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SIKA v. SLOVAKIA (No. 3) - 26840/02 [2007] ECHR 862 (23 October 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/862.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 862
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF SIKA v. SLOVAKIA (No. 3)
(Application
no. 26840/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
23
October 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Sika v. Slovakia (No. 3),
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr G.
Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
Mrs P. Hirvelä,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 2 October 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 26840/02) against the
Slovak Republic lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Slovak national, Mr Vladimír
Sika (“the applicant”), on 7 July 2002.
The
Slovak Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Ms A. Poláčková,
who was subsequently succeeded in that function by Ms M. Pirošíková.
On
7 July 2006 the
President of the Fourth Section of the Court decided to give notice
of the application to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of
the Convention, it was decided to rule on the admissibility and
merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Trnava.
A. Underlying facts and contact with administrative
authorities
The
applicant's family owned real estate to which the applicant now has
the title. It is located in the municipality of Drietomá.
In
1957 a road was built near the property to provide access to a
neighbour's property. In 1986 the road was modified.
After
the road had been built, changes were made to the Land Registry maps
and records in order to designate the road as a separate plot under a
separate number and with a separate ownership regime.
Since
then the applicant has turned numerous times to the municipal
authorities in Drietomá and to all levels of the Land Registry
authorities. He claimed that the road had been constructed without
the requisite permits; that it served solely the interests of his
neighbour, which was unjust; and that it was partly located on his
land without valid title, in violation of his property rights. The
applicant requested, unsuccessfully, that the legal position be
complied with both in the Land Registry records and in reality; that
the road be removed; and that he be paid damages.
In
a letter of 8 June 1995 the supreme Land Registry body (Úrad
geodézie, kartografie a katastra) informed the applicant
that his problem could not be solved through the administrative
procedure aimed at “restoring original legal borders”
(obnovenie hraníc pôvodného právneho
stavu) as this procedure only applied to uncontested situations.
It was understood that in the applicant's case there was a dispute
concerning the border between his property and the road. Such a
dispute could only be resolved by a court and the applicant was
advised to assert his claims there.
In
letters of 9 October and 6 November 1997 the Trenčín
district office (Okresný úrad) informed the
applicant that the Land Registry had no power to change boundaries of
plots and that, in so far as the applicant was seeking such changes,
he should bring his claims to the courts.
In
a letter of 15 December 1997 the Trenčín regional office
(Krajský úrad)
informed the applicant that the current Land Registry maps and
records in respect of his property had been drawn up and defined in
the 1960s and were considered completed. On 1 January 1998 an
amendment to the relevant legislation, the Land Registration Act (Law
no. 162/1995 Coll.), would enter into force, and would provide for a
new administrative procedure aimed at “determination of
boundaries” (určenie priebehu
hranice). If the applicant believed that the existing Land
Registry maps and records interfered with his property rights, from 1
January 1998 he could seek protection of such rights through this
procedure.
B. The 1998 Action
On
14 January 1998 the applicant brought an action against the district
office and the Drietomá municipal office (Obecný
úrad) in the Trenčín District Court (Okresný
súd). He sought a judicial order against the district
office, which was in charge of the relevant Land Registry records,
requesting it to rectify these records by bringing them into line
with his ownership claim.
On
22 January 1998 the District Court instructed the applicant
to provide further and better particulars and advised him that,
pursuant to sections 48 to 51 of the amended Land Registration Act,
since 1 January 1998 boundary disputes fell within the
jurisdiction of Land Registry authorities.
On
17 February 1998 the District Court discontinued the proceedings,
observing that at that time land boundary disputes fell to be
determined at first instance by district offices in their function as
Land Registry authorities. The District Court consequently referred
the matter to the Trenčín district office.
On
2 April 2001 the district office sent the matter back to the District
Court, holding that it fell within the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts since it concerned protection and restoration of rights in
respect of real property. On 26 April 2001 the Supreme Court
(Najvyšší súd) upheld this view.
The
District Court subsequently re-registered the action under a new file
number.
On
17 September 2001 the District Court requested the applicant to pay
the court fees. Subsequently, on 5 and 16 October 2001 and 31 January
2002, the applicant repeatedly requested an exemption from the
obligation to pay the court fees. The request was dismissed as
unfounded and the dismissal was upheld on appeal.
