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VOZHIGOV v. RUSSIA - 5953/02 [2007] ECHR 329 (26 April 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/329.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 329
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF
VOZHIGOV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 5953/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
26 April 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Vozhigov v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič,
President,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mrs A.
Gyulumyan,
Mr E. Myjer,
Mr David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Mrs I. Ziemele, judges,
and Mr S.
Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 29 March 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 5953/02) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Andrey Valeryevich
Vozhigov (“the applicant”), on 21 December 2001.
The
applicant was represented by Ms O. Mikhaylova, a lawyer practising in
Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by Mr Pavel Laptev, Representative of the Russian
Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, that criminal proceedings against
him were not fair because of a number of procedural irregularities.
By
a decision of 8 December 2005, the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
The
Government, but not the applicant, filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1974 and
lives in Bryansk.
1. Preliminary investigation
In
October 2000 the applicant was taken to a police station in the
Bezhitskiy District of Bryansk on suspicion of the murder of a man
who had been beaten to death.
The
applicant submitted that he was arrested on 17 October 2000 and
interrogated in the absence of a lawyer. According to the applicant,
on the same date he was ill-treated by policemen and wrote a
confession under pressure from them. He further submitted that a
medical examination was conducted only ten days later, when bruises
could no longer be seen.
The
Government submitted that the applicant was arrested and first
interrogated on 18 October 2000. In the report on his arrest the
applicant stated that he “agreed to be detained”. In the
course of the interrogation between 9.07 p.m. and 9.57 p.m. he waived
his right to legal assistance, as was noted in the record of the
interrogation.
On
21 October 2000 detention as a measure of restraint was applied to
the applicant.
During
interrogation on 26 October 2000 the applicant confirmed the waiver
of his right to legal assistance, which was also noted in the minutes
of the interrogation.
On
27 October 2000 he was charged with murder. During the interrogation
on the same date the applicant refused to make any statements and
denied his guilt.
In
the course of the investigation a witness, Ms Y., stated to the
investigative authorities that she had seen the applicant beating the
man. On an unspecified date the applicant was confronted with Ms Y.,
where it was open to him to put questions and comment on her
statements. Ms Y. confirmed her earlier statement.
On
an unspecified date the public prosecutor's office instituted
criminal proceedings against the policemen who had allegedly
ill-treated the applicant. As a result of the investigation
conducted, the proceedings were discontinued on account of lack of
indication of a crime.
On
30 October 2000 the applicant sent a request for legal assistance to
the prosecutor. He indicated that he wanted to be represented by one
of the following counsel: Mr V., a lawyer from the Moscow law firm
Vedischev and Partners; Ms M., a lawyer of the Moscow Bar
Association; or an unspecified lawyer from the Legal Advice Office of
the Bezhitskiy District of Bryansk. According to the Government, the
request was received by the public prosecutor's office on 8 November
2000. The prosecutor then transferred the request to the
investigator.
On
21 December 2000 the investigator sent three letters to the counsel
chosen by the applicant, asking them to inform him whether they could
participate in the investigative measures – the serving of the
bill of indictment and studying of the case file – scheduled
for 21, 25 and 26 December 2000.
On
21 December 2000 the letter was received by the Legal Advice Office
of the Bezhitskiy District of Bryansk and on 10 January 2001 by the
law firm Vedischev and Partners. It is not clear whether it was
received by Ms M.
The
Government submitted that no investigative measures were undertaken
on either 21 or 25 December 2000.
The
applicant submitted that the investigative measures were not
postponed, and that he was not provided with the opportunity to study
the case file.
On
25 December 2000 advocate K., a member of the Bryansk Bar
Association, was assigned to assist the applicant. According to the
Government, advocate K. worked for the Legal Advice Office of the
Bezhitskiy District of Bryansk.
On
26 December 2000, when the bill of indictment was served on the
applicant, advocate K. assisted him in studying the case file. The
applicant refused to sign a statement to the effect that he had
studied the case file. However, the statement was signed by advocate
K.
On
12 January 2001 the law firm Vedischev and Partners sent two replies,
to the investigator and the applicant. The reply to the investigator
read:
“We have received your letter, in which you inform
us that the following investigative measures ... are scheduled for
21, 25 and 26 December 2000 ... however, according to the postmark,
the letter was sent on 21 December 2000 and it was received by us on
10 January 2001.
By using such a method of notification you deliberately
excluded the possibility of our lawyer's participation in the
investigative measures indicated. By your action you have grossly
violated the defence rights of the accused [Mr] Vozhigov, who
expressed his wish to be assisted by a lawyer from our law firm.
