British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
OSINSKI v. POLAND - 13732/03 [2007] ECHR 825 (16 October 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/825.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 825
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF OSIŃSKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 13732/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
16
October 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Osiński v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr L.
Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J.
Šikuta,
Mrs P. Hirvelä, judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 25 September 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 13732/03) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Przemysław Osiński
(“the applicant”), on 24 March 2003.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
On
18 October 2005 the Court declared the application partly
inadmissible and decided to communicate complaints concerning the
length of the applicant's detention and the length of the criminal
proceedings to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 §
3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Gdańsk.
A. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
On
31 March 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of armed
robbery. On 1 April 1999 the Gdańsk District Court remanded him
in custody in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed
armed robbery. It held that there was a reasonable risk that the
applicant might abscond and attempt to induce witnesses to give false
testimonies.
On
24 June 1999 the Gdańsk Regional Court prolonged the applicant's
detention until 30 September 1999. It found that the prolongation was
justified by the need to obtain and secure evidence from many sources
and interrogate a number of other persons who could be charged
together with the applicant.
On
15 September 1999 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal extended the
applicant's detention until 31 December 1999. It found that it was
highly probable that he had committed the offence in question. It
also relied on the need to obtain various expert reports. Lastly, it
held that the severity of the anticipated penalty justified the
prolongation of the applicant's detention.
Later,
several other persons were detained and charged in connection with
the same investigation conducted by the Department of Organised Crime
of the Gdańsk Regional Prosecutor's Office. The applicant was
charged with the commission of 35 robberies and armed robberies.
On
8 December 1999 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant be
kept in custody pending investigation until 30 March 2000. It relied
on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the
offences with which he had been charged. In that respect, it referred
to evidence given by A.Ł., a member of the same criminal group,
who acted as a witness against the other suspects. The Court of
Appeal further relied on the need to obtain and secure evidence, in
particular from experts in ballistics, biology and fingerprints. It
stressed that it was also necessary to carry out a reconstruction of
the crime and to confront the suspects with each other. It also
considered that the scale and nature of the offences in question
justified the applicant's continued detention.
On
30 March 2000 the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant's detention
pending investigation – which had meanwhile exceeded the
one-year time-limit set for detention pending the investigation under
Article 263 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure –
until 30 June 2000. It considered that the case was “particularly
complex” given the volume of evidence and the number of charges
against the numerous suspects. It also held that there was a
reasonable risk that the applicant and other suspects might obstruct
the investigation.
On
24 May 2000 the Supreme Court ordered that that term should be
prolonged further until 15 December 2000. It reiterated the previous
grounds given for the applicant's detention and added that the case
was very complex, given that six further suspects had in the meantime
been charged and detained in the case and that several other
potential suspects were still being sought.
Further
prolongations of the applicant's detention pending the investigation
were ordered by the Gdańsk Court of Appeal on 13 December
2000 (up to 31 March 2001) and 7 March 2001 (up to 31 May 2001). In
its decision of 13 December 2000, the Court of Appeal reiterated the
original grounds given for his detention. Taking into account the
nature of the offences, the Court of Appeal added that the fact that
the charges against all nine suspects were closely interrelated gave
substance to the risk that, once released, they might obstruct the
proceedings. It also referred to the particular complexity of the
case. Furthermore, it noted that the prolongation of the
investigation was due to the fact that new suspects had been
identified in the course of the investigation. In its decision of
7 March 2001, the Court of Appeal added that the prolongation of
detention was justified by the need to obtain DNA evidence.
On
15 May 2001 the prosecution filed a
bill of indictment with the Gdańsk Regional Court.
The applicant was charged with several dozen counts of armed robbery
which had been committed in an organised armed criminal group. The
bill of indictment specified that the applicant was subject to the
rules on recidivism. It listed 118 charges brought against
19 defendants, who were all detained on remand. The case file
comprised 114 volumes. The prosecution asked the court to hear
evidence from 366 witnesses.
The
trial began on 28 December 2001. However, as of April 2002 the
reading out of the bill of indictment by the prosecution had still
not been concluded. Initially, the trial court held three hearings
per month.
