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JESINA v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC - 18806/02 [2007] ECHR 644 (26 July 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/644.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 644
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF JEŠINA v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC
(Application
no. 18806/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
26 July
2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Ješina v. the Czech Republic,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr V.
Butkevych,
Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr R.
Maruste,
Mr M. Villiger, judges,
and Mrs C.
Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 July 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 18806/02) against the Czech
Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Czech national, Mr Bohuslav Ješina
(“the applicant”), on 28 October 2001.
The
Czech Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr V.A. Schorm, Ministry of Justice.
The
applicant complained, in particular, about the decision of the
Constitutional Court of 14 May 2001 by which his constitutional
appeal had been dismissed for failure to exhaust statutory remedies
by appealing on points of law.
On
4 October 2005 the Court declared the application partly inadmissible
and decided to communicate the complaint concerning the aforesaid
decision of the Constitutional Court to the Government. Under the
provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Bruntál.
On
26 September 1996 a certain S. brought proceedings for damages
against the applicant in connection with a traffic accident which had
occurred on 5 March 1996.
On
21 October 1996 the Bruntál District Court (okresní
soud) granted his action and delivered a payment order
against the applicant who filed a protest (odpor) on
3 November 1996 alleging that S. was responsible for the
accident.
On
28 March 1997 the Ostrava Regional Court (krajský soud)
dismissed the applicant's challenge of the District Court's judge for
bias.
On
5 February 1998 the District Court appointed an expert in the price
and valuation of motor vehicles. On 27 March 1998 the expert drew up
his opinion.
In
the meantime, on 9 March 1998, S. had died.
On
30 December 1998 the applicant requested the District Court to
suspend the proceedings in order to bring the case to the
Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud), for a
preliminary ruling on the constitutionality of a certain
provision of the Code of Civil Procedure which was allegedly in
contradiction with certain provisions of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv
a svobod).
On
20 January 1999 the District Court dismissed his request. It further
allowed S.'s heirs' request to modify their action. On 30 April 1999
the Regional Court upheld this decision. On the same day, the court
dismissed the applicant's challenge of the District Court's judge for
bias.
On
17 August 1999 the District Court adjourned the proceedings pending
the outcome of inheritance proceedings.
On
2 September 1999 the court resumed the proceedings and ordered the
applicant to pay the damages claimed plus 16% default interest as of
1 November 1996. The court based its finding that the applicant
was responsible for the accident on the parties' statements, the
police file concerning the traffic accident and other documentary
evidence. The court did not grant the applicant's request to suspend
the proceedings pending the outcome of proceedings for damages which
he had brought against the police officers who had investigated the
accident.
On
11 October 1999 the applicant appealed against this judgment.
In
a letter of 3 September 2000 the applicant informed the Regional
Court that he could not take part in a hearing scheduled for
26 September 2000. He asked the court that his letter be
read out if the appellate proceedings continued.
On
26 September 2000 the Regional Court upheld the District Court's
judgment. It also dismissed an application by the applicant for leave
to appeal on points of law (dovolání) against
its decision.
On
27 February 2001 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal
(ústavní stíZnost) alleging, inter
alia, a violation of Articles 37 § 2 (the right to legal
assistance) and 37 § 3 (equality of the parties) and 38 § 2
(the right to a public hearing without delay and the right to comment
on submitted evidence) of the Charter.
On
14 May 2001 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant's appeal
inadmissible for failure to exhaust statutory remedies by appealing
on points of law. It referred to Article 239 § 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
relevant provisions of the national law and practice are described in
detail in Běleš and Others v. Czech Republic of
12 November 2002 (no. 47273/99, §§ 17-41,
ECHR 2002-IX), Zvolský and Zvolská v. Czech
Republic of 12 November 2002 (no. 46129/99, §§
18-36, ECHR 2002-IX) and Vodárenská akciová
společnost, S.A. v. Czech Republic of 24 February
2004 (no. 73577/01, § 21).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the Constitutional Court had declared his
appeal inadmissible for failure to exhaust statutory remedies in
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government left the matter to the Court's discretion.
The
Court reiterates that it is primarily for the national authorities,
notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic
legislation. Its role is limited to verifying whether the effects of
such interpretation are compatible with the Convention. This applies
in particular to the interpretation by courts of procedural rules
such as time-limits for filing documents or lodging appeals (Běleš
and Others v. the Czech Republic, cited above, § 60; mutatis
mutandis, Tejedor García v. Spain, judgment of 16
December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, §
31). The rules on the procedure and time-limits for appeals are
designed to ensure the proper administration of justice and, in
particular, legal certainty. Litigants should normally expect those
rules to be applied (Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain,
nos. 38366/97, 38688/97, 40777/98, 40843/98, 41015/98, 41400/98,
41446/98, 41484/98, 41787/98 and 41509/98, § 33, ECHR 2000-I).