You must set a new date for [the investigative measures]
and notify us about it in due time in order to provide a real
opportunity for our lawyer to participate in the defence of [Mr]
Vozhigov.”
2. Court proceedings
On
30 January 2001 the Bezhitskiy District Court of Bryansk ordered a
number of witnesses, including Ms Y., who appeared to be the only
eyewitness, to be brought before the court. The hearing was fixed for
19 February 2001. On that date the bailiff went to Ms Y.'s
residence. However, he did not find her at home as, according to her
mother, since December 2000 she had been living in Moscow. The
hearing was then postponed twice, until 19 March and 19 April 2001.
Both times the court ordered to have Ms Y. brought to the hearing.
According to the bailiff's report of 19 April 2001 Ms Y. had ceased
to reside at the address indicated to the court and her new place of
residence was not known.
On
7 May 2001 the court requested the prosecutor at the Bezhitskiy
District Court of Bryansk to establish Ms Y.'s whereabouts. In the
reply of 29 May 2001 the prosecutor informed the court that Ms Y. was
not registered as resident either in Moscow or in the Moscow Region.
The court issued another order to have Ms Y. brought to the hearing
of 4 June 2001. The Government submitted that by the
aforementioned date it appeared impossible to establish her
whereabouts since she did not live at the address provided to the
court and her relative did not have any information as to where she
was.
At
the hearing of 4 June 2001 the Bezhitskiy District Court of Bryansk
decided to examine Ms Y.'s statements made during the preliminary
investigation. The court asked both parties whether they had any
objections. Neither party objected. The court based its judgment on
the statements of Ms Y., the applicant's confession made at the
beginning of the investigation – although he later changed his
statements and pleaded not guilty before the court – and on a
certain amount of indirect evidence, such as statements by indirect
witnesses and expert reports. At the hearing the court also examined
the applicant's doctor, Mr R., who had monitored the applicant since
April 2000 in connection with a hip fracture he had sustained in
August 1999, with a view to determining whether the applicant
would have been able to commit the offence, taking into account his
injury. Mr R. stated that because of the improvement of his state of
health the applicant had not been operated on but had been
recommended not to lift weights of over 12 kilograms. The court also
found the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment unsubstantiated.
The court reached that conclusion relying on oral evidence given at
the hearing by another policeman, a medical certificate according to
which the applicant had no injuries that could have been caused on
the date of the alleged ill-treatment, and the results of the
investigation conducted by the public prosecutor's office.
Advocate K. assisted the applicant in the proceedings before the
trial court. The court convicted the applicant of murder and
sentenced him to 11 years and six months' imprisonment.
On
7 June 2001 the applicant applied to the Bezhitskiy District Court of
Bryansk to examine the record of the hearing. On 21 June 2001 the
applicant stated in writing that he had studied the record.
The
applicant appealed against the conviction on the grounds, inter
alia, that during the preliminary investigation he had been
unduly refused legal assistance and that the authorities had
deliberately precluded him from being assisted by the lawyer of his
choosing. He also claimed that his confession had been made under
pressure from the police officials and stated that the key witness,
Ms Y., had not been examined at the hearing.
On
6 July 2001 the Bryansk Regional Court upheld the conviction. The
court held that the trial court had been correct to rely on Ms Y.'s
statements made during the preliminary investigation because it had
been impossible for her to appear at the hearing. The court also held
that there had been no substantial breaches of procedural
requirements, including any alleged breach of the applicant's right
to defence, such as to render the conviction unlawful.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
1. Right to legal assistance
Article
48 of the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to qualified
legal assistance. Under Article 48 § 2 an arrested person has
the right to the assistance of a lawyer from the moment of the
arrest.
Pursuant
to Articles 47 and 52 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure of
1960, a suspect, from the moment of his arrest, has the right to be
represented by defence counsel, if necessary to be paid for by the
authorities.
2. Termination of the preliminary investigation
Pursuant
to Article 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960, the
preliminary investigation ends by the drawing up of a bill of
indictment. Article 201 further provides that an investigator has to
notify the accused of the termination of the preliminary
investigation and explain to him his right to examine the case file
either in person or with the assistance of a lawyer. When the accused
asks for the assistance of a lawyer the investigator has to provide
the accused and his lawyer with the file on the case, which facility
has to be deferred until the actual appearance of a lawyer, but not
for longer than five days. After the accused and his lawyer have
finished studying the case file, the investigator has to ask them
whether they wish to make any applications to amend the
investigation.
