BAILII
    British and Irish Legal Information Institute


    Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information

    [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

    European Court of Human Rights

    You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> GUZIUK v. POLAND - 39469/02 [2008] ECHR 1153 (21 October 2008)
    URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1153.html
    Cite as: [2008] ECHR 1153
    [New search] [Contents list] [Printable RTF version] [Help]





    FOURTH SECTION







    CASE OF GUZIUK v. POLAND


    (Application no. 39469/02)












    JUDGMENT




    STRASBOURG


    21 October 2008



    This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

    In the case of Guziuk v. Poland,

    The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

    Nicolas Bratza, President,
     Lech Garlicki,
     Giovanni Bonello,
     Ljiljana Mijović,
     Ján Šikuta,
     Mihai Poalelungi,
     Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
    and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

    Having deliberated in private on 30 September 2008,

    Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

    PROCEDURE

  1. The case originated in an application (no. 39469/02) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Stanislaw Guziuk (“the applicant”), on 30 October 2002.

  2. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

  3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that his detention had exceeded a “reasonable time” within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

  4. On 6 September 2006 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3).

    5. THE FACTS

    I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

  5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Szczecin. He is currently detained in Goleniów Prison.

  6. On 7 March 2000 the Szczecin – Zachód District Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Szczecin District Court. The applicant, a recidivist offender, was charged with three robberies and causing minor bodily harm. On 8 September 2000 the Szczecin District Court ordered that the case be transferred to the Regional Court and joined with the second set of proceedings (see below).

    7. A.  Criminal proceedings against the applicant and his detention during the proceedings

  7. The applicant was arrested on 7 January 1998. On 8 January 1998 the Szczecin District Court ordered him to be placed in detention pending trial on suspicion of robbery, assault and intimidating a witness. His detention was subsequently extended by the District Court on 29 January, 31 March and 1 June 1998.

  8. On 30 June 1998 the Poznań Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) extended the applicant’s detention until 7 October 1998. It relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. It further held that the gravity of the charges and the likelihood that the applicant would be given a heavy sentence justified the risk that he might obstruct the proceedings.

  9. On 29 September 1998 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 7 January 1999.

  10. On 6 January, 29 July and 13 December 1999 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) extended the applicant’s detention. It relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question. It also had regard to the nature of the charges against the applicant and their number. Furthermore, it held that the applicant had refused to consent to an examination by psychiatrists, and had thus deliberately prolonged the investigation.

  11. In October 1999 the applicant was transported to Łódź Prison Hospital for treatment, where he went on a hunger strike. On 17 December 1999 he was transported back to Potulice Prison Hospital. He persistently refused to undergo the relevant medical tests (except for 2 X-rays of his lungs).

  12. On 7 March 2000 the Szczecin District Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Szczecin Regional Court. The applicant was charged with 26 different offences, including threatening to kill a witness, intimidating a witness, uttering threats, two counts of assault, extortion and a number of robberies. The applicant was the sole defendant. On the same date the prosecutor filed another bill of indictment with the Szczecin District Court. The applicant was charged with three robberies and causing minor bodily harm. Both sets of proceedings were joined on 8 September 2000.

  13. On 17 March 2000 the Supreme Court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 September 2000. It held that it was necessary in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings and to prevent the applicant from obstructing them. Furthermore, it found that the applicant, by deliberately refusing to cooperate with the prison health service, had aimed at compelling the court to release him. Thus, he had impeded the conduct of the investigation.

  14. On 21 April 2000 the Regional Court informed the applicant, who was suspected of having contracted tuberculosis, that if he continued to refuse to undergo medical tests with a view to determining whether he could participate in the trial without posing an epidemiological danger to other persons, the court would conduct the trial in his absence.

  15. On 2 June 2000 the Regional Court stayed the proceedings. It found that the applicant had refused to undergo medical tests necessary to determine whether he was suffering from TB.

  16. On 21 September 2000 the Poznań Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 31 March 2001, relying on the same grounds as given in the previous decisions.

  17. On 14 November 2000 the Regional Court refused an application by the applicant for his release.

  18. On 6 March 2001 the Regional Court applied to the Court of Appeal for a further extension of the applicant’s detention. It specified that the applicant had been charged with numerous offences against the residents of his neighbourhood. It found that there was a very significant risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings, given that it had been established in the course of the investigation that he had intimidated the victims. On 20 March 2001 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 30 September 2001, endorsing the arguments of the Regional Court. The applicant appealed. On 24 April 2001 a different panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal.

  19. On 25 May 2001 the Regional Court resumed the trial. It noted that the applicant had persistently refused to undergo the relevant medical tests, and had thus impeded the proceedings. The applicant appealed against the decision to resume the trial. On 28 June 2001 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision on procedural grounds.

