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KONDRASHINA v. RUSSIA - 69533/01 [2007] ECHR 630 (19 July 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/630.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 630
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
KONDRASHINA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 69533/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 July
2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kondrashina v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mrs M.
Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mr J. Borrego
Borrego,
Mr M. Villiger, judges,
and Mrs
Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 26 June 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 69533/01) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Nadezhda Korneyevna
Kondrashina (“the applicant”), on 3 March 2001. The
applicant died on 25 December 2005 and her husband, Mr Nikolay
Dmitrievich Kondrashin, has decided to pursue the application.
The
applicant was represented by Mr V.D. Androsov, a lawyer practising in
Belgorod. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by Mr P. Laptev, the former Representative of the Russian
Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, that the domestic judicial
authorities had reconsidered a judgment given in her favour having
improperly used the procedure for reconsidering judgments on the
basis of newly discovered circumstances.
By
a decision of 11 October 2005 the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided, after consulting the
parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3
in fine).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1934 and lived in Belgorod.
The
applicant received an old-age pension. The Law of 21 July 1997 on the
Calculation and Upgrading of State Pensions (“the Pensions
Act”) introduced, from 1 February 1998
onwards, a new method for calculating pensions. The idea
behind this method, based on what is known as an “individual
pensioner coefficient”, was to link the pension to the
pensioner's previous earnings.
The
authority in charge of the applicant's pension, the Pension Fund
Agency of Belgorod (“the Agency”), fixed the applicant's
coefficient at 0.525. The applicant challenged the Agency's decision
in the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Belgorod. She argued that her
coefficient should be 0.7 from 1 February 1998.
On
1 July 1999 the District Court found for the applicant, considering
that the Agency had misinterpreted the Pensions Act. It decided that
the Agency was to recalculate the applicant's pension using a
coefficient of 0.7.
The
Agency appealed against the judgment. On 19 October 1999 the Belgorod
Regional Court upheld the judgment, which became enforceable on the
same day. The judgment was never executed.
On
29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour and Social Development (“the
Ministry”) issued an Instruction on the “Application of
Limitations” established by the Pensions Act (“the
Instruction”). The Instruction clarified how to apply the
Pensions Act.
On
12 January 2000 a Deputy Prime Minister wrote a letter to the
Prosecutor General. She complained that throughout the country courts
had been deciding in pensioners' favour based on a manifestly wrong
interpretation of the Pensions Act, and that the Pension Fund was
unable to meet the unforeseen expenses. She asked the Prosecutor
General to ask the Supreme Court to reconsider one such judgment to
create a pilot case.
Some
time thereafter a group of individuals challenged the Instruction
before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. On 24 April
2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. It found that,
contrary to what the complainants had suggested, the Ministry of
Labour had not acted ultra vires in issuing the Instruction,
and that the Ministry's interpretation of the Pensions Act had been
correct. On 25 May 2000 the Cassation Division of the Supreme Court
upheld this judgment on appeal.
On
25 May 2000 the Agency lodged an application
with the District Court for the reconsideration of the applicant's
case owing to newly discovered circumstances on the basis of the
Instruction, which supported their position. They argued that the
Instruction had been upheld by the Supreme Court.
On
14 September 2000 the District Court examined
the Agency's request. The Agency maintained that the interpretation
of the Pensions Act in the Instruction was a newly discovered
circumstance which warranted the quashing of the judgment. The
applicant submitted that the Agency had missed the statutory
time-limit for requesting the reconsideration.
The
District Court held as follows:
“... the court considers that the application by
the Pension Fund Agency of Belgorod is to be granted for the
following reasons:
On 29 December 1999 the RF Ministry of Labour and Social
Development issued an instruction on the application of the Federal
Law on the Calculation and Upgrading of State Pensions. The
lawfulness of the instruction was subject to examination by the RF
Supreme Court ... which established its compliance with the
provisions of the civil legislation.
... the Pension Fund Agency of Belgorod did not request
the reconsideration of the judgment of 1 July 1999 until after the
examination of the application [challenging the lawfulness of the
Instruction] by the RF Supreme Court... Therefore the Agency had
missed the statutory time-limit for requesting
the reconsideration for good reason.
