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ARTEMENKO v. UKRAINE - 33983/02 [2007] ECHR 451 (7 June 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/451.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 451
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF ARTEMENKO v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 33983/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7 June
2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Artemenko v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mr K.
Jungwiert,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs M.
Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr J. Borrego Borrego,
Mrs R.
Jaeger,
Mr M. Villiger, judges,
and Mrs C.
Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 15 May 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 33983/02) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by an Ukrainian national, Ms Natalya Ivanovna
Artemenko (“the applicant”), on 17 August 2002.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr Yuriy Zaytsev.
On
11 April 2006 the Court decided to communicate the complaint
concerning the length of the civil proceedings to the Government.
Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it
decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as
its admissibility.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Kirovograd.
In
March 1996 Mr. D. instituted proceedings against the applicant
seeking compensation for expenses of the funeral of his brother, the
applicant's husband. On 24 July 1996 the Leninsky District Court of
Kirovograd (hereinafter “the Leninsky Court”) allowed
this claim in part. On 12 September 1996 the Kirovograd Regional
Court upheld this decision.
On
1 October 1997 the Presidium of the Kirovograd Regional Court,
following the protest of the Deputy President of the Supreme
Court, quashed all previous decisions in the case and remitted it for
a fresh consideration.
On
22 November 1997 the applicant lodged a counterclaim against D.,
claiming that she was entitled to property and compensation in
connection with the administration of her late husband's estate.
On
11 December 1997 the Leninsky Court declined to consider the
counterclaim because the applicant had failed to pay the court fee.
On
18 December 1997 the applicant re-lodged her counterclaim.
On
29 September 1998, on the applicant's request, the case was
transferred to the Kirovograd District Court.
On
20 May 1999 the proceedings were resumed.
On
10 October 2000, following Mr D.'s modification of his claim, the
hearings were postponed until 14 November 2000.
On
14 November 2000, following the applicant's modification of her
claim, the hearings were postponed until 11 December 2000.
On
21 June 2001 the Kirovograd District Court allowed in part both the
original claim and the counterclaim.
On
17 October 2001 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal (hereinafter
“the Regional Court”) modified the judgment as to D.'s
claim. It also quashed the judgment in the part concerning the
applicant's counterclaim and remitted the case for a fresh
consideration.
On
27 December 2001 the Regional Court assigned the case to the Kirovsky
District Court of Kirovograd (hereinafter “the Kirovsky
Court”).
On
22 March 2002 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's cassation
appeal and upheld the ruling of 17 October 2001.
The
proceedings were resumed in the Kirovsky Court in June 2002.
On
23 March 2003 the proceedings were suspended until examination by the
Leninsky Court of the criminal case instituted upon the applicant's
request against Mr D. as to the alleged forgery of his brother's (the
applicant's husband's) will.
In
April 2003 the applicant lodged with the Kirovsky Court a request to
review the judgment of 21 June 2001 in the light of newly disclosed
circumstances.
On
22 December 2003 this request was rejected.
In
April 2004 the applicant lodged a request with the Supreme Court
seeking to review the decision of 21 June 2001 in the light of newly
disclosed circumstances.
On
24 March 2004 the Leninsky Court terminated the criminal proceedings
against Mr D. as prosecution had become time-barred. On 1 June and 7
December 2004 the Regional Court and the Supreme Court, respectively,
upheld this ruling.
On
15 April 2004 the Kirovsky Court requested the Leninsky Court about
the outcome of criminal proceedings against Mr D.
On
25 May 2004 the civil proceedings were resumed.
On
10 December 2004 the case-file was transferred to the Supreme
Court for examination of the applicant's request to review the
judgment of 21 June 2001 in the light of newly disclosed
circumstances.
On
31 October 2005 the Supreme Court rejected this request.
Since
January 2006 the proceedings are pending before the Kirovsky Court.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement,
provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
The
Court notes that the proceedings at issue began in March 1996 and are
pending to date. The Court recalls that the Convention entered into
force in respect of Ukraine on 11 September 1997. The
proceedings in the case were resumed on 1 October 1997, when the
Presidium of the Kirovograd Regional Court quashed all previous
decisions in the case and was remitted it for a fresh consideration
(see Yemanakova v. Russia, no. 60408/00, § 41,
23 September 2004, and Efimenko v. Ukraine, no. 55870/00,
§ 51, 18 July 2006). Thus, the period falling within
the Court's competence ratione temporis is nine years and
eight months.
2. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
The
Government contested the applicant's complaint, stating that there
were no significant periods of inactivity attributable to the State.
According to the Government, the applicant was responsible for some
periods of delay in the proceedings, as she lodged numerous requests,
including for review of the case in the light of newly disclosed
circumstances, modified her claims, as well as requested to suspend
the proceedings until examination of the criminal case against Mr D.
(see paragraphs 10, 20, 30, 31 and 34 above). The Government further
submitted that thirteen hearings were postponed upon the applicant's
request or due to her failure to appear. The Government maintained
that the case was complicated on amount of the above circumstances.
The
applicant disagreed.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
As
to the question of the complexity of the present dispute, the Court
observes that it concerned a dispute which arose in the context of
the administration of the estate of the applicant's late husband. The
courts based their decisions largely on the written evidence
submitted by the parties. The claim and the counter-claim concerned
the same subject matter. The Court concludes that the subject matter
of the litigation at issue could not be considered particularly
complex.
As
regards the Government's contentions that the applicant was
responsible for some delays in the impugned proceedings, the Court
observes that even assuming that some periods of delay could be
attributed to the applicant, the length of the proceedings falling
within the Court's competence to date has exceeded 9 years. In
particular, the case was pending before the first instance court from
October 1997 until June 2001, and again from December 2001 to date.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER COMPLAINTS
The
applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about
an unfair hearing in her civil case and about the partiality of the
courts towards her. She also complained under the same provision of
the Convention that the criminal proceedings against Mr D. were
terminated unlawfully.
However,
in the light of all the materials in its possession, the Court finds
that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It
follows that these parts of the applications must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35
§§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage without
specifying the exact amount.
The
Government did not submit their observation under this head.
The
Court observes that when invited to submit her just satisfaction
claims following the receipt of the Government's observations, the
applicant confirmed the claims which she had made at the time when
she had lodged the present application with the Court.
The
Court further considers that the applicant must have sustained
non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violations found (see
Kryachkov v. Ukraine, no. 7497/02, § 30,
1 June 2006). Making its assessment on an equitable basis,
as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards
the applicant EUR 2,400 in this respect.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not submit any claim under this head. The Court
therefore makes no award.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the applicant's complaint under Article
6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of proceedings in her
civil case admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,400 (two
thousand four hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus
any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 June 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer
Lorenzen
Registrar President
