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CHRUSCINSKI v. POLAND - 22755/04 [2007] ECHR 898 (6 November 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/898.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 898
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF CHRUŚCIŃSKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 22755/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
6 November
2007
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Chruściński v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr J. Casadevall, President,
Mr G.
Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr L.
Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta, judges,
and Mrs F. Aracı, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 9 October 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 22755/04) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Sławomir Chruściński
(“the applicant”), on 28 May 2004.
The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr J.
Brydak, a lawyer practising in Warszawa. The Polish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On
16 September 2005 the President of the Fourth Section of the Court
decided to communicate the application to the Government. Under the
provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was
decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as
its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in born in 1975 and lives in Wyględy, Poland.
A. The pre-trial detention
On
2 April 2003 the applicant was arrested by the police. On the same
date the applicant was charged by the Warsaw District Prosecutor with
having helped to sell two stolen cars while acting in an organised
criminal gang. The applicant was instructed that it was open to him
to make a request under Article 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to be served with the written reasons for the decision to charge him.
On
4 April 2003 the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy)
ordered that the applicant be detained on remand in view of the
reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he
had been charged. The court held that keeping him in custody was
necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings as there
was a fear that the applicant would influence witnesses.
On
18 June 2003 the District Prosecutor lodged a request to prolong the
applicant's detention. In his motion he indicated 138 investigative
actions that would be taken with respect to 23 suspects. The District
Court on 27 June 2003 accordingly prolonged the applicant's
detention, relying in particular on evidence obtained from one of the
co-accused.
In
his subsequent application of 19 September 2003 for an extension
of the applicant's detention the prosecutor relied on extensive
evidence that had already been obtained from 7 witnesses and an
expert witness. The application was granted on 30 September
2003.
On
29 December 2003 the Warsaw District Court further prolonged the
applicant's pre-trial detention.
On
6 November 2003 the Warsaw District Prosecutor decided to supplement
the charges against the applicant, adding several other offences
relating to the handling of stolen cars. The applicant was again
informed of his right to request the written reasons for the
decision, but he failed to make a request.
On
26 March 2004 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny),
on the application of the appellate prosecutor, decided to prolong
further the applicant's detention. In addition to the existence of a
reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences,
the court relied on the complexity of the case, the severity of the
penalty that might be imposed and the need to secure the proper
conduct of the investigation.
On 25 June and 28 December 2004 the Warsaw Court of
Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention. It reiterated the grounds
previously given for keeping him in custody. It further pointed to
the particular complexity of the case, which explained the length of
the investigative phase of the proceedings. The court in particular
relied on the evidence gathered by the prosecutor and referred in its
decision to the statements given by the witnesses and co-accused
which were included in the case file.
On
3 December 2004 the prosecutor decided to sever the charges against
the applicant and 16 co-accused and to deal separately with his
charges.
On
22 December 2004 the applicant was indicted before the Warsaw
District Court. The applicant was accused of having committed
12 offences, in particular handling stolen cars and forging
licence plates while acting in an organised criminal gang.
Subsequently,
his detention on remand was prolonged on 18 March 2005. The
applicant's numerous applications for release and his appeals against
the detention decisions were to no avail.
The
trial started on 18 April 2005. Afterwards, hearings were held at
regular intervals. In October 2005 the applicant and the prosecutor
negotiated an agreement whereby the applicant would plead guilty and
voluntarily submit to a penalty.
At
the hearing held on 10 November 2005 the court gave a judgment in
which it accepted the agreement concluded between the applicant and
the prosecutor according to which the applicant voluntarily accepted
a sentence of 3 years and 6 months' imprisonment and a fine. The
applicant was released on the same day.
The
applicant did not appeal against the judgment and it became final on
18 November 2005.
B. Access to the case-file
On
9 March and 3 September 2004 the applicant, represented by his
lawyer, requested leave to consult the case file against him.
