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DYULDIN AND KISLOV v. RUSSIA - 25968/02 [2007] ECHR 685 (31 July 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/685.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 685,
(2009) 48 EHRR 6
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF DYULDIN AND KISLOV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 25968/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
31
July 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Dyuldin and Kislov v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr S.E. Jebens,
Mr G.
Malinverni, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 10 July 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 25968/02) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by two Russian nationals, Mr Viktor
Gavrilovich Dyuldin and Mr Aleksandr Ivanovich Kislov (“the
applicants”), on 30 October 2001.
The
applicants were represented before the Court by Mrs F. Baisheva. The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr P. Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation at
the European Court of Human Rights.
The
applicants alleged, in particular, a violation of their right to
freedom of expression.
By
a decision of 13 May 2004 the Court declared the application partly
admissible.
The
applicants and the Government filed observations on the merits (Rule
59 § 1).
On
3 March 2005 the President of the Chamber granted the Lawyers for
Constitutional Rights and Freedoms (JURIX) and the Glasnost Defence
Foundation leave to intervene as a third party (Rule 44 § 2). On
1 April 2005 the third party submitted their written comments. On 14
May 2005 the Government submitted their observations on the
third-party comments.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicants were born in 1944 and 1948, and live in
Penza. At the material time the first applicant
was a trade-union leader, the second applicant a journalist. They
also co-chaired the Penza Regional Voters' Association “Civic
Unity” (Grazhdanskoye yedinstvo).
A. Adoption and publication of the open letter to
President Putin
On
15 August 2000 the Co-ordination Council of the Penza
Regional Voters' Association Civic Unity adopted at its
meeting the draft text of an open letter, entitled “Media
coverage of the reforms of President Putin in the Penza Region”
(“Informatsionnoye obespecheniy reform
Prezidenta V.V. Putina v Penzenskoy oblasti”).
On 16 August 2000 the text was discussed at a round
table attended by the applicants, the editors-in-chief of local
newspapers and journalists. The draft was amended and elaborated. The
discussion concluded with the adoption of the open letter by the
Co-ordination Council of Civic Unity and managers of the independent
media in the Penza Region to the President of the Russian Federation,
the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Journalists'
Union of Russia, the plenipotentiary representative of the President
for the Volga Federal District, and the Minister for Press and
Information of the Russian Federation. The open letter was signed by
the applicants and four editors-in-chief.
On
24 August 2000 the Novaya birzhevaya gazeta
newspaper published the open letter on its front page. The relevant
extracts of the letter, translated from Russian, read as follows:
“We (authors of the open letter) subscribe to
various political views but are unanimous in our support of the
President's drive to curb corruption in the country, bring order to
the economy, and assert the rule of law and democratic standards in
all sectors of society. We have gathered at the round table because
of our common concern for the fate of the President's reforms in the
Penza Region. The Penza Region is gradually transforming into a
private holding controlled by Governor V. Bochkaryov and his
close circle ... [emphasis added, see below]
Today we (the independent media) embarrass the regional
authorities because we openly disagree with the selfish and
destructive policy of the governor and his team, we
publish materials denouncing bribe-takers and officials who abuse
their position ...
Once again, as in early 1991 when the [Communist]
Party's nomenclature feared their imminent dismissal, the regional
authorities have started reprisals against the independent media.
Journalists are subjected to threats and beatings, our publications
are prohibited from being printed and distributed in the region ...
On the other side – the independent media, whose
attempts to stand for the rule of law, human rights, to talk
about bringing order to the economy and to expose corruption are
routinely suppressed by the governor and his acolytes ...”
The
remainder of the open letter harshly criticised the Governor of the
Penza Region personally and contained allegations of serious
wrongdoings.
B. Civil defamation action against the applicants
On
3 February 2001 twelve members of the Penza Regional Government
lodged a civil action with the Leninskiy District Court of Penza for
the protection of their honour, dignity and professional reputation
and for compensation for non-pecuniary damage allegedly sustained as
a result of the publication of the open letter. They named the
applicants and other signatories to the letter, as well as the
newspaper that published it, as co-defendants.
On
3 March 2001 the original plaintiffs were joined by fourteen other
members of the Penza Regional Government with identical claims.
On
30 March 2001 one of the original plaintiffs, Mr D., withdrew his
claim. Speaking to the Novaya birzhevaya gazeta
newspaper, he described the proceedings as “an attempt to bring
the media under control”. In April 2001 Mr D. was dismissed
from his position in the Government.