On
24 June 2002 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the
ground that the applicant had failed to pay the court fees. On
4 October 2003 the District Court corrected the decision by
adding a proviso to its operative part to the effect that the
decision would be rescinded if the fee was paid within the period
allowed for an appeal against that decision. On 22 October 2003
the District Court corrected clerical errors in the operative part of
the decision. The applicant appealed.
On
23 March 2004 the Trenčín Regional Court (Krajský
súd) upheld the decision to discontinue the proceedings
and it thus became final.
C. The 2000 Action
On
26 October 2000 the applicant brought a fresh action against the
Trenčín district office and the Drietomá municipal
office in the District Court. He argued that after his 1998 action
had been transmitted to it, the district office had failed to take
any steps to resolve the matter despite repeated reminders. The
applicant made claims similar to those he had made in 1998.
On
28 August 2001 the District Court discontinued the proceedings. It
was observed that the applicant's submissions had been aimed at
correcting Land Registry records, which was primarily to be done by
the Land Registry authorities and, therefore, fell outside the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
On
28 January 2002 the Regional Court quashed the decision of 28 August
2001 on the applicant's appeal and remitted the matter to the
District Court to continue the proceedings. The Regional Court based
its decision on the finding of the Supreme Court of 26 April 2001 in
connection with the 1998 action and instructed the District Court to
examine whether, in the circumstances, it was appropriate to join the
two actions.
On
21 June 2002 the District Court requested the applicant to provide
further and better particulars. He responded on 4 July 2002 and then
requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees.
On
26 February the District Court granted the applicant a 30% exemption
and on 30 June 2003 on the applicant's appeal the Regional Court
granted the applicant a full exemption from the court fees.
On
12 July 2005 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in so
far as the action was directed against the municipal office. The
District Court held that the municipal office was a body of the
municipality. It had no legal personality of its own and, therefore,
could not be a party to court proceedings. This shortcoming could not
be corrected, as the applicant had suggested, by “replacing”
the municipal office as the defendant by the municipality, because a
defendant who did not exist in law could not be replaced by another
entity.
On
17 August and 31 October 2005, respectively, the District Court and,
on the applicant's appeal, the Regional Court declared the
applicant's appeal against the decision of 16 July 2005 inadmissible
as being out of time.
On
29 December 2005 the applicant filed new claims seeking, inter
alia, an order to close the road in question. On 12 January 2006
the District Court decided to join the applicant's submission to the
action of 2000.
On
20 February 2006 the District Court requested the applicant
to provide further and better particulars and later summoned him
for an interview in chambers (informatívny výsluch)
in order to explore the legal nature of his submissions.
On
19 April 2006 the District Court interviewed the applicant and
informed him that his submissions could not be dealt with as a civil
action since they fell short of formal requirements, in particular
because of their vagueness and lack of substance. In response, the
applicant made a new written submission on 3 May 2006.
In
the meantime, the District Court sought information concerning the
case from the Drietomá municipality,
the land registration authorities and the Trenčín
district road traffic authority (obvodný
prad pre cestnú dopravu a pozemné komunikácie).
The
proceedings are still pending.
D. Constitutional complaint of 2003
On
8 September 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127
of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný
súd). He argued that there had been unjustified delays in
the 1998 and 2000 actions and in the proceedings before the Land
Registry authorities, and claimed 200,000 Slovakian korunas
(SKK) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
On
14 January 2004 the Constitutional Court appointed a legal-aid lawyer
to assist the applicant.
On
7 July 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the part of the
complaint concerning the delays in the 1998 and 2000 actions
admissible and the remainder inadmissible.
On
3 November 2004 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings
in so far as the complaint related to the 1998 action. It was
observed that the admissibility of this part of the complaint had
already been examined (see paragraph 38 below) and that it could not
be examined again.
On
8 December 2004 the Constitutional Court (Third Section) found that
the District Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing
“without unjustified delay” (Article 48 § 2 of the
Constitution) and “within a reasonable time” (Article 6 §
1 of the Convention) in the 2000 action. At the same time, it ordered
the District Court to proceed with the matter promptly and to pay the
applicant his legal costs and SKK 10,000
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Constitutional Court found that the subject matter of the proceedings
was not particularly complex and that the applicant had contributed
to the length of the proceedings to some extent in that his claim had
lacked clarity and that he had failed to discharge his obligation to
pay the court fees in time. Delays of more than 17 months were
imputable to the District Court. It was observed that the proceedings
were still pending, that the courts had not held a single hearing,
and that the only issue that had been resolved concerned the court
fees.