The
Warsaw District Prosecutor, on 24 March and 15 September 2004
respectively, dismissed the applicant's requests. The reasoning of
both decisions was identical. The prosecutor referred to the fact
that the preparatory proceedings were still pending and since the
case concerned an organised criminal gang the documents in the file
should not be revealed until all suspects had been arrested and
charged. Finally, the prosecutor noted that most items of evidence
had been considered confidential which “automatically prevents
access being granted to them”.
The
applicant appealed against both decisions complaining that he had
been detained for more than one year and that during this time he had
had no access to the case-file. That constituted a breach of his
defence rights in violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights.
On
12 May and 2 November 2004 the Warsaw Appellate Prosecutor dismissed
the appeals against the decisions of 24 March and 15 September
respectively. In identically reasoned decisions the Appellate
Prosecutor found that the interests of the investigation could in
some circumstances limit the defence rights of the accused.
Therefore, in the present case the applicant should not be allowed to
consult the file. In addition, in the decision of 2 November
2004 the prosecutor concluded:
“As regards the ECHR invoked by the [applicant] it
should be noted that the overriding aim of the criminal proceedings
is to establish all the circumstances in which the offence was
committed and to find the perpetrators. It is a concrete aim and in
achieving it the prosecutors and the courts aim at ensuring respect
for the rule of law and the security of the State and its citizens.
Therefore, it is not the intention of the Convention to disregard
those rules by making the rights of the citizens who breached the
laws absolute. A premature disclosure of the documents in the
case-file could prevent the achievement of the aims of the
proceedings...”
On
6 December 2004 the applicant's lawyer acquainted himself with the
case file. The applicant was allowed to consult the file between
6 and 14 December 2004.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1997, which entered into force on
1 September 1998, defines detention on remand as one of the
so called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze).
A
more detailed rendition of the relevant domestic law provisions is
set out in the Court's judgments in Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, § 75, ECHR 2000 XI and Celejewski
v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§ 22 and 23, 4 May
2006.
Article
156 § 5 of the Code concerns access to the file during
investigation. It provides:
“Unless provided otherwise by law, during the
preparatory proceedings parties, defence counsel, and legal
representatives shall be allowed to consult the files and make
certified copies and photocopies but only with the permission of the
person conducting the preparatory proceedings. With the permission of
a prosecutor and in exceptional circumstances access to the files in
the preparatory proceedings may be given to another person.”
Article
313 § 3 provides as follows:
“Before a suspect is given notice of the date on
which he can have access to the investigation materials, he may
request an oral presentation of the grounds for the charges against
him and the written reasons, on which he shall be advised. The
written reasons shall be notified to the suspect and his counsel
within 14 days.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand had
been unreasonable. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
The
applicant submitted that he had been kept in detention pending trial
for an unjustified period of time. He claimed that the case had not
been as complex as claimed by the Government because only a small
fraction of the investigation had concerned the charges against him.
Moreover, the procedure for prolongation of the applicant's detention
had been automatic and the grounds given for the decisions contained
suppositions which were not supported by any evidence.
The
applicant maintained that the grounds for his detention were not
“relevant” and “sufficient” and that the
authorities had failed to display the required degree of diligence.
The
Government considered that the applicant's pre-trial detention
satisfied the requirements of Article 5 § 3. It was justified by
“relevant” and “sufficient” grounds. These
grounds were, in particular, the gravity of charges against the
applicant who had been accused of membership of an organised criminal
gang. The Government further underlined the complexity of the case
which had required expert evidence to be obtained. In this respect
the Government submitted that the case-file at the time of the
lodging of the bill of indictment had consisted of 82 volumes.
The
Government argued that the domestic authorities had shown due
diligence, as required in cases against detained persons, and that
the length of the applicant's detention had been attributable to the
exceptional complexity of the case.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) Principles established under the
Court's case-law
The
Court recalls that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, were stated in a
number of its previous judgements (see, among many other authorities,
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110
et seq, ECHR 2000 XI; and McKay v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006-..., with further
references).
(b) Application of the principles to the
circumstances of the present case
The
Court first notes that the applicant remained in pre-trial detention
between 2 April 2003, when he was arrested, and 10 November
2005, when the judgment in his case was given and he was released.
