FIRST SECTION
CASE OF FALTER ZEITSCHRIFTEN GMBH v. AUSTRIA
(Application no. 26606/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22 February 2007
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Falter Zeitschriften Gmbh v. Austria,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr K. Hajiyev,
Mr D.
Spielmann,
Mr S.E. Jebens,
Mr G. Malinverni, judges,
and
Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 1 February 2007,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. The background of the case and the article at issue
“Spineless justice
COMMENT Informer trial ends with guilty verdicts: shadow cast over public prosecutor's office
The “informer affair” – the case about whether FPÖ politicians obtained secret data from the police computer system in return for money over a period of many years – has provisionally come to a close. Josef Kleindienst, the former FPÖ police trade unionist who set the case in motion with a full confession, and the police officer Michael Kreißl, the former right-hand man of the leader of the Vienna branch of the FPÖ, Hilmar Kabas, were given six-month suspended prison sentences. Among other things, they had disclosed official secrets concerning a drugs raid, allowing the Vienna FPÖ the time to publish press advertisements stirring up feelings against “1,000 Nigerians”. The judgments are not yet final.
The trial was highly instructive. At the hearing the public prosecutor, Michael Klackl, spoke for the first time of “revealing insight into the handling of sensitive police data” and criticised the “alarming networking between politicians [he presumably did not dare to say FPÖ – ed.] and the police”. Josef Kleindienst, whose detailed statements on the informing system within the FPÖ were nevertheless considered much too “vague” by the Ministry of Justice – headed by Mr Haider's friend Dieter Böhmdörfer – to justify bringing charges against high-ranking FPÖ politicians, was described by the independent criminal judge Kurt Wachsmann in the reasoning of the judgment as a person of “absolute credibility”.
How strange. Why, then, were no other high-ranking FPÖ politicians put in the dock? Why were the proceedings against Jörg Haider, Ewald Stadtler, Karl Schnell and 71 other accused FPÖ officials not energetically pursued, even though the “credible” Kleindienst had so heavily incriminated them? Why were the proceedings against the beneficiaries of the informers' services, the politicians, discontinued at a time when not even all the witnesses had been examined? Why did they never have to appear in a public arena before an independent judge, even though they had boasted in Parliament that they had access to secret police files? Could it have been because of political pressure? Because of threats by the FPÖ leadership against public prosecutors, judges and investigators? The public prosecutor's office is not required to justify itself. The notes it keeps in its so-called “journals” are secret.
The “informer affair” involves much more than just a few corrupt police officers and a web of officials, journalists and politicians who for years went unpunished in downloading secret material about political opponents from the police computer system and distributing it among themselves with a view to making public attacks – especially in the Kronen Zeitung – on people they did not like. The facts of the case suggest that the public prosecutor's office allowed itself to be intimidated. That it made such extensive use of its discretionary powers in assessing a witness's “credibility” that independent judges were left out of the picture. At no time did the prosecutors entrust the “preliminary investigation” of the case to an independent investigating judge, as they would in the case of any common shoplifter. They constantly sought to remain in charge of the proceedings in the context of “preliminary inquiries”. The public prosecutor's office was anxious about digging its teeth into the angry FPÖ senior politicians, whose counsel, as the Minister for Justice, was also the highest representative of the State prosecution service. It will not bite barking dogs.
The bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth century spawned the institution of the independent judge. The search for justice was henceforth supposed to take place in the courtrooms and not in political cabinets. To this day judges cannot be removed from office, are not subject to any instructions, and are supposed to represent a third branch of State power, which can treat everyone the same – above all, even the King – without having to fear personal consequences. However, Austrian criminal law in practice deprives this fundamental principle of all effect. What comes before a judge is decided by the public prosecutor, who is subject to instructions from the private office of the Minister of Justice. Prosecutors know that their career may depend on the click of a minister's fingers. That turns them into cowering vacillators rather than energetic investigators. Instead of raking through the muck and carrying out painstaking investigative work, they look upwards so as not to fall down. Justice ministers from all parties know why they do not wish to relinquish their right to issue instructions.
