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SZYDLOWSKI v. POLAND - 1326/04 [2007] ECHR 816 (16 October 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/816.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 816
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF SZYDŁOWSKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 1326/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
16
October 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Szydłowski v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J.
Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
Mrs P. Hirvelä,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 25 September 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 1326/04) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Jan Szydłowski (“the
applicant”), on 30 December 2003.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
On
14 March 2006 the Court declared the application partly inadmissible
and decided to communicate complaints concerning the length of the
applicant's detention and the length of the criminal proceedings to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Gdynia. The
application was lodged on his behalf by his wife, Mrs Beata
Szydłowska, who submitted a duly signed written authorisation
from the applicant.
A. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
On
17 March 2000 the Gdańsk District Court remanded the applicant
in custody on suspicion of attempted armed robbery. It held that
there was a reasonable risk that he would tamper with evidence. It
also relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty. At the same
time the applicant was detained on remand in respect of another,
separate set of criminal proceedings (no. IV K 174/98).
On
6 June 2000 the Gdańsk Regional Court prolonged the applicant's
detention until 17 September 2000. On 12 September 2000 the Regional
Court extended that period until 15 December 2000. It relied on the
complexity of the investigation, the need to obtain expert evidence
and the severity of the anticipated penalty. It further found that
detention on remand was the only measure which could secure the
proper conduct of the proceedings and prevent the applicant from
interfering with witnesses. On 5 December 2000 the Regional
Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 17 March 2001,
invoking the nature of the charges.
The
applicant was detained in connection with an investigation conducted
by the Department of Organised Crime of the Gdańsk Regional
Prosecutor's Office, in which several other persons had already been
detained and charged.
On
7 March 2001 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal prolonged the
applicant's detention until 31 May 2001. It relied on the reasonable
suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he
had been charged and the severity of the anticipated penalty. The
Court of Appeal further held that detention on remand was the only
measure which could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings,
given the nature of the charges and the relations between the
suspects who had acted in an organised group. It also considered that
the prolongation of detention was justified by the need to obtain DNA
evidence in order to corroborate evidence previously obtained.
On
15 May 2001 the prosecution filed a
bill of indictment with the Gdańsk Regional Court.
The applicant was charged with robbery and armed robbery which had
been committed in an organised armed criminal group. The bill of
indictment listed 118 charges brought against 19 defendants, who
were all detained on remand. The case file comprised 114 volumes.
The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from 366 witnesses.
On
17 May 2001 the Gdańsk Regional Court ordered that the applicant
be remanded in custody until 31 October 2001, finding that it was
necessary in order to prevent him and his co-defendants from evading
justice or tampering with evidence. It also referred to the
complexity of the case stemming from the number of defendants and
witnesses to be heard.
On
13 September 2001 the Gdańsk Regional Court refused the request
of the applicant and two other defendants (J.N. and R.O.) to grant a
severance order with a view to hearing their cases separately, and
thus expediting the proceedings. Similar requests were refused on
23 January 2003 and 15 April 2003.
On
16 October 2001 the Regional Court prolonged the applicant's
detention until 17 March 2002, finding that the grounds previously
given for remanding him in custody were still valid.
The
trial began on 28 December 2001. However, as of April 2002 the
reading out of the bill of indictment by the prosecution had still
not been concluded. Initially, the trial court held three hearings
per month. As from June 2002 it decided to hold five hearings per
month.
During
the hearing held on 30 January 2002 the trial court ordered the
removal of the applicant and some other defendants from the court
room because of their disruptive behaviour.
On
25 February 2002 the applicant attempted to commit suicide by hanging
himself. He was hospitalised in the detention centre hospital from
25 February to 4 March 2002 and treated for a head injury.
During
the hearing held on 27 February 2002 the applicant stated that he had
a severe headache and was unable to participate in the hearing. The
trial court ordered him to be examined by a doctor who found that the
applicant could participate in the hearing.
On
13 March 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant be
remanded in custody until 30 September 2002. In addition to the
grounds previously invoked, it found that the prolongation of
detention was justified under Article 263 § 4 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure by the particular complexity of the case. It
further observed that the delays in the trial were partly
attributable to some of the defendants who had attempted to disrupt
the proceedings and, consequently, had had to be removed from the
court room. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal held that no other
preventive measure could secure the proper conduct of the trial. In
that respect, the Court of Appeal observed that there was a
reasonable risk that the applicant and other defendants would
interfere with the proceedings, given the nature of the charges, the
severity of the anticipated penalty and the fact that some of them
had attempted to interfere with the proceedings in the course of the
investigation.