  20. On 18 September 2001 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 30 March 2002. The decision was upheld on appeal.

  21. On 29 January 2002 the Regional Court refused an application by the applicant for his release. It found that for many months he had hindered the conduct of the proceedings and attempted to compel the court to release him. It further noted that the applicant had persistently refused to undergo medical tests, and that his only aim had been to use the state of his health as an argument militating in favour of his release.

  22. On 14 February 2002 the Regional Court resumed the proceedings. That decision was upheld on appeal on 14 March 2002.

  23. On 20 March 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant be kept in detention until 30 September 2002, invoking the grounds given in the previous decisions. On 28 May 2002 the Regional Court refused an application by the applicant for his release.

  24. The Regional Court held hearings on 17 and 19 June 2002. On the former date it decided to conduct the trial in the applicant’s absence. It found that the applicant’s obstructive behaviour was the main obstacle to the conduct of the proceedings.

  25. On 25 June 2002 the Regional Court decided to hear evidence from the applicant in Potulice Prison. However, the applicant remained silent throughout and did not answer any of the judge’s questions.

  26. Further hearings were held on 28 June, 9 July, 2 August, 2 September, 7 and 23 October, 14 and 22 November, 5 and 16 December 2002. They took place in the applicant’s absence given that he had continuously refused to undergo medical tests. On 19 August 2002 the Regional Court informed the applicant that he could participate in the trial if he agreed to undergo medical tests and if their results showed that he did not pose a health risk to others.

  27. On 19 September 2002 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 30 December 2002, finding that the grounds previously given remained valid.

  28. On 20 December 2002 the Szczecin Regional Court convicted the applicant of all the offences with which he had been charged, except for one count of intimidating a witness and one count of robbery. It sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment.

  29. The applicant appealed. On 8 April 2003 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment.

  30. The applicant unsuccessfully requested the Ombudsman to file a cassation appeal on his behalf. It appears that the applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.

    31. B.  The alleged ill-treatment of the applicant

  31. On 26 April 2002 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the prosecution service, alleging that he had been ill-treated by the prison staff. On 16 June 2002 the Nakło nad Notecią District Prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that no offence had been committed. It noted that the applicant had persistently refused to undergo treatment for TB. It further found that any disciplinary measure taken against the applicant had resulted from breaches of the relevant prison rules. The applicant appealed.

  32. On 9 December 2002 the Nakło nad Notecią District Court upheld the contested decision. It held that the actions of the prison staff had been motivated by the applicant’s illness and his refusal to undergo medical treatment, and could not be considered as ill-treatment.

    33. C.  The alleged monitoring of the applicant’s correspondence

  33. The applicant claimed that during his detention his correspondence was censored and/or delayed by the authorities.

  34. The Nakło nad Notecią District Prosecutor dispatched a letter to the applicant on 10 June 2002. That letter was delivered to Potulice Prison on 11 June 2002. The envelope bears the stamp “Potulice Prison 11-06-2002”. However, the applicant submitted that the letter had been delivered to him on 24 June 2006, after having been censored by the Regional Court.

  35. On 7 November 2002 the Court’s Registry sent a letter to the applicant. That letter was first delivered to Potulice Prison on 18 November 2002 and subsequently, according to the applicant, was sent to the Szczecin Regional Court. It was re-delivered to Potulice Prison on 28 November 2002 and given to the applicant on the same day. The envelope in which the Registry’s letter was sent bears two stamps that read “Potulice Prison 18 11 2002” and “Potulice Prison 28-11-2002” and a handwritten note in pencil “R[egional] C[ourt] Szczecin”.

  36. On 27 January 2003 the Court’s Registry sent the applicant a letter in which it acknowledged receipt of his application form. That letter was first delivered to Potulice Prison on 31 January 2003 and subsequently was sent to the Szczecin Regional Court. It was re-delivered to Potulice Prison on 11 February 2003 and given to the applicant on the same day. The envelope in which that letter was sent bears two stamps that read “Potulice Prison 31 01-2003” and “Potulice Prison 11-02-2003” and a handwritten note in pencil “R[egional] C[ourt] Szczecin”.

  37. On 31 January 2003 the Court’s Registry sent the applicant a letter in which it had acknowledged the receipt of his letter. That letter was first delivered to the Potulice prison on 6 February 2003, and, was subsequently sent to the Szczecin Regional Court. It was re-delivered to the Potulice prison on 17 February 2003 and given to the applicant on the same day. The envelope in which that letter was sent bears two stamps that read “Potulice Prison 06-02-2003” and “Potulice Prison 17-02-2003” and a hand written note in pencil “R[egional] C[ourt] Szczecin IIIK”.

