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ZELENI BALKANI v. BULGARIA - 63778/00 [2007] ECHR 272 (12 April 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/272.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 272
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF ZELENI BALKANI v. BULGARIA
(Application
no. 63778/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 April 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Zeleni Balkani v. Bulgaria,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs M.
Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mr J. Borrego
Borrego,
Mrs R. Jaeger, judges,
and Mrs C. Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 20 March 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 63778/00) against the Republic
of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by “Zeleni Balkani” (which translated
means “Green Mountains”), a Bulgarian non-profit
environmental protection organisation founded in 2000 and based in
the city of Plovdiv (“the applicant organisation”), on 31
August 2000.
The
applicant organisation was represented by Mr M. Ekimdjiev, a lawyer
practising in Plovdiv.
The
Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Ms M. Karadjova, of the Ministry of Justice.
The
applicant organisation claimed that there had been an unlawful
interference with its right to freedom of peaceful assembly on
account of the prohibition by the Plovdiv Municipality of a public
rally planned for 19 April 2000. It also claimed that it did not
have an effective domestic remedy for the aforesaid complaint.
In
its initial submissions, the applicant organisation also raised
complaints under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. With a letter of
15 March 2005 it informed the Court that it no longer maintained
those complaints.
On
20 May 2005 the Court decided to communicate the application to the
Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
On
an unspecified date the Plovdiv Municipality (the municipality)
started clearing the banks and the riverbed of the river “Maritza”,
which runs through the city. The procedure involved the uprooting and
eradication of trees and plant life, which were blocking the flow of
the river.
The
applicant organisation believed that the actions of the municipality
were in violation of the domestic environmental protection
legislation and that the disorderly uprooting and eradication of the
trees and the plant life would disrupt the biological balance of the
river.
On
18 April 2000 the applicant organisation informed the municipality of
its intention to hold a public rally on the following day, the 19th,
in front of the municipality. The aim of the public rally was to
protest against the municipality's actions and to demand that the
disorderly uprooting and eradication of the river's plant life be
stopped because it was destroying important alluvial trees and the
habitat of rare, endangered birds.
In
a letter of 19 April 2000 the municipality informed the applicant
organisation that it would not permit the rally to go ahead as
planned. The full text of the letter, signed by the secretary of the
municipality, read as follows:
“We inform you that the Plovdiv Municipality does
not permit the conducting of the [planned] public rally.”
Later
on the same day, police officers visited the offices of the applicant
organisation and obtained signed declarations from its leaders that
they were aware of the prohibition and would not organise the rally
as planned.
The
applicant organisation did not hold a rally on 19 April 2000 and the
clearing the banks and the riverbed of the river “Maritza”
continued unabated.
On
26 April 2000 the applicant organisation appealed against the
municipality's prohibition of its public rally. The appeal was filed
with the municipality which did not forward it, as required under the
applicable legislation, to the domestic courts together with all
relevant documents.
On
7 June 2000 the applicant organisation re-filed its appeal with the
Plovdiv Regional Court.
On
21 June 2000 the Plovdiv Regional Court requested the municipality to
provide it with its file and all other relevant documents regarding
the public rally planned by the applicant organisation.
The
municipality sent the requested documents to the Plovdiv Regional
Court on 22 June 2000 with the exception of the applicant
organisation's appeal of 26 April 2000.
On
5 July 2000 the Plovdiv Regional Court requested that the
municipality also provide it with the applicant organisation's appeal
of 26 April 2000. On the same day it also instructed the
applicant organisation to deposit the required court fee, which the
latter did on 9 October 2000.
On
25 October 2000 the municipality provided the Plovdiv Regional Court
with the applicant organisation's appeal of 26 April 2000.
At
a hearing on 24 January 2001 the applicant organisation's appeal was
examined by the Plovdiv Regional Court.
In
a judgment of 28 March 2001 the Plovdiv Regional Court declared null
and void the municipality's prohibition of the public rally planned
by the applicant organisation for 19 April 2000. It established that
the prohibition had been issued in violation of the provisions of the
Meetings and Marches Act, as it had been decided not by the mayor but
by the secretary of the municipality. Furthermore, it lacked
reference to any of the statutory grounds for issuing such
prohibitions.