On
11 September 2002 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's
detention until 31 December 2002. In addition to the grounds
previously relied on, it held that the applicant's detention was
justified under Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure since that provision established a presumption to the
effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on the
applicant might induce him to obstruct the proceedings.
It also noted that the prolongation of detention was justified by the
volume of evidence to be heard during the trial.
On
18 December 2002 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal ordered that the
applicant be held in custody until 30 June 2003. On 25 June 2003 the
Court of Appeal extended the applicant's detention until 31 December
2003, relying on the same grounds as previously. In addition, it
observed that the trial could not be terminated earlier due to
obstructiveness on the part of the defendants who had filed numerous
requests challenging the trial court. It also noted that the trial
court had taken various procedural steps in order to accelerate the
proceedings.
On
11 December 2003 the Regional Court made an application under
Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the
Gdańsk Court of Appeal, asking that the applicant's detention be
prolonged beyond the statutory time-limit of 2 years –
until 30 June 2004. On 17 December 2003 the Court of Appeal
granted that application. The applicant appealed against that
decision.
On
29 January 2004 a different panel of the Court of Appeal amended the
decision of 17 December 2003, holding that the Court of Appeal could
not rule on the Regional Court's application of 11 December
2003, as that application had been premature. The Court of Appeal
found that since in the other set of criminal proceedings (no. IV K
174/98) the applicant had been remanded in custody from 29 October
1997 to 3 October 2002, and subsequently had begun to serve his
sentence, the period of the applicant's detention in the present case
has not yet reached the statutory time-limit of two years.
Consequently, a decision on the prolongation of the applicant's
detention should be taken by the Regional Court.
On
10 February 2004 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be
remanded in custody until 30 June 2004. It invoked the complexity of
the case, the volume of evidence and the severity of the anticipated
penalty. Having regard to the latter, it considered that the
applicant might attempt to obstruct the proceedings. In addition, the
Regional Court observed that up to April 2003, when the court
commenced to hear evidence, the defendants had frequently attempted
to obstruct the proceedings by filing numerous requests challenging
the trial court.
On
17 February 2004 the Regional Court informed the applicant that it
was not feasible to schedule more than 5 hearings per month.
Subsequently,
the Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention on 29 June
2004 (until 31 December 2004), 27 December 2004 (until 30 June 2005)
and 23 June 2005 (until 30 October 2005). In addition to the reasons
invoked in its decision of 10 February 2004, the Regional Court
relied on the exceptional nature of the case owing to the number of
charges and defendants.
During
the trial the applicant filed numerous but unsuccessful applications
for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against the
decisions prolonging his detention. He maintained that the length of
his detention was excessive and that the charges against him lacked a
sufficiently strong basis. In a number of decisions refusing his
applications for release (of 20 May 2003 and 20 January 2004), the
Regional Court relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty.
That factor, in the court's view, justified the conclusion that the
applicant might attempt to obstruct the proceedings by absconding or
interfering with witnesses. On that basis the Regional Court
considered that other preventive measures would not be sufficient to
secure the proper conduct of the proceedings.
On
21 March 2005 the trial court made a severance order with a view to
expediting the proceedings, and thereafter four defendants (J.N.,
G.P., Z.S. and Z.C.), who in the meantime had been released from
detention, were to be tried separately.
By
June 2005 the trial court had held over 150 hearings and heard more
than 400 witnesses.
After
20 June 2005 no hearing was held due to the serious illness of the
judge rapporteur. On 21 September 2005 the President of the Criminal
Section IV of the Gdańsk Regional Court assigned a new judge
rapporteur. Consequently, the trial had to commence de novo.
On 20 October 2005 the Regional Court ordered the
applicant's release under police supervision. It found that continued
application of the most severe preventive measure was no longer
justified since the trial had to commence de novo.
On
24 November 2005 the trial court made a further severance order and
split the case into eleven separate cases.
On
19 September 2006 the Gdańsk Regional Court held that it had no
jurisdiction to hear the case of the applicant and some other
defendants and referred it to the Poznań Regional Court. On 29
January 2007 the latter court objected to the Gdańsk Regional
Court's decision and referred the jurisdiction dispute to the Poznań
Court of Appeal. On 13 February 2007 the Court of Appeal ruled that
the applicant's case was to be heard by the Gdańsk Regional
Court. It held that the referral of the case to the Poznań
Regional Court at this stage of the proceedings would lead to
unacceptable delays. It further noted that the case had lain dormant
before the Gdańsk Regional Court from 24 November 2005 to 19
September 2006.
