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KOMANICKY v. SLOVAKIA (No. 2) - 56161/00 [2007] ECHR 758 (2 October 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/758.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 758
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KOMANICKÝ v. SLOVAKIA (No. 2)
(Application
no. 56161/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
2
October 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Komanický v. Slovakia (no. 2),
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr S.
Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta, judges,
and
Mrs F. Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 11 September 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 56161/00) against the
Slovak Republic lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Slovakian national, Mr Ioan
Kornelij Komanický (“the applicant”), on 17 August
1999.
The
Slovak Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Ms A. Poláčková, who was subsequently
succeeded in that function by Ms M. Pirošíková.
On
18 October 2005 the
Court declared the application partly inadmissible and decided to
communicate to the Government the complaint under Article 6 § 1
of the Convention concerning the length of several sets of civil
proceedings and the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and
Article 13 of the Convention related to the length of the proceedings
in the action of 1991. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of
the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application
at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bardejov.
A. Action of 1993 (the Bardejov District Court (Okresný
súd) file no. 8C 3/93) and related constitutional
complaint
1. Action
In
1993 the applicant and his wife brought proceedings for determination
of ownership in respect of a plot of land.
On
18 April 1996 the District Court dismissed the action and, on 19 June
1997, the Prešov Regional Court (Krajský súd)
upheld the judgment on appeal (odvolanie).
On
20 October 1997 the applicant and his wife appealed on points of law
(dovolanie). In the course of the proceedings on this appeal
procedural matters such as, for instance, the court fees and legal
aid, were determined repeatedly at all levels of jurisdiction. The
appeal on points of law concerning the merits of the case is still
pending.
2. Constitutional complaint
On
28 May 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the
Constitution with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný
súd). He complained of unjustified delays in the
proceedings on the appeal on points of law and requested a legal-aid
lawyer. The Constitutional Court dismissed the latter request on 30
June 2004, finding that, in so far as the applicant had substantiated
his financial situation, there was no ground for granting it.
On
24 September 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint
inadmissible on the ground that the applicant had failed to comply
with the statutory requirement to have legal representation.
B. Action of 14 December 1995 (the Bardejov District
Court file no. 11C 36/96)
On
14 December 1995 the applicant instituted proceedings seeking
modification of a certificate of employment. He argued that the
period of his employment was in reality one day longer than as shown
in the certificate.
The
action was dismissed by the District Court on 18 February 1999
and, on appeal, by the Prešov Regional Court on 3 December
1999.
On
28 January 2002 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší
súd) quashed the judgment of 3 December 1999 on an appeal
by the applicant on points of law and remitted the matter to the
Regional Court for a new determination of the appeal against the
judgment of 18 February 1999.
On
25 November 2002 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 18
February 1999. The applicant appealed again on points of law.
On
16 December 2004 the Supreme Court declared the appeal on points of
law inadmissible since it met none of the existing statutory
admissibility criteria.
C. Action of 23 May 1997 (the Bardejov District Court
file no. 11C 810/97) and related constitutional complaint
1. Action
On
23 May 1997 the applicant brought an action against his landlord, a
housing co-operative, in the District Court. He first claimed that
his rent should be reduced and later modified the claim in that he
reclaimed a part of the rent paid. A further attempt by the applicant
to modify the claim was declared inadmissible.
On
2 October 2001 the District Court granted the action by ordering the
defendant to pay an amount of money to the applicant. The applicant
appealed, arguing that the District Court had overlooked the
modification of his claim.
On
28 February 2002 the Prešov Regional Court declared the appeal
inadmissible, holding that the applicant lacked grounds for appeal,
since his claim had been granted in full. The applicant appealed on
points of law.
On
24 January 2005 the Supreme Court discontinued the proceedings on the
appeal on points of law on the ground that, despite a previous
request and warning, the applicant had failed to bring it in line
with the applicable procedural requirements.
2. Constitutional complaint
On
15 March 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint about
delays in the proceedings and requested a legal-aid lawyer. The
Constitutional Court dismissed the legal-aid request, finding that
the applicant was not eligible, in view of his material situation,
which was well known to the Constitutional Court in connection with
the applicant's other submissions to the Constitutional Court.
On
24 September 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint
inadmissible on the ground that the applicant had no legal
representation.
D. Action of 1998 (the Bardejov District Court file no.
8C 714/98) and related constitutional complaint
1. Action
On
18 May 1998 the applicant brought an action against the State, in the
person of the Ministry of Justice. He argued that the Ministry had
erroneously charged him an administrative fee for an administrative
complaint in a previous, unrelated matter and sought damages.
The
action was dismissed by the District Court on 4 August 1999 and,
on appeal, by the Prešov Regional Court on 27 March 2000.
The
applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In the course of the
proceedings on this appeal, procedural matters such as the court
fees, legal aid and impartiality of judges were determined repeatedly
and at all levels of jurisdiction. The appeal on points of law as
regards the merits of the case is still pending.
2. Constitutional complaint
On
14 April 2004 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court of
the length of the proceedings and then requested a legal-aid lawyer.
The
Constitutional Court examined the applicant's financial situation,
taking into account, in particular, the amount of social benefits the
applicant and his wife were receiving and the amount of just
satisfaction the applicant had been awarded recently on three
unrelated constitutional complaints. The Constitutional Court
concluded, on 30 June 2004, that the granting of legal aid to the
applicant was not justified.