The
applicant organisation claimed, which the Government did not
challenge, that it was informed of the judgment of the Plovdiv
Regional Court on 10 July 2001.
No
appeal was filed against the judgment of 28 March 2001 and it became
final on an unspecified date.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. The Constitution (1991) and the Meetings and Marches
Act (1990)
The relevant provisions of the Constitution (1991) and
the Meetings and Marches Act (1990) have been summarised in the
Court's judgment in the case of The United Macedonian Organisation
Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria (no. 44079/98, §§
72-79, 20 October 2005).
2. The Administrative Procedures Act (1979)
Section 39 (1) of the Administrative Procedures Act
provided at the relevant time that the administrative authority,
whose act was being appealed, had an obligation to forward the appeal
filed with it to the competent court within three days together with
its full file on the matter. The second paragraph of this section
provided that if the appeal and file were not forwarded to the courts
then the appellant had the right to re-file his appeal directly with
the courts.
3. The State Responsibility for Damage Act (1988)
Before
1 January 2006 the State Responsibility for Damage Act of 1988 (the
“SRDA”) provided, inter alia, that the State was
liable for damage caused only to private persons by (a) the illegal
acts, actions or omissions of its bodies and officials acting within
the scope of, or in connection with, their administrative duties; and
(b) the organs of the investigation, the prosecution and the courts
(sections 1 and 2: see Решение №
1307 от 21.10.2003 г. по гр.
д. № 2136/2002 г., V г. о. на
ВКС and Тълкувателно
решение № 3 от
22.04.2005 г. по т. гр.
д. № 3/2004 г., ОСГК
на ВКС).
Currently,
the State and local municipalities are also liable for damage caused
to juridical entities by the illegal acts, actions or omissions of
their bodies and officials acting within the scope of, or in
connection with, their administrative duties (section 1). The
amendment does not have retroactive effect in respect of damage cause
prior to its date of introduction.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 11 AND 13 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant organisation complained that there had been an unlawful
interference with its right to freedom of peaceful assembly, as
provided in Article 11 of the Convention, on account of the
prohibition issued by the municipality of the public rally planned
for 19 April 2000. It also complained of the lack of an effective
domestic remedy for its complaint under Article 11 of the Convention
on account of the domestic courts having declared null and void the
prohibition issued by the municipality almost a year after the date
of the planned event and also in view of the alleged inability to
seek redress for the actions of the municipality.
Articles
11 and 13 of the Convention provide as follows:
Article 11
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the
exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration
of the State.”
Article 13
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Preliminary objection of non-exhaustion
The
Government submitted that the applicant organisation had not
exhausted the available domestic remedies because it failed to appeal
against the judgment of the Plovdiv Regional Court of 28 March 2001,
with which it was evidently unsatisfied.
The
applicant responded that the Government's position was contradictory
as they insisted that it should have appealed against the said
judgment in order to obtain adequate redress for its Convention
complaints. However, they then also argued that the same judgment
should, in any event, be considered to have fully remedied the
alleged interference with the applicant organisation's rights under
the Convention (see paragraph 30 below). Thus, it considered the
Government's objection contradictory, unsubstantiated and requested
that it be rejected.
The
Court finds that the Government have failed to demonstrate that the
applicant organisation had a right of appeal against the judgment of
the Plovdiv Regional Court of 28 March 2001 (see paragraph 21 above),
given that the decisions of the domestic courts under section 12 (6)
of the Meetings and Marches Act (1990) were final (see paragraph 22
above). Moreover, they did not specify how such an appeal could have
remedied the applicant's complaints currently before the Court.
It
follows, therefore, that the Government's objection must be rejected.
B. The parties' further submissions
The
Government consented that there had been an interference with the
applicant organisation's right to freedom of peaceful assembly as
provided in Article 11 of the Convention. However, they argued that
that interference had been fully remedied by the judgment of the
Plovdiv Regional Court of 28 March 2001 which had declared the
prohibition null and void.