Taking into account the
above-mentioned reasons the court considers that the judgment ... of
1 July 1999 is to be quashed owing to newly discovered
circumstances.”
In
a decision of 14 September 2000 the District
Court granted the Agency's application and quashed the judgment of 1
July 1999.
As
a result of the fresh examination of the case the District Court
delivered a judgment of 14 September 2000 in which it rejected
the applicant's claims in full. The applicant appealed against the
judgment. On 31 October 2000 the Belgorod Regional Court
dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the judgment of 14
September 2000.
From
1 May 2001, following changes to the pension regulations, the
applicant's pension was calculated based on a coefficient exceeding
0.7. According to the Government the coefficient was fixed at 0.84.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The
Code of Civil Procedure of 1964 (“CCivP”), in force at
the material time, provided as follows:
Article 333. Grounds for reconsideration
“[Judgments] which have come into force may be
reconsidered on the basis of newly discovered circumstances. The
grounds for reconsideration ... shall be as follows:
1. significant circumstances which were not
and could not have been known to the party who applies for
reconsideration; ...
4. cancellation of a court [judgment] or of
another authority's decision which served as legal basis for the
[judgment] in question.”
Article 334. Lodging of application
“... [An application for reconsideration of a
[judgment] owing to newly discovered circumstances] shall be lodged
within three months after the discovery of the circumstances.”
Article 337. Court decision on reconsideration of a
case
“After examination of an application for
reconsideration of a [judgment] owing to newly discovered
circumstances, the court may either grant the application and quash
the [judgment], or dismiss the application.
The court decision by which an application for
reconsideration of a [judgment] owing to newly discovered
circumstances is granted shall not be subject to appeal. ...”
On
2 February 1996 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
adopted a ruling concerning certain provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”). In that ruling the
Constitutional Court decided that Article 384 of the CCrP (“Grounds
for reconsideration of a [criminal] case on the basis of newly
discovered circumstances”, which was in many respects similar
to Article 333 of the CCivP) was
unconstitutional in that it limited the grounds for the reopening of
a criminal case to situations of “newly discovered
circumstances”. In that ruling the Constitutional Court
suggested that this provision of the CCrP prevented rectification of
judicial errors and miscarriages of justice. In its ruling of
3 February 1998 the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion
that Article 192 § 2 of the Code of Commercial Procedure
was unconstitutional in so far as it had served as a basis for the
dismissal of applications for reconsideration of judgments of the
Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court, where the judgment had
been delivered as a result of a judicial error which had not been and
could not have been established earlier.
The
Instruction of the Ministry of Labour and
Social Development of 29 December 1999 on the “Application of
Limitations” established by the Pensions Act was registered by
the Ministry of Justice on 31 December 1999 and became binding in
February 2000, ten days after its official publication.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 AND ARTICLE 1
OF PROTOCOL No. 1
The
applicant complained that the State had reconsidered a final judgment
in her favour. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Article
6 § 1 of the Convention, as far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. The parties' submissions
1. The Government
The
Government submitted that the complaint was incompatible with the
Convention ratione materiae, as it did not concern “civil
rights and obligations” or “property” or,
alternatively, that there had been no breach of Article 6 § 1 or
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the reconsideration of the
case concerning the applicant's pension.
(a) Applicability of Article 6 § 1
The
Government stressed that the judgment of 1 July 1999 had not
determined any definite amount due to the applicant, but had rather
established how the pension should be calculated. In their words,
“the subject-matter of the dispute was
not the applicant's claim to award her monetary sums, but the matter
of lawfulness ... of application of the Instruction”. According
to the Government, the dispute at issue was not a civil one because
“the determination of the order of calculation of
pensions belongs to the realm of public law”. They referred to
Schouten and Meldrum v. the Netherlands (judgment of 9
December 1994, Series A no. 304, § 50); Pančenko v.
Latvia, ((dec.), no. 40772/98, 28 October 1999); and Kiryanov
v. Russia ((dec.), no. 42212/02, 9 December 2004).
(b) Applicability of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1
The
Government contested that the pension awarded to the applicant by
virtue of the judgment of 1 July 1999 constituted her “possession”.
They noted that in the case of Pravednaya v. Russia (no.
