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MAMMADOV (JALALOGLU) v. AZERBAIJAN - 34445/04 [2007] ECHR 33 (11 January 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/33.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 33
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF MAMMADOV (JALALOGLU) v. AZERBAIJAN
(Application
no. 34445/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11
January 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Mammadov (Jalaloglu) v. Azerbaijan,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mrs F. Tulkens,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr K. Hajiyev,
judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 7 December 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 34445/04) against the Republic
of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Azerbaijani national,
Mr Sardar Jalal oglu Mammadov (Sərdar
Cəlal oğlu Məmmədov; “the
applicant”), on 17 September 2004.
The
applicant was represented by Mr F. Agayev, a lawyer practising
in Baku. The Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent, Mr C. Asgarov.
The
applicant alleged ill-treatment by the police, absence of an
effective investigation and effective domestic remedies in this
respect, and discrimination on the ground of his political opinion.
On
25 October 2005 the Court decided to grant priority to the
application under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and give notice of it
to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Baku. More commonly known as
Sardar Jalaloglu in political circles, he was the Secretary General
of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. It was one of the opposition
parties that considered the presidential elections of 15 October 2003
illegitimate because of alleged falsifications.
A. The applicant's arrest
On
16 October 2003 a number of opposition supporters held unauthorised
public manifestations at the Azadliq Square in the centre of Baku,
protesting the results of the elections. The manifestations ended
with public disorder and violent clashes between the crowd and the
police. The applicant claimed that he had not personally participated
in these manifestations.
According
to the applicant, on 18 October 2003, between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m.,
several masked police officers, armed with Kalashnikov rifles,
appeared at the applicant's house, demanding that he open the door.
Before the applicant could do so, three or four of them entered the
applicant's apartment through a window. Without presenting an arrest
warrant or any other document, the police officers handcuffed the
applicant and his guest, N.J. Then the officers dragged them out of
the apartment and into a police car. The applicant and N.J. were
taken to the Organised Crime Unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(Mütəşəkkil Cinayətlərə
qarşı Mübarizə İdarəsi; hereinafter
“the OCU”).
Thereafter,
the applicant was kept handcuffed for about four hours in one of the
rooms inside the OCU's building. When the applicant's lawyer arrived
and attempted to find out the reasons for the applicant's arrest, the
Chief of the OCU told him that the reasons would be given the next
day.
B. Events following the applicant's arrival in OCU
On
the same day, the applicant was taken to the basement of the OCU's
building, which was used as a temporary detention facility. There,
in the office of the warden of the detention facility, he was ordered
to strip naked in the presence of several policemen. The policemen
checked his body for injuries and did not notice any. He was then
placed in a cell with two other detainees until the next morning.
The
next day, on 19 October 2003 between 12 noon and 1 p.m.,
the applicant was taken to the Investigation Department of the Chief
Prosecutor's Office and interrogated in the presence of his lawyer.
After the interrogation, he was charged with “organising public
disorder” and “use of violence against state officials”
for his alleged role in the events of 16 October 2003. According
to the applicant, he orally complained to the investigator that he
had been ill-treated on the way to the OCU and after being placed in
police custody.
At
4 p.m. on the same day the Nasimi District Court ordered the
applicant's detention on remand for three months. This decision was
subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal on 28 October 2003.
The
applicant was taken from the Nasimi District Court back to the OCU
where he was kept, until 22 October 2003, in the same cell with two
other detainees.
At
around 6 p.m. on 19 October 2003 the applicant was taken to the
office of the Deputy Chief of the OCU, where he was told that he
would be subjected to “additional interrogation”. The
applicant objected, stating that the OCU officers had no competence
to interrogate him after his indictment, but his objection was
unsuccessful. The interrogation lasted until approximately 10 p.m.
and involved questions concerning the activities of members of his
political party.
According
to the applicant, during this interrogation, he was subjected to
ill-treatment in the form of, inter alia, beating of the soles
of his feet by two masked policemen with truncheons.
C. The applicant's attempts to obtain redress for the
alleged ill-treatment
In
the morning of 20 October 2003 the applicant was visited by
representatives of the International Red Cross. He complained to them
that he had been ill-treated while in police custody.
On
21 October the applicant's lawyer sent a telegram to the Chief
Prosecutor's Office, complaining that the OCU did not allow him to
meet with the applicant in the detention facility on 20 and 21
October. Finally, on 22 October the applicant met with his lawyer and
told him that he had been beaten by police officers in the OCU.
On
the same day, the applicant was transferred from the OCU's detention
facility to the Investigative Isolator No. 1. Upon the transfer,
he was examined by the Isolator's doctors who observed injuries on
his body (more specifically, two haematomas on his right calf and
right heel) and made relevant notes in their records.
