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LYP v. POLAND - 25135/04 [2007] ECHR 917 (13 November 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/917.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 917
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF LYP v. POLAND
(Application
no. 25135/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13
November 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Lyp v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr J. Casadevall, President,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta, judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 October 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 25135/04) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr Piotr Lyp
(“the applicant”), on 25 June 2004.
The
applicant was represented by Mrs A. Naczyńska-Lyp, his wife. The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
On
2 September 2005 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 §
3 of the Convention, it was decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Rybnik.
On
24 October 2002 he was arrested and charged with armed robbery. On 26
October 2002 the Rybnik District Court remanded the applicant in
custody on reasonable suspicion that he had committed armed robbery.
The District Court had particular regard to evidence provided by an
anonymous witness. It also held that the need to secure the proper
conduct of the proceedings justified the applicant's detention, given
the severity of the anticipated penalty. It further considered that
there was a reasonable risk that the applicant would interfere with
the proceedings.
On
26 November 2002 the Gliwice Regional Court upheld the detention
order.
On
14 January 2003 the Gliwice Regional Court prolonged the applicant's
detention until 22 April 2003. It relied on the same grounds as
originally invoked. It added that since new witnesses were being
sought the investigation could not be completed within three months.
The
applicant appealed against that decision. He submitted that the
evidence in the case was insufficient to charge him with armed
robbery and contested the Regional Court's finding that he would
obstruct the proceedings.
On
19 February 2003 the Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed the
applicant's appeal. It found that the circumstances of the case and
the evidence gathered to date did not give substance to the risk that
the applicant would obstruct the proceedings. However, it concurred
with the Regional Court that the reasonable suspicion that the
applicant had committed the offence in question and the severity of
the anticipated penalty justified his detention.
In
the meantime, on 6 February 2003 the applicant was additionally
charged with incitement to armed robbery.
On
4 April 2003 the prosecution made a severance order with a view to
expediting the proceedings, and thereafter one of the three suspects
was to be tried separately.
On
7 April 2003 the prosecution filed a bill of indictment with the
Gliwice Regional Court against the applicant and one of his
accomplices. The applicant was charged with armed robbery and
incitement to armed robbery.
On
15 April 2003 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be held
in custody until 22 October 2003. That decision was upheld on appeal
on 14 May 2003.
On
18 June 2003 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the trial court
to refer the case back to the prosecution with a view to
supplementing the evidence.
On
14 October 2003 the Regional Court extended the applicant's detention
until 22 January 2004. It found that there was a reasonable risk that
the applicant would interfere with the proceedings, having regard to
the nature of the charges and the severity of the anticipated
penalty. On the same date the trial court released the applicant's
co-accused under police supervision. It noted that the co-accused,
unlike the applicant, had pleaded guilty and had made full
statements. Thus, in the court's view, the co-accused's release was
justified on account of the above considerations and the fact that
there was no risk that he would obstruct the proceedings. That
decision was upheld on appeal on 12 November 2003.
On
20 January 2004 the trial court ordered that the applicant be held in
custody until 22 April 2004. In addition to the grounds previously
invoked, it noted that the trial could not be terminated earlier due
to the volume of evidence to be heard. On 11 February 2004 the Court
of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the prolongation
of his detention. It found that the applicant had been charged with
offences which attracted a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years'
imprisonment.
On
17 March 2004 the trial court prolonged the applicant's detention
until 22 July 2004. It relied on the same grounds as given
previously. In addition, it found that other preventive measures
would not be sufficient to secure the proper conduct of the
proceedings.
The
trial court held some 11 hearings. Hearings scheduled for 30 July and
19 November 2003 were adjourned since the applicant had not been
brought to court by the police.
At
the last hearing the prosecutor requested the trial court to convict
the applicant as charged and to sentence him to 7 years'
imprisonment. On 26 May 2004 the Regional Court convicted the
applicant of armed robbery and sentenced him to 8 years'
imprisonment. The applicant appealed against that judgment.
He
remained in detention pending his appeal.