69529/01, 18 November 2004) the Court had regarded a judicial award
of that type as the applicant's “possession”. In that
case the Court had ordered the restoration of the initial judgment in
the applicant's favour and the payment of the pension in the amount
established by that judgment. However, in the Government's view, such
an approach created confusion. If the sum awarded by a court was a
pensioner's “possession”, it should not be affected by
any subsequent increase in pension rates. Therefore, in Pravednaya
the applicant would have had to return the money “excessively”
paid to her by virtue of the later changes in the legislation on
State pensions. They concluded that in order to avoid such situations
the Court should not regard the pension amounts awarded by the
domestic courts as the claimants' “possessions” within
the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
(c) Merits of the complaint
The
Government submitted that it was the Supreme Court's decision
upholding the Instruction which had constituted a newly discovered
circumstance and warranted the reopening of the case within the
meaning of Article 333 of the CCivP. This was a major difference with
the Pravednaya case (cited above). The Government explained
that to consider the Supreme Court's decision as a newly discovered
circumstance was in line with the position of the Constitutional
Court set out in its decisions of 2 February 1996 and 3 February
1998. The Constitutional Court had recognised that changes in
the law could be considered as newly discovered circumstances.
The
Government further submitted that the Instruction had been issued
after the initial judgment had become final, so the Agency could not
have relied on it in the appeal proceedings. This was another
difference with the Pravednaya case, where the Instruction had
been adopted while the proceedings were still pending. Therefore, the
Agency's request to reopen the case had not been an “appeal in
disguise” but a conscientious effort to make good a miscarriage
of justice.
The
Government observed that the reopening of the case had been lawful
and complied with the procedure prescribed by law, the request having
been lodged within the statutory three-month time-limit.
The
Government concluded that the reopening of the case had not infringed
the principle of legal certainty as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1
nor had it interfered with the applicant's property rights as
guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
2. The applicant
The
applicant maintained her complaint. She pointed out that the
Instruction had been subordinate to the Pensions Act and ought not to
distort the latter's meaning. She submitted that the executive had
disliked the Pensions Act and wished to cancel it by any means.
Furthermore, the Agency had missed the time-limit for reopening a
case: it had applied to the court six months after the Instruction
had been issued, instead of three months as required by the civil
procedure.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
The
Court notes that the dispute as to the increase of the applicant's
old-age pension entitlement was one of a pecuniary nature and
concerned a civil right within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention (see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, judgment
of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, p. 17, § 46; Massa v.
Italy, judgment of 24 August 1993, Series A no. 265 B, p.
20, § 26; Süßmann v. Germany, judgment of 16
September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p.
1170, § 42; and, as a recent authority, Tričković
v. Slovenia, no. 39914/98, § 40, 12 June 2001).
It
reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee, as
such, the right to an old-age pension or to any social benefit in a
particular amount (see, for example, Aunola v. Finland (dec.),
no. 30517/96, 15 March 2001). However a “claim” –
even concerning a pension – can constitute a “possession”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 if it is
sufficiently established to be enforceable (see Stran Greek
Refineries v. Greece, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no.
301, § 59). The judgment of the Sverdlovskiy District Court of 1
July 1999, which became final after it had been upheld on appeal by
the Belgorod Regional Court on 19 October 1999, provided the
applicant with an enforceable claim to receive an increased pension
based on a coefficient of 0.7.
The
Court notes that the objections and arguments put forward by the
Government were rejected in the earlier similar case of Bulgakova
v. Russia (no. 69524/01, §§ 27-32, 18 January 2007) and
sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Accordingly,
the Court considers that in the present case the applicant's dispute
concerned a civil right within the meaning of Article 6, and that the
applicant had a “possession” within the meaning of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
2. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1
The
Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal
as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be
interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which, in
its relevant part, declares the rule of law to be part of the common
heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental aspects of
the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which requires,
among other things, that where the courts have finally determined an
issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see
Brumărescu v. Romania, judgment of 28 October 1999,
Reports 1999-VII, § 61). This principle underlines that
no party is entitled to seek a review of a final and binding judgment
merely for the purpose of obtaining a rehearing and a fresh
determination of the case. Review by higher courts should not be
treated as an appeal in disguise, and the mere possibility of there
being two views on the subject is not a ground for re-examination. A
departure from that principle is justified only when made necessary
by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see
Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 52, ECHR 2003-IX).