During
the trial, the Gdańsk Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's
detention several times. The relevant decisions were given on 23 May
2001 (extending his detention up to 31 October 2001), 24 October
2001 (ordering his continued detention until 31 March 2002), 13 March
2002 (prolonging that period until 30 September 2002), 11 September
2002 (extending his detention until 31 December 2002), 18 December
2002 (prolonging his detention until 30 June 2003), 25 June 2003
(prolonging his detention until 31 December 2003), 17 December
2003 (extending that term until 30 June 2004), 23 June 2004
(extending that term until 31 December 2004), 15 December
2004 (ordering his continued detention until 31 March 2005),
30 March 2005 (extending that period until 30 June 2005)
and 22 June 2005 (prolonging his detention until 30 October
2005).
In
all those decisions the Court of Appeal considered that the original
grounds given for the applicant's detention were still valid. It
stressed that the applicant's detention was the only measure which
could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings in such a
particularly complex case, given the nature of the charges, the
number of defendants and the connections between them. In addition,
it referred to the volume of evidence to be heard.
In its decision of 13 March 2002 prolonging the
applicant's detention, the Court of Appeal considered that the trial
could be terminated by 30 September 2002. In addition to the grounds
previously invoked, it found that the prolongation of detention was
justified under Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure by the particular complexity of the case. It further
observed that the delays in the trial were partly attributable to
some of the defendants who had attempted to disrupt the proceedings
and, consequently, had to be removed from the court room. It
instructed the trial court to hold more than 3 hearings per month.
Furthermore, it held that no other preventive measure could secure
the proper conduct of the trial. In that respect, the Court of Appeal
observed that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant and
other defendants might interfere with the proceedings, given the
nature of the charges, the severity of the anticipated penalty and
the fact that such attempts had been made in the course of the
investigation.
On
15 January 2003 the Gdańsk Regional Court dismissed the
applicant's and his 17 co-defendants' request for the judges and lay
members of the trial court to withdraw.
In
its decision of 25 June 2003 extending the applicant's detention, the
Court of Appeal observed that the trial could not be terminated due
to obstructiveness of the defendants who had filed numerous requests
challenging the trial court. It further observed that although the
applicant and other defendants were free to make use of their
procedural rights, the abuse of those rights had undoubtedly led to
delays in the trial. It also noted that the trial court had taken
various procedural steps in order to accelerate the proceedings.
In
its decision on the applicant's detention of 23 June 2004, the Court
of Appeal observed that up to April 2003 the main reason for the
delays during the trial was the obstructiveness of the defendants and
the abuse of the rights of the defence. It also observed that the
trial could be concluded by the end of 2004 provided that the
Regional Court endeavoured to organise the trial efficiently.
In
its decision of 18 January 2005 dismissing the applicant's appeal
against the decision of 15 December 2004 prolonging his detention,
the Court of Appeal held that Article 258 § 2 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure established a presumption to the effect that the
likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on the applicant might
induce him to obstruct the proceedings. It added that the risk of
absconding or tampering with witnesses which existed in the present
case did not have to be supported by concrete facts, but resulted
from the above presumption.
In
its decision of 22 June 2005 the Court of Appeal again referred to
the presumption established by Article 258 § 2 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. In its decision of 27 July 2005 dismissing the
applicant's appeal against the decision of 22 June 2005 prolonging
his detention, the Court of Appeal held that that presumption alone
justified the applicant's continued detention. It also held that
keeping the applicant in custody was necessary in order to prevent
him from interfering with the trial, given the reasonable risk of
such interference which flowed from the fact that he had been charged
with the commission of the offences in an organised criminal group.
During
the trial the applicant filed numerous but unsuccessful applications
for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against the
decisions prolonging his detention. He maintained that the length of
his detention was excessive and that the charges against him lacked a
sufficiently strong basis.
On
21 March 2005 the Gdańsk Regional Court made a severance order
with a view to expediting the proceedings, and thereafter four
defendants (J.N., G.P., Z.S. and Z.C.), who in the meantime had been
released, were to be tried separately.
After
20 June 2005 no hearing was held due to the serious illness of the
judge rapporteur. On 21 September 2005 the President of the Criminal
Section IV of the Gdańsk Regional Court assigned a new judge
rapporteur. Consequently, the trial had to commence de novo.
On
20 September 2005 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's
detention until 31 January 2006. The applicant appealed against that
decision. On 18 October 2005 a different panel of the Court of Appeal
quashed the impugned decision and ordered the applicant's release
under police supervision. It also imposed on him a prohibition on
leaving the country. The Court of Appeal had regard to the fact that
the trial had to commence de novo and that the applicant had
already spent a few years in pre-trial detention.