It
appears that the proceedings against the applicant are still pending
before the first-instance court.
B. The applicant's complaint against the unreasonable
length of proceedings
On
3 November 2004 the applicant filed with the Gdańsk Court of
Appeal a complaint about a breach of his right to a trial within a
reasonable time and asked for compensation. He relied on section 5 of
the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the
right to a trial within a reasonable time (“the 2004 Act”).
The
applicant submitted that the hearings in the case had been short and
that a significant number of them had been cancelled. He further
referred to numerous absences of witnesses and the fact that the
trial court had failed to enforce discipline against those witnesses
who had failed to appear. Lastly, he submitted that the trial court
had refused his request for a severance order in respect of the
charges against him.
On
28 December 2004 the Court of Appeal dismissed his complaint as
unfounded, having regard to the criteria set out in section 2 §
2 of the 2004 Act, namely the conduct of the court and of the
parties, the nature of the case, its factual and legal complexity and
what was at stake in the proceedings for the complainant.
It
admitted that some hearings had been short, but that had been due to
the witnesses' absence or the need to take into account the
defendants' health problems. However, there had been a number of
hearings in the course of 2004 which had lasted until the late
afternoon. Overall, the Court of Appeal considered that the isolated
cases of hearings which had not been well prepared in advance could
not undermine the substantial efforts of the trial court in handling
the case. Furthermore, it considered that it could not be said that
the exceptional cancellation of some hearings pointed to inactivity
on the part of the trial court.
The
Court of Appeal also found that the absences of certain witnesses
referred to by the applicant had been justified; in other cases the
trial court had taken steps to discipline unjustified absenteeism. It
further considered that the joint examination of the charges against
the defendants who had collectively committed a crime was justified
under domestic law.
In
conclusion, the Court of Appeal found that given the nature of the
case, its complexity and the attitude of the defendants who, by
filing numerous unsubstantiated procedural applications, had
contributed to the delays in the trial, there was no ground to hold
that the proceedings had been unreasonably long.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The
relevant domestic law and practice regarding the imposition of
detention on remand (tymczasowe aresztowanie), the grounds for
its prolongation, release from detention and rules governing other,
so-called “preventive measures” (środki
zapobiegawcze) at the material time are stated in the Court's
judgments in the cases of Gołek v. Poland, no. 31330/02,
§§ 27-33, 25 April 2006 and Celejewski v. Poland,
no. 17584/04, §§ 22-23, 4 August 2006.
The relevant domestic law and practice concerning
remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings are stated
in the Court's decisions in the cases of Charzyński v. Poland
no. 15212/03 (dec.), §§ 12 23, ECHR 2005-V
and Ratajczyk v. Poland no. 11215/02 (dec.),
ECHR 2005 VIII, and the judgment in the case of Krasuski
v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand had
been excessive. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,
which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
The
Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
The
applicant's detention started on 17 March 2000, when he was detained
on remand on suspicion of attempted armed robbery. It continued until
20 October 2005 when the applicant was released. Thus, the total
period of his pre-trial detention in the present case comes to 5
years, 7 months and 5 days.
However,
between 3 October 2002 and 29 April 2004 the applicant served a
prison sentence which had been imposed on him in other criminal
proceedings. This term, being covered by Article 5 § 1 (a), must
therefore be subtracted from the period of the applicant's pre-trial
detention for the purposes of Article 5 § 3.
Accordingly,
the period to be taken into consideration under Article 5 §
3 amounts to 4 years and 9 days.
2. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant argued that the length of his pre-trial detention had been
unreasonable. In particular, he maintained that the court's decision
to examine jointly all the charges against the very many defendants
in one set of proceedings had resulted in the protracted examination
of the case. In this respect he submitted that he had been charged
with the commission of two offences with two defendants (A.Ł.
and J.K.) and that he had had no links with other defendants. The
applicant also maintained that his attempted suicide had been caused
by the manner in which he had been treated by the trial court.
