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SERDYUK v. UKRAINE - 15002/02 [2007] ECHR 732 (20 September 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/732.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 732
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF SERDYUK v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 15002/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20
September 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention.
In the case of Serdyuk v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mr K.
Jungwiert,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs M.
Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mrs R.
Jaeger,
Mr M. Villiger, judges,
and Mrs C.
Westerdiek, Section Registrar.
Having
deliberated in private on 28 August 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 15002/02) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Ukrainian national, Mr Viktor Viktorovich Serdyuk (“the
applicant”), on 7 December 2001.
The applicant is represented by Mrs L. Serdyuk,
his mother. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by Mr Y. Zaytsev, their Agent, and
Mrs I. Shevchuk, Head of the Office of the Government Agent
before the European Court of Human Rights.
On
29 September 2005 the
Court decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of
the proceedings to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of
the Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of
the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Dzhankoy, Ukraine.
On
24 July 1997, when the applicant, a minor at the time, was playing in
the yard near home and climbed the concrete wall surrounding the
Dzhankoy State Boarding School (the “School”; Джанкойська
республіканська
загальноосвітня
школа-інтернат),
a concrete slab from the wall, weighing 1,500 kg, fell on him. The
applicant survived, but became permanently and severely disabled.
A. Criminal proceedings concerning the applicant's
injury
According
to the applicant, between 1997 and 1999 his parents lodged numerous
unsuccessful requests for investigation into the accident, however,
he did not submit any relevant documents predating 7 June 1999.
On
7 June 1999 the Dzhankoy Prosecutors' Office refused to initiate
criminal proceedings into the accident, which decision was
subsequently quashed by the Dzhankoy Court (Джанкойський
міський суд).
Between June 1999 and May 2001 the criminal
proceedings were terminated and resumed on several occasions. The
last decision terminating the proceedings was given by the
Prosecutors' Office on 15 May 2001. The applicant did not challenge
this decision before the domestic courts.
According
to an expert assessment ordered in the course of the investigation,
the wall had been designed in breach of relevant technical standards,
which fact, augmented by lack of regular renovations, caused the fall
of the slab. The investigation further established that the wall had
been built in 1980s without a planning permission or other relevant
documents and that the School's staff performed some ad hoc
renovation works on it. However, the investigation was terminated on
the ground that it was not possible to establish either the
constructor or the owner of the wall, since the wall did not feature
in either the School's or the city records. These records listed,
instead, a non-existent fence of wood and wire-net belonging to the
School. Furthermore, a criminal investigation against the constructor
would have been time-barred.
B. Civil proceedings for compensation of damage
In
October 2000 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the
Zhankoy Court against the School and the Ministry of Education of the
Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, seeking compensation for damages
caused by his injury.
On
25 January 2001 the Court suspended the proceedings at the
request of one of the parties in view of the re-opening of the
criminal proceedings. In May 2001, after the criminal proceedings
were terminated, the court resumed the hearings.
Between
December 2000 and November 2001 the court scheduled some eleven
hearings, three of them being adjourned on account of the absence of
a School representative, and one in view of the judge's sickness.
On
20 November 2001 the Dzhankoy Court rejected the applicant's claims
as being unsubstantiated. In particular, it confirmed that the wall
surrounding the School did not belong to it and therefore the
defendants bore no liability for its maintenance.
On
13 February 2002 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of
the Crimea (the “Court of Appeal”; Апеляційний
суд Автономної
Республіки
Крим) quashed
this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the
first instance court. The court ordered to take additional measures
for establishing the parties responsible for the construction and
maintenance of the wall.
Between
June and December 2002 the City Court scheduled some six
hearings, two of them being adjourned on account of the defendant's
absence, and one – on account of absence of an expert.
On
12 December 2002 the City Court rejected the applicant's complaints,
having noted that all its efforts to establish a party responsible
for the construction or maintenance had been to no avail.
On
26 March 2003 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 12 December
2002 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration on essentially
the same grounds as before.
Between
June and October 2003 the court scheduled four hearings, all
adjourned on account of the defendants' conduct (absences and
requests for adjournments).
On
22 October 2003 the City Court allowed the School's request for leave
to appeal in cassation out of time against the ruling of
26 March 2003, having found that the School had not been
duly informed of this ruling.
On
6 June 2005 the Supreme Court rejected the School's cassation appeal.
Since
then the proceedings have been pending before the first instance
court.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION CONCERNING THE LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in his case
had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
In
his complaint, the applicant referred to the proceedings in their
entirety, including their criminal and civil limb.
