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DUYUM v. TURKEY - 57963/00 [2007] ECHR 230 (27 March 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/230.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 230
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF DUYUM v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 57963/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
27
March 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Duyum v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J.
Casadevall,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr L.
Garlicki,
Mr J. Šikuta,
Mrs P. Hirvelä,
judges,
and Mrs F. Aracı, Deputy Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 March 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 57963/00) against the Republic
of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Ahmet Duyum (“the
applicant”), on 16 May 2000.
The
applicant was represented by Mr A. İnce, a lawyer practising in
Istanbul. The Turkish Government (“the Government”)
did not designate an Agent for the purposes of the proceedings before
the Court.
On
19 May 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Istanbul.
On
22 May 1996 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion
of having committed a murder, together with the wife of the deceased.
On
27 May 1996 the Küçükçekmece Magistrates'
Court (Sulh Ceza Mahkemesi) ordered the applicant's detention
on remand.
On
6 June 1996 the Bakırköy public prosecutor filed a bill of
indictment with the Bakırköy Assize Court charging the
applicant and the deceased's wife, K.Y., under Articles 450 § 4,
40 and 64 of the Criminal Code with homicide.
On
31 July 1996 the Third Chamber of the Bakırköy Assize Court
held the first hearing and heard the applicant who denied the charges
against him. On the same day, the first-instance court issued a
summons requiring M.Y., K.Y.'s son, to give evidence and ordered that
the autopsy report on the deceased be submitted to it.
On
18 September 1996 the first-instance court heard M.Y and read out the
autopsy report. On the same day, the applicant requested the
first-instance court to order an examination of the blood stains
found at the scene of the incident. The court disregarded the
applicant's request. The applicant further requested to be released
pending trial. The first-instance court dismissed this request,
having regard to the content of the case file. The court also issued
summonses requiring M.Y. and K.Y.'s other children, Ü.Y. and
H.Y., to testify before the court during the next hearing.
On
6 November 1996 M.Y. once again testified before the first instance
court. The court further heard M.D., the applicant's wife. On the
same day, the deceased's brother, İ.Y., joined the proceedings
as a civil party (müdahil). At the end of the hearing,
the assize court once again requested Ü.Y. and H.Y. to give
evidence and also issued summonses requiring İ.Y.'s wife and
brother and a certain H.D. to testify before the court.
On
9 December 1996 the court heard H.D. and reiterated its orders in
respect of İ.Y's brother, Ü.Y. and H.Y.
On
17 February 1997 the assize court heard S.Y., İ.Y.'s daughter.
On the same day, the statements of İ.Y.'s brother taken by the
Niksar Criminal Court of First Instance were read out. The
first-instance court reiterated its order in respect of Ü.Y. and
H.Y.
On
28 March 1997 H.Y. testified before the first-instance court. The
court heard the applicant and K.Y. and issued summonses requiring
F.Ç. and Y.Ç, the applicant's witnesses, to give
evidence. The court dismissed the request for an on-site inspection.
On
16 May 1997 the Third Chamber of the Bakırköy Assize Court
heard Ü.Y., F.Ç. and Y.Ç. On the same day, the
court decided to send the case file to the public prosecutor and
requested the latter to file his submissions on the merits of the
case.
On
27 June 1997 the first-instance court heard K.Y. who maintained that
the deceased had filed an application for divorce. The court ordered
that the file concerning this case be obtained from the relevant
court. It further ordered that M.Y. be brought before the court in
order to give further evidence.
On
22 July 1997 the applicant requested the first-instance court to
broaden the scope of the investigation. In particular, he requested
that two additional witnesses be heard by the court and that the
financial links between K.Y., the deceased and the deceased's brother
İ.Y. be investigated.
On
27 August 1997 the assize court reiterated its order that M.Y. be
brought before the court in order to give additional evidence. It
further requested the public prosecutor to submit his opinion on the
applicant's request to broaden the scope of the investigation.
On
20 October 1997 the first-instance court once again heard the
applicant and K.Y. At the end of the hearing, it dismissed the
applicant's request holding that it was not necessary to broaden the
scope of the investigation. The court once again ordered that M.Y. be
brought before it.