The detention thus lasted 2 years, 7 months and 10 days.
In
their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on
three grounds, namely (1) the serious nature of the offences with
which he had been charged, (2) the severity of the penalty to which
he was liable which made it probable that the applicant would
obstruct the course of the criminal proceedings, and (3) the need to
secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, in particular, in view
of the risk that the applicant might influence witnesses.
The
applicant was charged with and convicted of handling stolen cars
committed while acting in an organised criminal gang (see
paragraphs 5 and 17 above).
In
the Court's view, the fact that the case concerned a member of a
criminal gang should be taken into account in assessing compliance
with Article 5 § 3 (see Bąk v. Poland, no.
7870/04, § 57, 16 January 2007).
The
Court accepts that the suspicion against the applicant of having
committed the offences might initially have justified his detention.
Also, the need to determine the degree of the alleged responsibility
of each of the defendants constituted a valid ground for the
applicant's initial detention.
The
Court notes that the judicial authorities relied heavily on the
likelihood that a severe sentence would be imposed on the applicant
given the serious nature of the offences at issue. In this respect,
the Court recalls that the severity of the sentence faced is a
relevant element in the assessment of the risk of absconding or
re-offending. It acknowledges that in view of the seriousness of the
accusations against the applicant the authorities could justifiably
consider that such an initial risk was established. However, the
Court has repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot by
itself serve to justify long periods of detention on remand (see
Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, §§ 80-81,
26 July 2001).
It
is to be noted that the judicial authorities had presumed the risk of
pressure being exerted on witnesses or of obstruction of the
proceedings, basing themselves on the serious nature of the offences
and the fact that the applicant had been charged with being a member
of an organised criminal gang. In this respect, the Court reiterates
that the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the
assessment of the risk of absconding or re offending (see,
Górski v Poland, no. 28904/02, § 57, 4
October 2005). It acknowledges that in view of the seriousness of the
accusations against the applicant, the authorities could justifiably
have considered that such an initial risk was established.
The
foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude
that, taking into account the particular difficulties in dealing with
a case concerning an organised criminal gang, the grounds given for
the applicant's pre-trial detention were “relevant” and
“sufficient” to justify holding him in custody for the
entire relevant period of 2 years and 7 months.
It
therefore remains to be ascertained whether the national authorities
displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the
proceedings. In this regard, the Court recalls that the criminal case
at issue was complex. The Court takes note of the seriousness of the
charges against the applicant and the number of other persons charged
in the same proceedings and the need for the implementation of
special measures in cases concerning organised crime (see Bąk
v. Poland, cited above, § 64). It observes that a
substantial amount of evidence had to be examined in the course of
the proceedings. The complexity of the case undoubtedly prolonged its
examination and contributed to the length of the applicant's
detention on remand.
The
Court further notes that there were no significant periods of
inactivity on the part of the prosecution authorities and the trial
court. It considers that the need to supplement the charges against
the applicant apparently prolonged the investigation and that the
charges against him were severed so as to deal with them separately
and more efficiently (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above). For these
reasons, the Court considers that the domestic authorities displayed
“special diligence” in the handling of the applicant's
case.
There
has therefore been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF
THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that in the preparatory proceedings pending
between April 2003 and December 2004 neither he nor his lawyer had
been able to have access to the case-file. In consequence, he had not
been able to effectively challenge the decisions prolonging his
pre trial detention. He alleged a violation of Article 5 §
4 of the Convention, which reads:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The
Government stated that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic
remedies in respect of his complaint in that he had failed to lodge a
constitutional complaint. Nor had he made a request under Article 313
of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be served with the written
reasons for the District Prosecutor's decision to charge him.
The
applicant disagreed with the Government and submitted that there was
no effective remedy which he could have used to complain about the
lack of access to the case-file. He maintained that the Government
had failed to provide any evidence or any judicial practice that
would prove that the constitutional complaint would have been an
effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1
of the Convention.