The
Government presented no specific comments as to the period to be
taken into account. However, in their observations they commented on
the conduct of the applicant and that of the authorities taking the
date of the accident as the starting date.
The
Court recalls that the right to institute criminal proceedings and to
secure the conviction of a third party is not a right which is
included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention
(see, e.g., Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99,
§ 70, ECHR 2004 I). Article 6 § 1
may, nevertheless, apply to those proceedings, where the civil limb
remains so closely linked to the criminal limb, that the outcome of
the criminal proceedings may be decisive for the civil claims (see
e.g. Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, no. 32967/96, § 62,
17 January 2002).
Turning
to the facts of the present case, the Court agrees that there was a
certain nexus between the criminal investigation into the accident
and the applicant's claim for damage. Particularly, both proceedings
concerned the same facts and at one point of time the civil
proceedings were suspended on account of the criminal proceedings
being pending.
At
the same time the Court recalls that the applicant's injury had not
been inflicted intentionally and the accident at issue did not
necessarily qualify as a criminal offence. There is no evidence that
a criminal investigation into the events was necessary to enable the
applicant to lodge a civil complaint or, for that matter, that he
attempted to lodge a claim for damage within the framework of the
criminal investigation (see, a contrario, Baglay v.
Ukraine, no. 22431/02, §§ 9 and 27,
8 November 2005). Moreover, the applicant failed to
challenge the termination of the criminal proceedings on 15 May 2001
and deliberately chose instead to pursue his civil action lodged in
October 2000.
In
view of the above, the Court finds that the period to be taken into
consideration began only in October 2000, when the applicant
lodged his civil claim. The period in question has not yet ended. It
has thus lasted six years and eleven months. During this period the
case was examined in three levels of jurisdiction, due to the
remittal of the case, seven instances were involved.
2. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Government argued that the length of the proceedings in the present
case can largely be attributed to the complexity of the case and to
the conduct of the parties (notably, requests for adjournments
and appeals). They submitted that there were no significant periods
of inactivity attributable to the judicial authorities, except for a
nineteen-month protraction in consideration of the School's appeal in
cassation (see paragraphs 18-19 above).
The
applicant disagreed.
The
Court recalls that the proceedings concerned compensation for the
applicant's permanent disability and finds that what was at stake for
the applicant called for an expeditious decision on his claims (see
e.g., Litvinyuk v. Ukraine, no. 9724/03, § 47,
1 February 2007).
The
Court further notes that the case originated in the events dating
back to 1980s and accepts that it was of certain complexity. However,
this complexity appears to have been largely generated by the lack of
any municipal or other public records concerning ownership of a wall
surrounding a State-owned educational facility (see paragraph 8
above). The Court finds that since the State entities were in any way
responsible for the keeping of the records, by their prolonged
failure to clarify the situation, the domestic authorities largely
contributed to the protractions in the proceedings. The Court
further considers that the State authorities were responsible
for deficient communication of the decision of 26 March 2003
to the School, several adjournments of the hearings attributable to
the defendants (the State entities) and for the nineteen-month delay
in consideration of the School's cassation appeal, which was
mentioned by the Government.
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
in the instant case the length of the proceedings has been excessive
and fails to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained under Article 2 of the Convention about
ineffective investigation into the accident and insufficient funding
of his medical, educational, rehabilitation, and other needs and
under Article 13 of the Convention about lack of the effective
remedies in this regard. Lastly he complained under Article 6 § 1
of the Convention about the unfairness of the civil proceedings.
Having
carefully examined the applicant's submissions in the light of all
the material in its possession, and insofar as the matters complained
of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not
disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set
out in the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article
35 §§1, 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed various health-related and caretaking expenses as
well as compensation for the loss of potential earnings by way of
compensation for pecuniary damage. He also claimed 1,000,000 hryvnyas
(EUR 169,788) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested these claims.
The
Court recalls that the matter before it is the excessive length of
civil proceedings and does not discern any causal link between the
violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore
rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers that the
applicant must have suffered non pecuniary damage and awards him
EUR 2,800 in this respect.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant claimed UAH 683 (EUR 116) in legal fees and
postal expenses. He presented copies of receipts for the amount
claimed.
The
Government did not comment on this claim.
The
Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the amount
claimed.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,916
(two thousand nine hundred sixteen euros) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage and costs and expenses to be
converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 September 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President