On
10 September 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant's
complaint inadmissible on the ground that he had no legal
representation.
E. Action of 1 October 1997 (the Bardejov District
Court file no. 11C 2130/97)
On
1 October 1997 the applicant and his wife filed a civil action
seeking the division and dissolution of the co-ownership of a plot of
land.
On
24 April 2003 the Bardejov District Court granted the claim and the
judgment became final and binding on 11 June 2003.
F. Proceedings concerning the estate of the applicant's
mother (the Svidník District Court file no. D 240/93)
On
11 March 1992 the applicant sent a letter to the Svidník State
Notary requesting that the estate of his late mother be determined.
He made a similar submission to the District Court on 9 March 1993,
following which, on 28 May 1993, the District Court opened the
inheritance proceedings and appointed a notary public to deal with
the case.
Between
8 August 1993 and 23 January 2001 the notary held 12 hearings. A
hearing that was held on 3 October 1995 was adjourned at the
applicant's request with a view to settling the estate by
agreement of the prospective heirs. The hearing held on 23 July 1996
was adjourned in order to examine the applicant's claim that he had
changed his name.
The
applicant failed to appear at six of the above hearings. He excused
himself for not being able to attend the hearing of 11 March 1996 one
day before that hearing, on account of a clash of scheduled court
appearances. Three days before the hearing listed for 9 November 1998
the applicant submitted that he could not appear for health reasons.
The applicant also apologised for not being able to attend the
hearings of 22 November 1999 and 6 March 2000 three days before
those hearings.
In
the meantime, on 4 January 1994, the notary requested that the
applicant submit documentary evidence, which the applicant did only
on 4 November 1994, after having been reminded three times.
In
the course of 1995 the notary obtained several pieces of documentary
evidence defining the extent of the estate.
On
7 February 2001 the notary held another hearing, following which, on
the same day, he determined the case by ruling that the estate passed
to the applicant and issuing an order for costs against him. The
decision was upheld by the District Court on 9 April 2001 and on
appeal by the applicant by the Prešov Regional Court on 26
July 2001.
The
applicant subsequently lodged an application with the courts for
enforcement of the inheritance decision of 7 February 2001. He sought
an order requiring the Land Register Administration to register
his title to the inherited property. The application was examined
twice, at two levels of jurisdiction, and the judicial proceedings in
respect of it were finally discontinued, in 2004, on the ground that
the enforcement of the decision fell outside the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts. The application was consequently transmitted to the
Svidník Land Register Administration which was the body which
should deal with it. The “enforcement” appears to be
still pending there and questions such as, for example,
identification of the property under a new referencing system, are
being determined.
G. Appeal on points of law of 1996
1. First-instance proceedings and appeal
On
11 May 1993 the applicant brought an action for damages in the
Bardejov District Court. It was dismissed by the District Court on
20 January 1994 and, on appeal, by the Košice Regional
Court on 26 May 1995.
2. Appeal on points of law
On
19 January 1996 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law
against the Regional Court's judgment.
On
16 September 1996 the District Court instructed the applicant to
bring his appeal in line with the applicable procedural requirements
and to pay the court fees. The applicant replied on 25 September 1996
by asking for an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees.
On
2 March, 2 June and 15 October 1997 the District Court repeatedly
requested that the applicant make a declaration in respect of his
financial standing, with a view to determining the question of the
court fees. In the absence of a relevant response, the District Court
finally established the applicant's standing on the basis of the
information which the applicant had submitted in the context of other
proceedings.
On
23 February 1999 the District Court exempted the applicant from the
obligation to pay the court fees and appointed him a legal-aid
lawyer.
On
9 December 1999 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal, as having been
lodged after the expiry of the statutory one-month time-limit.
H. Action of 1991 (the Bardejov District Court file
nos. 7C 107/91 and 4C 1313/98), related enforcement proceedings and
related constitutional complaint
1. Proceedings file no. 7C 107/91
On
14 February 1991 the applicant and his wife brought an action against
an individual in the District Court for protection of their ownership
rights in respect of two plots of land. In the course of the
proceedings they identified further defendants and extended the
action by seeking protection in respect of another plot and claiming
that the defendants should be obliged to remove rubbish from the
plots in question.
On
31 October 1996 the District Court ordered the defendants to refrain
from interfering with the plaintiffs' ownership rights in respect of
the first two plots and decided that the remaining claim would be
dealt with in a separate set of proceedings (see paragraph 47
below).
On
4 March 1998 the Prešov Regional Court upheld the judgment of
31 October 1996 on appeal. It thus became final on 21 August 1998.
2. Enforcement of the judgment of 31 October 1996
In
1998 the applicant and his wife requested that the District Court
enforce its judgment of 31 October 1996.
In
the course of the enforcement proceedings a fine was imposed on the
defendants for their failure to abide by the above final judgment and
the fine was upheld on appeal. The applicant then requested, numerous
times, but unsuccessfully, that further fines be imposed.
3. Proceedings file no. 4C 1313/98
As
regards the claim concerning the third plot, which the District Court
decided to determine in a separate set of proceedings (see paragraph
43 above), four hearings were held between 4 February and 18 May
1999. Three of them were adjourned owing to the absence of the
defendants' representative, one in order for the parties to submit
evidence.
