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KOLOMIYETS v. RUSSIA - 76835/01 [2007] ECHR 167 (22 February 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/167.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 167
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF KOLOMIYETS v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 76835/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
22
February 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kolomiyets v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr S.E. Jebens,
Mr G.
Malinverni, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 1 February 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 76835/01) against the
Russian Federation lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by two Russian nationals, Ms Svetlana Yevgenyevna Kolomiyets and Ms
Galina Nikolayevna Kolomiyets (“the applicants”), on 1
June 2001.
The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr P. Laptev, the Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights.
On
25 May 2005 the Court
decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Applying
Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
The
applicants were born in 1970 and 1946 respectively and live in the
town of Kireyevsk of the Tula Region. They are relatives.
On
23 October 1992 the second applicant lodged an action against her
former husband, claiming division of their marital property,
including a country house.
On
29 December 1993 the Kireyevskiy District Court of the Tula Region
ordered the equitable distribution of property. The judgment was
quashed on 26 April 1994 and the case was remitted for a fresh
examination.
On 14 June 1994 the Kireyevskiy District Court
transferred the case to the Tsentralniy District Court and on 10 July
1995 the Tsentralniy District Court partly accepted the action. On 16
May 1996 the Tula Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted
the case for a fresh examination.
On
10 January 1997 the first applicant entered the proceedings in the
capacity of a co-plaintiff. In September 1998 the applicants' amended
their claim.
According
to the Government, after September 1998 the District Court listed
several hearings which were adjourned because the defendant defaulted
and the District Court had to summons additional witnesses.
In
1999 the applicants complained to the Judicial Department of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Tula Regional
Judicial Qualification Board about the excessive length of the
proceedings. On 13 April 1999 the Tula Regional Judicial
Qualifications Board informed the applicants that the excessive
length had been caused by the complexity of the case, a large amount
of cases pending before the court and the parties' failure to attend
hearings. The Board also noted that the presiding judge had been
asked to observe the time-limits.
On 4 December 2000 the Presidium of the Tula Regional
Court, by way of a supervisory review, quashed the decision of 14
June 1994 and transferred the case back to the Kireyevskiy District
Court for further examination.
On
25 December 2000 the Kireyevskiy District Court received the
case-file. On the same day the applicants asked for a stay in the
proceedings because they had complained about the decision of 4
December 2000 to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The
proceedings were resumed in February 2001 after the Supreme Court had
refused to quash the decision of 4 December 2000.
By
a decision of 18 December 2001 the Kireyevskiy District Court severed
the applicants' claims concerning the common household and decided to
examine them in a separate set of the proceedings. On 3 April 2002
the District Court dismissed those claims. The judgment was not
appealed against and became final on 14 April 2002.
On
23 July 2002 the Kireyevskiy District Court examined the remaining
claims and partly accepted the applicants' action. The Tula Regional
Court quashed the judgment in the part concerning the division of the
country house and remitted the case for a new examination on
14 November 2002.
The
Kireyevskiy District Court fixed a preparatory hearing for 17 March
2003. Of the six hearings listed between 1 April 2003 and 28 April
2004, four hearings were adjourned because the defendant did not
attend and two were adjourned upon the applicants' requests awaiting
the outcome of the related proceedings.
On
30 April 2004 the District Court discovered that the defendant had
died on 17 April 2004. The proceedings were stayed for determination
of a successor. The Kireyevskiy District Court resumed the
proceedings on 1 April 2005 as the defendant's daughter, Ms K.,
entered the proceedings on his behalf.
On
25 April 2005 the District Court asked Ms K. to provide certain
evidence related to the inheritance procedure. The District Court set
the time-limit until 15 June 2005.
The
proceedings were stayed again on 23 June 2005 because the Kireyevskiy
District Court had discovered certain deficiencies in inheritance
documents provided by Ms K.
On 28 November 2005 the District Court resumed the
proceedings and ordered an expert study. The expert fees were to be
paid by the Federal Treasury. The decision of 28 November 2005 was
upheld on appeal, subject to certain amendments.
