regarding the context in which “Lithuanian calendar 2000”
was published, the Court has particular regard to the general
situation of the Republic of Lithuania. The Court takes into account
the Government's explanation as to the context of the case that after
the re-establishment of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania
on 11 March 1990 the questions of territorial integrity and
national minorities were sensitive. The Court also notes that the
publication received negative reactions from the diplomatic
representations of the Republic of Poland, the Russian Federation and
the Republic of Belarus. In this regard the Court also
notes the obligations of the Republic of Lithuania under
international law, namely, to prohibit any advocacy of national
hatred and to take measures to protect persons who may be subject to
such threats as a result of their ethnic identity (see 40-44 above).
The
Court now turns to the question of the specific language the
applicant used in “Lithuanian calendar 2000”. The
applicant expressed aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism (“The
Lithuanian nation will only survive by being a nationalist nation –
no other way exists!”), repeatedly referred to the Jews as
perpetrators of war crimes and genocide against the Lithuanians (“The
soviet occupying power, with the help of ... many Jews... carried out
the genocide and colonisation of the Lithuanian nation”,
“Through the blood of our ancestors to the worldwide community
of the Jews”, “... executions against the Lithuanians and
the Lithuanian nation, carrying out pro-Jewish politics”). She
also used the same language with reference to the Poles (“In
1944 ... the Polish Krajova Army killed 12 Lithuanians for the
sole reason that they were Lithuanians”, “In 1944 ... the
Polish Krajova Army brutally killed more than a hundred Lithuanians
... the Poles, in war conditions, carried out ethnic cleansing. In
the whole territory of Lithuania [the members of the Krajova Army]
killed about 1 000, and in the ethnic Lithuanian lands about
3 000 more innocent people for the sole reason that they were
Lithuanians. The ... events should be regarded as the genocide of the
Lithuanian nation...”). The impugned passages contained
statements inciting hatred against the Poles and the Jews. The Court
considers that these statements were capable of giving the Lithuanian
authorities cause for serious concern.
In
considering the approach of the domestic courts when deciding whether
a “pressing social need” indeed existed and the reasons
the authorities adduced to justify the interference, the Court
observes that the Vilnius City Second District Court appointed
experts, who provided conclusions as to the gravity of the
applicant's statements and the danger they posed to society. The
courts agreed with the conclusion of the experts that a biased and
one-sided portrayal of relations among nations hindered the
consolidation of civil society and promoted national hatred. The
national courts noted the negative reaction which the publication
received from a certain part of Lithuanian society and some foreign
embassies. They also took into consideration the experts' conclusions
that the applicant's statements could be attributed to the “ideology
of extreme nationalism”, which promoted national hatred,
xenophobia and territorial claims. Having regard to the margin of
appreciation left to the Contracting States in such circumstances,
the Court considers that the domestic authorities, in the
circumstances of the case, did not overstep their margin of
appreciation when they considered that there was a pressing social
need to take measures against the applicant.
(b) “Proportionality”
Noting
the political dimension of the instant case, the Court nevertheless
recalls that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the
Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on
matters of public interest (see Wingrove v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of
25 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, pp. 1957-58,
§ 58). The Court would also like to reiterate that the dominant
position which the government occupies makes it necessary for it to
display restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly
where other means are available for replying to the unjustified
attacks and criticisms of its adversaries. Nevertheless, it certainly
remains open to the competent State authorities to adopt, in their
capacity as guarantors of public order, measures, even of a
criminal-law nature, intended to react appropriately and without
excess to such remarks
(see Incal v. Turkey, judgment of 9
June 1998, Reports 1998-IV, pp. 1567-68, § 54, and
the Appendix to Recommendation no. R (97) 20 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on “Hate speech”,
quoted in § 42 of this judgment).
The
examination of the domestic courts' decisions reveals that the courts
recognised that the present case involved the conflict between the
right to freedom of expression, established in Article 25 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, and the protection of the
reputation of the rights of others. The courts acknowledged the
applicant's right to express her ideas, nonetheless stressing that
along with freedoms and rights a person also has obligations, inter
alia, the obligation not to violate the Constitution and domestic
law. They also stressed that personal beliefs cannot justify the
breach of national law and the commission of administrative offences.
Having balanced the relevant considerations, the national courts
found no reason not to apply the relevant articles of the Code on
Administrative Law Offences.
The
nature and severity of the penalties imposed are among the factors to
be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an
interference with the freedom of expression (see Ceylan v. Turkey
[GC],
no. 23556/94, § 37, ECHR 1999-IV; Tammer v.
Estonia, no. 41205/98,
§ 69, ECHR 2001-I; and
Skałka v. Poland,
no. 43425/98, §§ 41 42, 27 May 2003).
The Court must also exercise the utmost caution where the measures
taken or sanctions imposed by the national authorities are such as to
dissuade the press from taking part in the discussion of matters of
legitimate public concern (see Jersild, cited above, §
35).
In
the instant case, the Court notes that the confiscation measure
imposed on the applicant could be considered relatively serious.