On
9 June 1999 the District Court held a hearing following which, on the
same day, it ordered the defendants to refrain from interfering with
the plaintiffs' ownership rights. The court further decided to deal
with the remaining claim concerning the prohibition on entering the
third plot and the removal of rubbish; in yet another separate set of
proceedings. The applicant and his wife appealed.
In
1999 the applicant and his wife requested protection of their rights
by way of an interim measure. The request was dismissed on 7 April
2000 and, on appeal, on 19 September 2001.
On
19 April 2004 the Regional Court quashed the injunction of 9 June
1999 and remitted this matter to the District Court for
reconsideration.
On
8 August 2004 the applicant challenged the District Court's judge
dealing with the case for bias, on the ground that he was responsible
for unjustified delays. On 8 September 2004 the Regional Court
dismissed the challenge.
On
10 December 2004 the defendants submitted a contract to the court
under which they had sold their plots to third persons. The District
Court adjourned the case and invited the plaintiffs to confirm
whether they wished to maintain their claim in these circumstances.
On
28 December 2004 the applicant informed the court that the plaintiffs
maintained their claim. The proceedings are still pending.
4. Constitutional complaint
On
7 July 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional
Court. He directed the complaint both against the District Court and
the Regional Court and challenged unjustified delays in the
proceedings files, nos. 7C 107/91 and 4C 1313/98.
On
10 October 2004 the applicant supplemented his complaint in that he
also claimed a violation of his right under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to enjoy his possessions peacefully, owing to the length of the
proceedings.
On
28 October 2004 the Constitutional Court invited the applicant to
specify his complaint in so far as it was directed against the
Regional Court. The applicant failed to do so.
On
15 December 2004 the Constitutional Court declared admissible the
complaint of the length of the proceedings, in so far as it concerned
the District Court, and inadmissible as being unsubstantiated, in so
far as it concerned the Regional Court. It also found inadmissible as
being manifestly ill-founded the complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
On
15 March 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court
had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified
delay (Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution) and ordered it
to proceed with the case expeditiously. The Constitutional Court
found that the District Court had been inactive without any
justification from 16 November 1995 to 22 July 1996 (a
total of nine months) and that there had been several formal errors
on the part of the District Court, which had contributed to the total
length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court also found that
the applicant's behaviour had significantly contributed to the length
of the proceedings, as he had failed to appear at three hearings, had
modified his claim several times and had challenged the judge twice
(in 1992 and in 2004 respectively). It therefore decided not to award
the applicant any just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
I. Action of 22 December 1995 (the Bardejov District
Court file no. 12C 647/95) and related constitutional complaint
1. Action
On
22 December 1995 the applicant's housing co-operative brought an
action against him and his wife claiming arrears of rent.
On
14 April 1999 the District Court discontinued the proceedings as the
plaintiff had withdrawn the action. The Prešov Regional Court
upheld the decision on 30 November 1999 on the applicant's appeal.
The
applicant lodged an appeal on points of law and requested a legal-aid
lawyer. The request was dismissed with reference to the applicant's
financial situation.
On
25 May 2005 the Supreme Court declared the applicant's appeal on
points of law inadmissible on the ground that he had no legal
representation.
2. Constitutional complaint
On
26 March 2004 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court
about unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Court
in connection with the processing of his appeal on points of law.
On
5 May 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It observed, firstly,
that the complaint was directed solely against the proceedings before
the District Court, which concerned the appeal on points of law. It
further observed that, in the circumstances, the applicant's appeal
on points of law had no prospect of success and was bound to fail.
Finally, the Constitutional Court observed that burdening the courts
with inadmissible and unmeritorious appeals, as in the applicant's
case, prevented due administration of justice. In view of these
considerations the Constitutional Court concluded that, at the time
of its assessment, there was no appearance of a violation of the
applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay.
J. Action of 2001 (the Bardejov District Court file no.
1C 204/01) and related constitutional complaint
1. Action
On
5 March 2001 the applicant brought proceedings against his housing
co-operative, claiming that the defendant's rent assessment should be
declared null and void.
In
response to the District Court's request to pay the court fees, the
applicant asked for an exemption from the obligation to do so. Having
examined the applicant's financial situation, the District Court
rejected the request and discontinued the proceedings on the merits,
on 1 June 2001.
On
14 June 2001 the applicant paid the court fees and the District Court
resumed the proceedings.
On
22 June 2004 the District Court dismissed the action. The applicant
appealed.
On
16 September 2004 the District Court discontinued the appellate
proceedings as the applicant had failed to pay the court fees for the
appeal. The decision became final on 27 October 2004.
2. Constitutional complaint
On
9 May 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional
Court alleging unjustified delays in the action of 2001.
On
14 April 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court
had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified
delay. It held that the District Court had been inactive without any
justification from 17 July 2001 to 13 March 2002 (a total of eight
months) and also from 11 April 2002 to 10 November 2003 (a total of
seventeen months). It awarded the applicant 20,000 Slovakian korunas
(SKK) by way of just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage
and ordered reimbursement of his legal costs.