On
22 October 2003 the applicant's lawyer filed a petition with the
investigator of the Chief Prosecutor's Office dealing with the
applicant's case, requesting a medical examination of the applicant's
injuries. In the petition, the lawyer noted that the applicant had
complained about torture in the OCU's temporary detention facility
and that he had personally seen injuries on the applicant's calf and
foot.
Five
days later, on 27 October, not having received a reply from the
investigator, the lawyer filed a complaint with the Head of the
Investigation Department of the Chief Prosecutor's Office concerning
the investigator's failure to respond to his petition.
Following
this, on 28 October the investigator ordered a medical examination
and on 29 October the applicant was examined by a medical expert of
the Forensic Medicine and Pathologic Anatomy Department of the
Ministry of Health. According to the forensic report issued on 30
October, the expert observed the following injuries to the
applicant's body: (1) a pale rosy circular bruise of 1x1 cm on the
left elbow joint; (2) a yellowish haematoma of an indefinite shape
measuring 5x3 cm on the upper part of the right calf; and (3) a
yellowish haematoma of an indefinite shape measuring 6x5 cm on the
inside of the right heel. Finding it unnecessary to determine the
degree of gravity of these injuries, the expert concluded that they
had been caused by a hard blunt object. The expert also commented
that “[the possibility that] the injuries had been inflicted on
16 October 2003 cannot be excluded”.
On
18 December the warden of the OCU's temporary detention facility was
interrogated in connection with the applicant's complaint. He
testified that, when the applicant had been brought to his detention
facility on 18 October, he had been in good health and that no
injuries had been observed on his body. He further testified that the
applicant had not complained about any health problems upon his
arrival in the OCU. He also denied the applicant's allegations of
ill-treatment in the OCU's detention facility.
On
8 January 2004 the Head of the Investigation Department of the Chief
Prosecutor's Office, after interrogating four police officers of the
OCU, officially refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning
the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant in the OCU's detention
facility, finding that the applicant's allegations were not
substantiated. The investigator noted that the police officers denied
all the allegations of ill-treatment, that the forensic report did
not establish conclusively that the applicant's injuries had been
inflicted while in police custody, and that the applicant failed to
furnish any other evidence of ill-treatment.
Meanwhile,
on 14 December 2003 the applicant filed a separate complaint with the
Nasimi District Court, complaining that he had been unlawfully
arrested and tortured in police custody. Specifically, he complained
that, during the interrogation in the office of the Deputy Chief of
the OCU, for approximately four hours, he had been beaten with
truncheons on the soles of his feet by two people in masks. He
further noted that after the beating his cellmates had witnessed his
injuries and provided some assistance to him. He asked the court to
bring the officials concerned to criminal responsibility.
On
28 January 2004 the Nasimi District Court refused to examine the
complaint due to lack of territorial jurisdiction, finding that
complaints against the OCU officials must be filed with the Narimanov
District Court.
On
29 January 2004 the applicant filed a complaint of the same substance
with the Narimanov District Court. This court also refused to examine
the complaint due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. The matter was
referred to the Court of Appeal, which decided that it was within the
Nasimi District Court's territorial jurisdiction to examine the
complaint.
Finally,
on 18 February 2004 the Nasimi District Court examined the
applicant's complaint concerning the unlawfulness of the Chief
Prosecutor's Office's refusal to institute criminal proceedings and
dismissed it as unsubstantiated. The court specifically noted that
the forensic report did not rule out the possibility that the
injuries could have been inflicted to the applicant during the public
disorder on 16 October 2003, i.e. prior to the applicant's arrest. As
such, the court did not consider this forensic report as conclusive
evidence proving the applicant's beating in the OCU's detention
facility. The court found that the applicant did not produce
sufficient evidence to support his allegations.
The
applicant appealed, claiming that the Nasimi District Court failed to
give proper legal assessment to the evidence showing that he had been
tortured in police custody. On 17 March 2004 the Court of Appeal
upheld the Nasimi District Court's decision. The full decision of the
Court of Appeal was posted to the applicant's lawyer on 18 March
2004. No further appeal lay against this decision under the domestic
law.
As
for the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant for his
role in organising the public disorder on 16 October 2003, on
22 October 2004 he was convicted and sentenced to three years'
imprisonment. The court found that, although the applicant had not
been personally present at the Azadliq Square on 16 October 2003, he
was one of the organisers of the public disorder and gave
instructions to his followers from his party's headquarters.
In
March 2005 the applicant was released from serving the remainder of
his prison sentence pursuant to a presidential pardon decree.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL REPORTS
A. Constitution
Article
46 (III) of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan provides
as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or
ill-treatment. No one shall be subjected to degrading treatment or
punishment. ...”