(b) The Government
The
Government argued that the period of the applicant's detention had
not been excessive. Thy submitted that his pre-trial detention had
been justified by the genuine risk that he would obstruct the
proceedings, the gravity of the charges and the severity of the
anticipated penalty. The necessity of the applicant's continued
detention had been thoroughly examined by the courts which on each
occasion had given sufficient reasons for their decisions. The
applicant's case had been extremely complex on account of the number
of charges and defendants and the volume of evidence.
Furthermore,
the Government maintained that the defendants, including the
applicant, had borne the main responsibility for the length of the
trial by lodging numerous ill-founded applications and appeals.
Lastly, they maintained that the authorities had displayed the
requisite diligence in dealing with the applicant's case.
3. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
The
Court recalls that the general principles regarding the right “to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”, as
guaranteed by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention were stated in a
number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities,
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 110
et seq, ECHR 2000 XI; and McKay v. the United Kingdom
[GC], no. 543/03, §§ 41-44, ECHR 2006-..., with further
references).
(b) Application of the above principles in
the present case
In
their detention decisions, the authorities, in addition to the
reasonable suspicion against the applicant, relied principally on
four grounds, namely (1) the serious nature of the charges against
him, (2) the severity of the penalty to which he was liable and the
consequential risk that he might obstruct the trial, (3) the risk
that the applicant might abscond or interfere with witnesses, given
the fact that he had been a member of a criminal gang and (4) the
complexity of the case related to the number of defendants and volume
of evidence to be heard. The domestic courts also referred to the
obstructive behaviour of the defendants aimed at delaying the trial.
The
applicant was charged with robbery and armed robbery committed in an
organised and armed criminal group (see paragraph 9 above). In
the Court's view, the fact that the case concerned a member of such a
criminal group should be taken into account in assessing compliance
with Article 5 § 3 (see Bąk v. Poland, no. 7870/04,
§ 57, ECHR 2007 ... (extracts)).
The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion against the applicant of
having committed the serious offences could initially warrant his
detention. In addition, it notes that the authorities were faced with
the difficult task of determining the facts and the degree of alleged
responsibility of each of the defendants. In these circumstances, the
Court also accepts that the need to obtain voluminous evidence from
many sources, coupled with the fact that in the course of the
investigation new suspects had been identified, constituted relevant
and sufficient grounds for the applicant's initial detention.
However,
with the passage of time, those grounds became less and less
relevant. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds
adduced by the courts were “relevant” and “sufficient”
(see, Kudła cited above, § 111).
According
to the authorities, the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed
on the applicant created a presumption that the applicant would
obstruct the proceedings. They relied in this respect on the Supreme
Court's resolution and its construction of Article 258 § 2 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 18 above). However, the
Court would reiterate that, while the severity of the sentence faced
is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of absconding or
re-offending, the gravity of the charges cannot by itself justify
long periods of detention on remand (see, for instance, Ilijkov v.
Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, §§ 80-81, 26 July 2001).
Having regard to the above, the Court cannot accept the position
adopted by the judicial authorities in the present case, namely that
the presumption referred to above would alone, after a certain lapse
of time, justify the applicant's continued detention, without the
need to indicate any concrete facts supporting the risk of
obstruction of the proceedings.
Furthermore,
the judicial authorities relied on the fact that the applicant had
been charged with being a member of an organised criminal gang. In
this regard, the Court reiterates that the existence of a general
risk flowing from the organised nature of the alleged criminal
activities of the applicant may be accepted as the basis for his
detention at the initial stages of the proceedings (see, Górski
v. Poland, no. 28904/02, § 58, 4 October
2005) and in some circumstances also for subsequent prolongations of
the detention (see, Celejewski, cited above, § 37). It is
also accepted that in such cases, involving numerous accused, the
process of gathering and hearing evidence is often a difficult task.
Moreover, the Court considers that in cases such as the present
concerning organised criminal gangs, the risk that a detainee, if
released, might bring pressure to bear on witnesses or other
co-accused, or might otherwise obstruct the proceedings, is by the
nature of things often particularly high. The Court notes that
certain delays during the trial were caused by the defendants'
obstructiveness (see paragraphs 14, 19 and 22 above).
While
all those above factors could justify even a relatively long period
of detention, they did not give the domestic courts an unlimited
power to prolong this measure. Even if the particular circumstances
of the case required detention on remand to be extended beyond the
period generally accepted under the Court's case-law, particularly
strong reasons would be needed to justify this (Wolf v. Poland,
nos. 15667/03 and 2929/04, § 90, 16 January 2007). In
this respect, the Court observes that the applicant was held in
custody for 4 years and 9 days.