The
case-file was sent to the experts on 16 January 2006. In March 2006
the experts asked the Kireyevskiy District Court for additional
materials. On 15 March 2006 the District Court provided the experts
with the necessary documents.
It appears that the proceedings are at present pending
before the Kireyevskiy District Court.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The
applicants complained that the length of the proceedings was
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
period to be taken into consideration began on 5 May 1998, when the
Convention entered into force in respect of Russia. However, in
assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that
date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at the time.
The proceedings in question have not yet ended. They have thus lasted
so far for more than eight years and eight months.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government argued that the proceedings were complex as the
subject-matter of the claim had concerned personal relationships and
the domestic courts had had to be particularly sensitive. Delays had
been caused by the applicants' frequent amendments to their claims,
the death of the defendant and the necessity to identify a successor.
Another delay resulted from the need to obtain an expert opinion.
The
applicants maintained their claims.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court agrees that the proceedings at issue were complex as they
required examination of voluminous documents and expert studies.
However, the Court cannot accept that the complexity of the case,
taken on its own, was such as to justify the overall length of the
proceedings.
As
concerns the applicant's conduct, the Court is not convinced by the
Government's argument that the applicants should be held responsible
for amending their claims. It has been the Court's constant approach
that an applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the
resources afforded by national law in the defence of his interests
(see, mutatis mutandis, Yağcı and Sargın v.
Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A no. 319 A, § 66).
The
Court, however, observes substantial periods of inactivity, for which
the Government have not submitted any satisfactory explanation, are
attributable to the domestic courts. In particular, the Court finds
it striking that it took the domestic authorities more than six years
to determine the court competent to examine the applicants' case (see
paragraphs 7 and 11 above). The Court is not called upon to determine
the reasons for that delay because the principle responsibility for
it rests ultimately with the State (see, among other authorities,
Löffler v. Austria, no. 30546/96, § 57, 3
October 2000). Furthermore, the Court observes that the proceedings
in the present case are still pending before the first-instance court
and that the Government did not provide any explanation as to the
District Court's failure to render the judgment.
Having
examined all the material submitted to it and having regard to the
overall length of the proceedings, the Court considers that in the
instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed
to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has
accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION
The
applicants complained under Article 6 of the Convention that on 4
December 2000 the Presidium of the Tula Regional Court had unlawfully
quashed the decision of 14 June 1994.
The
Court observes that on 4 December 2000 the Presidium of the Tula
Regional Court quashed a procedural decision of 14 June 1994 by which
the applicants' claim had been sent to the Tsentralniy District Court
for an examination. By the decision of 4 December 2000 the case was
returned to the Kiryevskiy District Court.
The
Court observes that the decisions of 14 June 1994 and 4 December
2000 concerned determination of the territorial jurisdiction of the
domestic courts in examination of the applicants' claim. They did not
determine, either finally or provisionally, the applicants' civil
rights and obligations (see Fedotova v. Russia (dec.), no.
73225/01, 1 April 2004). The Court therefore concludes that the
applicants' complaint about the procedural decision of 4 December
2000 as such is outside the scope of Article 6 of the Convention
(see, e.g., Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria (dec.),
no. 62763/00, 16 January 2003; Wiot v. France (dec.),
no. 43722/98, 15 March 2001; Apis a.s. v. Slovakia
(dec.), no. 39754/98, 13 January 2000).
It
follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae
with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article
35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article
35 § 4.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Invoking
Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the
applicants finally complained that they had sustained pecuniary
damage and that their health had deteriorated during the proceedings,
that certain employees of the Kireyevskiy District Court were
relatives of the employees of the Tula town council and that the
defendant had sold the country house.
Having
regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that
these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It
follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
Court points out that under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court any claim
for just satisfaction must be itemised and submitted in writing
together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, “failing
which the Chamber may reject the claim in whole or in part”.
The
Court observes that on 8 September 2005 the applicants were invited
to submit by 10 November 2005 quantified claims for just
satisfaction. No claims were received within the time allowed.
Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award the
applicants any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of
the proceedings in the applicants' case;
3. Holds that there is no call to award the
applicants just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 February 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President