The
applicants brought a counterclaim against the plaintiffs, alleging
that they had violated civil-service law in that they had used their
official position to discredit and adversely affect the functioning
of the Civic Unity association. The applicants claimed compensation
for non-pecuniary damage allegedly caused by a violation of their
rights and freedoms, in particular, the right to freedom of opinion
guaranteed by the Constitution.
On 15 May 2001 the Leninskiy District Court of Penza
gave judgment. It carried out at the outset a detailed analysis of
federal and regional laws on the structure of the Penza Regional
Government and reached the following conclusion on the plaintiffs'
standing in the defamation suit:
“... any State official in the Penza Region wields
a certain power and authority that is essential to the performance of
his functional duties; hence, he falls into the category of 'regional
authority'. Considering that the 'regional authority' is made up of
individuals, that is, State officials, the term 'regional authority'
applies to each plaintiff who is, by virtue of his position, a State
official in the Penza Region.
The words 'the close circle of Governor Bochkaryov',
'the governor's acolytes', and 'the governor's team' used in the
impugned publication are – in the court's opinion, and despite
the defendants' and their representatives' assertions to the contrary
– applicable to all State officials [working in] the executive
body of the Penza Regional Government and, therefore, to the
plaintiffs.”
The District Court then examined the truthfulness of
the applicants' statements referring to the “destructive”
policy of the governor's team. It found that the applicants had not
used any “scientific methodology for a comprehensive assessment
of the social and economic development of the region” for the
preparation of the open letter and that their evaluation had been
entirely based on their personal views. The court rejected the
statement by Mr D. on the economic decline in the Penza Region in
2001 because he had been dismissed from the Government and therefore,
in the court's opinion, he was on the defendants' side. The court
concluded that the statements referring to the “selfish and
destructive policy” were untrue.
Likewise,
the District Court found no evidence to support the statements
referring to the persecution of journalists in the Penza Region. It
pointed out that one of the signatories, the editor-in-chief of a
local newspaper, could not prove that an attack on one of his
journalists had been politically motivated. In the court's opinion,
the fact that certain members of the Government had put pressure on
local officials to subscribe to the newspapers controlled by the
governor to the detriment of all others was lawful and could not be
interpreted as “prohibition on distribution”.
The
District Court held that the extracts of the open letter bold-faced
in the text above were not true and damaged the honour and dignity of
the plaintiffs as the members of the Penza Regional Government. It
ordered that all the plaintiffs be jointly compensated for
non-pecuniary damage: the defendant newspaper was to pay 50,000
Russian roubles (RUR) and each of the applicants and four of their
co-defendants was to pay RUR 2,500. The court also ordered the
defendant newspaper to publish a rectification.
The
District Court dismissed the applicants' counterclaim on the ground
that the plaintiffs had exercised their right to a court and,
therefore, had not violated any of the applicants' rights.
On
24 July 2001 the Penza Regional Court examined an appeal by the
applicants and upheld the judgment of 15 May 2001.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Constitution of the Russian Federation
Article
29 guarantees freedom of thought and expression, together with
freedom of the mass media.
B. Civil Code of the Russian Federation
Article 152 provides that an individual may apply to a
court with a request for the rectification of statements (svedeniya)
that are damaging to his or her honour, dignity or professional
reputation if the person who disseminated such statements does not
prove their truthfulness. The aggrieved person may also claim
compensation for losses and non-pecuniary damage sustained as a
result of the dissemination of such statements.
C. Resolution of the Plenary Supreme Court of the
Russian Federation, no. 11 of 18 August 1992 (amended on 25
April 1995)
The Resolution (in force at the material time)
provided that, in order to be considered damaging, statements had to
be untrue and contain allegations of a breach of laws or moral
principles (commission of a dishonest act, improper behaviour at the
workplace or in everyday life, etc.). Dissemination of statements was
understood as the publication of statements or their broadcasting
(section 2). The burden of proof was on the defendant to show that
the disseminated statements had been true and accurate (section 7).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicants complained under Article 10 of the Convention of a
violation of their right to impart information. Article 10 provides
as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ...”
A. Submissions by the parties
1. The applicants
The
applicants submitted that the open letter had not disseminated any
untrue information. The main point of the letter was to allege that
coverage of reforms in the region by the State television channels
controlled by the regional government was biased. The authors of the
letter were concerned about the curtailing of the freedom of the
press by the regional governor and his team. The letter did not
contain allegations of unlawful actions or criminal offences.