On
the same day, the Third Chamber of the Bakırköy Assize
Court again dismissed the applicant's request to be released pending
trial.
On
30 October 1997 the applicant filed an objection with the
Fourth Chamber of the Bakırköy Assize Court against
the decision of 20 October 1997.
On
3 November 1997 the Fourth Chamber of the Bakırköy Assize
Court dismissed his objection.
On
5 December 1997 M.Y.'s statements which had been taken by another
court were read out. The assize court issued a summons requiring İ.Y.
to testify before it.
On
4 February 1998 the Bakırköy Assize Court heard İ.Y.
and issued summonses requiring İ.Y.'s brothers and one of his
neighbours to give evidence.
On
13 March 1998 the first-instance court heard İ.Y.'s neighbour
and postponed the hearing in order to await the statements of İ.Y.'s
brothers.
On
27 April 1998 the statements of İ.Y.'s brothers were read out.
On the same day, the court decided to investigate whether K.Y., İ.Y.
and the deceased had rented a common safe-deposit box in a bank. It
further requested a relative of İ.Y. to give evidence.
On
8 June 1998 the court heard İ.Y.'s relative, the applicant and
K.Y. The latter gave evidence concerning a certain T.Ç. The
assize court subsequently decided to investigate possible financial
links between T.Ç. and K.Y. It further ordered that T.Ç.
be summoned to give evidence.
On
15 July 1998 the court heard N.G., a former co-prisoner of K.Y. It
reiterated its summons concerning T.Ç. but withdrew its
decision to investigate the financial links between T.Ç. and
K.Y.
On
11 September 1998 the assize court heard T.Ç. and in the light
of the latter's statements ordered a bank to provide information
concerning K.Y.'s account with them.
On
4 November 1998 the first-instance court decided to send the case
file to the public prosecutor and requested him to submit his
observations on the merits of the case.
On
16 December 1998 the public prosecutor's submissions were read out.
The court requested the applicant to submit his defence submissions.
On
8 February 1999 the first-instance court postponed the trial in order
to prepare its judgment in the case.
On
19 March 1999 the court heard the applicant. It requested that the
tapes and the transcripts of two television programmes concerning the
murder, during which the applicant had made statements, be submitted
to it.
On
12 May 1999 the court withdrew its order of 19 March 1999.
On
21 June 1999 the first-instance court once again heard K.Y. and the
applicant. Furthermore, letters from the television channels
informing the court that the requested tapes had been destroyed were
read out. On the same day, the court ordered that blood samples be
taken from the applicant, K.Y., İ.Y. and another person, T.Ç.,
and that a comparative analysis of these blood samples and the blood
stains found at the scene of incident be carried out.
On
11 August 1999 the court postponed the trial as the results of the
blood analysis had not been sent to them.
On
6 October 1999 the court ordered İ.Y. and T.Ç. to give
blood samples.
On
1 December 1999 the first-instance court once again postponed the
trial as the results of the blood tests concerning İ.Y. and T.Ç.
had not been sent to them.
On
30 December 1999 experts from the Forensic Medicine Institute
concluded that the blood found at the scene of the incident did not
match that of the applicant. They considered that it might belong to
T.Ç. The experts were of the view that a DNA analysis was
necessary in order to determine whether the blood found at the scene
of the incident matched that of T.Ç.
On
24 January 2000 the court postponed the trial as the results of the
examination carried out by the experts from the Forensic Medicine
Institute had not been received by the court.
On
22 March 2000 the report of 30 December 1999 was read out. On the
same day, the court issued a summons requiring T.Ç. to give a
blood sample for DNA analysis.
On
17 May 2000 the first-instance court went back on its decision to
obtain a blood sample from T.Ç. for DNA analysis. The court
requested the applicant and K.Y. to make their defence submissions at
the next hearing.
On
7 June 2000 the applicant and K.Y. made their submissions. On the
same day, the Bakırköy Assize Court acquitted the
applicant, holding that there was insufficient evidence to convict
him. It further ordered the applicant's release from detention.