The
Court examined the quashing of a final judgment on the ground of
newly discovered circumstances in Pravednaya (cited above), a
case with a similar set of facts, where it held:
“27. The procedure for quashing of a
final judgment presupposes that there is evidence not previously
available through the exercise of due diligence that would lead to a
different outcome of the proceedings. The person applying for
rescission should show that there was no opportunity to present the
item of evidence at the final hearing and that the evidence is
decisive. Such a procedure is defined in Article 333 of the CCivP and
is common to the legal systems of many member States.
28. This procedure does not by itself
contradict the principle of legal certainty in so far as it is used
to correct miscarriages of justice. ...”
In
the case of Pravednaya the Instruction of the Ministry of
Labour had been issued between the first-instance and appeal
judgments. The relevant pension agency had not relied on the
Instruction in the appeal proceedings but had only done so later, in
their request for the judgment, then final, to be set aside owing to
“newly discovered circumstances”. The Court considered
that the agency's request had been an “appeal in disguise”
and found that by granting it the court had infringed the principle
of legal certainty and the applicant's “right to a court”
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Pravednaya,
cited above, §§ 29-34).
The
present case differs from Pravednaya in that the Instruction
of the Ministry of Labour was issued after the first-instance
judgment had been upheld on appeal. The Court's task is to determine
whether, on the facts of the present case, the quashing of the
judgment was exercised in a manner compatible with Article 6. To do
so it will examine the reasons adduced by the Sverdlovskiy District
Court for the quashing of the judgment (see paragraph
16 above).
The
Sverdlovskiy District Court considered that the interpretation of the
Pensions Act by the Ministry of Labour, which had been upheld by the
Supreme Court, was a “newly discovered circumstance” as
had been suggested in the Agency's request for reopening. Therefore,
the District Court decided that the request should be granted and the
judgment be quashed.
The
Court first notes that the Instruction and the
Supreme Court's decision upholding it did not exist during the
examination of the applicant's case. They were adopted after the
judgment had been upheld on appeal. In the Court's view, the
above-mentioned Instruction and decision were new legal acts and did
not constitute newly discovered circumstances as considered by the
District Court (see Article 333 of the CCivP, paragraph 20
above).
Further,
the judgment of 1 July 1999 was a result of the District
Court's interpretation and application of the Pensions Act to the
applicant's case. As it transpires from the decision of 14 September
2000, the fact that the Ministry's interpretation of that Act in an
Instruction, a subordinate legal instrument, differed from the
court's findings, with the effect that it would have led to a
different outcome of the proceedings, was considered by the District
Court a sufficient reason to quash the judgment and reconsider the
case. The Court finds that this reason as such could not justify the
reopening of the case after a final and binding judgment.
The
Court notes the Government's argument that the reopening was
necessary to make good a miscarriage of justice. However, other than
referring to the Ministry's interpretation of the law as a reason for
the reopening, the District Court said nothing in its decision to
explain why its original findings were to be considered a
“miscarriage of justice” such as to justify the
reopening.
The
Court finds that by granting the Agency's request to reconsider the
applicant's case and setting aside the final judgment of 1 July 1999,
as upheld on 19 October 1999, the District Court infringed the
principle of legal certainty and the applicant's “right to a
court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
There
has accordingly been a violation of that Article.
3. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
The
Court notes that the “possession” in this case was the
applicant's claim to a pension based on a coefficient of 0.7 from
1 February 1998, in accordance with the judgment of the
Sverdlovskiy District Court of 1 July 1999, upheld on 19 October
1999.
The District Court did not determine the date until
which this method of calculation should have been maintained. When
delivering its judgment it applied the statutory pension regulations
which were in force at the time. Those regulations, however, “are
liable to change and a judicial decision cannot be relied on as a
guarantee against such changes in the future” (see Sukhobokov
v. Russia, no. 75470/01, § 26, 13 April 2006). Thus the
Court observes that, as a result of such changes, the coefficient for
the calculation of the applicant's pension exceeded 0.7 from 1 May
2001.