The
Court observes that the applicant complained that he and his lawyer
had no access to the case-file during the preparatory proceedings. He
made several requests to be granted access to the file and had raised
this complaint, relying inter alia on the Convention, in his
appeals against the prosecutor's decisions refusing access. In those
circumstances the Court finds that the Government failed to
demonstrate in what way a request to be served with the written
reasons for the charges against the applicant could remedy the
prosecutor's decisions refusing him access to the file.
Moreover, the Court finds that the Government's
contention that a constitutional complaint under Article 156 of the
Code of the Criminal Procedure should be considered an effective
remedy for the applicant's complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the
Convention has not been substantiated. The Court reiterates that
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, which sets out the
rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies, provides for a distribution
of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government claiming
non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective
one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is
to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of
providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and
offered reasonable prospects of success (see Selmouni v. France
[GC], no. 25803/94, § 76, ECHR 1999-V and Mifsud
v. France (dec.), no. 57220/00, § 15, ECHR
2002-VIII). The Government have not provided any examples of concrete
cases in which a constitutional complaint was shown to be an
effective remedy in respect of a complaint such as the applicant's.
Accordingly,
the Court rejects the Government's preliminary objection. It further
notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that it is
not inadmissible on any other grounds. The Court therefore declares
it admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
The
applicant submitted that the authorities' refusal to grant him and
his lawyer access to the case-file had violated his defence rights
and the principle of equality of arms. He maintained that the first
request to be allowed to consult the file against him had been lodged
by his lawyer as early as 17 April 2003. However, it was dismissed,
as were all his other applications lodged in 2004.
The
applicant argued that only access to the case-file would have allowed
him to challenge effectively the decisions to prolong his pre-trial
detention. His defence was severely impaired given the extraordinary
length of the investigation against him which had lasted over 20
months. During that time he had been deprived of liberty and had had
no access to witnesses' statements and documents obtained in the
course of the investigation.
The
Government considered that the principle of equality of arms had been
sufficiently guaranteed in the applicant's case. The prosecutor's
refusal to allow him access to his case-file was in accordance with
the law, was justified by the particular circumstances of the case
and did not limit the applicant's right to raise arguments in favour
of his release.
The
Government underlined that the case had concerned organised crime and
was very complex. The prosecutor's decisions were motivated by the
interest of the investigation as there existed a risk that the
applicant would tamper with evidence or even threaten witnesses.
Moreover, the Government underlined that a part of the case-file had
contained documents that were classified as confidential or secret.
The applicant could consult the totality of the file when the
interests of the investigation allowed for this.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) Principles established under the
Court's case-law
The
Court reiterates that although it is not always necessary that the
procedure under Article 5 § 4 be attended by the same
guarantees as those required under Article 6 of the Convention
for criminal or civil litigation, it must have a judicial character
and provide guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of
liberty in question (see, for instance, Assenov and Others
v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, p. 3302, § 162, and Włoch
v. Poland, no. 27785/95, § 125,
ECHR 2000-XI, both with reference to Megyeri v. Germany,
judgment of 12 May 1992, Series A no. 237-A, p. 11, § 22).
The
proceedings must be adversarial and must always ensure “equality
of arms” between the parties. More specifically, the Court
reiterates that a certain degree of access to the case-file, if only
to such an extent as to afford the detainee an opportunity of
effectively challenging evidence on which his detention was based,
may in certain instances be envisaged in proceedings concerning
review of the lawfulness of detention on remand (see Lamy v.
Belgium, judgment of 30 March 1989, Series A no. 151,
pp. 16-17, § 29). These requirements are derived from the right
to an adversarial trial as laid down in Article 6 of the Convention,
which means, in a criminal case, that both the prosecution and the
defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and
comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the
other party. According to the Court's case-law, it follows from the
wording of Article 6 – and particularly from the autonomous
meaning to be given to the notion of “criminal charge” –
that this provision can be applied to pre-trial proceedings (see
Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 November
1993, Series A no. 275, p. 13, § 36). It thus follows
that, in view of the dramatic impact of deprivation of liberty on the
fundamental rights of the person concerned, proceedings conducted
under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention should in
principle also meet, to the largest extent possible under the
circumstances of an ongoing investigation, the basic requirements of
a fair trial, such as the right to adversarial procedure (see Schops
v. Germany, no. 25116/94, 13 February 2001, § 44;
Lietzow v. Germany, no. 24479/94, 13 February
2001, § 44).