The
Third Chamber of the Bakırköy Assize Court held thirty
hearings. Throughout these hearings the applicant requested to be
released pending trial. He also filed several petitions with the
first-instance court to be released on bail. The applicant submitted
in his petitions that he had a permanent domicile and that he would
not try to abscond. At the later stages of the proceedings, he
further maintained that all the evidence had been obtained and that,
therefore, there was no risk that it would be tampered with it.
During the first hearing, the court dismissed the applicant's request
to be released having regard to the content of the case file and the
state of the evidence. The court dismissed his requests on all
subsequent occasions with reference to the content of the case file.
On
an unspecified date İ.Y. appealed against the judgment of
7 June 2000.
On
3 May 2001 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 7 June 2000
in respect of the applicant.
On
9 October 2001 the applicant brought an action before the Eyüp
Assize Court against the Treasury, pursuant to Law No. 466.
He requested compensation for his unjustified detention on remand.
On
18 April 2003 the Eyüp Assize Court awarded the applicant
3,372,421,663 Turkish liras (TRL)
and TRL 10,000,000,000
in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage respectively. The
applicant appealed, arguing that the amount of compensation awarded
was not sufficient.
On
2 June 2004 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of
18 April 2003.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
Article 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in force
at the material time provided that a person could be remanded in
custody where there was a fear that the accused would abscond, or
there were attempts by the accused to remove evidence or interfere
with witnesses. When the offence was a felony, it was presumed that
the suspect was planning to escape. The last paragraph of Article 104
provided that detention on remand could not be imposed if another
measure was adequate.
Articles
117-122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the material
time provided for the conditions for release on bail.
50. Relevant parts of Article 1 of Law no. 466 on the Payment of
Compensation to Persons Unlawfully Arrested or Detained provide:
“Compensation shall be paid by the State in
respect of all damage sustained by persons:
...
(6) who, after being arrested or detained in
accordance with the law, are not subsequently committed for trial
..., or are acquitted or discharged after standing trial;
...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3, 5 § 1 AND 6 §§ 1
AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION
In
his submissions of 5 January 2006, the applicant complained under
Articles 3 and 5 § 1 of the Convention that there had
been no reasonable suspicion for his arrest and that he had
been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody. The
applicant further alleged a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and
3 of the Convention.
The Court reiterates that it may
only deal with a matter within a period of six months from the date
on which the final decision was taken at the domestic level. When the
acts of an authority are not amenable to challenge by means of an
effective remedy, the six-month period runs from the date on which
the impugned act took place.
The Court observes that the
applicant's detention in police custody and the criminal
proceedings against him ended on 27 May 1996 and 7 June 2000
respectively, whereas these complaints were lodged with the Court on
5 January 2006 i.e. more than six months later.
It
follows that these complaints have been introduced out of time and
must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4
of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that his detention on remand had exceeded the
“reasonable time” requirement as provided for in Article
5 § 3 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as
follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
The Government argued that the applicant had lost his
“victim status” following the Eyüp Assize
Court's decision awarding him compensation pursuant to Law No. 466.
The
Court reiterates that an applicant is deprived of his or her status
as a victim if the national authorities have acknowledged, either
expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, a breach of
the Convention (see Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95,
§ 44, ECHR 1999-VI).
In
the instant case, the applicant complained under Article 5 § 3
of the Convention that the length of his detention on remand had been
excessive.
The
Court has already held that Law No. 466, which provides for an action
for damages taken against the State in respect of the detention of
a person who is subsequently acquitted, concerns Article 5 §
5 only (see, among many others, Yağcı and Sargın v.
Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A no. 319 A,
§ 44). Therefore, the compensation awarded to the
applicant cannot be considered to constitute recognition of or a
redress for the specific violation alleged by the applicant, namely
the excessive length of his detention on remand.
The
Court accordingly dismisses the Government's objection.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that the Bakırköy Assize Court had not
unduly prolonged the applicant's detention on remand. The offence
with which the applicant was charged was of a serious nature. His
detention on remand was also necessary in view of the statements of
his co-accused and the latter's son.
The
applicant submitted that the grounds given by the Bakırköy
Assize Court for his continued detention on remand had been
insufficient.