B. Criminal responsibility for torture and inhuman and
degrading treatment
In
accordance with the Criminal Code, torture of an individual who is
under detention or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty is a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to ten years
(Article 113). Infliction of physical or psychological suffering to
an individual by way of systematic beating or other violent actions
performed by a public official in his official capacity is a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to ten years (Article
133).
In
accordance with Article 37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
criminal proceedings are instituted on the basis of a complaint by
the victim of an alleged criminal offence.
C. Civil action against public authorities' unlawful
act or omission
The
Law On Complaints against Acts and Omissions Infringing Individual
Rights and Freedoms, dated 11 June 1999 (hereinafter the “Law”),
provides for a judicial avenue for claims against public authorities.
In accordance with Article 2 of the Law, any act or omission by a
public authority infringing an individual's rights or freedoms may be
challenged either (a) directly before a court; or (b) before a higher
(supervising) public authority. If the complaint is first filed
before a supervising public authority, such authority must inform the
complainant in writing, within one month of the receipt of the
complaint, of the results of the examination of his or her complaint.
In
accordance with Article 5 of the Law, a direct judicial complaint
must be filed within one month from the date the complainant became
aware of the infringement of his rights or freedoms. However, if the
complainant has initially filed a complaint against acts or omissions
of the subordinate public authority with a supervising public
authority, a judicial complaint challenging the decision of the
supervising authority must be filed within one month of receipt of
this decision. Provided the complainant had a good reason for the
filing of a complaint after expiry of the deadline, the court may
still accept it.
According
to Article 6 of the Law, the court is entitled to declare the
disputed act or omission unlawful, to lift the liability imposed on
the complainant or to take other measures to restore the infringed
right or freedom, and to determine the liability of the public
authority for its unlawful act or omission. The court's finding of an
infringement of the individual rights and freedoms gives rise to a
civil claim for damages against the State.
The
Civil Code contains similar provisions. In accordance with the Civil
Code, disputes between individuals and public authorities concerning
individual rights and freedoms may be the subject matter for a civil
action (Articles 2 and 5). Unlawful acts or omissions of a public
authority or its officials give rise to a civil claim for damages
against the State (Article 22). The State's civil liability is the
same as that of an ordinary legal person (Article 43).
The
Code of Civil Procedure provides for the procedure by which an
individual can sue the State for damages in civil proceedings.
D. Investigations by the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture (CPT)
The
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has carried
out three visits to Azerbaijan. The first visit took place in
November-December 2002 and involved visits to the Investigative
Isolator No. 1 as well as the detention facilities under the
authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including OCU's
temporary detention facility. The main purpose of the second (ad
hoc) visit in January 2004 was to collect information concerning
the treatment of persons detained in relation to the events which
followed the presidential election of 15 October 2003. The delegation
interviewed some thirty persons held at Investigative Isolator No. 1.
In addition, the delegation visited OCU's temporary detention
facility. The main purpose of the third (ad hoc) visit in May
2005 was to examine the situation in Gobustan prison. The CPT's
reports on these visits, except that of November-December 2002, have
not been made public, such publication requiring the consent of the
State concerned, which has not been forthcoming.
While
the CPT report concerning the visit of November-December 2002
mentions no specific instances of ill-treatment in OCU's temporary
detention facility, it notes that the delegation received numerous
allegations of physical ill-treatment of persons detained by the
police in the establishments under the authority of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. The types of ill-treatment alleged mainly concerned
slaps, punches, kicks and blows struck with truncheons, gun butts and
other hard objects. In some cases, the severity of the ill-treatment
alleged – such as the infliction of electric shocks, blows
struck on the soles of the feet, blows to the body while the person
concerned was handcuffed in a suspended position – was such
that it could be considered as amounting to torture. Further, several
persons gave accounts of different forms of humiliation and threats
to use physical force (including sexual violence) against them or
their relatives, in order to make them confess to a crime or provide
information.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had
been ill-treated during his arrest, that he had been tortured in the
OCU's temporary detention facility, and that the conditions of his
further detention at the Investigative Isolator No. 1 also amounted
to ill-treatment. He also complained that his allegations of
ill-treatment had not been investigated effectively, as required by
the procedural obligation imposed by the same Article. Article 3 of
the Convention provides as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
1. As regards the alleged ill-treatment during the
arrest
In
this part of the complaint, the applicant contended that during his
arrest on 18 October 2003, the police officers had knocked him down,
handcuffed him, dragged him to the ground and hit him. While being
transported in the car to the OCU, he was hit and verbally assaulted.