Having
regard to the foregoing, even taking into account the fact that the
courts were faced with the particularly difficult task of trying a
case involving members of an organised criminal group, the Court
concludes that the grounds given by the domestic authorities could
not justify the overall period of the applicant's detention. In these
circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings
were conducted with special diligence.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 17 March 2000 when the
applicant was charged with attempted armed robbery. The proceedings
are pending before the trial court. They have thus lasted 7 years,
6 months and 10 days for one level of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that since the applicant's complaint lodged
under the 2004 Act had been dismissed on 28 December 2004, the
applicant had a possibility to lodge another complaint about the
length of the proceedings after a lapse of 12 months, according to
section 14 of that Act. In a new complaint the applicant could have
raised his arguments concerning the conduct of the courts after 28
December 2004. Therefore, in the Government's view, the subsequent
period should not be taken into account by the Court in the
assessment of the overall length of the proceedings.
The
Court recalls that it has already established that the remedies
provided by the 2004 Act were effective in respect of excessive
length of criminal proceedings (see Charzyński v. Poland,
cited above). However, the Court observes that the applicant's
complaint was dismissed when the proceedings in his case had already
been pending for 4 years and over 9 months. The Court does not
consider it necessary for the applicant, in order to comply with the
requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, to lodge a new
complaint every 12 months (see Wolf v. Poland, cited above,
§ 62).
For
this reason, the Government's plea of inadmissibility on the ground
of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies with regard to the period
after 28 December 2004 must be dismissed.
The
Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The applicant
The
applicant submitted that the authorities had been responsible for the
delays in the proceedings. He criticised the trial court for having
joined all the charges against numerous defendants in one set of
proceedings and submitted that he had requested to have his case
examined separately but to no avail.
(b) The Government
The
Government underlined that the case had been extremely complex. It
had concerned an organised criminal group and 118 charges brought
against 19 defendants. The trial court has heard so far about
400 witnesses. As of April 2006 the case file comprised more
than 200 volumes. The Government relied on the volume of
evidence obtained by the prosecuting authorities and on the
difficulties in conducting the investigation, given the considerable
number of defendants and victims, as well as the serious nature of
the offences committed by the criminal gang.
As
regards the conduct of the authorities, the Government maintained
that they had shown special diligence required in cases of detained
persons, both at the investigative and the judicial phase of the
proceedings. The trial court had held hearings at regular intervals,
initially three, and subsequently five per month. Some of the
hearings had to be adjourned due to the absence of witnesses and
defence counsel, but the trial court had taken all available measures
to ensure their presence at the hearings. Consequently, the
Government maintained that there had been no delays in the
proceedings for which the authorities could be held responsible.
As
to the applicant's conduct, the Government emphasised that the
defendants had borne the main responsibility for the length of the
proceedings. The conduct of the proceedings was hindered by the
excessive exercise of procedural rights by the defendants and their
defence counsel. They had lodged hundreds of applications and
appealed against every decision, even when they had been informed
that the appeal had been inadmissible. The trial court had been
required to examine all those applications and the prolongation of
the proceedings had thus been inevitable. Due to the defendants'
attitude the hearing of evidence could only begin in April 2003. The
Government referred in that respect to the Court of Appeal's
decisions which had observed that the main reason for the delays in
the proceedings until April 2003 had been the defendants'
obstructiveness. In order to remedy that situation of intentional
prolongation of the proceedings the trial court had decided to limit
the time assigned for submission of procedural motions during every
hearing. In the Government's view, the defendants' behaviour
justified the conclusion that they had resorted to delaying tactics.
As
regards the applicant, he had contributed significantly to the length
of the proceedings by lodging numerous ill-founded applications and
appeals. On many occasions he had challenged the trial court, made
applications for a severance order or requested that a different
legal-aid counsel be appointed for him.
2. The Court's assessment
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among
many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France
[GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
The
Court accepts the Government's argument that the case before the
domestic authorities was undoubtedly complex. This is clearly shown,
inter alia, by the number of defendants and volume of evidence
obtained during the proceedings. During the investigation the
prosecuting authorities gathered extensive documentary evidence.
Numerous witnesses had to be interviewed. Even before the trial had
commenced, the case file numbered 114 volumes, and the number reached
204 volumes by April 2006.