The
Court reiterates that it is for the national judicial authorities to
ensure that, in a given case, the detention of an accused person
pending trial does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they
must examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a
genuine requirement in the public interest justifying, with due
regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, a departure
from the rule of respect for individual liberty, and set them out in
their decisions on the applications for release. It is primarily on
the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the
established facts mentioned by an applicant in his or her appeals,
that the Court must determine whether or not there has been a
violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Assenov and
Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII, § 154; and, more
recently, McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, §
43, 3 October 2006).
The
persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a sine qua non for the validity of the
continued detention but, after a certain lapse of time, it no longer
suffices. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds
cited by the judicial authorities continue to justify the deprivation
of liberty (see, among other authorities, Ilijkov v. Bulgaria,
no. 33977/96, § 77, 26 July 2001, and Labita v. Italy
[GC], no. 26772/95, §§ 152-153, ECHR 2000-IV).
The
Court notes that, in the instant case, the period to be taken into
consideration began on 22 May 1996, when the applicant was taken into
police custody and ended on 7 June 2000, when the first-instance
court ordered the applicant's release following his acquittal. The
applicant's detention on remand thus lasted more than four years.
During
this period, the Bakırköy Assize Court considered the
applicant's continued detention at the end of each hearing, either of
its own motion or upon the request of the applicant. However, the
first-instance court ordered the applicant's continued detention on
remand on all occasions, using an identical expression, i.e. “having
regard to the content of the case file”.
The Court acknowledges the seriousness of the offence
with which the applicant was charged and the severity of the sanction
which he faced if found guilty. However, it reiterates that the
gravity of the charges cannot by itself serve to justify long
periods of detention pending trial (see, among others, Vayiç
v. Turkey, no. 18078/02, § 37, 20 June 2006, and Ječius
v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97, § 94, ECHR 2000-IX).
In this connection, the Court observes that the
first-instance court does not appear to have addressed itself to the
pertinent facts of the case. In particular, it did not take into
consideration the applicant's submissions that he had a permanent
residence and therefore he would not abscond and that after the
passage of time there was no risk of removing evidence since the
latter had already been gathered. Furthermore, the first-instance
court never gave consideration to the application of a preventive
measure other than continued detention of the applicant, such as
prohibition on leaving the country or release on bail, if need be,
subject to police supervision. The Court observes, in this
connection, that there was insufficient reasoning in the domestic
court's decisions to prolong the applicant's detention pending trial.
Moreover, although, in general, the expressions “the
state of evidence” and “the content of the case file”
may be relevant factors for the existence and persistence of serious
indications of guilt at the beginning of the proceedings, it
nevertheless, alone, cannot justify the length of the detention of
which the applicant complains (see Gökçe and Demirel
v. Turkey, no. 51839/99, § 43, 22 June 2006; Demirel v.
Turkey, no. 39324/98, § 59, 28 January 2003; and
Karagöz v. Turkey, no. 5701/02, § 42, 20
October 2005).
The
aforementioned considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to
conclude that the length of the applicant's detention on remand,
which lasted over four years, has not been shown to have been
justified by relevant and sufficient reasons.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement,
provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 22 May 1996, when the
applicant was arrested and taken into police custody and ended on 3
May 2001, when the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the
Bakırköy Assize Court in respect of the applicant. The
period under consideration thus lasted approximately five years
before two instances.
A. Admissibility
The
Government argued that the applicant could not be considered a victim
of a violation of Article 6 § 1 since he had been awarded
compensation pursuant to Law No. 466.
In
view of its considerations concerning the admissibility of the
complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs
56-59 above), the Court dismisses the Government's objection.
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government maintained that, in the circumstances of the present case,
the length of the criminal proceedings could not be considered
unreasonably long. In this respect, they referred to the time spent
gathering evidence. The Government pointed out that the
first-instance court heard several witnesses, investigated financial
links between the deceased, the deceased's brother and the
applicant's co-accused and ordered that blood samples be taken for
forensic analysis.