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention about a number
of procedural irregularities. In particular, he complained
about the failure to conduct an expert medical examination on him
during the preliminary investigation so as to determine whether he
could have committed the offence, taking into account his injury.
Relying on Article 6 § 3 (b), he alleged that he had not been
provided with the opportunity to study the case file. Invoking
Article 6 § 3 (c), he complained that he had
been de facto refused legal assistance because the
investigator had sent his request to the law firm of his choosing too
late, which rendered the presence of his lawyer impossible. Relying
on Article 6 § 3 (d), the applicant also complained about the
court's failure to examine the key witness Ms Y. at the hearing.
Article
6, in so far as relevant, provides:
“1. In the determination of ... any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ...
hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...
...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence
has the following minimum rights:
...
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for
the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient
means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him ...”
a) The parties' submissions
In
his observations submitted prior to the decision as to the
admissibility of 8 December 2005, the applicant reiterated that the
investigator had deliberately sent the letters to the counsel of his
choosing too late, thus preventing them from participating in the
investigative measures. He further claimed that by appointing
advocate K., a member of the Bryansk Bar Association, as his counsel
the investigator had violated his right to legal assistance of his
choosing. Furthermore, advocate K. had failed to represent his
interests effectively. As regards the failure to examine Ms Y. at the
hearing, the applicant contended that the authorities had not taken
adequate measures to ensure her presence in the courtroom.
In
their observations submitted prior to the decision as to the
admissibility of 8 December 2005, the Government stated that the
applicant had twice waived his right to legal assistance, on 18 and
26 October 2000. Following his request for legal assistance, lodged
on 30 October 2000, the applicant had been assigned advocate K., who
had assisted him in examining the case file on 26 December 2000.
Therefore, the first investigative measure after the applicant had
lodged the request for legal assistance had been taken in the
presence of his lawyer, who had also assisted him before the trial
court. Accordingly, there had been no breach of the applicant's right
guaranteed by Article 6 § 3 (c). As regards the court's failure
to examine Ms Y. at the hearing, the Government submitted that the
court had taken all possible measures to ensure her presence at the
hearing; however, it had appeared impossible to establish her
whereabouts. Furthermore, the applicant had not objected to the
examination of the statements she had made in the course of the
preliminary investigation. Accordingly, there had been no breach of
the applicant's rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 3 (d). In sum,
the applicant's complaints under Article 6 were manifestly
ill-founded.
In
their additional observations submitted after the decision as to the
admissibility of 8 December 2005, the Government stated that
advocate K., being a member of the Bryansk Bar
Association, worked for the Legal Advice Office of the Bezhitskiy
District of Bryansk. Since in his request for appointment of a lawyer
the applicant indicated three options, one of them being any lawyer
from the aforementioned Legal Advice Office, the appointment of
advocate K. was fully in accordance with the applicant's
choice. As regards the court's failure to examine Ms Y. at the
hearing, the Government reiterated their arguments submitted in the
previous set of their observations. They also added that the judgment
in the applicant's case was not based on Ms Y.'s statement alone but
on other evidence as well. Therefore, the proceedings in the
applicant's case were in compliance with Article 6 of the Convention.
b) The Court's assessment
(i) Alleged failure to conduct a medical
expert examination of the applicant
The
Court notes, firstly, that the applicant has submitted no evidence
that he had requested either the investigative authorities or the
courts to conduct a medical examination. In any event, the Court
reiterates that Article 6 does not impose on domestic courts an
obligation to order an expert opinion to be produced or any other
investigative measure to be taken solely because it was sought by a
party. It is primarily for the national court to decide whether the
requested measure is relevant and essential for deciding a case (see
mutatis mutandis H. v. France, judgment of
24 October 1989, Series A no. 162 A, p. 23, §§
60-61). At the hearing in the present case the trial court examined
Mr R., the doctor who had monitored the applicant in connection with
a fracture of his hip, precisely to determine whether the applicant
would have been physically able to commit the offence. The Court
finds that the trial court therefore had sufficient information on
this aspect of the case. Accordingly, there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in this respect.
(ii) Opportunity to study the case file
From
the facts of the case it follows that on 26 December 2002 the
applicant studied the case file with the assistance of his counsel,
advocate K. Although the applicant refused to sign a statement
confirming that he had studied the case file, it was signed by
advocate K. Later the applicant was provided with the record of the
hearing, as is confirmed by his written statement. Accordingly, the
Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 3
(b) in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
(iii) Right to legal assistance of own
choosing
The
Court first notes that the guarantees in paragraph 3 of Article 6
are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial in criminal
proceedings as set forth in paragraph 1 of the same Article.