  38. On 9 April 2003 the Court’s Registry sent another letter to the applicant. That letter was first delivered to Potulice Prison on 15 April 2003 and was subsequently re-delivered to Wronki Prison on 22 April 2003, where the applicant had been transferred. The applicant claims that that letter was given to him on 30 April 2003. The envelope in which that letter was sent bears two stamps that read “Potulice Prison 15-04-2003” and “Wronki Prison 22-04-2003”.

  39. The applicant’s counsel posted a letter to the applicant on 26 March 2003. That letter was first delivered to Potulice Prison on 28 March 2003 and subsequently, according to the applicant, was sent to the Szczecin Regional Court. It was re-delivered to Potulice Prison on 11 April 2003 and given to the applicant on the same day. The envelope in which it was sent bears two stamps that read “Potulice Prison 28-03-2003” and “Potulice Prison 11-04-2003” and a handwritten note in pencil “R[egional] C[ourt] Szczecin”.

    40. II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

    A.  Preventive measures, including detention during judicial proceedings

  40. The relevant domestic law and practice concerning the imposition of detention during judicial proceedings (aresztowanie tymczasowe), the grounds for its extension, release from detention and rules governing other “preventive measures” (środki zapobiegawcze) are stated in the Court’s judgments in the cases of Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 75-79, ECHR 2000-XI; Bagiński v. Poland, no. 37444/97, §§ 42-46, 11 October 2005; and Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006.

    41. B.  Monitoring of correspondence

    41.  The relevant domestic law concerning the means of monitoring the correspondence of persons involved in criminal proceedings applicable at the material time is set out in the Court’s judgment in the case of Michta v. Poland, no. 13425/02, §§ 33-39, 4 May 2006.

    THE LAW

    I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION

  41. The applicant complained that the length of his detention during the trial had been excessive. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:

    42. “Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

  42. The Government contested that argument.

    43. A.  Admissibility

  43. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

    44. B.  Merits

    1.  Period to be taken into consideration

  44. The applicant’s detention started on 7 January 1998, when he was arrested on suspicion of robbery, assault and intimidating a witness. On 20 December 2002 the Szczecin Regional Court convicted him as charged.

  45. As from that date he was detained “after conviction by a competent court”, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a) and, consequently, that period of his detention falls outside the scope of Article 5 § 3 (see Kudła, cited above, § 104).

  46. Accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration amounts to four years, eleven months and three weeks.

    47. 2.  The parties’ submissions

    (a)  The applicant

  47.  The applicant submitted that the delays in the proceedings in his case had resulted in the unreasonable length of his detention during the trial. He argued that the detention, which had initially been justified by the domestic courts, had become unjustified with the lapse of time.

    48. (b)  The Government

  48. The Government considered that the applicant’s pre-trial detention satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. It was justified by “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds. These grounds were, in particular, the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged and the genuine risk that he might obstruct the proceedings. Moreover, the Government considered that the case had been complex.

  49. The Government further argued that the domestic authorities had shown due diligence, as required in cases against detained persons, and that the proceedings had been conducted swiftly. The only delay in the proceedings had resulted from the applicant’s state of health and his refusal to be treated.

  50. In addition the applicant’s detention had been subject to regular supervision by the trial court. The decisions were reasoned sufficiently and in a detailed manner.

    51. 3.  The Court’s assessment

    (a)  General principles

  51. The Court reiterates that the general principles regarding the right “to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”, as guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, were stated in a number of its previous judgements (see, among many other authorities, Kudła cited above, § 110 et seq., and McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006-..., with further references).

    52. (b)  Application of the above principles in the present case

  52. In their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on four grounds, namely, the serious nature of the offences with which he had been charged; the severity of the penalty to which he was liable; the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings; and the risk that the applicant might tamper with evidence (see paragraphs 8, 10, 13 and 18 above).

  53. The Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed serious offences could initially warrant his detention. Also, the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, in particular the process of obtaining evidence from witnesses, constituted valid grounds for the applicant’s initial detention.

  54. However, with the passage of time, those grounds became less and less relevant. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds adduced by the courts – namely, the severity of the anticipated sentence and the risk that the applicant would tamper with evidence – were “relevant” and “sufficient” (see Kudła cited above, § 111).

  55. According to the authorities, the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed on the applicant created a presumption that he would obstruct the proceedings. However, the Court would reiterate that, while the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of absconding or reoffending, the gravity of the charges cannot by itself justify long periods of detention during judicial proceedings (see Michta v. Poland, no. 13425/02, §§ 49, 4 May 2006).