The
applicant was released on 19 October 2005.
On
24 November 2005 the trial court made a further severance order and
split the case into eleven separate cases.
By March 2006 the trial court had held some 135
hearings of the 162 which had been scheduled. It heard more than 400
witnesses.
It
appears that the proceedings are still pending before the
first-instance court.
B. The applicant's complaint against the unreasonable
length of proceedings
On
19 November 2004 the applicant filed with the Gdańsk Court of
Appeal a complaint about a breach of his right to a trial within a
reasonable time and asked for compensation. He relied on section 5 of
the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the
right to a trial within a reasonable time (“the 2004 Act”).
The
applicant submitted that the charges against all the defendants had
been unjustifiably joined in one set of proceedings. He claimed that
numerous hearings had been cancelled and that the process of taking
evidence from witnesses had been lengthy. He also submitted that he
had been detained on remand throughout the proceedings and that his
applications challenging the trial court had been made in accordance
with the provisions of criminal procedure.
On
12 January 2005 the Court of Appeal dismissed his complaint as
unfounded, having regard to the criteria set out in section 2 §
2 of the 2004 Act, namely the conduct of the court and of the
parties, the nature of the case, its factual and legal complexity and
what was at stake in the proceedings for the complainant.
Replying
to the applicant's submissions, the Court of Appeal held that the
joint examination of the charges against the defendants who had
collectively committed a crime was justified under the domestic law.
Furthermore, it considered that it could not be said that the
exceptional cancellations of some hearings pointed to inactivity on
the part of the trial court, bearing in mind the number of hearings
held and the fact that they had been scheduled in advance.
The
Court of Appeal also found that the applicant's complaint relating to
the allegedly lengthy process of taking evidence from witnesses was
unsubstantiated. It pointed out in this respect that the trial court
had disciplined the witnesses who had failed to comply with the
summons. The court further held that the defendants had contributed
to the length of the proceedings by multiplying their applications in
respect of procedural issues that had already been determined. It
found that the fact that the applicant had been remanded in custody
was not a relevant consideration for the determination of his
complaint concerning the allegedly excessive length of proceedings.
In
conclusion, having regard to the nature of the case and its
complexity, the Court of Appeal held that delays in the proceedings
could not be attributed to the trial court. On the contrary, the
trial had been conducted in a diligent manner.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
relevant domestic law and practice regarding the imposition of
detention on remand (tymczasowe aresztowanie), the grounds for
its prolongation, release from detention and rules governing other,
so-called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze) at the material time are stated in the Court's
judgments in the cases of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02,
§§ 27-33, 25 April 2006 and Celejewski v. Poland,
no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006.
The
relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the
excessive length of judicial proceedings are stated in the Court's
decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland no.
15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12 23, ECHR 2005-V and
Ratajczyk v. Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.), ECHR 2005 VIII,
and the judgment in the case of Krasuski v. Poland,
no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand had
been excessive. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,
which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
The
Government, having regard to the Court's case-law concerning the
length of pre-trial detention, refrained from taking a position on
the admissibility of the complaint.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
The
applicant's detention started on 31 March 1999, when he was arrested
on suspicion of armed robbery. It continued until 19 October 2005
when the applicant was released. Accordingly, the period to be taken
into consideration amounts to 6 years, 6 months and 21 days.
2. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant argued that the length of his pre-trial detention had been
unreasonable. In particular, he maintained that the court's decision
to examine jointly all the charges against the very many defendants
in one set of proceedings had resulted in the protracted examination
of the case.
(b) The Government
The
Government firstly presented some statistical data, indicating that
in the years 2000-2005 the number of indictments and convictions in
cases concerning organised crime increased both in absolute terms and
in relation to other crimes. In 2004 there were 617 indictments in
such cases and 220 persons were convicted. They argued that in
organised crime cases the authorities were faced with particular
problems, relating to the taking and assessment of evidence and
various logistical issues.
With
reference to the present case, the Government submitted that the
applicant's pre-trial detention had been justified by the existence
of substantial evidence of his guilt, the nature of the offences with
which he had been charged and the severity of the anticipated
penalty. They underlined that the length of the applicant's detention
should be assessed with reference to the fact that he and his
co-defendants had acted in an organised criminal gang. The risk that
the defendants might obstruct the proceedings or tamper with evidence
was aggravated by the fact they had been members of a tightly-knit
organised criminal group. Thus, the domestic courts had considered it
necessary to remand the applicant and his co-defendants in custody
until all relevant witnesses had been heard.