K. Action of 1996 (the Bardejov District Court file no.
8C 60/96) and related constitutional complaint
1. Action
On
10 January 1996 the applicant brought an action against his housing
co-operative. He principally sought an order against the defendant to
sell and transfer the flat in which the applicant was living to him,
under special legislation of 1991. The applicant also sought
universal settlement in respect of all outstanding pecuniary and
non pecuniary claims between himself and the defendant.
On
28 January 1999 the District Court dismissed the applicant's claim
for the transfer of the flat and discontinued the proceedings
concerning the settlement, as the applicant had failed to specify
this part of his claim despite repeated requests. The applicant
appealed.
On
14 February 2000 the Prešov Regional Court upheld the District
Court's judgment in so far as it concerned the discontinuation of the
proceedings and quashed it in so far as it concerned the dismissal of
the principal claim. The latter claim was remitted to the District
Court for reconsideration.
In
the course of the subsequent proceedings various procedural issues
such as the court fees and legal aid were examined numerous times at
all levels of jurisdiction. The proceedings are still pending.
2. Constitutional complaint
On
3 August 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint
alleging a violation of his rights under Article 6 of the Convention
and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the action of 1996 and
requested a legal-aid lawyer.
On
10 September and 10 November 2004, respectively, the Constitutional
Court dismissed as unfounded the applicant's legal-aid request and
declared his constitutional complaint inadmissible on the ground that
he had no legal representation.
L. Action of 1999 (the Bardejov District Court file no.
7C 75/99) and the related constitutional complaint
1. Action
On
3 February 1999 the applicant sued the National Employment Authority
before the District Court for an amount of money. The District Court
dismissed the claim on 9 September 1999. The applicant appealed and
on 10 April 2000 the Prešov Regional Court declared his appeal
inadmissible as being lodged out of time.
On
7 June 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against
the Regional Court's decision. The Bardejov District Court, which
dealt with the appeal on points of law prior to its submission to the
Supreme Court, invited the applicant to rectify shortcomings in the
appeal and to submit a power of attorney. The applicant
requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees and
asked for a legal-aid lawyer. His requests were rejected by the
courts at two instances, with reference to the applicant's financial
situation.
On
2 September 2004 the Supreme Court discontinued the proceedings,
holding that the applicant had failed to comply with the statutory
requirement to have legal representation.
2. Constitutional complaint
In
November 2004 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court
about unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Court
in respect of his appeal on points of law of 7 June 2000.
On
14 April 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the Bardejov
District Court had violated the applicant's constitutional right to
have the case decided without unjustified delays. The Constitutional
Court observed that the District Court had been inactive without any
justification from 27 July 2001 until 20 September 2002 (a total
of thirteen months) and from 4 November 2002 until 7 January 2004 (a
total of fourteen months). The Constitutional Court also found that
the applicant's behaviour had significantly contributed to the length
of the proceedings, as he had repeatedly sent incomplete applications
to the court and the court had had to invite him to rectify the
shortcomings in them. It therefore decided not to award the
applicant any just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court ordered reimbursement of the
applicant's legal costs.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the above court proceedings
(or parts of them) had been incompatible with the “reasonable
time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
1. Action of 1993
The
Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic
remedies, as required under Article 35 § of the Convention, in
that he had failed properly to seek redress by way of a complaint
under Article 127 of the Constitution. The applicant's complaint to
the Constitutional Court of 28 May 2004 did not count since it had
not been made in accordance with the applicable requirements.
The
applicant disagreed and argued that he had complied with the
requirements of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as regards
exhaustion of domestic remedies. He submitted that the complaint
under Article 127 of the Constitution was not a remedy to be
exhausted in his case for a variety of reasons. Firstly, an important
part of his proceedings had taken place prior to 1 January 2002,
whereas the remedy in question had only become available on that
date. Secondly, he could not actually use this remedy because his
financial situation did not allow him to fulfil the requirement of
legal representation. Thirdly, and finally, in the applicant's view,
complaints under Article 127 of the Constitution had no adequate
prospects of success owing to irregularities in the Constitutional
Court's decision-making.
The Court reiterates that, as a general rule, a
complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution is a remedy to
be used in respect of length of proceedings (see Andrášik
and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 57984/00, 60237/00,
60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00, 68563/01 and 60226/00, ECHR 2002 IX).
It is the task of applicants to formulate their constitutional
complaints so as to allow the Constitutional Court to examine the
overall length of the proceedings (see Obluk v. Slovakia, no.
69484/01, § 61, 20 June 2006). In so far as the application
has been substantiated, the Court has found no reasons of principle
why this remedy should not be used in circumstances such as in the
present case.
As
for the applicant's objection concerning mandatory legal
representation, the Court observes that the requirement of
representation by a lawyer in proceedings before a higher court
does not of itself infringe the principles of the Convention (see,
for example, Gillow v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 24
November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 27, § 69
and Slezák v. the Czech Republic, no. 32487/96,
Commission decision of 14 January 1998, unreported).