However, the applicant did not have a fine imposed on her, which is
the punishment Article 21412
of the Code on Administrative Law Offences stipulated for the acts
she had committed. The domestic courts took into account that the
applicant had been negligent and had not acted deliberately, that it
was her first administrative offence, as well as the fact that she
was handicapped, and instead imposed a warning under Article 301
of the Code on Administrative Law Offences, which is the mildest
administrative punishment available.
Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers
that the applicant's punishment was not disproportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued and that the reasons advanced by the domestic
courts were sufficient and relevant to justify such interference. The
interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression
could thus reasonably be considered necessary in a democratic society
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others within the
meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
There has consequently been no breach of Article 10 of
the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed EUR 2,285,050 for pecuniary damage caused by the
confiscation of the calendar. She also claimed EUR 2,000,000 for
non-pecuniary damage because she had had to leave her homeland and
had suffered damage to her health.
The
Government submitted that the applicant's claims for just
satisfaction were absolutely unreasoned, unsubstantiated and
excessive.
The
Court is of the view that there is no causal link between the
violation found under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the
alleged pecuniary damage. Consequently, it finds no reason to award
the applicant any sum under this head.
However,
the Court considers that, in view of the violation of Article 6 § 1,
the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage, which is not
sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation. Making its
assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of
the Convention, the Court awards the applicant the global sum of EUR
2,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for the legal costs and expenses
incurred before the Court.
The
Government contested the claim.
The
Court notes that the applicant was granted legal aid under the
Court's legal aid scheme, under which the sum of EUR 355 has been
paid to the applicant's lawyer to cover the submission of the
applicant's observations and additional expenses.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court awards the claim in
full, less the sum already paid under the Court's legal aid scheme
(EUR 355). Consequently, the Court awards the final amount of
EUR 1,645 in respect of the applicant's costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Holds by six votes to one that there has been a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds unanimously that there has been no
violation of Article 10 of the Convention;
Holds by six votes to one
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent
State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
2,000 (two thousand euros) for non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
1,645 (one thousand six hundred and forty-five euros) in respect of
costs and expenses;
(iii) plus
any tax that may be chargeable;
these
amounts are to be converted into the national currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the
applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 November 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Josep
Casadevall
Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the partly dissenting opinion of
Judge Myjer is annexed to this judgment.
J.C.M.
S.H.N.
Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Myjer
The
Court held unanimously that there has been no violation of Article 10
of the Convention.
In
paragraph 79 of the judgment the Court stated with regard to the
language used by the applicant in the Lithuanian calendar 2000 that
'the applicant expressed aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism
(..), repeatedly referred to the Jews as perpetrators of war crimes
and genocide against the Lithuanians (..) (and) used the same
language with reference to the Poles. (..)' The Court concluded: 'The
impugned passages contained statements inciting hatred against the
Poles and the Jews.' I fully agree with this conclusion.
Still,
my colleagues also held that in the national proceedings the refusal
to entertain the applicant's request to have the experts examined in
open court failed to meet the requirements of Article 6 of the
Convention. I did not agree with them.
The
first, rather formalistic, reason is that it is not clear from the
facts that the applicant ever requested to have the opportunity to
put questions to the experts. From the facts mentioned in paragraph
26 it is only clear that she asked for a postponement of the hearing
and for the establishment of the reasons behind the experts' absence
and that they be sanctioned. Only on appeal, when the case was
reviewed under a written procedure, did she mention that her defence
rights had been violated (paragraph 33).
My
second reason is related to the issues at stake. The national judge
had to decide if the Lithuanian calendar 2000 contained information
material promoting national, racial or religious hatred. That is
first and foremost a legal question which should of course be based
on an assessment of the facts. As mentioned above, the affirmative
answer to that question was clear to our Court.
Still,
at the national level the Vilnius City Second District Court decided
to ask for four separate expert opinions, reflecting the point of
view of Vilnius University professors specialising in the following
fields: history, psychology, political science and library science.
Personally, I fail to see what these expert opinions could reasonably
contribute to the legal issues which had to be decided by the
national court (did the calendar contain information material
promoting national, racial or religious hatred?) and what could be
the additional use of putting questions in open court to these
experts. In that respect, I fully understand that apparently the
Vilnius City Second District Court finally decided that there was no
need for the experts to be present at the hearing to explain their
written conclusions (as summarised by the Supreme Administrative
Court, see paragraph 35).
When
an expert is needed to explain if a painting is a real Rembrandt or
not, an expert opinion will be very relevant, and if there is a
disagreement between experts there is every reason to question these
experts in open
court. The same happens for instance when complex technical or
medical issues are at stake. Then indeed special knowledge is
required for solving a case.
However,
here the experts' opinions are just certain views from different
scientific angles on an issue which ultimately only a judge has to
decide on as a legal issue. Certainly, the applicant will have given
her views on the issue as well. Yet to require in the circumstances
of the case – also taking into account that according to the
Lithuanian legislation the issues at stake only concerned minor
administrative offences – that the experts who wrote these
different views should come to the court and explain their written
submissions, is to me one bridge too far.