In the courtyard of the OCU, he was forced to lie on the wet ground
with his face down and asked questions concerning his identity. In
support of his allegations, the applicant submitted statements by
several family members who, with varying degree of detail and
consistency, asserted that the applicant had been roughly treated by
the police in his house during the arrest.
The
Government submitted that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic
remedies with regard to the part of the complaint relating to the
ill-treatment during his arrest, because he failed to properly raise
this complaint before the domestic authorities. The Government noted,
in particular, that the applicant had not submitted his relatives'
statements to any domestic authority prior to submitting them to the
Court. The applicant did not comment specifically on this objection
by the Government.
The
Court finds that it is not necessary to decide whether the applicant
has exhausted domestic remedies with regard to this part of the
complaint because, even assuming this to be the case, it is
inadmissible for the following reason.
The
Court notes that, apart from the statements of his family members
(which appear to have not been submitted to the domestic authorities
for scrutiny), it does not have in its possession any other evidence
of the applicant's alleged ill-treatment by the police during the
arrest. The Court also notes the applicant's allegations of beating
during the arrest are rebutted by the testimony of the warden of the
OCU's temporary detention facility who testified that no injuries
were observed on the applicant's body upon his arrival in the OCU.
The applicant himself heavily relied on this testimony in connection
with the part of his complaint concerning the alleged ill-treatment
in custody, and maintained that all of his injuries noted in the
forensic report of 30 October 2003 had been inflicted upon him on 19
October 2003, one day after his arrest. In the light of the
foregoing, and based on all the materials available in the case file,
the Court considers that the evidence submitted in respect of this
part of the complaint is not sufficient to enable the Court to
examine the question of whether the applicant was subjected to
ill-treatment during his arrest.
It
follows that this part of the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and
must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3
and 4 of the Convention.
2. As regards the alleged ill-treatment in police
custody
In
this part of the complaint, the applicant claimed that, in the OCU's
temporary detention facility, he had been beaten and tortured during
the interrogation on 19 October 2003, threatened with rape, held in a
poorly-ventilated cell, and kept hungry and without clean drinking
water for five days.
The
Court finds that this part of the complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
3. As regards the conditions of detention in
Investigative Isolator No. 1
In
this part of the complaint, the applicant alleged that, during his
further detention on remand in the Investigative Isolator No. 1, he
had been held for 40 days in a very small cell of 1,35 metres to 2,5
metres, which was in an unhygienic condition, was not heated and had
electric lights switched on throughout the day and night. He was told
that this cell had been previously used for those convicts who were
sentenced to death and that two such persons had actually been
executed in that cell several years earlier.
The
Government submitted that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic
remedies with regard to this part of the complaint. He had not raised
it before any domestic authority prior to lodging the present
application with the Court.
The
applicant submitted that there was no remedy available to him in this
regard. He argued that, although the domestic law expressly
prohibited torture and inhuman treatment by prison officials and
provided avenues for redress against such ill-treatment, there was no
specific legal regulation of other types of ill-treatment such as the
general conditions of detention. The applicant also noted that, in
any event, in the light of the apparent ineffectiveness of the
official investigation into his claims of torture in custody, any
attempt to seek redress for the conditions of his detention would
also be ineffective.
The
Court recalls that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies
referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to
bring their case against the State before an international judicial
or arbitral organ to use first the remedies provided by the national
legal system, thus dispensing the States from answering before an
international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity
to put matters right through their own legal systems. In order to
comply with this rule, normal recourse should be had by an applicant
to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in
respect of the breaches alleged (see e.g. Akdivar and Others v.
Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1996 IV, p. 1210, § 65-66).
The Court cannot accept the applicant's argument that
there was no remedy available to him under domestic law in respect of
the conditions of his detention. It notes that the Law On
Complaints against Acts and Omissions Infringing Individual Rights
and Freedoms provides for a judicial avenue for challenging any
act or omission by a public authority infringing an individual's
rights or freedoms. Both Article 46 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Azerbaijan and Article 3 of the Convention, which is
directly applicable in the domestic legal system, prohibit inhuman
and degrading treatment. Therefore, relying on these provisions, the
applicant could either file a complaint with the Ministry of Justice
(as a supervising authority for the Investigative Isolator No. 1) or
file a lawsuit directly with the domestic courts, complaining about
the conditions of his detention. However, the applicant has not
attempted to do so. Moreover, he has not shown convincingly that such
steps were bound to be ineffective. Mere doubts about the
effectiveness of a remedy are not sufficient to dispense with the
requirement to make normal use of the available avenues for redress
(see e.g. Kunqurova v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 5117/03,
3 June 2005).
It
follows that this part of the complaint must be rejected under
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
B. Merits
1. Alleged ill-treatment in police custody
(a) The parties' submissions
The
Government submitted that the applicant failed to produce any
conclusive evidence showing that he had been ill-treated while in
police custody. The medical expert opinion of 30 October 2003 did not
exclude the possibility that the applicant suffered his injuries on
16 October 2003, i.e. prior to his arrest and during the public
disorder in the aftermath of the elections. The Government also
argued that in any event, according to the forensic report, the
applicant's injuries did not seriously affect his health. Therefore,
the alleged ill-treatment did not attain the minimum level of
severity required by Article 3 of the Convention.