Furthermore,
the “right to a court”, of which the right of access is
one aspect, is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted
by implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility
of an appeal are concerned, since by its very nature it calls for
regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of
appreciation in this regard (García Manibardo v. Spain,
no. 38695/97, § 36, ECHR 2000-II, and Běleš and
Others v. Czech Republic, cited above, § 61). Nonetheless,
the limitations applied must not restrict or reduce the individual's
access in such a way or to such an extent as to impair the very
essence of the right. Furthermore, limitations will only be
compatible with Article 6 § 1 if they pursue a legitimate
aim and there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between
the means employed and the aim pursued (Guérin v. France,
judgment of 29 July 1998, Reports 1998-V, § 37;
Běleš and Others cited above, § 62).
The
Court notes that the situation of the applicant is identical to that
of the applicants in the aforesaid case Běleš and
Others v. Czech Republic in which the Court found a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In Běleš
the Court made the following findings (see paragraphs 63 et 68):
“63. ... [T]he decision whether or not to grant
leave to appeal on points of law, within the meaning of Article 239 §
2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was within the sole discretion of
the Supreme Court, which had to decide whether the impugned decision
concerned a point of 'crucial legal importance'. In those
circumstances, neither the applicants nor their lawyer were in a
position to assess their prospects of obtaining leave from the
Supreme Court, particularly it had been refused by the appeal court.
In the event of leave to appeal on points of law being refused, there
was a risk that the applicants' constitutional appeal would be
dismissed as being out of time.
...
68. The Court also finds that the requirement
in sections 72(2) and 75(1) of the Constitutional Court Act for 'all
remedies' to be exercised, without any distinction being made between
ordinary and special remedies (apart from applications to reopen
proceedings), coupled with the unpredictability of applications for
leave to appeal on points of law as a result of the way Article 239 §
2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applied, undermines the very
essence of the right of recourse by imposing on appellants a
disproportionate burden that upsets the fair balance that has to be
struck between the legitimate concern to ensure that the formal
procedure for appealing to the Constitutional Court is complied with
and the right of access to that court. Since, under Czech law, an
appeal on points of law is a special remedy that is not automatically
available and for which leave at the discretion of the Supreme Court
is required, it cannot be regarded as an effective remedy that
required exhaustion in the instant case (see, mutatis mutandis,
Esposito v. Italy, no. 20855/92, Commission decision of
16 October 1996, unreported).”
Turning
to the instant case, the Court sees no reason to depart from its
conclusions reached in Běleš and Others case which
are entirely pertinent in the case of the present applicant.
The
Court notes with satisfaction that after the delivery of its
judgments in cases of Běleš and Others v. Czech
Republic (cited), and Zvolský and Zvolská
v. Czech Republic, the Czech Constitutional Court announced a
modification of its practice concerning the admissibility
requirements of constitutional appeals. However, this modification
could not have any impact on the situation of the applicant in the
present case.
In
these circumstances, the Court finds that the particularly
restrictive interpretation by the Constitutional Court of a
procedural rule deprived the applicant of his right of access to
court.
Consequently,
there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 12,424,000 Czech korunas (CZK), that is to say
441,319 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and CZK 1,000,000
(EUR 35,522) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contended that there was no causal link between the
conduct of the Constitutional Court which could be considered as
a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the
pecuniary damage the applicants claimed to have suffered.
Accordingly, that claim should be dismissed.
As
to the reparation sought by the applicant for non-pecuniary damage,
the Government considered that the finding of a violation would
afford sufficient just satisfaction.
The
Court considers that the basis for an award of just satisfaction in
the present case must be the denial of access of the applicant to a
court, which is part of the right to a fair trial, within the meaning
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It finds no causal link
between the pecuniary damage alleged by the applicant and its finding
of a violation of Article 6. Nor can it speculate on what the outcome
would have been if the Constitutional Court had declared the
applicant's appeal admissible and proceeded to hear it. Accordingly,
the Court makes no award under this head.
Having regard to the nature of the violation of
Article 6 § 1 found in the present case, the Court considers –
as it did in other similar cases (Běleš and Others
cited above, §§ 76 and 77, Vodárenská
akciová společnost, S.A. v. Czech Republic,
cited above, § 40, Šroub v. Czech Republic, no.
5424/03, § 29, Mařík v. Czech Republic, no.
73116/01, § 21, Soudek v. Czech Republic, no. 56526/00, §
26) - that the finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just
satisfaction in the circumstances.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant did not make any claim in respect of the
costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the
Court. Accordingly, the Court makes no award under this head.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that the finding of a violation
constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the
non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 July 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