As
regards the applicant's conduct, the Court observes that he lodged
several requests for release and appealed against the court decisions
prolonging his detention. It further notes that the defendants in the
present case, including the applicant, certainly contributed to the
length of the proceedings by having made frequent applications on
procedural matters which, inevitably, led to delays in the
examination of the case. The defendants' obstructiveness was referred
to expressly on a few occasions by the domestic courts (see
paragraphs 14, 19 and 22 above). While the applicant's conduct must
have generated delays at the trial and cast doubt on his intention to
have the proceedings concluded speedily, the Court cannot subscribe
to the view that this factor could justify the entire length of the
proceedings.
As
to the conduct of the authorities, the Court notes that the trial
court initially held three hearings per month. On 13 March 2002 the
Court of Appeal directed the trial court to increase that number to
five per month. The Court notes that otherwise hearings were held
regularly and when they were adjourned it was normally for reasons
not attributable to the court. Furthermore, the trial court took
measures to ensure the presence of defence counsel and witnesses at
the hearings. On the other hand, the Court cannot but note that
following the judge rapporteur's illness and the subsequent change in
the composition of the trial court some time after 21 September
2005 the trial had to commence de novo.
The
Court further observes that on 28 December 2004 the Gdańsk Court
of Appeal dismissed as unfounded the applicant's complaint about the
breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time. The Court of
Appeal concluded that there had been no delays caused by the trial
court's inactivity. The Court considers that the Court of Appeal in
examining the applicant's complaint generally applied standards which
were in conformity with the principles embodied in the Court's
case-law. The Court discerns only one shortcoming in the review
carried out by the Court of Appeal, namely that the latter did not
regard the fact of the applicant's detention as a relevant factor for
directing the trial court to conduct the proceedings with particular
diligence.
77. In
this connection, it recalls that persons kept in detention pending
trial are entitled to “special diligence” on the part of
the authorities. Consequently, in cases where a person is detained
pending the determination of a criminal charge against him, the fact
of his detention is itself a factor to be considered in assessing
whether the requirement of a decision on the merits within a
reasonable time has been met (see, for example, Abdoella
v. the Netherlands, judgment of 25 November
1992, Series A no. 248-A, p. 17, § 24; Jabłoński v.
Poland, no. 33492/96, § 102, 21 December 2000;
Mõtsnik v. Estonia, no. 50533/99, § 40,
29 April 2003; Bąk v. Poland, cited above, §
81).
In
this respect, the Court would point out that the duty to administer
justice expeditiously was incumbent in the first place on the
domestic authorities, especially given that during a substantial part
of his trial (4 years and 9 days) the applicant remained in custody.
Notwithstanding the significant difficulties which they faced in the
present case, the domestic authorities were required to organise the
trial efficiently and ensure that the Convention guarantees were
fully respected in the proceedings. However, the Court notes that the
trial, which has already lasted 6 years and over 4 months, appears to
be still pending before the first-instance court.
Having
regard to all the circumstances of the case and the overall length of
the proceedings, the Court considers that the reasonable time
requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention has not been
respected. Consequently, there has been a violation of this
provision.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 30,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage for both alleged violations. He referred to the
deterioration of his health which had resulted from the excessive
length of pre-trial detention and the maintenance arrears which had
accrued during that time.
The Government submitted that the applicant's claims
were exorbitant and speculative and should be rejected. In respect of
the complaint under Article 5 § 3, they argued that a finding of
a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction.
Alternatively, should the Court find a violation of Article 5 §
3 and a violation of Article 6 § 1, they invited the Court to
assess the amount of just satisfaction on the basis of its case-law
in similar cases and having regard to national economic
circumstances.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. In
respect of the non-pecuniary damage, the Court notes that it has
found a violation of Article 5 § 3 on account of the excessive
length of pre-trial detention and a violation of Article 6 § 1
on account of the unreasonable length of the proceedings. The
applicant's claims were submitted in respect of both those
violations. The Court considers that the applicant has suffered some
non-pecuniary damage which is not sufficiently compensated by the
finding of the above violations of the Convention. Considering the
circumstances of the case, in particular that the facts which gave
rise to both violations overlap to a certain extent and making its
assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant
EUR 3,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 250 for the costs of photocopying
documents and postage incurred in the proceedings before the Court.
The
Government submitted that the applicant had not produced any
documents to confirm his claim.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the applicant, who was not represented by a
lawyer, the sum of EUR 100 under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,000
(three thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 100
(one hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted
into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 October 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