The
applicant submitted that he had been subjected to ill-treatment
amounting to torture whilst in the custody of the OCU. He relied on
the marks on his heel, calf and elbow. He contended that no other
plausible explanation for the injuries on his body had been
forthcoming from the authorities. In particular, he noted that he
could not have even hypothetically suffered his injuries during the
events of 16 October 2003 because he simply had not been at the
Azadliq Square on that day. The fact that there had been no injuries
on his body when he was brought to the OCU's detention facility was
attested by the facility's warden during the investigation.
The
applicant noted that, shortly after he had been brought to the OCU, a
police officer hit him several times with a truncheon in the liver
area and the sides of his body. On the next day, 19 October 2003,
during the interrogation in the office of the Deputy Chief of the
OCU, two masked police officers, using truncheons, struck blows on
the soles of his feet for a duration of approximately four hours with
the intention of extracting information from him. They also
occasionally hit him on other parts of his body. The beating was
accompanied by threats of rape. The beating caused very serious
physical pain due to which he temporarily lost the ability to walk
unaided. After he was taken back to his cell by the OCU officers, his
cellmates helped him to take off his socks and witnessed the bad
condition of his feet.
The
applicant submitted that rape threats continued even after the
beating, when he was placed in a poorly-ventilated cell, banned from
meeting his lawyer for three days, and could hear the cries of other
detainees being ill-treated. Given the circumstances and environment
in which these threats were made, they inflicted intense moral
suffering upon him.
The
applicant further noted that, although the beating occurred on
19 October 2003, he was only allowed to meet his lawyer and
inform him about it three days later. Despite the lawyer's immediate
attempt to obtain a medical examination, the examination only took
place on 29 October 2003 due to the intentional delay caused by the
authorities. By that time, the applicant had largely regained the
ability to walk unaided, his injuries had partially healed and many
smaller traces of beating had disappeared. The delay in the medical
examination prevented a more accurate determination of the time of
infliction of the injuries. Moreover, the applicant argued that the
medical expert failed to note the full extent of his injuries because
he was an employee of a state institution and, therefore, not
independent.
(b) The Court's assessment
As
the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 enshrines one of
the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most
difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and
organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the
substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4,
Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it
is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a
public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see e.g.
Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V;
Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR
2000 IV; and Dikme v. Turkey, no. 20869/92, § 89,
ECHR 2000 VIII).
The
Court reiterates that “[w]here an individual, when taken in
police custody, is in good health, but is found to be injured at the
time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible
explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear
issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention” (see Tomasi
v. France, judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A, pp.
40-41, §§ 108-11; and Selmouni, cited above, § 87).
The
Court observes, at the outset, that the only medical record submitted
by the parties is the forensic report of 30 October 2003, issued
several days after the alleged beating of the applicant. However, the
Court notes that, despite having been transferred to another
detention facility in the meantime, the applicant was continuously
under detention, i.e. within the control of the authorities, from the
date of the alleged ill-treatment until the date of issue of the
forensic report.
As
to the Government's argument that the applicant failed to present
sufficient evidence of ill-treatment by the police, the Court recalls
that, in assessing evidence, it has generally applied the standard of
proof “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Ireland v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no.
25, pp. 64-65, § 161). However, such proof may follow from the
coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences
or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in
issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of
the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in
custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of
injuries occurring during such detention. Indeed, the burden of proof
may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Ribitsch v. Austria,
judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, pp. 25 26, §
34; and Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR
2000-VII).
The
Court notes that, while the Government disputed the applicant's
allegations of ill-treatment, they did not provide any reasonable
explanation as to when and how these injuries were caused. The Court
cannot accept the Government's argument that the forensic report did
not exclude the possibility that the applicant had sustained his
injuries before his arrest. As regards the time of the injuries, the
report is vaguely worded and inconclusive. It likewise does not
exclude the possibility that the injuries were suffered after the
applicant's arrest and when he was kept in police custody in the OCU.
Accordingly, the Court finds that, although the forensic report
established conclusively the presence of injuries on the applicant's
body, it did not determine the exact time when they were sustained.
