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KOSTI AND OTHERS v. TURKEY - 74321/01 [2007] ECHR 354 (3 May 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/354.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 354
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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF KOŞTİ AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 74321/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3 May
2007
This judgment will
become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Koşti and Others v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mrs F. Tulkens, President,
Mr A.B.
Baka,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Mr V.
Zagrebelsky,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D. Popović,
judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 3 April 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 74321/01) against the Republic
of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by three Turkish nationals, Mr Osman Koşti,
Mr Mehmet Koşti and Mr Hışman Öngör
(“the applicants”), on 27 May 2001.
The
applicants were represented by Mr M. Vefa, a lawyer practising in
Diyarbakır. The Turkish Government (“the Government”)
did not designate an Agent for the purpose of the proceedings before
the Court.
On
25 August 2005 the Court declared the application partly inadmissible
and decided to communicate to the Government the complaint concerning
the length of the applicants' remand in custody and the criminal
proceedings brought against them. Under the provisions of
Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicants were born in 1981, 1983 and 1981 respectively and live in
Şanlıurfa.
The
applicants were arrested and taken into custody on 19 and 20 February
1999 respectively on suspicion of their involvement in the throwing
of Molotov cocktails at various public buildings. On 23 February 1999
the Suruç Magistrates' Court ordered their remand in custody.
The applicants were aged sixteen (Mehmet Koşti) and eighteen
(the other applicants) at the time of the events.
On
23 March 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State
Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicants and
four other persons, accusing them of throwing Molotov cocktails at
the Suruç primary school and the Suruç public garage on
18 February 1999 and of attempting to throw Molotov cocktail at the
Suruç Atatürk primary school with a view to supporting
the activities of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the
Kurdistan Workers' Party). The charges were brought under Article 168
§ 2 of the Turkish Criminal Code.
On
7 April 1999 the criminal proceedings against the applicants and four
other accused commenced before the Diyarbakır State Security
Court.
On 12 May 1999 the court heard the applicants who refuted the
allegations against them and their earlier submissions given before
the police, public prosecutor and the Magistrates' Court. They also
challenged the accuracy of the arrest protocol and the report on the
reconstruction of the events. The court decided to secure the
testimony of those who had attended the arrest and the reconstruction
of events and the submissions of the accused who were not detained.
It further ordered that the birth date of Hışman Öngör
and another accused be determined since they had claimed that they
were actually born in 1986.
Between
12 May 1999 and 22 December 2000, the Diyarbakır Security Court
held fifteen hearings where it took various procedural decisions and
postponed the trial as the procedure concerning the determination of
the age of two accused had not been completed.
At
the hearings held on 22 December 2000 and 20 February 2001
respectively, the court requested the prosecution and the defendants
to submit their observations on the merits of the case. On 10 April
2001 the applicants' lawyer requested an extension for the submission
of the applicants' observations. This request was accepted by the
court.
Throughout
the proceedings the applicants' lawyer repeatedly requested that the
applicants be released pending trial. He maintained, inter alia,
that they were juveniles and that their acts could not be considered
to constitute an offence under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal
Court. The first instance court dismissed the applicants' requests
until 29 May 2001, having regard to the nature of the offence
with which they were charged and the state of the evidence.
On
29 May 2001 the court decided to defer sentencing the applicants and
their co-accused, pursuant to Law no. 4616. It therefore ordered the
release of the applicants from detention.
The
public prosecutor appealed.
On
20 September 2001 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the
first instance court.
II. THE RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
relevant domestic law and practice in force at the material time are
outlined in the Çobanoğlu and Budak judgment
v. Turkey, (no. 45977/99, §§ 29 30, 30
January 2007).
THE LAW
I. ADMISSIBILITY
The
Government asked the Court to dismiss the application for failure to
exhaust domestic remedies, under Article 35 § 1
of the Convention. In this regard, the Government maintained that the
applicants failed to object to their continued remand in detention
pursuant to Article 298 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP).