Separately,
the Government claimed that the applicant organisation had
contributed to any alleged delay by the domestic courts because it
belatedly and wrongly re-filed its appeal with the Regional Court
instead of filing it with the District Court immediately after the
municipality failed to forward it itself. They also noted that the
applicant organisation had not promptly paid the required court fees.
The Government further argued that, once the documents had been
received from the municipality and the court fees had been paid, the
Regional Court had examined the appeal in only one hearing and had
promptly delivered its judgment.
The
Government also claimed that the applicant organisation could have
organised a similar rally on some other day, but never tried to do
so.
Lastly,
they argued that if the applicant organisation considered that it had
suffered damage as a result of the prohibition of its event, then it
should have filed a tort action for damage, which the Government
considered to be an effective domestic remedy.
The
applicant organisation responded that it was irrelevant how long it
had taken for it to re-file its appeal with the domestic courts. What
it did consider relevant was that the municipality had unlawfully
prohibited its rally of 19 April 2000 without citing any grounds. It
had then employed the police to force its leaders to sign
declarations that they would not violate the said prohibition. The
applicant organisation therefore considered immaterial any delay on
its part in utilising its right to re-file its appeal with the
domestic courts after the municipality had failed to forward it to
them.
In
addition, the applicant organisation argued that the municipality had
protracted the proceedings before the Regional Court by at least four
months as it had failed promptly to provide the domestic court with
the full file regarding the public rally. The applicant organisation
further noted that the rally of 19 April 2000 was planned to coincide
with the municipality's actions in clearing the banks and the
riverbed of the river “Maritza”. However, as a result of
the aforesaid delay in providing the Regional Court with the required
documents, the latter's review of the actions of the municipality
became redundant. This was additionally exacerbated by the Regional
Court which, despite of the requirement of the Meetings and Marches
Act to examine such appeals within five days, heard the appeal only
on 24 January 2001 while having received all the required documents
on 25 October 2000. In addition, despite of the simple and
straightforward nature of the case, the domestic court took another
two months to deliver its judgment on 28 March 2001. In conclusion,
the applicant organisation considered that any delay on its part was
greatly outweighed by the authorities' failure to promptly examine
the said appeal.
In
respect of whether the interference with its right to peaceful
assembly had been prescribed by law, the applicant organisation
referred to the findings in the judgment of 28 March 2001 of the
Plovdiv Regional Court where the latter found that the municipality's
prohibition had been issued in violation of the Meetings and Marches
Act. In view of the aforesaid, the applicant organisation did not
consider it necessary to examine whether the interference was
necessary in a democratic society, nor whether it was proportionate.
Nevertheless, noting that the Government did not claim that the
interference had a legitimate aim, it referred to the findings of the
Court in the case of Stankov and the United Macedonian
Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (nos. 29221/95 and
29225/95, §§ 84-87, ECHR 2001 IX) which it considered
relevant to the present case.
C. Admissibility
In
respect of the applicant organisation's victim status following the
domestic court's judgment of 28 March 2001, the Court recalls its
case-law that a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not
in principle sufficient to deprive the said applicant of his or her
status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have
acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded
redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis,
Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1996 III, p. 846, § 36; Dalban
v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999 VI and
Roşca v. Moldova, no. 6267/02, §§ 18-22,
22 March 2005).
In
the present case, the Court notes that in its judgment of 28 March
2001 the Plovdiv Regional Court declared null and void the
municipality's prohibition on a technicality stemming from the fact
that it had been decided not by its mayor but by its secretary (see
paragraph 19 above). Despite finding that the prohibition had been
unlawfully issued, the domestic court neither acknowledged a breach
of the applicant organisation's right to freedom of peaceful assembly
nor afforded redress for it (see paragraph 19 above). In addition, it
declared the prohibition as null and void almost one year after the
planned event when, in the view of the applicant organisation, the
need for such a public rally no longer existed (see paragraph 31
above).