The
Court notes that the applicant has repeatedly insisted, both before
the domestic authorities and the Court, that he had not been present
at the Azadliq Square during the events of 16 October 2003 and,
therefore, could not have been injured there. However, at the time of
investigation, the domestic authorities did not take any steps in
order to rebut this. A mere presumption that the applicant could have
been injured before his arrest, uncorroborated by any other evidence,
cannot be considered as a satisfactory and convincing explanation on
the part of the Government. Moreover, having regard to the nature of
the injuries sustained by the applicant, in particular the haematoma
on his heel caused by a blunt object, the Court considers that this
is a specific type of injury which is very unlikely to be sustained
during ordinary street clashes with the riot police. In this
connection, the Court takes note of the fact that, at the applicant's
subsequent criminal trial which took place several months later, it
was established that he indeed had not been personally present at the
Azadliq Square on that day.
Furthermore,
the Court notes that the Government have not submitted any
documentary proof showing that the applicant had been injured prior
to his arrest, since no proper medical examination of the applicant
was carried out when he was taken into custody (compare with Doğanay
v. Turkey, no. 50125/99, § 30, 21 February 2006; and
Akkurt v. Turkey, no. 47938/99, § 36, 4 May
2006). On the contrary, according to the unambiguous testimony of the
warden of the OCU's detention facility, given during the
investigation, no signs of injuries had been observed on the
applicant's body upon his check-in to the detention facility (see
paragraph 21 above).
The
Court considers that the haematoma on the applicant's right heel
combined with the other bruises on his body were consistent with the
application of falaka (beating of the soles of the feet),
which the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture reported
was one of the forms of ill-treatment used in the temporary detention
facilities which were under the authority of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. Injuries of this type were not likely to have been caused
accidentally (see Salman, cited above, § 113).
Having
regard to the applicant's consistent and detailed allegations,
corroborated by the forensic report, and in view of the absence of
any other plausible explanation as to the origin of the injuries
found on the applicant, the Court accepts that these injuries must be
considered attributable to a form of ill-treatment for which the
authorities were responsible.
As
to the seriousness of the act of ill-treatment, the Court reiterates
that, in determining whether a particular form of ill-treatment
should be qualified as torture, consideration must be given to the
distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of
inhuman or degrading treatment. It appears that it was the intention
that the Convention should, by means of this distinction, attach a
special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious
and cruel suffering (see Ireland, cited above, pp. 66-67, §
167; and Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996,
Reports 1996-VI, pp. 2278-79, § 63). In addition to
the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element, as
recognised in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which came into
force on 26 June 1987, and which in Article 1 defines torture in
terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with
the aim, inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting
punishment or intimidating (see Salman, cited above, §
114; and Dikme, cited above, §§ 94-95).
Having
regard to the nature of the ill-treatment (beating of the soles of
the applicant's feet), the Court considers that it could only have
been intentionally inflicted because a certain amount of preparation
and exertion would have been required to carry it out. It would
appear to have been administered with the aim of obtaining admissions
or information from the applicant (cf. Aksoy, cited above, p.
2279, § 64; also compare with Salman, cited above, §
115, in which case the Court found that the application of falaka
amounted to torture). The Court considers that this treatment was of
such a serious and cruel nature that it can be characterised as
torture.
In
conclusion, the Court finds that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention in this regard.
2. Alleged failure to carry out an effective
investigation
(a) The parties' submissions
The
Government submitted that the authorities carried out an effective
official investigation into the applicant's complaint of
ill-treatment. Specifically, the Government pointed out that the
General Prosecutor's Office conducted a criminal investigation,
during which four OCU's officers were interrogated in connection with
the applicant's allegations, and found that these allegations were
unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the applicant contested judicially the
results of the investigation and his complaint was examined on the
merits by the domestic courts.
The
applicant submitted that neither the investigation authorities nor
the domestic courts had carried out a thorough and effective
investigation of his complaints. He maintained that the investigation
was superficial and subject to numerous flaws. Specifically, the
authorities clearly ignored the testimony of the warden of the OCU's
detention facility that the applicant was in good health when he was
admitted into custody. Likewise, they did not seek testimonies of any
other witnesses who could confirm this fact. The domestic courts
delayed the consideration of his case for more than two months and
committed the same mistakes as the prosecution authorities.
(b) The Court's assessment
The
Court recalls that, where an individual raises an arguable claim that
he or she has been seriously ill-treated by the police in breach of
Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State's
general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
... [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there
should be an effective official investigation. This investigation
should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of
those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would,
despite its fundamental importance (see paragraph 59 above), be
ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for
agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control
with virtual impunity (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria,
judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998 VIII, p.
