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European Court of Human Rights
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SIPOS v. HUNGARY - 7060/05 [2008] ECHR 1025 (7 October 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1025.html
Cite as:
[2008] ECHR 1025
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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF SIPOS v. HUNGARY
(Application
no. 7060/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7
October 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Sipos v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise
Tulkens,
President,
Ireneu
Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Danutė
Jočienė,
András
Sajó,
Nona
Tsotsoria,
Işıl
Karakaş,
judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 September 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 7060/05) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Hungarian national, Ms Márta
Sipos (“the applicant”), on 11 February 2005.
The
applicant was represented by Ms É. Snyozik, a lawyer
practising in Debrecen. The Hungarian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent,
Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
On
9 January 2008 the
President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Hajdúsámson.
On
2 May 1989 the applicant filed for divorce. She also requested the
division of the matrimonial property.
After
having pronounced the parties' divorce in a partial decision, having
held several hearings and obtained the opinions of experts, on
9 November 1994 the Debrecen District Court adopted a decision
on the property. This was reversed by the Hajdú-Bihar County
Regional Court on 20 June 1996. On 24 June 1997 the Supreme Court's
review bench quashed this decision and remitted the case to the
second-instance court.
In
the resumed second-instance proceedings, the Regional Court held a
hearing and quashed the District Court's decision on 27 October 2000.
In
the resumed first-instance proceedings, on 5 June 2001 the District
Court adopted a new decision concerning the property. This was
reversed by the Regional Court on 23 November 2001.
On
10 November 2004 a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court's review
bench examined the respondent's petition for review on the merits. It
held that the taking of evidence in the case had been comprehensive
and without a fault and that the applicant's petition did not
disclose a breach of the relevant law. It therefore upheld the
Regional Court's judgment.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the proceedings had lasted an unreasonably
long time. She relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the
Convention. The Court considers that the application falls to be
examined from the perspective of the “reasonable time”
requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention alone, which
reads as follows::
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration only began on 5 November 1992,
when the recognition by Hungary of the right of individual petition
took effect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time
that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of
proceedings at that stage. The Court observes that the proceedings
had already been pending for three and a half years by then.
The
period in question ended on 10 November 2004. It thus lasted over
twelve years for three levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant's petition for review did not
qualify as an effective remedy in the circumstances and that
therefore the six-month time-limit started to run from the Regional
Court's 2001 decision. In their view, the application was thus
introduced out of time.
The
Court observes that the competent bench of the Supreme Court examined
the merits of the applicant's petition and upheld the Regional
Court's judgment holding that that there was no appearance of a
breach of the relevant law in the case. It does not discern any
element which would call into question the effectiveness of this
remedy in the circumstances. It follows that the Government's
objection cannot be sustained. The Court notes that the application
is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §
3 of the Convention. Moreover, it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. The application must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject,
the Court finds that the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 8 million Hungarian forints
in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested these claims.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, it considers that the applicant must have sustained some
non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR
9,600 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant made no costs claim.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 9,600 (nine
thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Hungarian
forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 October 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise
Tulkens
Deputy Registrar President