Accordingly, the applicant's complaint will be examined under these
provisions taken together (see, among other authorities, Benham v.
the United Kingdom, judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 755, § 52).
The
Court reiterates at the outset that, read as a whole, Article 6
guarantees the right of an accused to participate effectively in a
criminal trial. In general this includes not only the right to be
present, but also the right to receive legal assistance, if
necessary, and to follow the proceedings effectively. Such rights are
implicit in the very notion of an adversarial procedure and can also
be derived from the guarantees contained in sub-paragraphs (c), (d)
and (e) of Article 6 § 3 (see, among other authorities, Stanford
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 23 February 1994,
Series A no. 282-A, pp. 10–11, § 26).
The
Court reiterates that Article 6 § 3 (c) entitles an accused
to be defended by counsel “of his own
choosing”. Notwithstanding the importance of a
relationship of confidence between lawyer and client, the right to
choose one's own counsel cannot be considered to be absolute. It is
necessarily subject to certain limitations where free legal aid is
concerned. When appointing defence counsel the national courts must
certainly have regard to the defendant's wishes. However, they can
override those wishes when there are relevant and sufficient grounds
for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice (see
Croissant v. Germany, judgment of 25 September 1992,
Series A no. 237-B, § 29).
The
Court further reiterates that Article 6 – especially paragraph
3 – may be relevant before a case is sent for trial if and so
far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced
by an initial failure to comply with its provisions (see Imbrioscia
v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A
no. 275, p. 13, § 36 and Brennan v. the United Kingdom,
no. 39846/98, § 45, ECHR 2001 X).
The
Court notes that the parties disagreed on certain factual matters
concerning the date of the applicant's arrest and first
interrogation. From the report on his arrest it follows that the
applicant was arrested on 18 October 2000. The report was
signed by the applicant, who also stated in writing that he “agreed
to be detained”. The Government also submitted the record of
the applicant's interrogation on 18 October 2000, signed by him. The
applicant has provided no evidence to support the allegations that he
was arrested and interrogated on 17 October 2000. Accordingly, the
Court is satisfied that the applicant's arrest and first
interrogation took place on 18 October 2000.
The
Court further notes that on 18 and 26 October 2000 the applicant
waived his right to legal assistance. However, in his application of
30 October 2000, received by the public prosecutor's office
on 8 November 2000, the applicant requested the assistance
of a lawyer and indicated three alternative choices of counsel. The
application was granted and on 21 December 2000 the investigator sent
the letters informing the lawyers concerned of the applicant's wish
to be represented by them and of the investigative measures to be
taken on 21, 25 and 26 December 2000. The Legal Advice Office of the
Bezhitskiy District of Bryansk received the letter on the same date.
The law firm Vedischev and Partners received the letter on 10 January
2001. It is not clear whether the letter was received by Ms M. The
Court observes that the domestic authorities should have handled the
applicant's request for legal assistance with greater expedition.
On
25 December 2000 the investigative authorities appointed advocate K.,
a member of the Bryansk Bar Association, as the applicant's counsel.
The Government submitted that advocate K. worked for the Legal Advice
Office of the Bezhitskiy District of Bryansk, which was not contested
by the applicant.
On
the next day, when the bill of indictment was served on the
applicant, advocate K. assisted him in studying the case file.
According to the Government's submissions, no investigative measures
took place before 26 December 2000. The applicant submitted no
evidence to the contrary.
The
Court observes that in his request for legal assistance the applicant
indicated three choices of counsel, one of them being any lawyer from
the Legal Advice Office of the Bezhitskiy District of Bryansk. It is
not in dispute between the parties that advocate K., who assisted the
applicant in the course of the investigative actions, worked for the
aforementioned Legal Advice Office. Furthermore, the applicant has
submitted no evidence that he objected to the appointment of this
particular counsel of the Legal Advice Office or brought any
complains concerning the quality of his assistance before domestic
authorities. In such circumstances the Court concludes that the
applicant's choice of counsel was fully respected.
Therefore,
the Court finds that there has been no violation of the applicant's
rights under Article 6 § 3 (c) in
conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
(iv) Right to examine prosecution
witnesses
As
the guarantees of paragraph 3 (d) of Article 6 are specific aspects
of the right to a fair trial set forth in paragraph 1 of this
Article, the Court will consider the complaint concerning the failure
to examine Ms Y. in the hearing under the two provisions taken
together (see Asch v. Austria, judgment of 26 April 1991,
Series A no. 203, p. 10, § 25).