The
Court notes that the applicant's concern under Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 was the loss of her entitlement to a pension based on a
coefficient of 0.7 for the period between 1 February 1998 and,
apparently, 1 May 2001, as opposed to the pension calculated and
actually paid. However, the Court further notes that before the end
of that period, the Instruction had removed the ambiguity of the
Pensions Act with the effect that the applicant's dispute over the
coefficient had been resolved, at the level of the statutory
regulations, in favour of the Agency. The Court considers that it was
until the moment when the Instruction became binding in February
2000, and apparently changed the legislative framework relevant to
the applicant's dispute, that the applicant's claim – and
“possession” under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 –
had been secured by the judgment.
The
effect produced by the decision of the District Court of 14 September
2000, by which the application for reconsideration was granted, was
that the applicant became deprived, retrospectively in respect of the
above-mentioned period from February 1998 to February 2000, of the
right to receive the pension in the amount initially determined by
the court or, in other words, deprived of her possession within the
meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. The taking of property, in the light of this rule,
can only be justified if it is shown, inter alia, to be “in
the public interest” and “subject to the conditions
provided for by law” (see Pravednaya, cited above, §§
39-40).
While
assuming that it was in the public interest to ensure a uniform
application of the Pensions Act, the compliance of the
reconsideration of the applicant's case with the “lawfulness”
requirement is questionable (see paragraph 41 above). Even assuming
that the court's interpretation of the domestic procedural law was
not arbitrary (see the Government's argument concerning the
Constitutional Court's decisions and the relevant domestic law in
paragraphs 27 and 21 above), it still remains to be established
whether the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.
In
this connection the Court reiterates its finding in Pravednaya
that “the State's possible interest in ensuring a uniform
application of the Pensions Law should not have brought about the
retrospective recalculation of the judicial award already made”
(Pravednaya, cited above, § 41). Having regard to the
fact that the reconsideration of the case resulted in the full
dismissal of the applicant's claim that had been granted in the
initial judgment, the Court finds no reason to depart from that
conclusion in the present case.
Based
on the above considerations, the Court finds that by depriving the
applicant of the right to benefit from the pension in the amount
secured in a final judgment, the State upset the fair balance between
the interests at stake.
There
has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
In
her letter of 14 December 2005, in reply to the Court's proposal to
submit claims for just satisfaction, the applicant submitted that she
was a disabled person, that her pension had been underpaid and that
with 2,795 roubles (RUR) being her monthly pension she could not
afford to buy basic foodstuffs. She further submitted that in order
to meet the Court's procedural requirements she had hired a lawyer to
whom she had promised to pay 30% of the Court's potential award, or
at least a sum equivalent to 12,000 United States dollars (USD). She
also stated that she had no documents to prove her postal expenses in
connection with her application to the Court and other expenses which
she had incurred in order to obtain information and translate the
Court's letters. The applicant asked the Court to make a “right
decision to compensate the material and moral damage caused to [her]
by the state”.
The
Government asserted that the applicant had failed to submit any
claims in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. They further
submitted that in any event no just satisfaction should be awarded to
the applicant because there had been no violation of her rights under
the Convention. Alternatively, the finding of a violation in itself
would constitute sufficient just satisfaction. The Government also
argued that the claim of USD 12,000 in respect of legal costs should
be rejected as unsubstantiated.
The
Court cannot agree with the Government that the applicant had
submitted no claims for just satisfaction. It will examine her
submissions as indicated above.
As
regards pecuniary damage, the applicant failed to submit information
which would enable the Court to calculate its amount. Therefore the
Court makes no award under this head.
As
regards non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that the applicant
has sustained non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violations
found and that this cannot be made good merely by the Court's finding
of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as
required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the
applicant 2,000 euros.
Lastly,
as regards costs and expenses, the Court points out that under Rule
60 of the Rules of Court any claim for just satisfaction must be
itemised and submitted in writing together with the relevant
supporting documents or vouchers, “failing which the Chamber
may reject the claim in whole or in part”. According to the
Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his
costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. Since the applicant has failed to meet the above
requirements, the Court makes no award under this head.
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant's husband, within three
months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,000 (two
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Russian roubles at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 July 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Peer
Lorenzen
Deputy
Registrar President