3290, § 102; and Labita, cited above, § 131). The
minimum standards as to effectiveness defined by the Court's case-law
also include the requirements that the investigation must be
independent, impartial and subject to public scrutiny, and that the
competent authorities must act with exemplary diligence and
promptness (see Isayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 57947/00,
57948/00 and 57949/00, §§ 208-213, 24 February 2005; and
Menesheva v. Russia, no. 59261/00, § 64, ECHR
2006 ...).
The
Court notes, at the outset, that the applicant was not able to bring
his claim of ill-treatment immediately to the attention of the
authorities because he was not allowed to see his lawyer for three
days after the beating. The matter was first brought to the attention
of the authorities when his lawyer demanded a medical examination on
22 October 2003. However, this request was not handled with
sufficient diligence, as no action was taken in this regard until the
lawyer complained to the prosecutor, five days later, about the
failure to arrange for a medical examination. Even after this, it
took two more days for the medical examination to be carried out. The
Court notes, in this regard, that allegations of torture in police
custody are extremely difficult for the victim to substantiate if he
or she has been isolated from the outside world, without access to
doctors, lawyers, family or friends who could provide support and
assemble the necessary evidence (see Aksoy, cited above, p.
2286, § 97). The authorities must take whatever reasonable steps
they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including
inter alia forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the
investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of
injury or the person responsible will risk falling foul of this
standard (see Batı and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097/96
and 57834/00, § 134, ECHR 2004 IV (extracts)). The
Court therefore considers that the failure to secure the forensic
evidence in a timely manner was one of the important factors
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the investigation in the
present case. A timely medical examination could have enabled the
medical expert to reach a more definitive conclusion as to the time
of infliction and cause of the injuries.
Furthermore,
the ensuing criminal investigation in the present case was not
satisfactory. The investigation authorities limited themselves to
studying the forensic report and questioning four police officers who
had been in contact with the applicant in the OCU. No other witnesses
were interrogated. In this connection, given that the finding of the
applicant's ill treatment could entail criminal responsibility
of the OCU officials, it does not strike the Court as unusual that
the interrogated police officers denied the allegations of
ill-treatment. Nevertheless, the investigator took the denial of the
police officers at face-value and refused to institute criminal
proceedings, despite the applicant's statements and his undisputed
bodily injuries.
Based
on this limited investigation, the investigator merely presumed that
the applicant must have received those injuries during the events of
16 October 2003, relying on a highly inconclusive statement in the
forensic report stating that such a possibility could not be
excluded. The investigator, however, failed to take into account the
fact that the forensic report, likewise, did not exclude the
possibility that those injuries could have been inflicted after the
applicant's arrest. In effect, this amounted to shifting onto the
applicant the burden to prove his allegations of ill treatment.
However, as has been stated above, in cases where a person is found
to be injured while in custody, the burden of proof rests on the
authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation as
to the cause of the injuries (see paragraphs 60 and 62 above).
The
Court further notes that the investigation authorities, in reaching
their decision not to institute criminal proceedings, totally failed
to take into account the unambiguous statement of the warden of the
OCU's temporary detention facility who testified that the applicant
had been in good health upon his arrival in the OCU. At no stage of
the proceedings did the authorities establish that the warden's
testimony was unreliable. This testimony alone could have led the
investigator to conclude that the applicant's injuries had been
inflicted in custody.
Moreover,
the applicant consistently claimed that he had not been present at
the Azadliq Square during the events of 16 October 2003 and,
therefore, could not have suffered his injuries there. However, at
the time of the investigation, the authorities did not take any steps
to verify this information, such as to interrogate any witnesses who
could confirm the applicant's absence at the Azadliq Square. They
failed to seek testimonies of any other witnesses (such as the
applicant's family members, neighbours, or any other persons who had
been in contact with the applicant before his arrest), who could
testify as to whether the applicant had already been injured prior to
his arrest. Neither did they seek to interrogate the applicant's
cellmates in OCU who had seen him immediately after the beating.
Having
regard to these numerous flaws and omissions, the Court finds that no
effective investigation was carried out into the applicant's
allegations of ill-treatment. Accordingly, there has been a
violation of Article 3 of the Convention on this account.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that he had been denied an effective remedy in
respect of his Convention complaint of ill-treatment in police
custody. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides as
follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above
and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
parties' submissions were the same in substance as those concerning
the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.
The Court recalls that Article 13 of the
Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy
to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in
whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal
order. As a general rule, if a single remedy does not by itself
entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of
remedies provided for under domestic law may do so (see e.g. Kudła
v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 157, ECHR 2000-XI; and
Menesheva, cited above, § 71).
However, the scope of the State's obligation under
Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant's
complaint, and in certain situations the Convention requires a
particular remedy to be provided. Thus, in cases of suspicious death
or ill-treatment, given the fundamental importance of the rights
protected by Articles 2 and 3, Article 13 requires, in addition to
the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and
effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and
punishment of those responsible (see Aksoy, cited above, pp.