The
Government emphasised that the serious nature of the charges as well
as the fact that there had been nineteen defendants charged with
numerous offences required the authorities to take all necessary
measures to secure the proper conduct of the trial. The necessity of
the applicant's continued detention had been thoroughly examined by
the courts which on each occasion had given sufficient reasons for
their decisions. The applicant's case had been extremely complex on
account of the number of charges and defendants, and by reason of the
volume of evidence.
Furthermore,
the Government maintained that the defendants had borne the main
responsibility for the length of the trial by lodging numerous
ill-founded applications and appeals. Lastly, they maintained that
the authorities had displayed the requisite diligence in dealing with
the applicant's case.
3. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
The
Court recalls that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention were stated in a
number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities,
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110
et seq, ECHR 2000 XI; and McKay v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006-..., with further
references).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
In
their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on
three grounds, namely (1) the serious nature of the charges against
him, (2) the severity of the penalty to which he was liable and the
consequential risk that he might obstruct the trial and (3) the
complexity of the case related to the number of defendants and volume
of evidence to be heard. The domestic courts also referred to the
obstructive behaviour of the defendants aimed at delaying the trial.
The
applicant was charged with numerous counts of armed robbery committed
in an organised and armed criminal group (see paragraph 13
above). In the Court's view, the fact that the case concerned a
member of such a criminal group should be taken into account in
assessing compliance with Article 5 § 3 (see Bąk v.
Poland, no. 7870/04, § 57, ECHR 2007 ...
(extracts)).
The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion against the applicant of
having committed the serious offences could initially warrant his
detention. In addition, it notes that the authorities were faced with
the difficult task of determining the facts and the degree of alleged
responsibility of each of the defendants. In these circumstances, the
Court also accepts that the need to obtain voluminous evidence from
many sources, coupled with the fact that in the course of the
investigation new suspects had been identified, constituted relevant
and sufficient grounds for the applicant's initial detention.
However,
with the passage of time, those grounds became less and less
relevant. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds
adduced by the courts were “relevant” and “sufficient”
(see, Kudła cited above, § 111).
According
to the authorities, the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed
on the applicant created a presumption that the applicant would
obstruct the proceedings. They relied in this respect on the Supreme
Court's resolution and its construction of Article 258 § 2 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 21-22 above). However,
the Court would reiterate that, while the severity of the sentence
faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of
absconding or re-offending, the gravity of the charges cannot by
itself justify long periods of detention on remand (see, for
instance, Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, §§
80-81, 26 July 2001). Having regard to the above, the Court
cannot accept the position adopted by the judicial authorities in the
present case, namely that the presumption referred to above would
alone, after a certain lapse of time, justify the applicant's
continued detention, without the need to indicate any concrete facts
supporting the risk of obstruction of the proceedings.
Furthermore,
the judicial authorities relied on the fact that the applicant had
been charged with being a member of an organised criminal gang. In
this regard, the Court reiterates that the existence of a general
risk flowing from the organised nature of the alleged criminal
activities of the applicant may be accepted as the basis for his
detention at the initial stages of the proceedings (see, Górski
v. Poland, no. 28904/02, § 58, 4 October
2005) and in some circumstances also for subsequent prolongations of
the detention (see, Celejewski, cited above, § 37). It is
also accepted that in such cases, involving numerous accused, the
process of gathering and hearing evidence is often a difficult task.
Moreover, the Court considers that in cases such as the present
concerning organised criminal gangs, the risk that a detainee, if
released, might bring pressure to bear on witnesses or other
co-accused, or might otherwise obstruct the proceedings, is by the
nature of things often particularly high. In this respect, the Court
accepts that certain delays during the trial were caused by the
defendants' obstructiveness and the abuse of the rights of the
defence (see paragraphs 19-20 above).
While
all those above factors could justify even a relatively long period
of detention, they did not give the domestic courts an unlimited
power to prolong this measure. Even if the particular circumstances
of the case required detention on remand to be extended beyond the
period generally accepted under the Court's case-law, particularly
strong reasons would be needed to justify this (Wolf v. Poland,
nos. 15667/03 and 2929/04, § 90, 16 January 2007). In
this respect the Court observes that the applicant had spent 6 years
and nearly 7 months in pre-trial detention which is a particularly
long period.