The
Court reiterates that the admissibility of evidence is primarily
governed by the rules of domestic law, and that, as a rule, it is for
the national courts to assess the evidence before them. The task of
the Court is to ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety,
including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair (ibid.,
p. 10, § 26).
All
evidence must normally be produced in the presence of the accused at
a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument. However, the
use in evidence of statements obtained at the stage of the police
inquiry and the judicial investigation is not in itself inconsistent
with paragraphs
3 (d) and 1 of Article 6, provided that the
rights of the defence have been respected. As a rule, these rights
require that the defendant be given an adequate and proper
opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him or her
either when that witness is making a statement or at a later stage of
the proceedings (see Lüdi v. Switzerland, judgment of 15
June 1992, Series A no. 238, p. 21, § 49). In particular, the
rights of the defence are restricted to an extent that is
incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 if the conviction is
based solely, or in a decisive manner, on the depositions of a
witness whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have
examined either during the investigation or at trial (see A. M.
v. Italy, no. 37019/97, § 25, ECHR 1999-IX, and Saïdi
v. France, judgment of
20 September 1993, Series A no. 261-C,
pp. 56-57, §§ 43-44).
Turning
to the facts of the present case, as to the notion of witness, given
its autonomous interpretation, the Court considers that, although
Ms
Y. did not testify at a court hearing, she should, for the purposes
of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention, be regarded as
a witness because her statements, as taken down by the investigative
authorities, were used in evidence by the domestic courts (see Asch,
cited above, p. 10, § 25).
The
Court notes that the applicant's conviction for murder was based,
inter alia, on statements given by Ms Y. during the
preliminary investigation. During the investigation she was also
confronted with the applicant and confirmed her statements.
Furthermore, the Bezhitskiy District Court of Bryansk adjourned the
trial a number of times and several attempts were made to ensure the
presence of Ms Y. in order to examine her as a witness. The trial
court issued several orders to have her brought before the court.
Furthermore, at the court's request the prosecutor made efforts to
establish her whereabouts, which, however, proved impossible.
The
Court finds that the domestic authorities were not negligent in their
efforts to bring Ms Y. before the trial court. It would clearly have
been preferable for Ms Y. to have given evidence in person, but, in
view of the authorities' efforts, her unavailability did not in
itself make it necessary to stay the prosecution (see Artner v.
Austria, judgment of 28 August 1992, Series A no. 242 A, p.
10, § 21). Since it proved impossible to secure the attendance
of Ms Y. at the court hearings, it was open to the national courts,
subject to the rights of the defence being respected, to have regard
to Ms Y.'s statements to the investigative authorities,
especially since they could consider those statements to be
corroborated by other evidence before it (ibid., p. 10,
§ 22; see also Doorson v. the Netherlands, judgment of
26 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II,
p. 473, § 80).
The
Court notes that the applicant was confronted with Ms Y. during the
preliminary investigation, where it was open to him to put questions
and make comments concerning her statements. Accordingly, he enjoyed
the guarantees secured under Article 6 § 3 (d) to a significant
extent (see Isgrò v. Italy, judgment of 19 February
1991, Series A no. 194 A, p. 13, § 36).
The
Court observes, moreover, that the applicant's conviction did not
rest solely on Ms Y.'s statement. The courts also had regard to other
evidence, in particular statements by indirect witnesses, expert
reports and the applicant's statement made during the preliminary
investigation.
Finally,
it was open to the applicant to object to the reading out of Ms Y.'s
statements at the hearing. However, both the applicant and his
counsel explicitly stated that they had no objections. The Court
reiterates that a waiver of the exercise of a right guaranteed by the
Convention, in so far as such a waiver is permitted in domestic law,
must be established in an unequivocal manner (see Colozza v.
Italy, judgment of 12 February 1985, Series A no. 89,
pp. 14-15, § 28). The Court observes that neither the letter nor
the spirit of Article 6 § 3 (d) prevented the applicant from
expressly waiving his rights of his own free will (see, mutatis
mutandis, Osinger v. Austria, no. 54645/00, § 46,
24 March 2005). The Court finds that in the present case the
applicant has exercised such a waiver.
Therefore,
in the circumstances of the case there is no indication that the
failure to examine Ms Y. at the hearing infringed the rights of the
defence to an extent incompatible with Article 6 §§ 1 and 3
(d). Accordingly, there has been no violation of the above
provisions.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 of
the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 April 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Boštjan
M. Zupančič
Registrar President