E. Constitutional complaint of 2004
On
11 March 2004, without offering an explanation, the applicant lodged
a new constitutional complaint, which was almost identical to his
complaint of 8 September 2003.
On
31 August 2004, under a different file number, the Constitutional
Court declared the complaint admissible in respect of the 2000 action
and inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded in respect of the
1998 action.
On
14 January 2005 the Constitutional Court (Fourth Section) delivered a
judgment (nález) which was substantially the same as
that of 8 December 2004. Making no mention of the judgment of
8 December 2004, the judgment of 14 January 2005 varied
slightly in its reasoning and in the amount of the just satisfaction
awarded to the applicant, namely SKK 20,000.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings before the
administrative authorities and in his 1998 and 2000 actions had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads
as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
1. Contact with the administrative authorities
The
Government pointed out that the essence of the applicant's
communication with the administrative authorities had been his claims
for protection of property rights in a dispute. However, at the
relevant time, the resolution of any property disputes had been
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and the
administrative authorities had had no decision-making power in this
area. The applicant's contact with the administrative authorities
therefore had not involved determination of his civil rights and
obligations and, as such, had fallen outside the purview of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
The
applicant disagreed and argued that all the claims which he had
submitted to the administrative authorities had had a valid basis in
law and should have been dealt with in accordance with the procedural
requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Court observes that the subject matter of the
applicants' claims before the various administrative authorities was
the road adjacent to his property, its location and the damage
allegedly caused to him in connection with it (see paragraph 8
above). These claims were contentious and, at the time when they were
made, that is to say prior to 1 January 1998, the administrative
authorities had no jurisdiction to entertain them (see paragraphs 9
to 11 above). It follows that they could not have produced any
results which would have been directly decisive for the applicant's
civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention (see, among many other authorities,
Balmer-Schafroth and Others v. Switzerland, judgment of
26 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 IV,
p. 43, § 32). The complaint is therefore incompatible
ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in
accordance with Article 35 § 4.
2. The 1998 Action
The
Government claimed that the subject matter of the proceedings had
been complex in that it had involved determination of the question of
jurisdiction over the applicant's claims in a period when the
relevant legal framework had been changing. They also submitted that
the length of the proceedings had been substantially influenced by
the applicant's procedural conduct and that what had been at stake
for him had not been of any particular importance for the purposes of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Nevertheless, the Government acknowledged that the complaint was not
manifestly ill-founded.
The
applicant reiterated his complaint.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 14 January 1998 and
ended on 23 March 2004. It thus lasted more than six years. In this
period the questions of jurisdiction and court fees but not the
merits of the case were examined at two levels of jurisdiction and
the former question was also dealt with by the local land
registration authority, the district office.
The
Court notes that the complaint concerning the 1998 action is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
3. The 2000 Action
The
Government argued that, as a result of the Constitutional Court's
judgments of 8 December 2004 and 14 January 2005, the applicant could
no longer claim to be a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the
Convention, of a violation of his right to a hearing within a
reasonable time as regards the period that had already been examined
by the Constitutional Court. They pointed out that the Constitutional
Court had expressly acknowledged the infringement of the applicant's
right and had provided him with preventive and compensatory redress.
This redress was adequate and sufficient and it was compatible with
the principles and practice of both the Constitutional Court and the
Court. The Government emphasised the promptness with which the
Constitutional Court had dealt with the applicant's complaints,
submitted that further to the Constitutional Court's injunctions for
acceleration of the proceedings there had no longer been any delays
and concluded that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
Nevertheless,
as to the substance of the complaint, the Government admitted, with
reference to the Constitutional Court's findings of 8 December
2004 and 14 January 2005, that the applicant's right to a hearing
within a reasonable time had been violated.
The
applicant reiterated his complaint and argued that the redress which
he had obtained from the Constitutional Court had been inadequate.