The
applicants asserted that they had had no intention to disseminate
untrue information, as they firmly believed in the accuracy of their
statements, which were founded on data collected by the independent
trade union “Sotsprof” in Penza and a human-rights
organisation working in the region. The purpose of their open letter
to the President and senior State officials was to have a
comprehensive investigation opened into the alleged wrongdoings in
the Penza Region.
The
applicants pointed out that the defamation claim had not been lodged
by the Penza Regional Government, the Penza Legislative Assembly and
the Penza Regional Court as collective entities but rather by a group
of individuals. However, the publication did not identify any State
official by name or by other characteristics. The applicants
maintained that these twenty-five members of the regional government
had had no standing to sue in defamation. Rather, they should have
exercised their right to reply provided for in the Russian Mass Media
Act.
2. The Government
The
Government submitted that the interference with the applicants' right
to impart information had been prescribed by law and pursued the
legitimate aim of the protection of the reputation and rights of
others.
The
Government claimed that the applicants had neglected their duties and
responsibilities, which consisted of providing accurate and reliable
information on matters of public interest. In their view, in the
present case there had been a “pressing social need” to
protect the reputation of the State officials of the Penza Region
because the applicants had disseminated information alleging that
they had committed criminal offences. The interference had been
proportionate to the legitimate aim because the courts had clearly
identified defamatory statements and granted the claim in part. The
Government concluded that the necessity of the interference had been
“obvious” and that the applicants' complaint was
manifestly ill-founded.
Commenting
on the submissions by the third party (see below), the Government
pointed out that these submissions were of a general nature and did
not take into account the particular circumstances of the case.
3. The third party
The
third party submitted that the restrictions listed in paragraph 2 of
Article 10 should not be interpreted as conferring standing to
sue in defamation on individual public officials who had not been
specifically identified, who would then act as surrogates or alter
egos for the State. The common law in the United States has long
protected journalists against claims for defamation brought by
unnamed members of a group based upon criticism voiced about the
group under the “group libel” doctrine (Abramson v.
Pataki, 278 F.3d 93 – no libel claim for unnamed union
members based on statement accusing certain employees of criminal
behaviour; Anyanwu v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 887 F. Supp
690 – no libel claim for a Nigerian doing business in the USA
based on defamatory reference to all Nigerians doing business in the
USA). The doctrine holds that an allegedly false statement about a
group is not “of and concerning” any individual member of
the group (Restatement [Second] of Torts, § 564A). Not
only individual members but even elected leaders of an organisation
are barred by the “group libel” doctrine from asserting
individual defamation claims based on statements critical of the
group (McMillen v. Arthritis Foundation, 432 F. Supp. 430;
Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika v. American
Broad. Cos., 609 F. Supp. 104).
The
third party further pointed out that in Britain, the House of Lords
had warned of the “chilling effect” of defamation on free
speech if public bodies could sue their critics (in the case of
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspaper [1993] AC 534). The Law Lords considered that elected bodies should not be
entitled to sue in defamation because any reputation they might have
would belong to the public as a whole, which on balance benefits from
uninhibited criticism. Allowing public bodies to sue was therefore an
inappropriate use of taxpayers' money, one which may well be open to
abuse by governments intolerant of criticism (Die Spoorbond and
Anor. v. South African Railways [1946] AD 999).
The
third party finally insisted that in each case involving a conflict
between freedom of expression and other individual or collective
interests, the court must weigh both interests and explain the
grounds for its conclusion as to which interest prevails over the
other. When politicians deployed defamation actions against the media
allegedly to protect their honour, dignity and reputation, a more
realistic view held that their real purpose was to stifle criticism.
What suffered was the free flow of information that was vital to
vigorous political discourse.
B. The Court's assessment
It
is common ground between the parties that the judgments pronounced in
the defamation action constituted an interference with the
applicants' right to
freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of
the Convention.
It
is not contested that the interference was “prescribed by law”,
namely Article 152 of the Civil Code, and pursued a legitimate aim,
that of protecting the reputation or rights of others, for the
purposes of Article 10 § 2. The dispute in the case relates
to whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic
society”.
The
Court reiterates that freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic
conditions for its progress. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it
is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas”
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a
matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or
disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness, without which there is no “democratic society”
(see Handyside v. the United Kingdom, judgment of
7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 23, § 49,
and Jersild v. Denmark, judgment of 23 September
1994, Series A no. 298, p. 26, § 37).
The
press fulfils an essential function in a democratic society. Although
it must not overstep certain bounds, particularly as regards the
reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart –
in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities –
information and ideas on all matters of public interest (see De
Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, judgment of 24 February
1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 I, pp.