Having
regard to the foregoing, even taking into account the fact that the
courts were faced with the particularly difficult task of trying a
case involving members of an organised criminal group, the Court
concludes that the grounds given by the domestic authorities could
not justify the overall period of the applicant's detention. In these
circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings
were conducted with special diligence.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 31 March 1999 when the
applicant was charged with armed robbery. The proceedings are pending
before the trial court. They have thus lasted 8 years and 6 months
for one level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that since the applicant's complaint lodged
under the 2004 Act had been dismissed on 12 January 2005, the
applicant had a possibility to lodge another complaint about the
length of the proceedings after a lapse of 12 months, according to
section 14 of that Act. In a new complaint the applicant could have
raised his arguments concerning the conduct of the courts after 12
January 2005. Therefore, in the Government's view, the subsequent
period should not be taken into account by the Court in the
assessment of the overall length of the proceedings.
The
Court recalls that it has already established that the remedies
provided by the 2004 Act were effective in respect of excessive
length of criminal proceedings (see Charzyński v. Poland,
cited above). However, the Court observes that the applicant's
complaint was dismissed when the proceedings in his case had already
been pending for 5 years and nearly 10 months. The Court does not
consider it necessary for the applicant, in order to comply with the
requirement of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, to lodge a new
complaint every 12 months (see Wolf v. Poland, cited above,
§ 62).
For
this reason, the Government's plea of inadmissibility on the ground
of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies with regard to the period
after 12 January 2005 must be dismissed.
The
Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant argued that there had been unjustified delays in the
investigation and at the trial. He criticised the trial court for
having joined all the charges against numerous defendants in one set
of proceedings and submitted that he had requested that his case be
examined separately but to no avail. Eventually, in November 2005 the
trial court had split the case into eleven separate cases, referring
to the needs of “procedural economy”.
(b) The Government
The
Government underlined that the case had been extremely complex. It
had concerned an organised criminal group and 118 charges brought
against 19 defendants. The trial has heard so far about 400
witnesses. As of April 2006 the case file comprised 204 volumes. The
Government relied on the volume of evidence obtained by the
prosecuting authorities and on the difficulties in conducting the
investigation, given the considerable number of defendants and
victims, as well as the serious nature of the offences committed by
the criminal gang.
As
regards the conduct of the authorities, the Government maintained
that they had shown special diligence required in cases of detained
persons, both at the investigative and the judicial phase of the
proceedings. The trial court had held hearings at regular intervals,
initially three, and subsequently five per month. Some of the
hearings had to be adjourned due to the absence of the defence
counsel, but the trial court had taken all available measures to
ensure their presence at the hearings. Similarly, the court had taken
measures to discipline witnesses who had failed to comply with
summonses. Consequently, the Government maintained that there had
been no delays in the proceedings for which the authorities could be
held responsible.
As
to the applicant's conduct, the Government emphasised that the
defendants had borne the main responsibility for the length of the
proceedings. They had lodged hundreds of applications and appealed
against every decision, even when they had been informed that the
appeal had been inadmissible. The trial court had been required to
examine all those applications and the prolongation of the
proceedings had thus been inevitable. Due to the defendants' attitude
the hearing of evidence could only begin in April 2003. The
Government referred in that respect to the decision of the Court of
Appeal of 23 June 2004 which had observed that the main reason for
the delays in the proceedings until April 2003 had been the
obstructiveness of the defendants and the abuse of the rights of the
defence. In order to remedy that situation of intentional
prolongation of the proceedings the trial court had decided to limit
the time assigned for submission of procedural motions during every
hearing. In the Government's view, the defendants' behaviour
justified the conclusion that they had resorted to delaying tactics.
As
regards the applicant, he had contributed significantly to the length
of the proceedings by lodging numerous ill-founded applications and
appeals. On many occasions he had challenged the trial court and
requested that the case be sent back to the prosecution or
transferred to another court. At the hearing held on 18 May 2005 the
applicant had requested to read all the documents indicated in the
bill of indictment. That request had resulted in significant delay in
the proceedings.
The
Government concluded that there had been no violation of Article 6
§ 1 in the present case.