On
16 December 2004 the Katowice Court of Appeal quashed the
first-instance judgment and remitted the case. It found that the
trial court had incorrectly assessed the evidence, in particular that
adduced by the defence. Furthermore, the trial court had heard the
anonymous witness without providing the applicant with an opportunity
to put questions to him and to comment on his evidence, thus
manifestly vitiating the rights of the defence. The Court of Appeal
also had reservations about classifying the act committed by the
applicant as armed robbery. It gave the Regional Court specific
instructions concerning the evidence to be heard in the course of the
retrial. Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted that in view of the
applicant's lengthy detention, the Regional Court should fix the date
of the hearing as soon as practicable.
On
23 March 2005 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be kept
in detention until 30 June 2005. On 15 June 2005 it prolonged his
detention until 31 July 2005. During the retrial the Regional Court
held about 12 hearings.
On
29 July 2005 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery,
and not of armed robbery as in its first judgment, and sentenced him
to 5 years' imprisonment. The applicant and the prosecution appealed
against this judgment.
It
appears that the applicant was released on bail on 2 August 2005.
On
19 January 2006 the Katowice Court of Appeal upheld the Regional
Court's judgment. On some later unspecified date the applicant began
to serve his sentence.
During
the trial and the retrial the applicant filed a number of
unsuccessful applications for release on bail.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The
relevant domestic law and practice regarding the imposition of
detention on remand (tymczasowe aresztowanie), the grounds for
its prolongation, release from detention and rules governing other,
so-called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze) at the material time are stated in the Court's
judgments in the cases of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02,
§§ 27-33, 25 April 2006 and Celejewski v. Poland,
no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF
THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand had
been excessive. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention which reads, in so far as relevant:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
The
applicant's detention started on 24 October 2002, when he was
arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. On 26 May 2004 the Gliwice
Regional Court convicted him of armed robbery and sentenced him to 8
years' imprisonment. As from that date he was detained “after
conviction by a competent court”, within the meaning of
Article 5 § 1 (a) and, consequently, that period of
his detention falls outside the scope of Article 5 § 3 (cf.
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 104,
ECHR 2000 XI).
On 16
December 2004 the Katowice Court of Appeal quashed the applicant's
conviction. Following that date his detention was again covered by
Article 5 § 3. It continued until 29 July 2005
when the applicant was convicted of robbery.
Accordingly,
the period to be taken into consideration amounts to 2 years, 2
months and 14 days.
2. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant argued that the length of his detention was clearly
unreasonable. He submitted that the courts had justified his
detention by repeatedly relying on the same grounds: the reasonable
suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he had been
charged, the severity of the anticipated penalty and the risk of
obstruction of the proceedings. As regards the latter, the applicant
averred that the authorities had not specified any concrete grounds
justifying that risk. Moreover, one of the main prosecution witnesses
(M.S.) had been in custody during the relevant time. The applicant
also argued that the courts had not taken into account that he had
had an unblemished reputation. Lastly, he submitted that there had
been delays in the proceedings and that hearings had been held
infrequently.
(b) The Government
The
Government submitted that the applicant's detention had been duly
justified over the entire period. They emphasised that, apart from
the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences, the
applicant's detention had been justified by the severity of the
anticipated penalty. Furthermore, there had been a risk that the
applicant would tamper with evidence or influence witnesses, having
regard to the fact that his accomplices had not been identified for a
long time. In addition, they relied on the fact that one of the
co-accused had been released in the course of the trial. The
Government further stressed that the applicant had been charged with
armed robbery of a company which had been co-owned by his father.
This circumstance substantiated the risk that the applicant would
influence witnesses.
The
Government asserted that the necessity of the applicant's continued
detention had been thoroughly examined by the courts which on each
occasion had given sufficient reasons for their decisions. They
finally submitted that the authorities had displayed due diligence in
the conduct of the proceedings. In addition, certain procedural
motions filed by the applicant's lawyers had caused delays in the
trial.
3. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
The
Court recalls that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention were stated in a
number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities,
Kudła, cited above, § 110 et seq; and
McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, §§
41-44, ECHR 2006-..., with further references).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
In
their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on
three grounds, namely (1) the severity of the penalty to which he was
liable, (2) the risk that the applicant might obstruct the
proceedings and (3) the nature of the offences with which he had been
charged.
The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion against the applicant of
having committed armed robbery could initially warrant his detention.
However, with the passage of time, that ground became less and less
relevant. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds
adduced by the courts were “relevant” and “sufficient”
(see, Kudła cited above, § 111).
The
Court notes that the judicial authorities continuously relied on the
likelihood that a heavy sentence might be imposed on the applicant
given the nature of the offence with which he had been charged. In
this respect, the Court recalls that the severity of the sentence
faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of
absconding or re-offending. It acknowledges that in view of the
seriousness of the charge against the applicant the authorities could
justifiably consider that such a risk existed. However, the Court has
repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot by itself
serve to justify long periods of detention on remand (see Ilijkov
v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, §§ 80-81, 26 July
2001).
In
this respect, the Court further observes that the possibility that
the applicant could be sentenced to a maximum 15-year term of
imprisonment required, with the passage of time, to be reassessed in
the light of the evidence that was gradually obtained by the court.
In the event, the legal classification of the applicant's offence was
altered and the actual sentence imposed on the applicant, 5 years'
imprisonment (see paragraph 23 above), was considerably lighter than
the original estimate.
As
regards the risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings,
the Court notes that the authorities did not indicate any concrete
circumstance capable of showing that the anticipated risk went beyond
a merely theoretical possibility. The Court is not, therefore,
persuaded by that argument, especially as it appears that there was
no indication that at any earlier stage of the proceedings the
applicant tampered with evidence or made any attempt to induce
witnesses to perjure themselves. In this respect the Court cannot but
note that the Court of Appeal in its decision of 19 February 2003
held that there had been no substance to the risk that the applicant
would obstruct the proceedings. Nevertheless, the courts continued to
invoke that risk without specifying any concrete grounds justifying
their view.
The
Court further observes that the applicant was detained on a charge of
armed robbery committed together with two accomplices. The
defendants had not been formally charged with acting in an organised
criminal group. In these circumstances, the Court is not persuaded
that the instant case presented particular difficulties for the
investigation authorities and for the courts to determine the facts
and mount a case against the perpetrators as would undoubtedly have
been the case had the proceedings concerned organised crime (see
Celejewski v. Poland, cited above, § 37 and Kwiatek
v. Poland, no. 20204/02, § 46, 6 February
2007).
Having
regard to the foregoing, the Court concludes that the grounds given
by the domestic authorities could not justify the overall period of
the applicant's detention. In these circumstances it is not necessary
to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with special
diligence.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 50,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately EUR
13,000) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government submitted that the applicant's claim
was exorbitant. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, they
argued that a finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient
just satisfaction. Alternatively, the Government invited the Court to
assess the amount of just satisfaction on the basis of its case-law
in similar cases and having regard to national economic
circumstances.
The
Court considers that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage
which is not sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation
of the Convention. Considering the circumstances of the case and
making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the
applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant submitted that the amount of PLN 50,000 referred to under
the head of non-pecuniary damage covered also his claim for costs and
expenses in respect of his lawyer's fees in the domestic proceedings.
He estimated the amount of these fees at PLN 22,000 (approximately
EUR 5,700) and produced copies of the relevant invoices.
The
Government submitted that the Convention did not guarantee the
reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred by the applicant in the
domestic proceedings.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. The Court notes that part of the lawyer's fees claimed
concerned the applicant's defence against the criminal charges in the
domestic proceedings. This part of the fees does not constitute
expenses necessarily incurred in trying to prevent the violation
found in the present case from occurring (see Beyeler v.
Italy (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202/96, § 25,
28 May 2002). In the present case, regard being had to the
information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 for costs and
expenses in the domestic proceedings.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,000 (two
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted
into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 November 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of
Court.
T.L. Early Josep Casadevall
Registrar President