They further submitted that the applicants failed to raise the
substance of the complaint concerning the length of the proceedings
before the domestic courts.
The
applicants did not specifically deal with the Government's objections
under this head.
As regards the first limb of the Government's
objection, the Court reiterates that under the terms of Article 35 §
1 of the Convention it can only deal with the matter after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally
recognised rules of international law. However, only available
and adequate remedies must be tried under Article 35 § 1
of the Convention. The existence of such remedies must be
sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing
which they lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. There
is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or
ineffective (see, among others, Cennet Ayhan
and Mehmet Salih Ayhan v. Turkey, no. 41964/98, §
64, 27 June 2006).
The Court recalls that, in the area of exhaustion
of domestic remedies, the burden of proof is on the Government
claiming non exhaustion to indicate to the Court with sufficient
clarity the remedy to which the applicants have not had recourse and
to satisfy the Court that this remedy was effective and available in
theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say that it
was accessible, was capable of providing redress in respect of the
applicants' complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success
(see Cennet Ayhan and Mehmet Salih
Ayhan, cited above, § 65). Furthermore, the Court
notes that the application of the rule of exhaustion
must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied
in the context of machinery for the protection of human rights that
the Contracting Parties have agreed to establish. Accordingly, the
Court has recognised that Article 35 § 1 must be applied
with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism
(see Acunbay v. Turkey, nos. 61442/00 and
61445/00, § 45, 31 May 2005).
In the instant case the Court notes that the trial
court examined the applicants' detention on remand at the end of each
hearing, either of its own motion or upon the request of the
applicants. It therefore had the opportunity to end the applicants'
alleged lengthy detention and to avoid or to
redress an alleged breach of the Convention (see Acunbay,
cited above, § 48, and Tamer and Others v.
Turkey, no. 235/02, § 28, 22 June 2006).
The
Court further notes that, pursuant to Article 298 of the CCP (since
repealed), the applicants could have objected to their continued
remand in custody as indicated by the Government. However, the Court
cannot agree with the Government that this remedy was effective and
offered reasonable prospects of success in practice for the following
reasons.
The Court has examined several cases against Turkey in
which it has found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention based on the fact that, inter alia, the State
Security Courts used the same formal reasons for the applicants'
continued detention without explaining their specific relevance in
each case (see, for example, Hasan Ceylan v. Turkey,
no. 58398/00, 23 May 2006, Pakkan v. Turkey,
no. 13017/02, 31 October 2006, Gıyasettin Altun v.
Turkey, no. 73038/01, 24 May 2005, Tutar v. Turkey,
no. 11798/03, 10 October 2006, Mehmet Güneş v.
Turkey, no. 61908/00, 21 September 2006, Acunbay,
cited above, and Tamer and Others, cited above). It
considers that, in these circumstances, an objection against such
stereotype reasoning would have had little prospect of success before
another instance. Moreover, as a rule, the objection proceedings in
question are not adversarial and are decided in the absence of an
oral hearing (Article 302 § 1 of the CCP). They therefore lack
the guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in
question (see, for example, Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC],
no. 31195/96, § 58, ECHR 1999-II, and Assenov and Others
v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII, p. 3302, § 162).
The Court notes that there is a distinction between
the requirement of exhaustion of domestic
remedies under Article 35 § 1 and the requirements of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention aimed at providing
safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of liberty. However, where
its consistent case-law shows that such safeguards fail or are
deficient, it would be contrary to the very principle of the
Convention and would lead to excessive formalism under Article 35 §
1 to demand of the applicant the pursuit of inadequate safeguards.
Furthermore,
the Court notes that the Government's submissions in the instant case
remain very general, only citing the relevant provisions in the law.
The Court reiterates that it is not for the Convention bodies to cure
of their own motion any shortcomings or lack of precision in the
respondent Government's arguments (see, in particular, Stran Greek
Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9
December 1994, Series A no. 301-B, p. 77, § 35). In
the light of the above, the Court rejects the Government's objection
under this head.