It
is the applicant's contention that he could not afford a lawyer and
he requested a legal-aid counsel. His request was examined by the
Constitutional Court and dismissed with reference to his financial
standing. In order to assess the situation in its context, it must be
noted that the applicant has been involved in an extensive number of
judicial proceedings in which questions of the court fees and legal
aid were examined repeatedly at all levels of jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts and before the Constitutional Court (see, for
example, the other proceedings reviewed in this judgment, the
decision of 18 October 2005 on
partial inadmissibility of the present application, the decisions and
a judgment in applications nos. 32106/96, 56161/00, 13677/03, and
many others).
The
Court considers that, because of their direct knowledge of their
society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle
better placed than the international judge to appreciate the
competing interests in the present case (see, among many other
authorise, mutatis mutandis, Weeks v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 114,
p. 26, § 50). In so far as the application has been
substantiated, the Constitutional Court's assessment in respect of
the applicant's legal-aid request does not appear manifestly
unreasonable, arbitrary or wrong.
In
view of the above considerations the applicant cannot be considered
as having exhausted domestic remedies, for the purposes of Article 35
§ 1 of the Convention, in accordance with the applicable
procedural requirements (see, for example, Akdivar and Others v.
Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1210, § 66).
It
follows that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
in respect of the 1993 action must be rejected under Article 35
§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies.
2. Actions of 14 December 1995, 23 May 1997, 1998, 1
October 1997 and 1996
As
regards the actions of 14 December 1995, 23 May 1997, 1998, 1 October
1997 and 1996, the Government raised a similar objection of
non exhaustion of domestic remedies as mentioned above (see
paragraph 84 above).
The
applicant disagreed and advanced similar arguments to those mentioned
above (see paragraph 85 above).
The
Court observes that the proceedings on the applicant's appeal on
points of law in the action of 14 December 1995 ended in 2004 and
that the applicant did not complain of the overall length of these
proceedings under Article 127 of the Constitution.
The
Court further observes that the proceedings on the applicant's appeal
on points of law in his action of 23 May 1997 ended in 2005 and that
the applicant's complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution of
their length was declared inadmissible as falling short of the
applicable requirements.
The
Court also observes that the action of 1998 is still pending on the
applicant's appeal on points of law and that the applicant's
complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution of the length of the
proceedings was declared inadmissible as falling short of the
applicable requirements.
Furthermore,
the Court observes that the proceedings in the action of 1 October
1997 ended in 2003 and that there is no indication that the applicant
complained of their length under Article 127 of the Constitution in
accordance with the applicable procedural requirements.
Finally,
the Court observes that the proceedings in the action of 1996 are
still pending and that the applicant's constitutional complaint in
respect of their length was inadmissible because he had failed to
bring it through a lawyer.
For
reasons similar to those indicated above (see paragraphs 87-89
above), the Court finds that the dismissals by the Constitutional
Court of the applicant's requests for legal aid do not raise any
issues under the Convention.
It
follows that the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
of the length of proceedings in the actions of 14 December 1995,
23 May 1997, 1998, 1 October 1997 and 1996 must be rejected
under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
3. Proceedings concerning the estate of the applicant's
mother
(a) Inheritance proceedings
The
Government considered that the complaint of the length of the
proceedings concerning the estate of the applicant's mother was
manifestly ill-founded. They submitted that the proceedings had
commenced on 28 May 1993 and that, apart from some minor delays
imputable to the authorities, their length was mainly due to the
applicant's procedural behaviour.
The
applicant disagreed and reiterated the complaint. He emphasised that
the proceedings had already commenced with his first letter to the
Svidník notary in March 1992 and that their subject matter was
particularly important for him.
The
Court observes first of all that the inheritance proceedings were
followed by proceedings in which the applicant sought enforcement of
the inheritance decree. The former proceedings were judicial in their
nature whereas the latter are administrative. The administrative
proceedings are governed by a different procedural code, have
different parties and involve the determination of administrative and
technical questions, concerning the registration of the applicant's
title, which are different from the legal questions determined in the
inheritance proceedings. The Court finds that there is not a
sufficiently direct connection between the inheritance proceedings
and the proceedings in which the applicant sought registration of his
title to treat them as a single matter for the purposes of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention. They will therefore be examined
separately.
As
for the inheritance proceedings as such, the Court finds that, for
the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, they had
commenced on 9 March 1993 when the applicant had lodged a formal
application for their commencement with the competent court. They
ended on 26 July 2001, after having lasted about eight years and four
months. The reasonableness of this period must be assessed in the
light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the
following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the
applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the
applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities,
Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR
2000-VII).
As
for the subject matter of the proceedings, the Court does not find
any particular complexity.
As
to the applicant's conduct in the proceedings under examination, the
Court observes that he once requested an adjournment of a hearing
with a view to settling the case out of court, and that one hearing
was adjourned in order to examine his claim that he had changed his
name. The applicant did not appear at hearings six times, once
submitting an apology one day before the hearing and three times
three days before the hearings in question. In 1994 he had to be
reminded three times to submit evidence. The Court finds that these
actions and omissions caused delays in the proceedings.
Furthermore,
the Court considers that the applicant's conduct in the present
proceedings must be seen in the overall context of his litigious
involvement in an extensive number of judicial proceedings at all
levels of jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and before the
Constitutional Court (see paragraph 88 above).
As
regards the conduct of the authorities, the Court observes that the
case was examined by the notary and courts at two levels of
jurisdiction. The core of the proceedings took place before the
notary, who held 12 hearings. Following his decision the case was
transmitted to the courts, which dealt with it relatively quickly,
another hearing being held before the first-instance court.