This brings us to the case of the leader of the Vienna branch of the FPÖ, Hilmar Kabas. Initially the fraud squad actually wanted him to be detained on remand. Kleindienst had not only stated that he had been bribed by Kabas; he also confessed to having handed him a secret file on nuclear crime. Subsequently, according to Kleindienst, they celebrated this coup over boiled beef in the Plachutta restaurant together with a Krone reporter. The judge believed Kleindienst's version of events and convicted him of abusing his office. Kabas should really also have been convicted by this stage as the person receiving the file. Kabas admitted having met at Plachutta but denied having taken possession of a file. The justice system also believed this version, resulting in a grotesque situation in which the person who had handed over the secret file was convicted but the high-ranking official who had received it walked away free. At the hearing – at which Kabas gave evidence under oath as a witness, although he could have asserted his right not to do so – the FPÖ agitator was unable to remember any files being handed over. The judge observed: “This is the question: can he [Kabas – ed.] no longer remember? After all, he does have other things to deal with at present.” Rarely can possibly false evidence have been downplayed so elegantly.
The public prosecutor's office should now at least become active again and investigate Kabas either for giving false testimony or for abusing his office. The accusations against other leading politicians likewise appear in a new light now. Why should Kleindienst have appeared credible in one case but not in his many other confessions? In any event, the public prosecutor, Mr Klackl, will have “another thorough look” at the case concerning Kabas, as a spokesman for the public prosecutor's office confirmed.
One thing has become clear after the trial, however. In proceedings conducted in public by an independent judge the justice system can probe closer to the truth than in secret preliminary proceedings under the sole control of public prosecutors who are subject to instructions.
The “informer affair” may be resumed informally at any time. All that is required is the political will to allow the judges to do their work. The fact that political will is needed for the justice system to start working properly is frankly unacceptable.”
B. The proceedings under the Media Act
“The 'informer affair' involves much more than just a few corrupt police officers and a web of officials, journalists and politicians who for years went unpunished in downloading secret material about political opponents from the police computer system and distributing it among themselves with a view to making public attacks – especially in the Kronen Zeitung – on people they did not like...
Kabas should really also have been convicted by this stage as the person receiving the file...
... a grotesque situation in which the person who had handed over the secret file was convicted but the high-ranking official who had received it walked away free...
...The public prosecutor's office should now at least become active again and investigate Kabas either for giving false testimony or for abusing his office...”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
“1. A person suspected of having committed an offence but not yet convicted by final judgment, who is portrayed in a medium as being guilty or as the perpetrator of the offence and not only as a suspect, is entitled to claim compensation from the media owner for the insult suffered. The amount of compensation shall not exceed 14,535 EUR;...
2. There shall be no right to compensation if
(1) a true report about a hearing at a public session of the National Assembly, the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly, the Diet of a Land or a committee of these general representative bodies is concerned,
(2) a true report about a conviction at first instance is concerned which indicates that the conviction is not final,
(3) the person concerned has made a confession in public or before a medium and has not revoked it,
(4) a direct broadcast (live broadcast) is concerned and the employee of the broadcast has applied the care required of journalists,
(5) a true quotation of the statement of a third person is concerned and if there was a predominant public interest in the publication of the quoted statement.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A. Admissibility
B. Merits
(i) The press plays an essential role in a democratic society. Although it must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest (see De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, judgment of 24 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, pp. 233-234, § 37). Not only does it have the task of imparting such information and ideas, the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog” (see Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, judgment of 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239, p. 28, § 63; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 62, ECHR 1999-III; and Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, no. 28525/95, § 46, 26 February 2002).
(ii) This undoubtedly includes questions concerning the functioning of the system of justice, an institution that is essential for any democratic society. However, even if such a debate is of public interest, there are limits to the right to freedom of expression. In particular, it may prove necessary to protect the judicial system against destructive attacks that are essentially unfounded (see Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A no. 313, p. 17, § 34) or to protect the presumption of innocence of third persons (see Constantinescu v. Romania, no. 28871/95, §§ 72- 78, ECHR 2000 VIII).
(iii) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual's self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. As set forth in Article 10 § 2, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly (see Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93, § 43, ECHR 1999-VIII).
(iv) There is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest (see Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, § 61, ECHR-IV).
(v) The notion of necessity implies a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in this respect, but this goes hand in hand with a European supervision which is more or less extensive depending on the circumstances. In reviewing under Article 10 the decisions taken by the national authorities pursuant to their margin of appreciation, the Convention organs must determine, in the light of the case as a whole, whether the interference at issue was “proportionate” to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons adduced by them to justify the interference are “relevant and sufficient” (see Lingens v. Austria, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 25, §§ 39-40; and The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, p. 28-29, §§ 50).
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
B. Costs and expenses
C. Default interest
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant company, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, 4,955.15 EUR (four thousand nine hundred fifty five euros and fifteen cents) in respect of pecuniary damage and 4,094.55 EUR (four thousand ninety four euros and fifty five cents) in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 February 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President