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DURSUN v. TURKEY - 17765/02 [2007] ECHR 359 (3 May 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/359.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 359
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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF DURSUN v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 17765/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 May
2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Dursun v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mrs F. Tulkens, President,
Mr A.B.
Baka,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr M.
Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A. Mularoni,
Ms D. Jočienė,
judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 April 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 17765/02) against the Republic
of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Turkish national, Ali Dursun (“the
applicant”), on 18 February 2002.
The
applicant was represented by Mrs F. Karakaş Doğan, a lawyer
practising in İstanbul. The Turkish Government (“the
Government”) did not designate an Agent for the purpose of the
proceedings before the Court.
On
3 March 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1969 and lives in İstanbul.
On
18 July 1992 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody by
police officers at the İstanbul Security Directorate on
suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation.
On
3 August 1992 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor
at the İstanbul State Security Court. On the same day, he was
also brought before a judge at the İstanbul State Security Court
who ordered his remand in custody.
On
30 September 1992 the public prosecutor at the İstanbul State
Security Court filed an indictment against the applicant and sixteen
other co-accused and requested the applicant's conviction under
Article 125 of the Criminal Code for his activities aimed at breaking
up the unity of the State and removing part of the national territory
from the State's control.
The
first hearing, held before the İstanbul State Security Court on
23 October 1992, in the applicant's absence, was taken up with
procedural matters, such as the measures to be taken for securing the
presence of the accused.
Between
23 October 1992 and 11 April 2003, the İstanbul State Security
Court held hearings at regular intervals. On 26 November 1992 the
first-instance court decided to join another case against the
applicant to the proceedings. It further decided to join to the
proceedings against the applicant several other cases brought against
other persons who were also accused of membership of the same
organisation. At the end of each hearing, the İstanbul State
Security Court considered releasing the applicant pending trial both
ex officio as well as upon his requests. At each hearing, the
court, taking into account the content of the case file and the state
of the evidence, decided to prolong the applicant's remand in
custody.
On
11 April 2003 the İstanbul State Security Court convicted the
applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
On
7 June 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first
instance court.
Subsequent
to promulgation of Law no. 5190 on 16 June 2004, which abolished
the State Security Courts, the İstanbul Assize Court acquired
jurisdiction over the applicant's case.
On
30 December 2004 the İstanbul Assize Court released the
applicant pending trial.
According
to the information available in the file, the case is apparently
still pending on the date on which the present judgment was adopted.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 3, 4 AND 5,
ARTICLE 6 § 2 AND ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of his remand in custody was
unreasonably long, and that his requests for release pending trial
received no serious consideration by the first-instance court. He
invokes Articles 5 §§ 3, 4 and 5, 6 § 2 and 13 of the
Convention.
The
Court considers that this complaint should be examined from the
standpoint of 5 § 3 alone, which reads:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be
conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Government contended that the domestic authorities
displayed diligence when considering the applicant's requests for
release pending trial. Moreover, they claimed that the seriousness of
the crime and the special circumstances of the case justified his
continued detention on remand.
The
applicant maintained his allegations.
The Court reiterates that it falls in the first place
to the domestic judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case,
the detention of an accused person pending trial does not exceed a
reasonable time. To this end they must examine all the facts arguing
for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public
interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of presumption
of innocence, a departure from the rule of respect for individual
liberty, and set them out in their decisions on the applications for
release. It is primarily on the basis of the reasons given in these
decisions, and of the established facts mentioned by the applicants
in their appeals, that the Court must determine whether or not there
has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see
Sevgin and İnce v. Turkey, no. 46262/99, §
61, 20 September 2005).
The
persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a sine qua non for the validity of the
continued detention but, after a certain lapse of time, it no longer
suffices; the Court must then establish whether the other grounds
cited by the judicial authorities continued to justify the
deprivation of liberty (see, among other authorities, Ilijkov v.
Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, § 77, 26 July 2001, and Labita
v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, §§ 152-153, ECHR
2000-IV).