The
Court discerns no reasons of relevance under Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention to support the applicant's contention, in so far as it
has been substantiated, that what was at stake for him in the present
proceedings called for special diligence within the meaning of that
provision.
Having
regard to the foregoing considerations, in particular the applicant's
procedural conduct both in the present proceedings and in a broader
context, the Court concludes that there is no indication that the
overall length of the proceedings in the present case was contrary to
the requirements laid down in Article 6 § 1 (compare Kandráčová
and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 48674/99, 27 January 2004, and
Bleyová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 69353/01, 17 October
2006; and also, for example, Katte Klitsche de la Grange v. Italy,
judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A no. 293-B, §§ 49-63;
Ciricosta and Viola v. Italy, judgment of 4 December
1995, Series A no. 337 A, § 28; Sergi v.
Italy (dec.), no. 46998/99, 26 September 2000; and Viscomi v.
Italy (dec.), no. 52927/99, 8 February 2001).
It
follows that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
(b) Proceedings for enforcement of the
inheritance decree
Even
assuming that the proceedings in question fall within the purview of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the complaint of their length
is inadmissible because the applicant has failed to raise it by way
of an administrative-law action and, as the case may be, a
complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (see Csepyová
v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 67199/01, 8 April 2003).
It
follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35
§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies.
4. Appeal on points of law of 1996
The
Government argued that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
The
applicant disagreed.
The
Court observes at the outset that the applicant complained
exclusively about the proceedings on his appeal on points of law and
not about the proceedings at first instance and appeal. Nevertheless,
for the assessment of its length, the appeal on points of law cannot
be dissociated completely from the proceedings that preceded it (see
Pavlík v. Slovakia, no. 74827/01, § 107,
30 January 2007).
It
is to be noted that an appeal on points of law in Slovakia is an
extraordinary remedy, the merits of which fall to be determined by
the country's highest body of ordinary jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court. The appeal in the present case was lodged on 19 January 1996
and decided upon on 9 December 1999. The proceedings in respect of it
thus lasted more than three years and ten months.
The
Court considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that the
complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention,
the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The
Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been
established.
5. Action of 1991
The
Government submitted that, as a result of the Constitutional Court's
judgment of 15 March 2005, the applicant could no longer be
considered a “victim” in the Convention sense of a
violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time in
this action. They pointed out that the applicant had obtained an
express acknowledgment of a violation of his right and, as concluded
by the Constitutional Court, in the circumstances there was no call
for an award of just satisfaction.
The
applicant contested that argument, submitted that no significant
delays were imputable to him and argued that the redress afforded to
him by the Constitutional Court could not be considered adequate or
sufficient.
The
Court reiterates that an applicant's status as a “victim”
within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention depends on whether
the domestic authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in
substance, the alleged infringement of the Convention and, if
necessary, provided appropriate redress in relation thereto. Only
when these conditions are satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the
protective mechanism of the Convention preclude examination of an
application (see, among many other authorities, Cocchiarella v.
Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § 71, ECHR 2006-...).
There
is a strong but rebuttable presumption that excessively long
proceedings will occasion non-pecuniary damage. However, in some
cases, the non-pecuniary damage may be only minimal or none at all
(see Nardone v. Italy, no. 34368/98, 25 November 2004). The
domestic courts will then have to justify their decision by giving
sufficient reasons (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no.
36813/97, § 204, ECHR 2006-...).
In
the present case, although the proceedings as such had already
commenced on 14 February 1991, the period to be taken into
consideration began only on 18 March 1992, when the Convention
entered into force in respect of Slovakia. Nevertheless, in assessing
the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account
must be taken of the state of proceedings at the time. It is to be
noted that the courts divided the examination of the particular
claims in the action of 1991 into two sets of proceedings (file nos.
7C 107/91 and 4C 1313/98) and that, pursuant to the judgment of 9
June 1999, a third set of proceedings was opened (see paragraph 48
above). Moreover, the proceedings were accompanied by proceedings for
enforcement of the judgment of 31 October 1996, which also enjoyed
the protection of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and should be
taken into account (see, for example, Hornsby v. Greece,
judgment of 19 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1997 II, p. 510, § 40, and also PreloZník v.
Slovakia, no. 54330/00, § 92, 12 December 2006).
The
Court finds that, in these circumstances, for the purposes of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention, these claims should be treated as a
single dispute. This dispute is still pending (see paragraph 53
above). The period under consideration has thus lasted more than
fifteen years and three months for three levels of jurisdiction.
On
15 March 2005 the Constitutional Court found that there had been a
violation of the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified
delay and ordered that the first-instance court proceed with the case
expeditiously. However, apart from those rulings, it granted the
applicant no just satisfaction. It considered that an award of just
satisfaction was not appropriate, given in particular the applicant's
contribution to the length of the proceedings. The Court cannot
subscribe to that conclusion, in view of the overall length of the
proceedings at that time and the following consideration.