Considering
the above, the Court finds that the domestic court's judgment of 28
March 2001 did not deprive the applicant organisation of its “victim”
status (see, mutatis mutandis, Christians against Racism
and Fascism v. the United Kingdom, no. 8440/78, Commission
decision of 16 July 1980, Decisions and Reports 21, p. 138;
Christian Democratic People's Party (1) v. Moldova (dec.), no.
28793/02, 22 March 2005; and, for a similar consideration in respect
of exhaustion see Stankov and United Macedonian Organisation
“Ilinden” v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95,
Commission decision of 29 June 1998, unreported).
In conclusion, the Court finds that the applicant's
complaints under Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention are not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on
any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
D. Merits
1. Alleged violation of Article 11 of the Convention
(a) Whether there was interference
36. The
parties agreed that there had been an interference with the exercise
of the applicant organisation's right to freedom of peaceful assembly
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 11 of the
Convention (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above).
That view is shared by the Court.
(b) Whether the interference was justified
The
Court reiterates that such an interference will constitute a
breach of Article 11 of the Convention unless it was “prescribed
by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2
and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the
achievement of those aims.
38. The
Court observes that the Plovdiv Regional Court established in
its judgment of 28 March 2001 that the municipality's prohibition of
the applicant organisation's public rally of 19 April 2000 was issued
in violation of the Meetings and Marches Act (see paragraph 19
above). Accordingly, the said prohibition represented an interference
with the exercise of the applicant organisation's right to freedom of
peaceful assembly which was not “prescribed by law”
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 11 of the
Convention.
In
the light of this conclusion, the Court is not required to determine
whether the interference pursued one or more legitimate aims under
paragraph 2 and whether it was “necessary in a democratic
society” for the achievement of those aims (see, mutatis
mutandis, in respect of a similar conclusion in reference to
Article 8 of the Convention, Malone v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, p. 37, § 82, Khan
v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, § 28, ECHR 2000 V
and Yordanov v. Bulgaria, no.
56856/00, § 116, 10 August 2006; and, in reference to
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, Amat-G Ltd
and Mebaghishvili v. Georgia, no. 2507/03, § 62, 27
September 2005).
Neither
is it of relevance, as the Government claimed, whether or not the
applicant organisation could have organised a similar public rally on
another day as the prohibited event was in any event time specific to
coincide with the clearing of the banks and the riverbed of the local
river (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above).
Considering
all of the above, the Court finds that there has been a violation of
Article 11 of the Convention on account of the municipality's
unlawful prohibition of the applicant organisation's public rally of
19 April 2000.
2. Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention
The
Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the
availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the
substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they
might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of
Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to
deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under
the Convention and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting
States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they
conform to their Convention obligations under this provision. The
scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the
nature of the applicant's complaint under the Convention.
Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be “effective”
in practice as well as in law (see Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment
of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2286, § 95;
Aydın v. Turkey, judgment of 25 September 1997,
Reports 1997 VI, pp. 1895-96, § 103; and Kaya
v. Turkey, judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998 I,
pp. 329-30, § 106).