2286 and 2287, §§ 95 and 98; and Assenov and Others,
cited above, p. 3293, § 117).
On
the basis of the evidence put forward in the present case, the Court
has found that the authorities were responsible for the injuries
sustained by the applicant while in police custody of the OCU. The
applicant's complaints to the domestic authorities in this regard
were based on the same evidence and were therefore “arguable”
for the purposes of Article 13 (see Boyle and Rice v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131,
p. 23, § 52). The authorities thus had an obligation
to carry out an effective investigation into his allegations against
the police officers.
For
the reasons set out above, the Court found that the domestic
investigation of the applicant's claim was not sufficiently thorough
and effective. Likewise, the domestic courts, which reviewed the
result of the criminal investigation, simply endorsed the
investigator's opinion that the applicant's claim was unsubstantiated
without attempting to independently assess the facts of the case and,
in essence, committed exactly the same flaws and omissions as those
committed by the investigator during the criminal investigation.
Therefore,
having regard to the finding that no effective investigation was
carried out in the present case, the Court finds that the applicant
has been denied an effective domestic remedy in respect of the
ill treatment by the police. Consequently, there has been a
violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that he had been tortured and otherwise
ill-treated because of his political opinion and affiliation to an
opposition party. He was thus discriminated against, contrary to the
prohibition contained in Article 14 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The
Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic
remedies because he had not raised his discrimination complaint
before any domestic authority. In any event, the Government
maintained that the applicant had not suffered any discrimination.
The
applicant reiterated his complaint and argued that he was not
required to exhaust any separate domestic remedies in connection with
it.
Even
assuming that the applicant has exhausted the domestic remedies in
connection with this complaint, the Court considers that he has not
submitted such evidence of discrimination which would enable the
Court to examine the question of whether there has been a violation
of Article 14 in the present case. It follows that this complaint is
manifestly ill founded and must be rejected in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
1. Pecuniary damage
The
applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage.
He claimed that the beating in custody resulted “in
irreversible consequences for the rest of his life”. He still
suffered from post-traumatic pains in his feet and legs and had to
seek regular medical aid. In support of his claims, he submitted
recent medical statements (issued in 2006) prescribing to him such
medical measures as physiotherapy, massage and medication treatment.
The
Government argued that the applicant failed to submit any evidence of
pecuniary damage.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged. Specifically, it is not clear from
the submitted medical statements that the applicant's current health
problems stem directly from the beating inflicted upon him during his
custody in 2003. Moreover, although these statements prescribe
certain medical treatment to the applicant, they do not specify the
duration, intensity or cost of such treatment. Finally, the applicant
has neither submitted any evidence showing that he has actually
undergone any medical treatment since the time of his release from
custody, nor any evidence showing the cost of such treatment. The
Court therefore rejects the applicant's claim in respect of pecuniary
damage.
2. Non-pecuniary damage
The
applicant claimed EUR 400,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He
argued that the ill-treatment in custody caused him serious moral
suffering.
The
Government noted that the amount claimed was unjustified and
excessive.
Given
the finding that the applicant suffered torture in police custody and
that the domestic investigation into his complaints was ineffective,
the Court considers that this cannot be compensated solely by the
finding of a violation. Nevertheless, the amount claimed is
excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required
by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant the
sum of EUR 10,000 in respect of moral damage, plus any tax that may
be chargeable on this amount.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 100 for postal expenses, EUR 890 for the
costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 890
for those incurred before the Court. He submitted only the proof of
postal expenses in the amount of 46 United States dollars (USD)
(approximately EUR 37). He has not submitted any proof of costs and
expenses incurred before the domestic courts.
The
Government did not make any comments with regard to these costs and
expenses.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, the Court will award the postal
expenses in the amount justified by the applicant, i.e. EUR 37. As to
the costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings, having regard to
the facts of the case, the Court considers that, although the
applicant failed to submit any evidence in respect of these costs and
expenses, it is reasonable to award the amount claimed by the
applicant. The Court also considers it reasonable to award the amount
claimed by the applicant for costs and expenses for the proceedings
before the Court. Accordingly, the Court awards the sum of EUR 1,817
covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable
on this amount.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints concerning the alleged
ill-treatment in custody and lack of effective domestic remedies
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention as regards the ill-treatment in police custody;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention as regards the lack of effective
investigation into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 10,000 (ten
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,817 (one
thousand eight hundred and seventeen euros) in respect of the costs
and expenses, to be converted into New Azerbaijani manats at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable on these amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 January 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren
Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President