The
Court observes that since the Constitutional Court's judgment the
action file no. 4C 1313/98 has remained pending before the
first-instance court. It is thus uncertain what preventive effect, if
any, the Constitutional Court's judgment had. In these circumstances,
the Court finds that the redress granted to the applicant by the
Constitutional Court, which was mainly of a declaratory nature,
cannot be considered sufficient to deprive the applicant of the
status of “victim” under the Convention. It follows that
the Government's objection must be dismissed.
The
Court considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that the
complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention,
the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The
Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been
established.
6. Action of 22 December 1995
The
Government objected that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic
remedies by bringing the complaint to the Constitutional Court in
respect of the proceedings as a whole under Article 127 of the
Constitution in accordance with the applicable requirements.
The
applicant disagreed.
The
Court observes, first of all, that, in his constitutional complaint
of 26 March 2004, the applicant challenged exclusively and
specifically the proceedings before the District Court, which
concerned solely his appeal on points of law. The applicant therefore
cannot be considered as having exhausted domestic remedies in respect
of the rest of the proceedings, in particular the basic proceedings
at first-instance, the proceedings before the court of appeal and
before the Supreme Court (see Šidlová v. Slovakia,
no. 50224/99, § 53, 26 September 2006, and Pavlík v.
Slovakia, no. 74827/01, § 100, 30 January 2007).
To the extent that the remainder of the complaint has been
substantiated, the Court finds no appearance of a violation of the
applicant's right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a
hearing within a reasonable time.
It
follows that, in so far as domestic remedies have been exhausted,
this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in
accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
7. Actions of 2001 and 1999
The
Government objected that, in view of the Constitutional Court's
judgments of 14 April 2005 (see paragraphs 70 and 81 above), the
applicant could no longer be considered a “victim”
in the Convention sense of a violation of his right to a hearing
within a reasonable time in these two actions.
The
applicant contested that argument, submitting that, in respect of
both of these actions, the redress afforded to him by the
Constitutional Court was not sufficient.
The
Court observes that the proceedings in the 2001 action commenced on 5
March 2001 and ended on 16 September 2004. They thus lasted about
four years and one month for two levels of jurisdiction.
The
proceedings in the 1999 action commenced on 3 February 1999 and ended
on 2 September 2004. They thus lasted about five years and seven
months for three levels of jurisdiction.
On
14 April 2005 the Constitutional Court found that there had been a
violation of the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified
delay in both actions, and granted the applicant reimbursement of his
legal costs. As for the former proceedings, it awarded him the
equivalent of approximately 575 euros (EUR)
in just satisfaction. As for the latter proceedings, it found
that there was no call for an award of just satisfaction.
In
the light of all the material submitted to it, the Court does not
find this redress manifestly inadequate or insufficient, having
regard to Article 41 of the Convention and the criteria cited above
(compare Šedý v. Slovakia, no. 72237/01,
§§ 74 and 75, 19 December 2006).
The
Court therefore concludes that, even assuming that the length of
these two sets of proceedings would otherwise raise an issue under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant can no longer
claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article
34 of the Convention of the alleged violation of his right to a
hearing within a reasonable time.
It
follows that the complaint of the length of the proceedings in the
2001 action and in the 1999 action is manifestly ill-founded and must
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
B. Merits
The
Court is now called upon to determine whether the length of the
proceedings in the appeal on points of law of 1996 and in the action
of 1991 complied with the “reasonable time” requirement
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to those in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, despite the applicant's
contribution to the length of the proceedings in question, the Court
considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings in
the 1996 appeal on points of law and in the 1991 action was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time”
requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that, as a result of the length of the
proceedings in the 1991 action, he had been prevented from enjoying
his possessions peacefully, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, which provides that:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to raise the
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint before the Constitutional Court
under Article 127 of the Constitution, and had therefore failed to
exhaust domestic remedies as required under Article 35 § 1 of
the Convention. They further submitted that, in any event, the
complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
The
applicant disagreed and pointed out that, contrary to the
Government's suggestion, he had raised the Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 complaint in the supplement to his constitutional complaint.
The
Court observes that on 10 October 2004 the applicant extended his
constitutional complaint of 7 July 2004 by also claiming that the
protracted length of the proceedings had constituted a violation of
his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and that this complaint
had been found manifestly ill-founded by the Constitutional Court on
15 December 2004. It follows that the complaint cannot be rejected
for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
The
Court considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that the
complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention,
the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The
Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been
established.
B. Merits
Having
regard to the finding of a violation of the applicant's right to a
hearing within a reasonable time in the proceedings in the 1991
action (see paragraph 133 above), the Court finds that it is not
necessary to examine separately the merits of the complaint of
the violation of the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 as a consequence of the excessive length of those proceedings
(see, for example, Zanghì v. Italy, judgment of 19
February 1991, Series A no. 194-C, p. 47, § 23; Versini
v. France, no. 40096/98, § 35, 10 July 2001; and Šidlová,
cited above, § 88).
III. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION, IN CONJUNCTION WITH
ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that he had had no effective remedy at
his disposal in respect of his complaint about the excessive length
of his proceedings. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which
provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
1. Actions of 1993, 14 December 1995, 23 May 1997,
1998, 1 October 1997, 1991 22 December 1995, 2001, 1996, 1999 and the
enforcement of the inheritance decree of 7 February 2001
The
Government pointed out that since 1 January 2002 there had been the
remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution (see Andrášik
and Others, cited above), which had been available to the
applicant in respect of the proceedings that had been pending at that
time.