233-34, § 37, and Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway
[GC], no. 21980/93, § 59, ECHR 1999 III). Freedom
of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering
and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of their political
leaders. In particular, it gives politicians the opportunity to
reflect and comment on the preoccupations of public opinion; it thus
enables everyone to participate in the free political debate which is
at the very core of the concept of a democratic society (see Castells
v. Spain, judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236, p. 23,
§ 43 in fine).
The
Court's task in this case has to be seen in the light of these
principles. It has to satisfy itself that the Russian authorities did
apply standards which were in conformity with these principles and,
moreover, that in doing so they based themselves on an acceptable
assessment of the relevant facts (see Oberschlick v. Austria (no.
1), judgment of 23 May 1991, Series A no. 204, p. 26, § 60).
The
Court observes that the publication at issue represented a collective
open letter to the highest officials of the Russian State. Its text
had been finalised and approved in a public discussion organised by a
regional non-governmental organisation. Signatories to the letter
included several editors-in-chief and a trade-union leader (the first
applicant) acting in their professional capacity (see paragraph 9
above). They admitted having different political leanings, but the
letter reflected their common position: they were unanimous in the
expression of their apprehension that the regional powers were
hindering the implementation of the President's policy to assert the
rule of law and curb corruption. They felt that the media were being
repressed by the regional authorities that sought to deter them from
publishing material exposing corrupt practices among State officials.
The
Court notes that the open letter concerned the possibility of
conducting an open and unhindered public discussion on the issues
that inconvenienced the regional authorities, that is, the
possibility for the regional press to play the role essential for
ensuring the proper functioning of a political democracy (see Sürek
and Özdemir v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94,
§ 58, 8 July 1999). The publication thus focused on the
very substance of the freedom of the press and the issues raised
therein were undeniably part of a political debate on a matter of
general and public concern. The Court reiterates in this connection
that it has been its constant approach to require very strong reasons
for justifying restrictions on political speech, as broad
restrictions imposed in individual cases would undoubtedly affect
respect for the freedom of expression in general in the State
concerned (see Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, § 83,
ECHR 2001 VIII, and Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1)
[GC], no. 26682/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-IV).
The
Court further notes that the plaintiffs in the defamation claim were
individual State officials, members of the Penza Regional Government.
Not one of them was mentioned by name or otherwise identified in the
letter. In fact, the only person who was expressly identified in the
document was the regional governor. Although a significant part of
the letter was devoted to exposing his alleged wrongdoings, he was
nevertheless not among the plaintiffs, who were collectively
described as his “close circle”, “team”,
“acolytes” or simply as “the regional authorities”.
The
domestic courts accepted that the plaintiffs had been affected by the
publication and could therefore sue in defamation because the terms
“regional authorities”, “team” etc. had been
broad enough to cover any State official who worked in the executive
branch of the Penza Regional Government, as the plaintiffs did (see
paragraph 16 above). The Court is not convinced that in reaching this
finding the domestic courts applied standards which were in
conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 (see, for
example, Grinberg v. Russia, no. 23472/03, § 27,
21 July 2005). It reiterates that a fundamental requirement of
the law of defamation is that in order to give rise to a cause of
action the defamatory statement must refer to a particular person. If
all State officials were allowed to sue in defamation in connection
with any statement critical of administration of State affairs, even
in situations where the official was not referred to by name or in an
otherwise identifiable manner, journalists would be inundated with
lawsuits. Not only would that result in an excessive and
disproportionate burden being placed on the media, straining their
resources and involving them in endless litigation, it would also
inevitably have a chilling effect on the press in the performance of
its task of purveyor of information and public watchdog (see, mutatis
mutandis, Radio Twist, A.S. v. Slovakia,
no. 62202/00, § 53, ECHR 2006 ...).
The
Court considers that, for an interference with the right to freedom
of expression to be proportionate to the legitimate aim of the
protection of the reputation of others, the existence of an objective
link between the impugned statement and the person suing in
defamation is a requisite element. Mere personal conjecture or
subjective perception of a publication as defamatory does not suffice
to establish that the person was directly affected by the
publication. There must be something in the circumstances of a
particular case to make the ordinary reader feel that the statement
reflected directly on the individual claimant or that he was targeted
by the criticism. Thus, in a freedom-of-expression case against
Luxembourg, the Court noted the size of the country as a special
feature to be taken into account, before accepting that the claimants
in the defamation action were easily identifiable to listeners even
though they had not been mentioned by name in the applicant's radio
programme (see Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97,
§ 56, ECHR 2001 III). In the present case, however,
the Court does not discern any elements which could have warranted
extending to all officials of a regional government the same
protection that was appropriately afforded to a small group of
employees of a named department in a particular ministry.