The
Court acknowledges the need for criminal investigations to be
conducted efficiently, which may imply that part of the information
collected during them is to be kept secret in order to prevent
suspects from tampering with evidence and undermining the course of
justice. However, this legitimate goal cannot be pursued at the
expense of substantial restrictions of the rights of the defence.
Therefore, information which is essential for the assessment of the
lawfulness of a person's detention should be made available in an
appropriate manner to the suspect's lawyer (see Lietzow,
cited above, § 42 and
Migoń v. Poland, no. 24244/94, § 80,
25 June 2002).
(b) Application of the principles to the
circumstances of the present case
Turning
to the particular circumstances of the instant case the Court notes
that the applicant who was arrested on 2 April 2003 did not have any
access to the case-file until 6 December 2004 as his requests were
dismissed by the prosecutor. On the latter date the applicant's
lawyer was able to study the file for the first time. Thus, for over
20 months during which the applicant was detained on remand, neither
he nor his lawyer had been allowed to consult the file (see
paragraphs 19-23 above).
During
this period of time the only documents with which they had been
served were the statements of charges against the applicant, the
decisions ordering his detention and those concerning the
prolongation of his pre trial detention. The prosecutor's
motions to apply for and to prolong the applicant's detention were
also served on them. In appealing against those decisions the
applicant did not have an opportunity to examine the evidence relied
on by the prosecuting authorities and the courts or to contest the
findings based on the evidence collected. The applicant was deprived
of access to the case-file during the entire investigation phase
given that the bill of indictment against him had been lodged with
the trial court only in December 2004.
In
this connection the Court observes that the prosecuting authorities
relied on very many items of evidence to substantiate their motions
to the courts to prolong the applicant's detention (see paragraphs 7,
8, 12 above). Moreover, the courts in prolonging the applicant's
detention based the existence of the reasonable suspicion against the
applicant on the evidence that had been furnished by the prosecutor.
In their decisions the courts referred to particular witnesses'
statements and other evidence included in the case-file. The
applicant and his lawyer had no access to any of those documents.
The
Court also takes note of the Government's argument that the
prosecutor's refusal to allow the applicant access to the case-file
was justified by the fact that the case had concerned a complex
investigation of the criminal activity of an organised gang and that
the file included classified documents. However, it reiterates that
the efficient conduct of an investigation, albeit a legitimate goal,
cannot be pursued at the expense of substantial restrictions of the
rights of the defence of the applicant who, along with his lawyer,
was prevented from accessing the entirety of his case-file during a
period of over 20 months.
The
Court considers that it was essential for the applicant and his
lawyer to have access to the file and to inspect the documents in it
in order to challenge the lawfulness of the applicant's arrest and
subsequent prolongations of his pre-trial detention. The documents
made available to the applicant did not provide an adequate basis on
which to address the arguments relied on by the court or by the
prosecutor, particularly given the rapidly increasing amount of
evidence collected and which was relied on by the authorities in
their decisions to prolong the applicant's detention on remand (see
Migoń, cited above, § 86).
In
the light of the above, given the extensive period of time during
which neither the applicant nor his lawyer could access any of the
documents in the case-file, the Court considers that the applicant
could not effectively exercise his defence rights in the proceedings
concerning the review of the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention.
Moreover, the prosecutor was familiar with the whole file. Thus, the
procedure failed to ensure equality of arms and was not truly
adversarial (see Lamy v. Belgium, cited above, § 29).
Accordingly,
there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested this claim.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 1,000 in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant, who was represented by a lawyer and had been granted legal
aid from the Council of Europe, did not claim reimbursement of any
costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 4 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Polish zlotys at the rate applicable at the date of settlement,
plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 November 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Josep Casadevall
Deputy
Registrar President