2. The Court's assessment
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among
many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France
[GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
The
Court accepts the Government's argument that the case before the
domestic authorities was undoubtedly complex. This is clearly shown,
inter alia, by the number of defendants and the volume of
evidence obtained during the proceedings. During the investigation
the prosecuting authorities gathered extensive documentary evidence.
Numerous witnesses had to be interviewed. Even before the trial had
commenced, the case file numbered 114 volumes, and the number reached
204 volumes by April 2006.
As
regards the applicant's conduct, the Court observes that he lodged
several requests for release and appealed against the court decisions
prolonging his detention. It further notes that the defendants in the
present case, including the applicant, certainly contributed to the
length of the proceedings by having made frequent applications on
procedural matters which, inevitably, led to delays in the
examination of the case. The defendants' obstructiveness and the
abuse of the rights of the defence were referred to expressly on a
few occasions by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 19-20 above).
While the applicant's conduct must have generated delays at the trial
and cast doubt on his intention to have the proceedings concluded
speedily, the Court cannot subscribe to the view that this factor
could justify the entire length of the proceedings.
As
to the conduct of the authorities, the Court notes that the trial
court initially held three hearings per month. On 13 March 2002 the
Court of Appeal directed the trial court to increase that number to
five per month. The Court notes that otherwise hearings were held
regularly and when they were adjourned it was normally for reasons
not attributable to the court. Furthermore, the trial court took
measures to ensure the presence of defence counsel and witnesses at
the hearings. On the other hand, the Court cannot but note that
following the judge rapporteur's illness and the subsequent change in
the composition of the trial court some time after 21 September
2005 the trial had to commence de novo.
The
Court further observes that on 12 January 2005 the Gdańsk Court
of Appeal found, on a complaint by the applicant about the breach of
his right to a trial within a reasonable time, that the length of the
proceedings had not been excessive. The Court of Appeal concluded
that there had been no delays caused by the trial court's inactivity.
The Court considers that the Court of Appeal in examining the
applicant's complaint generally applied standards which were in
conformity with the principles embodied in the Court's case-law. The
Court discerns only one shortcoming in the review carried out by the
Court of Appeal, namely that the latter did not regard the fact of
the applicant's detention as a relevant factor for directing the
trial court to conduct the proceedings with particular diligence.
75. In
this connection, it recalls that persons kept in detention pending
trial are entitled to “special diligence” on the part of
the authorities. Consequently, in cases where a person is detained
pending the determination of a criminal charge against him, the fact
of his detention is itself a factor to be considered in assessing
whether the requirement of a decision on the merits within a
reasonable time has been met (see, for example, Abdoella
v. the Netherlands, judgment of 25 November
1992, Series A no. 248-A, p. 17, § 24; Jabłoński v.
Poland, no. 33492/96, § 102, 21 December
2000; Mõtsnik v. Estonia, no. 50533/99, § 40,
29 April 2003; Bąk v. Poland, cited above, § 81).
In
this respect, the Court would point out that the duty to administer
justice expeditiously was incumbent in the first place on the
domestic authorities, especially given that the applicant remained in
custody until 19 October 2005, that is for six years and nearly
seven months. Notwithstanding the significant difficulties which they
faced in the present case, the domestic authorities were required to
organise the trial efficiently and ensure that the Convention
guarantees were fully respected in the proceedings. However, the
Court notes that the trial, which has already lasted over 6 years and
4 months, appears to be still pending before the first-instance
court.
Having
regard to all the circumstances of the case and the overall length of
the proceedings, the Court considers that the reasonable time
requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention has not been
respected. Consequently, there has been a violation of this
provision.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 6,000 euros (EUR) for each year of the overall
period spent in detention on remand in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The
Government refrained from taking a position in respect of the
applicant's claims regarding the complaint under Article 5 § 3.
They also presented their opinion on the applicant's claims related
to the complaint under Article 6 § 1.
The
Court notes that the applicant's claims were limited to his complaint
under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in respect of the
excessive length of pre-trial detention and that he did make any
claims in respect of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. In those circumstances, the Court sees no reason to make
any award in respect of the violation of Article 6 § 1.
In
respect of the claims concerning Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention, the Court considers that the applicant has suffered some
non-pecuniary damage which is not sufficiently compensated by the
finding of a violation of this provision. Considering the
circumstances of the case, in particular the fact that the applicant
contributed to the delays in the trial, and making its assessment on
an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 2,000
under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant submitted no claim for costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,000 (two
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 October 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