The
Court observes that, in view of the Constitutional Court's judgments
of 8 December 2004 and 14 January 2005, the question arises whether
the applicant can still claim to be a victim, within the meaning of
Article 34 of the Convention, of a violation of his right to a
hearing within a reasonable time.
An
applicant's status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of
the Convention depends on whether the domestic authorities
acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, the alleged
infringement of the Convention and, if necessary, provided
appropriate redress in relation thereto. Only when these conditions
are satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism
of the Convention preclude examination of an application (see, among
many other authorities, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no.
64886/01, § 71, ECHR 2006-...).
In
the present case the Constitutional Court expressly found, twice,
that the District Court had violated the applicant's right to a
hearing within a reasonable time, ordered that the proceedings
be accelerated and awarded the applicant, in total, the equivalent of
approximately EUR 855 in just satisfaction. Although the double
examination of substantially the same problem by the Constitutional
Court appears unusual, it is not the specific technical approach to
examination of individual complaints which is of crucial importance
under the Convention, but the overall compatibility of the protection
afforded to applicants at the national level with the protection due
under the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Bako v.
Slovakia (dec.), no. 60227/00, 15 March 2005).
Whether
the redress afforded to the applicant in the present case was
adequate and sufficient having regard to Article 41 of the Convention
falls to be determined in the light of the principles established
under the Court's case-law (see, most recently, Scordino v. Italy
(no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006-..., and
Cocchiarella, cited above, §§ 69-98). These include,
most notably, the amount of the compensation awarded to the applicant
and the effectiveness of the preventive measure applied.
At
the time of the Constitutional Court's second examination of the
length of the proceedings in question, on 14 January 2005, they had
lasted more than four years without a single decision on the merits.
The total amount awarded to the applicant by the Constitutional Court
by way of just satisfaction is around 25% of what the Court would
generally award in a similar situation in a Slovakian case.
Although this amount of just satisfaction is relatively low, of
itself this does not necessarily mean that it is incompatible with
the Convention principles.
After
the Constitutional Court's second judgment, the proceedings have
continued for more than another two years and seven months without a
single decision on the merits and they are still pending today. This
raises doubts as to what preventive effect, if any, the
Constitutional Court's injunctions actually had in accelerating the
proceedings.
In
view of the relatively low amount of just satisfaction awarded by the
Constitutional Court in combination with the ineffectiveness of its
injunctions in accelerating the proceedings, the Court finds that the
redress obtained by the applicant at the national level cannot be
considered adequate and sufficient (see Scordino (no. 1),
cited above, §§ 205-06 and 214-15). The applicant can
accordingly still claim to be a “victim” of a breach of
the “reasonable time” requirement.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 26 October 2000 and
has not yet ended. It has thus lasted more than six years and ten
months. In this period the action has been dealt with at two levels
of jurisdiction.
The
Court notes that the complaint concerning the 2000 action is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court is now called upon to determine whether the length of the
proceedings in the 1998 action and in the 2000 action complied with
the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 §
1 of the Convention.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96,
§ 43, ECHR 2000 VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it and having regard to its
case-law on the subject as well as the admission by the Government
(see paragraph 49 above), despite the applicant's contribution to the
length of the proceedings in question, the Court considers that in
the instant case the length of the proceedings in both the 1998
action and the 2000 action was excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage
comprising lost profit and other material damage and EUR 25,000 in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested these claims.
In
so far as the claim in respect of pecuniary damage has been
substantiated, the Court does not discern any causal link between the
violation found and the damage alleged. It therefore rejects this
claim. On the other hand, it considers that the applicant must have
sustained non pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis,
and having regard to its case-law on the subject (see the
recapitulation of the relevant principles and, mutatis mutandis,
their application in Scordino (no. 1), cited above, §§
267-272), and taking into account the fact that the applicant has
already obtained a measure of just satisfaction under the
Constitutional Court's judgments of 8 December 2004 and 14 January
2005, it awards him EUR 6,000 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed a lump sum of EUR 2,000 for the costs and
expenses incurred before both the domestic courts and before the
Court.
The
Government contested the claim.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 400 under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings in the 1998 action and in the 2000 action
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of both actions;
3. Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 6,000 (six
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 400 (four
hundred euros) in respect costs and expenses, the above amounts to be
converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses
the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 October 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