As
to whether the applicants had failed to complain about the length of
the proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that
it has already examined and rejected the Government's preliminary
objections in similar cases (see, in particular, Mete v. Turkey,
no. 39327/02, §§ 18-19, 25 October 2005). The Court
finds no particular circumstances in the instant case which would
require it to depart from its findings in the above mentioned
application. It therefore also rejects this aspect of the
Government's objection.
The
Court considers that the application raises serious issues of fact
and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an
examination of the merits. It concludes therefore that the
application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring
it inadmissible has been established.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that their remand in custody exceeded the
“reasonable time” requirement as provided in Article 5 §
3 of the Convention, which reads insofar as relevant as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ...
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
The
Government maintained that the applicants' detention was based on the
existence of reasonable grounds of suspicion of them having committed
an offence, and that the custodial measure had been reviewed
periodically by the competent authority, with special diligence, in
accordance with the requirements laid down by the applicable law at
the relevant time. They pointed out that the offence with which the
applicants were charged was of a serious nature, and that their
continued remand in custody was necessary to prevent crime and to
preserve public order.
The
applicants maintained their allegations.
The
Court notes from the material in the case file that the State
Security Court considered the applicants' detention on remand at the
end of each hearing, either on its own motion or upon the request of
the applicants. On each occasion it prolonged that detention using
identical, stereotyped terms, such as “having regard to the
nature of the offence, the state of evidence and the content of the
file”. Although, in general, the expression “the state of
evidence” may be a relevant factor for the existence and
persistence of serious indications of guilt, in the present case it
nevertheless, alone, cannot justify a length of preventive detention
of over two years and three months, in particular, having regard to
the young age of the applicants (see, in particular, Selçuk
v. Turkey, no. 21768/02, §§ 34-36, 10 January 2006,
Letellier v. France, judgment of 26 June 1991, Series A
no. 207, Tomasi v. France, judgment of 27 August 1992,
Series A no. 241-A, Mansur v. Turkey, judgment of 8
June 1995, Series A no. 319-B, § 55).
Consequently
there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that the length of the criminal proceedings
exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement under Article
6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of ...any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a.hearing within a reasonable
time by [a] ...tribunal...”
The Government maintained that, in the circumstances of the present
case, the length of the criminal proceedings could not be considered
unreasonably long.
The
applicants maintained their allegations.
The
Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began
on 19 February 1999, when the applicants were arrested and taken into
custody and ended on 20 September 2001, when the Court of Cassation
upheld the judgment of the first instance court. The period under
consideration thus lasted two years and seven months before two
instances.
After
examining the overall duration of the proceedings, and taking into
account that the case was of some complexity, the number of accused
and the fact that the case was dealt with at two levels of
jurisdiction, the Court does not consider that the length of the
proceedings in the present case was excessive even if it had been
somewhat prolonged by the decision of the first instance court to
adjourn a number of hearings pending the establishment of the ages of
some of the accused. In this connection the
Court reiterates that while Article 6
§ 1 requires that
judicial proceedings be conducted expeditiously, it also lays
emphasis on the more general principle of the proper administration
of justice (see, for example, Gast and Popp v. Germany,
no. 29357/95, p. 487, § 75, ECHR 2000-II). The Court
further observes that no significant delay resulted at the appeal
stage.
Having
regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court finds
that the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was complied with in the present
case. Consequently, the Court concludes that there has been no
violation of Article 6 § 1 as regards the length of the
proceedings.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicants claimed, in total, 60,000 euros (EUR) in respect of
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested the amounts.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards each applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of
non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicants also claimed, in total, EUR 16,802 for the costs and
expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.
The
Government contested the amounts.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in
its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim
for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it
reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000, jointly, for the
proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts to be converted into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
3,000 (three thousand euros) each in respect of non pecuniary
damage;
(ii) EUR
1,000 (one thousand euros) jointly, in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 May 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Dollé F.
Tulkens Registrar President