  56. Furthermore, in the authorities’ opinion the applicant used his various health problems in order to obstruct the trial. They considered that the applicant’s behaviour had been aimed at prolonging the trial and avoiding criminal responsibility. The Court observes that while Article 5 § 3 cannot be read as obliging the national authorities to release a detainee on account of his state of health, the authorities when deciding whether a person should be released or detained are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (see Jabloński v. Poland, no. 33492/96, § 82-83, 21 December 2000). In the present case the authorities did not mention why alternative measures would not have secured the applicant’s presence before the court nor, had he been released, why his trial would not have followed its proper course.

  57. While all the above factors could justify even a relatively long period of detention, they did not give the domestic courts an unlimited power to prolong this measure. In this context, the Court would observe that on 7 March 2000, the date when the bill of indictment was filed, the applicant had already spent two years and two months in detention.

  58. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that even taking into account the particular difficulty in dealing with the case and the fact that for some time the applicant refused to undergo the relevant medical tests, the grounds given by the domestic authorities were not “relevant” and “sufficient” to justify the applicant’s being kept in detention for almost five years.

  59. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

    60. II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

  60. The applicant further complained of the fact that his correspondence had been censored and delayed. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention.

    61. “1  Everyone has the right to respect for his ... his correspondence.

    2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

  61. The Government submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his correspondence. There was no indication that the correspondence was censored or that the contents of the letters were checked. They stressed that, under Polish law, the correspondence of a detained person was submitted through the authority at whose disposal the detainee remained. In the present case, that had been the Szczecin Regional Court. That was why a few days might have elapsed before the letters were transmitted to the applicant. However, the Government were of the opinion that the authorities had acted with due diligence and that the letters had been sent to the applicant immediately without acquaintance with the contents or even opening the envelopes.

  62. Lastly, the Government maintained that as regards letters from the Court’s Registry or the applicant’s counsel the authorities had not acquainted themselves with their contents.

  63. The Court observes that the applicant submitted several envelopes containing letters from the Court’s Registry, his counsel and the Nakło nad Notecią District Prosecutor. The envelopes did not bear the stamp “censored” and the applicant did not submit any other evidence that his correspondence had been opened or censored (see paragraphs 34-39 above). In the absence of any other evidence, for instance stamps which could confirm that the letters had indeed been censored, the Court cannot establish beyond reasonable doubt that the authorities acquainted themselves with the contents of the letters from the Court or the applicant’s counsel and subsequently resealed the envelopes.

  64. As regards the alleged delaying of the applicant’s correspondence, the Court reiterates in this respect that it has already recognised that some measure of control over prisoner’s contacts with the outside world is called for and is not of itself incompatible with the Convention (see Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, pp. 32-34, § 98, and Chishti v. Portugal (dec.), no. 57248/00, 2 October 2003).

  65. The Court firstly notes that the period of up to two weeks between the date when the letters were delivered to prison and when they were handed to the applicant causes some concern (see paragraphs 34-36 above). However, it further observes that it does not appear that any of the applicant’s letters were stopped by the public authorities. It follows that the applicant has not been deprived to a significant extent of his written contacts with the outside world.

  66. In view of the above, the Court finds that in the particular circumstances of the case the complaint has not been substantiated and does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see Płoski v. Poland (dec.), no 26761/95, 4 December 2001; Piotr Kuc v. Poland, no. 37766/02, § 42, 19 December 2006; and Otomanski v. Poland (dec), no. 4612/03, 16 October 2007). It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

    67. III.  OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

  67. The applicant also complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he was ill-treated while in detention. He alleged, further, a breach of Article 6 § 1 on the ground of unfairness of the proceedings. Lastly, he invoked Article 12 submitting that the prosecution service had thwarted his plan to get married.

  68. The Court has examined these complaints as submitted by the applicant. Even assuming that the applicant exhausted the required domestic remedies, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that the applicant has failed to substantiate his complaints. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

    69. IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

  69. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

    70. “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

    A.  Damage

  70.  The applicant claimed 60,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in respect of non pecuniary damage.

  71. The Government contested the claim.

  72. The Court awards the applicant EUR 1,500 in respect of non pecuniary damage.

    73. B.  Costs and expenses

  73. The applicant did not seek reimbursement of any costs and expenses.

    74. C.  Default interest

  74. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

    75. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

  75. Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the applicant’s detention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;


  76. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;


  77. Holds

    78. (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable; to be converted into Polish zlotys at the rate applicable at the date of the settlement;

    (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;


  78. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

    79. Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 October 2008, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

    Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza
    Deputy Registrar President

About BAILII - FAQ - Copyright Policy - Disclaimers - Privacy Policy amended on 25/11/2010