The
applicant disputed the Government's arguments. He maintained that the
requests he had made in 1996 and 1997 for an examination of the blood
stains found at the scene of the incident, for the hearing of
additional witnesses and for the investigation of financial links
between the deceased, the deceased's brother and his co-accused had
been dismissed by the court. However, in 1998 and 1999 the
first-instance court decided to investigate these issues and
therefore unreasonably prolonged the proceedings.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the criteria established by its case-law,
particularly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant
and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the
applicant in the dispute (see Kiper v. Turkey, no.
44785/98, § 36, 23 May 2006).
Although
the Government have pointed to the number of witnesses and the
seriousness of the charge as indicative of complexity, the Court
considers that it is not apparent that the case presented any special
difficulty. It cannot therefore be said that the complexity of the
case in itself justified the total length of the proceedings.
As
regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court observes that it does
not appear that he contributed to the prolongation of the
proceedings. The Government have not argued to the contrary.
As
to the conduct of the domestic authorities, the Court observes
that there were significant periods of delay which were
attributable to the authorities. In this respect, the Court
observes that between 18 September 1996 and 16 May 1997 and 27
June and 5 December 1997 the first-instance court postponed hearings
mainly on account of the absence of two of K.Y.'s children despite
the fact that one of these witnesses, M.Y. had already been heard
twice by the court. The Court further observes that the assize
court postponed the trial five times between 21 June 1999 and
22 March 2000 in order to await the results of a blood analysis
(see paragraphs 34 to 40 above) as the intervening party and a
witness who had been ordered to give blood had failed to do so.
Furthermore,
as alleged by the applicant, in 1998 and 1999 the first-instance
court issued orders for the obtaining of certain evidence such as the
analysis of the blood stains found at the scene of the incident and
evidence concerning the financial links between the deceased and
the applicant's co-accused, although it had rejected the applicant's
requests for these investigations in 1996 and 1997 at the beginning
of the trial.
Recalling
that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention imposes on the Contracting
States the duty to organise their legal systems in such a way that
their courts can meet each of the requirements of that provision,
including the obligation to decide cases within a reasonable time
(see Arvelakis v. Greece, no. 41354/98, § 26, 12
April 2001), the Court considers that the assize court could have
applied stricter measures to speed up the proceedings. In particular,
it could have shown greater diligence in determining possible
witnesses and the relevant evidence at the beginning of the trial.
The
Court further notes that, throughout the proceedings, the applicant
was detained on remand – a fact which required particular
diligence on the part of the courts dealing with the case to
administer justice expeditiously (see Kiper, cited above, §
40 and Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99, § 132,
ECHR 2002-VI).
In
the circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the proceedings
in the instant case were unnecessarily prolonged as the national
court failed to act with the necessary diligence in conducting the
proceedings against the applicant. The length of the proceedings
therefore cannot be considered to have complied with the reasonable
time requirement laid down under Article 6 § 1.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed EUR 280,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. As
regards pecuniary damage, the applicant submitted that he had
requested TRL 100,000,000,000 pursuant to Law No. 466 and had been
awarded TRL 3,372,421,663 by the Eyüp Assize Court. He contended
that he had lodged another application with the Court under
application no. 25048/05 complaining about the
aforementioned award.
The
Government submitted in reply that the amount claimed in respect of
non-pecuniary damage was excessive. As regards the applicant's
submissions concerning pecuniary damage, the Government maintained
that the applicant had failed to make any claim.
On
the question of pecuniary damage, the Court observes that the
applicant has not produced any document in support of his claim. It
accordingly dismisses the claim.
As
regards the alleged non-pecuniary damage, the Court accepts that the
applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be
sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation alone. Having
regard to the awards made by the Court in similar cases and taking
into account the fact that the applicant was awarded approximately
EUR 5,780 by the Eyüp Assize Court in respect of
non-pecuniary damage to compensate him for the period he had spent in
detention (see paragraph 47 above), the Court awards the applicant
EUR 1,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 17,000 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and EUR 10,575 for those incurred before
the Court.
The
Government contested these claims.
According
to the Court's jurisprudence, an applicant is entitled to
reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings
and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 for the
proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints concerning the length of
the applicant's detention on remand and the criminal proceedings
against him admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts to be converted into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 March 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Nicolas
Bratza
Deputy Registrar President