In
any event, the Court reiterates that the limits of permissible
criticism are wider with regard to a government than in relation to a
private citizen, or even a politician. In a democratic system the
actions or omissions of the government must be subject to the close
scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but
also of the press and public opinion. Furthermore, the dominant
position which the government occupies makes it necessary for it to
display restraint in resorting to libel proceedings, particularly
where other means are available for replying to the unjustified
attacks and criticisms of its adversaries or the media (see Incal
v. Turkey, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1998 IV, pp. 1567-68, § 54, and
Castells, cited above, pp. 23-24, § 46).
A
further aspect relevant to the Court's determination in the present
case is the distinction between statements of fact and value
judgments. It has been the Court's constant view that, while the
existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments
is not susceptible of proof. The requirement to prove the truth of a
value judgment is impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of
opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured by
Article 10 (see Lingens v. Austria, judgment of 8
July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 28, § 46, and
Oberschlick, cited above, pp. 27-28, § 63,).
In
the present case the Court observes that the domestic courts
considered all terms employed by the applicants in their publication
to be statements of fact without examining the question whether they
could be considered to be value judgments. Their failure to embark on
that analysis was accounted for by the state of the Russian law on
defamation at the material time. As the Court has already found, it
made no distinction between value judgments and statements of fact,
referring uniformly to “statements” (“svedeniya”),
and proceeded from the assumption that any such “statement”
was amenable to proof in civil proceedings (see Grinberg,
cited above, § 29; Zakharov v. Russia, no. 14881/03,
§ 29, 5 October 2006; and Karman v. Russia,
no. 29372/02, § 38, 14 December 2006, and the domestic
law cited in paragraphs 23 and 24 above).
The
Court considers that the expressions used in the letter should be
characterised as value judgments rather than statements of fact.
However, since under the Court's case-law a value judgment must be
based on sufficient facts in order to constitute a fair comment under
Article 10, the difference between a value judgment and a statement
of fact finally lies in the degree of factual proof which has to be
established (see Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft v.
Austria, no. 39394/98, § 40, ECHR 2003 XI).
The Court observes that the document at issue was the product of a
collective effort reflecting, as it did, the concerns about the
curtailing of the freedom of the press expressed by a representative
sample of regional editors-in-chief, journalists and human-rights
activists at a public round table. It was founded on their first-hand
knowledge of the situation and experience of working in the media.
The Court notes with concern that the domestic courts adopted an
unusually high standard of proof, finding that a description of the
governor's policy as “destructive” would only be true if
it was based on a scientifically sound comprehensive assessment of
the social and economic development of the region (see paragraph 17
above). It stresses that the degree of precision which ought to be
observed by a journalist when expressing his opinion on a matter of
public concern could hardly be compared with that for making economic
forecasts.
The
Court would in any event observe that the distinction between
statements of fact and value judgments is of less significance in a
case such as the present one, where the impugned statement was made
in the course of a lively political debate at local level and where
elected officials and journalists should enjoy a wide freedom to
criticise the actions of a local authority, even where the statements
made may lack a clear basis in fact (see Lombardo and Others v.
Malta, no. 7333/06, § 60, 24 April 2007).
In
conclusion, the Court finds that the Russian authorities overstepped
the margin of appreciation afforded to member States under the
Convention. Accordingly, the interference complained of was not
“necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of
Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
There
has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicants claimed RUR 600,000 (equivalent to 17,140 euros (EUR))
each in respect of compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government considered that the applicants' claim was excessive and
unreasonable.
The
Court considers that the applicants have suffered non-pecuniary
damage as a result of the domestic judgments which were incompatible
with the Convention principles. The damage cannot be sufficiently
compensated by the finding of a violation. The Court considers,
however, that the particular amount claimed by the applicants is
excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court
awards each applicant EUR 1,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable
on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicants claimed RUR 286.45 for postal expenses. The Government did
not comment.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses in so far as it has been shown that these have
been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to
quantum. Having regard to the material in its possession, the Court
is satisfied that the postal expenses had been actually incurred and
that the amount is not excessive. It awards each applicant EUR 5 in
respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable on
that amount.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
10 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay each applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
5 (five euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii) any
tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 31 July 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