In
the instant case, the Court notes that there were two periods of
pre-trial detention. The first period began on 18 July 1992 with the
applicant's arrest and ended on 11 April 2003, the date of the
judgment of the İstanbul Assize Court. From that point on, and
until the Court of Cassation's decision of 7 June 2004, the applicant
was detained “after conviction by a competent court”,
which falls within the scope of Article 5 § 1 (a)
of the Convention. The second period began on 7 June 2004 and ended
on 30 December 2004 when the applicant was released pending trial. It
thus lasted approximately eleven years and three months in total
(see, in particular, Solmaz
v. Turkey,
no. 27561/02, §§ 23-36, 16 January 2007).
During this time, the first-instance court considered the applicant's
continued detention at the end of each hearing, either on its own
motion or upon the request of the applicant. However, the Court notes
from the material in the case file that the State Security Court
ordered the applicant's continued detention on remand using
identical, stereotyped terms, such as “having regard to the
nature of the offence and the state of the evidence”.
The
Court takes note of the seriousness of the offence attributed to the
applicant and the severity of the relevant punishment. However, it
recalls that the danger of absconding cannot solely be assessed on
the basis of the severity of the sentence risked, but must be
analysed with reference to a number of other relevant additional
elements, which may either confirm the existence of such a danger or
make it appear so slight that it cannot justify detention pending
trial (see Muller v. France, judgment of 17 March 1997,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 II, §
43, and Letellier v. France, judgment of 26 June 1991,
Series A no. 207, § 43). In this regard, the Court notes the
lack of such sufficient reasoning in the domestic court's decisions
to prolong the applicant's remand in custody.
Finally,
although, in general, the expression “the state of the
evidence” may be a relevant factor for the existence and
persistence of serious indications of guilt, in the present case it
nevertheless, alone, cannot justify the length of the detention of
which the applicant complains (see Letellier, cited
above; Tomasi v. France, judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A
no. 241-A; Mansur v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995,
Series A no. 319-B, § 55, and Demirel v.
Turkey, no. 39324/98, § 59).
The
foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to
conclude that the length of the applicant's pre-trial detention,
which lasted, in total, approximately eleven years and three months,
has exceeded the reasonable-time requirement.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the criminal proceedings
exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement under Article
6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of ...any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a...hearing within a reasonable
time by [a] ...tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust
domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention, as the criminal proceedings against him were still
pending. They further maintained that the applicant failed to raise
the substance of his complaint before the domestic courts.
The
applicant disputed the Government's arguments.
The
Court reiterates that it has already examined and rejected the
Government's similar objections in previous cases (see, in
particular, Karakullukçu v. Turkey, no. 49275/99, §§
27-28, 22 November 2005, and Tutar v. Turkey, no. 11798/03, §§
12-14, 10 October 2006). The Court finds no particular circumstances
in the instant case, which would require it to depart from its
findings in the above-mentioned applications. It therefore rejects
the Government's objections under this head.
Moreover,
the Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other
grounds for declaring it inadmissible has been established. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government disputed that the length of the proceedings were
unreasonably long.
The
applicant maintained his allegations.
The
Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began
on 18 July 1992, when the applicant was arrested and taken into
police custody. According to the information in the case file, the
case has apparently not yet ended. It has already thus lasted more
than fourteen years and eight months.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see, in particular, Pakkan v. Turkey, no.
13017/02, § 44, 31 October 2006).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it and having regard to its
case-law on the subject, the Court considers that, in the instant
case, the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet
the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant initially complained that he was discriminated against
because he was charged with crimes committed against the State in
breach of Article 14 of the Convention, which provides:
“The
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.”
The
Court has examined the applicant's allegation in the light of the
evidence submitted to it and considers it unsubstantiated. It follows
that this part of the application should be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§
3 and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and EUR
22,000 for non-pecuniary damages. In support of his pecuniary damage
claims, which included the expenses incurred by his relatives and
lawyers during his incarceration, the applicant submitted a number of
bus and ferry ticket receipts.
The
Government contested the amounts.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, deciding on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant
EUR 12,000 in respect of non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 5,800 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the Court. In support of his claim, the applicant submitted
the İstanbul Bar Association's recommended minimum fees list for
2006.
The
Government contested the amount.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the length of
the applicant's detention pending trial and the length of the
criminal proceedings admissible, and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
sums, to be converted into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement;
(i) EUR
12,000 (twelve thousand euros) for non-pecuniary damage,
(ii) EUR
1,000 (one thousand euros) for costs and expenses,
(iii) plus
any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 May 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Dollé F. Tulkens Registrar President