The
Court further reiterates that, in general, actions for damages in the
domestic courts may provide an effective remedy in cases of alleged
unlawfulness or negligence by public authorities (see, for example,
Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, §§
162-63, ECHR 2001 III (extracts) and Paul and Audrey Edwards
v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 99, ECHR
2002 II).
The
Court notes at the outset that the applicant organisation had a
procedure available under the Meetings and Marches Act which provided
for a juridical review, within five days, of the municipality's
prohibition of its public rally (see paragraph 22 above). The
applicant organisation made use of this procedure and appealed
against the said prohibition on 26 April 2000 (see paragraph 12
above). However, the domestic court failed to examine the applicant
organisation's appeal within the prescribed five-day deadline. In
fact, it delivered its judgment and declared the municipality's
prohibition null and void ten months later on 28 March 2001 (see
paragraph 19 above). In so far as its conclusion in respect of
the lawfulness of the prohibition rested solely on the question of
whether the mayor or the secretary of the municipality could issue
such a prohibition, the Court does not find it justified that the
domestic proceedings took such a period to conclude. The Court does
recognise that the municipality and the applicant organisation
contributed to some extent to part of the delay in the proceedings by
failing to provide the domestic court with all the relevant documents
and to timely deposit the required court fees (see paragraphs 14 17
above). However, that does not excuse the lack of expedience on the
part of the domestic court once the case file was fully compiled on
25 October 2000 (see paragraphs 17-19 above).
Thus,
the Court finds that in the present case the applicant organisation
use of the appeal procedure under the Meetings and Marches Act was
not effective as it resulted in the domestic court declaring the
municipality's prohibition as null and void almost a year after the
planned event when the need for such a rally no longer existed.
In
respect of the possibility for the applicant organisation to seek
redress for the unlawful actions of the municipality, the Court
observes that it not have such a right under the State Responsibility
for Damage Act. The Court is also not convinced by the Government's
argument that the applicant organisation could have filed a tort
action for damage, as there are no relevant reported domestic cases,
and the Government does not cite or rely on any such, where such an
organisation has successfully obtained damage from the State in a
similar situation.
Considering
all of the above, the Court finds that there has been a violation of
Article 13, in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant organisation claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) as compensation for
the non pecuniary damage arising out of the violation of its
Convention rights. It claimed that its opposition to the actions of
the municipality had been frustrated which had been further
intensified by the involvement of the police and the latter's
insistence that its leaders sign declarations that they would not
violate the issued prohibition. The applicant organisation also
claimed that the lengthy proceedings before the domestic courts and
the uselessness of the resulting judgment created further frustration
and a sense of helplessness in the face of the unlawful actions of
the authorities. It also referred to other cases against Bulgaria,
where the Court had found a violation of Article 11 of the Convention
and had awarded compensation for non pecuniary damage to the
applicants in those cases (see Stankov and the United Macedonian
Organisation Ilinden, cited above, § 121; The United
Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, cited
above, § 122; and The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden
– PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, § 67, 20
October 2005).
The
Government stated that these claims were excessive and did not
correspond to the size of awards made by the Court in previous
similar cases. Referring to the award of 10,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN:
approximately EUR 5,128) in the case of Hasan and Chaush v.
Bulgaria [GC] (no. 30985/96, § 121, ECHR 2000 XI), they
noted that the applicant organisation's claim was twice as large as
what the Court had awarded in that case.
Taking
into account the circumstances of the case, the Court accepts that
the applicant organisation suffered non-pecuniary damage as a
consequence of the violation of its right to freedom of peaceful
assembly. Making its assessment on an equitable basis and having
regard to its case law (see the cases referred to in the
previous paragraphs), the Court awards the applicant organisation the
sum of EUR 2,500 on that account, plus any tax that may be chargeable
on this amount.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant organisation also claimed EUR 2,324 for cost and expenses.
The amount included (a) 6 hours of legal work of its lawyer on the
proceedings before the domestic authorities at an hourly rate of
EUR 70, (b) 27 hours of legal work by its lawyer in the
proceeding before the Court at the same hourly rate and (c) EUR 49
for postal, stationary and photocopies expenses. The applicant
organisation submitted a legal fees agreement, a timesheet and
registered mail receipts. It also requested that the costs and
expenses be paid directly to its lawyer minus BGN 500 (approximately
EUR 256), which he received as advance payment for his services from
the applicant organisation.
The
Government stated that the claim was excessive and that the postal,
photocopy and stationery expenses were not supported by receipts to
evidence that they had actually been incurred.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. The Court notes that the applicant failed to present
supporting documents in respect of the allegedly incurred expenses
for stationary and photocopies. Having regard to all relevant
factors, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR
1,500 covering costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be
chargeable on that amount.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
11 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13, in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay to the applicant organisation, within
three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable
on the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non pecuniary
damage;
(ii) EUR
1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros) in respect of costs and
expenses, of which EUR 1,244 payable into the bank account of the
applicant organisation's lawyer in Bulgaria, Mr M. Ekimdjiev;
(iii) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant
organisation's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 April 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia
Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President