The
applicant contested that contention, reiterating substantially the
same objections as mentioned above (see paragraph 85 above).
The
Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the
availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the
substance of the Convention rights and freedoms. Its effect is to
require the provision of a domestic remedy capable of dealing with
the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the
Convention and of granting appropriate relief (see, amongst other
authorities, Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 25 September 1996,
Reports 1996-VI, p. 2286, § 95).
As
to the actions of 1993, 14 December 1995, 23 May 1997, 1998, 1
October 1997, 1991, 22 December 1995, 2001, 1996, 1999 and the
enforcement of the inheritance decree of 7 February 2001, which were
all pending on and after 1 January 2002, the applicant could and, in
fact in some cases did, raise his length of proceedings complaint
under Article 127 of the Constitution.
The
Court reiterates further that the word “remedy” within
the meaning of Article 13 does not mean a remedy which is bound to
succeed, but simply an accessible remedy before an authority
competent to examine the merits of a complaint (see, mutatis
mutandis, Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, no. 44599/98, §
56, ECHR 2001-I).
In
the light of the above the Court finds that in respect of the above
proceedings the applicant did have at his disposal a remedy
compatible with the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention.
It
follows that the relevant part of the applicant is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. Inheritance proceedings
The
Government considered that there was no issue under Article 13
of the Convention in connection with these proceedings.
The
applicant disagreed and upheld his complaint.
The
Court has found that the applicant's complaint of the length of the
inheritance proceedings was inadmissible (see paragraph 109 above).
For similar reasons, the applicant did not have an “arguable
claim” and Article 13 of the Convention is therefore
inapplicable to it.
It
follows that that the Article 13 complaint in respect of the length
of the inheritance proceedings is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
3. Appeal on points of law of 1996
The
Government considered that there was no issue under Article 13 of the
Convention in connection with the inheritance proceedings.
The
applicant disagreed and upheld his complaint.
The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one concerning the
length of the proceedings in the appeal on points of law, which was
examined above, and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy
before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement
under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see
Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR
2000-XI). It has previously found that there were no legal remedies
in Slovakia at the relevant time capable of effectively redressing
alleged violations of the right to a hearing within a reasonable
time (see, for example, PreloZník v. Slovakia,
no. 54330/00, § 116, 12 December 2006) and sees no
reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Accordingly,
the Court considers that in respect of the proceedings on the
applicant's appeal on points of law of 1996 there has been a
violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of a
remedy under domestic law whereby the applicant could have obtained a
ruling upholding his right to have his case heard within a reasonable
time, as set forth in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION, IN CONJUNCTION WITH
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1
Lastly,
relying on Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained
that he had had no effective remedy at his disposal in respect of his
complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerning his inability
to enjoy his possessions peacefully on account of the length of
the proceedings in the 1991 action.
Referring
to their contention that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 was in any event manifestly ill-founded (see paragraph 135
above), the Government submitted that there was no “arguable
claim” to attract the protection of Article 13 of the
Convention.
The
applicant disagreed and insisted on his complaint.
The
Court observes that, in so far as the applicant had an “arguable
claim” under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, he was free to claim
compensation in respect of any non-pecuniary damage by way of
a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution and in respect
of pecuniary damage by way of an action under section 18 (1) of the
State Liability Act of 1969 (see Csepyová, cited above,
and Šebeková and Horvatovičová v.
Slovakia, no. 73233/01, § 52, 14 February 2006). The
Court finds that these remedies, taken together, provide the
applicant with legal protection compatible with Article 13 of the
Convention.
It
follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed approximately SKK 350,000
plus any further amount that the Court would consider appropriate in
respect of pecuniary damage. He also claimed EUR 1 for the
proceedings in the 1998 action and SKK 150,000
for each of the remaining proceedings in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The
Government contested these claims.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it considers that the applicant must have sustained
non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis and having regard
to all the circumstances including the applicant's contribution to
the length of the proceedings, it awards him EUR 8,000 under that
head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed SKK 9,904
and a further amount which was not specified in detail for postage
and various administrative and legal costs.
The
Government invited the Court to determine the amount of the award in
accordance with its case-law and the “subject value”.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the applicant, who was not represented before the
Court by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 280 to cover costs under all heads.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares admissible (i) the complaint under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
concerning the excessive length of the proceedings in the 1996 appeal
on points of law and in the 1991 action, (ii) the complaint under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and (iii) the complaint under Article 13
of the Convention of the lack of an effective remedy in respect of
the excessive length of the proceedings in the 1996 appeal on points
of law;
Declares inadmissible the remainder of the
application;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the
proceedings in the 1996 appeal on points of law and in the 1991
action;
4. Holds
that in respect of the proceedings in the 1996 appeal on points of
law there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention
on account of the lack of a remedy under domestic law whereby the
applicant could have obtained a ruling upholding his right to have
his case heard within a reasonable time, as set forth in Article 6 §
1 of the Convention;
5. Holds
that it is not necessary to examine separately the merits of the
complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
6. Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 8,000
(eight thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 280
(two hundred and eighty euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to
be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may
be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
7. Dismisses
the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 October 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza
Deputy Registrar President