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European Court of Human Rights
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> Jeffrey Shane WATKINS v United Kingdom - 35757/06 [2007] ECHR 1100 (29 November 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/1100.html
Cite as: [2007] ECHR 1100
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29 November 2007
FOURTH SECTION
Application no.
35757/06
by Jeffrey Shane WATKINS
against the United
Kingdom
lodged on 24 August 2006
STATEMENT OF FACTS
THE FACTS
The applicant, who was born in 1962, is a British national who is currently serving a life sentence in a prison in Rugby. He is represented before the Court by Mr E. Abrahamson, a lawyer practising in Liverpool.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
1. The interception of the applicant's correspondence
Between 1 May 1998 and 5 December 2000 the applicant was engaged in a variety of legal proceedings, actual or contemplated, which necessitated correspondence with various legal advisers, courts and other bodies. For the first part of this period he was detained at prison W. and in September 1999 he was moved to prison F.
On 16 September 1998, whilst the applicant was being detained in Prison W., he asked the officer on duty for his mail and was told that unless he opened the letters in that officer's presence he would not be allowed to have them. The applicant pointed out that he was entitled to take his legal correspondence unopened unless the governor had reasonable cause to suspect an illicit enclosure, but the officer refused to give it to him. The officer proceeded to inform the applicant that he would be referring the letters to the principal officer in his wing.
On 17 September 1998 another prison officer summoned the applicant to his office and told him that there were two legal letters for him. Each envelope was marked with a reference to Rule 37A of the Prison Rules 1964 (“the Rule,” later replaced by Rule 39 of the Prison Rules 1999, see Relevant Domestic Law below) and each bore a franked strip containing details of the solicitor from whom the correspondence originated. The officer pulled out legal paperwork from a larger envelope which had already been opened. When the applicant complained, the officer told him that the envelope was already open when he had entered the office. The officer then inspected the contents of the envelope before he handed the envelope and the legal papers over to the applicant. The officer then picked up a smaller envelope, opened it, and inspected its contents before handing it over. When the applicant protested about the breach of Rule 37A, the officer laughed and said “So report me to John Major” (the British Prime Minister between 1990 and 1997). The following day the applicant made a formal complaint about the matter which led to the promulgation of a notice to staff drawing attention to the effect of Rule 37A.
On 5 October 1998 the applicant noticed that his name was on a board indicating that he had received mail. When the applicant asked for his mail he was told that there was a Rule 37A letter for him but the officer on duty refused to hand it over to him unless he was willing to open it in his presence. Later that day another officer called the applicant and informed him that there was a letter for him. The officer then proceeded to rip the letter open. When the applicant asked him why he was doing this, the officer told him that the new notice mentioned above only applied to outgoing mail. The applicant made a complaint ten days later.
2. The proceedings in the County Court
On 5 December 2000, whilst the applicant was pursuing County Court proceedings against one of the prison officers, that particular officer opened two letters marked “Durham County Court” addressed to the applicant without the latter's knowledge or consent. The officer then handed them to the applicant already opened.
The applicant made several complaints to the effect that his correspondence, both outgoing and incoming, was being treated by prison officers in a manner that conflicted with the requirement of the Rule.
The applicant found his attempts to pursue the matter both through the formal prison complaints systems and the Prisons Ombudsman unsatisfactory, and he was eventually granted legal aid to bring an action for damages in the courts.
On 15 July 2003 the County Court gave judgment refusing the applicant's claims for damages for misfeasance in public office against the Home Office and 14 named prison officers. The judge found that most of the prison officers had committed a breach of the Rule but that they had not acted in bad faith. He found further that some misunderstandings had arisen in prison W. from the fact that although the prison governor had notified both prisoners and prison staff on 21 September 1998 about the effect of the Rule, he had overlooked the fact that the letters a court sent to a prisoner bore the name of the court on the envelope but contained no reference to Standing Order 5 (see Relevant Domestic Law below). Moreover, the judge was satisfied that some of the officers had opened the relevant letters accidentally and in other cases he ascribed the breach of the Rule to inadequate training. Therefore, the applicant's claims against those officers failed as bad faith was an essential ingredient of the tort of misfeasance in public office.
Though the judge found that three prison officers had, on the balance of probabilities, acted in bad faith when dealing with the applicant's legally privileged correspondence in breach of the Rule, he was not satisfied that the applicant had suffered any loss or damage as a result.
3. The appeal proceedings
An application for permission to appeal was made but refused by the County Court judge. The application for leave to appeal was then renewed before the Court of Appeal and permission to appeal was granted on the papers on 17 October 2003. The applicant appealed against the dismissal of his claims against the three officers who had acted in bad faith, contending that the tort of misfeasance in public office was a tort actionable per se, and so capable of being established without proof of damage, or alternatively capable of being established by proof of anxiety and distress falling short of physical or mental injury.
On 20 July 2004 the Court of Appeal gave judgment on the applicant's appeal against the County Court's decision of 15 July 2003. The applicant's appeal was allowed on the ground that the three officers' acting in bad faith had infringed a constitutional right of such importance, namely, that of unimpeded access to court and access to confidential legal advice, that the applicant's cause of action in misfeasance in public office was complete even without proof of damage. The Court of Appeal held that the County Court judge's conclusion on the issue was therefore wrong and that the applicant was entitled at least to nominal damages against the officers who had acted in bad faith. The Court of Appeal further stated that it was for the trial judge and not itself to determine whether exemplary damages should be awarded.
In sum, the applicant's appeal was allowed, a nominal award of GBP 5 (British pounds sterling) was entered against the three defendants who had been found to have acted in bad faith and the case was remitted back to the County Court judge to determine whether to make an exemplary award against any of the defendants and if so, for assessment of the sums to be awarded. The Court of Appeal also granted the Home Office leave to appeal to the House of Lords on condition that it paid the applicant's costs irrespective of the outcome.
4. The proceedings before the House of Lords
On 29 March 2006 the House of Lords allowed the Home Office's appeal and restored the judgment of the County Court judge. The House of Lords found that though in the present context the unlawfulness of what was done to interfere with the applicant's enjoyment of his right to confidential legal correspondence was clear, the House should not take the novel step of introducing into the tort of misfeasance in public office a right to damages (based on the importance of the constitutional right infringed) in the absence of material damage to the victim. It was noted in this regard that the great weight of authority treated damage as an element of the tort. Furthermore, it was considered that the applicant did in fact have legal remedies available to him, namely, judicial review against prison officers who acted in breach of the applicable rules (even in the absence of bad faith) and the prison governors. Moreover, it was suggested that errant officers would be susceptible to disciplinary sanctions and that failure to initiate such proceedings could also on appropriate evidence be challenged by judicial review, or alternatively that the officers in question might well be indictable for the common law offence of misconduct in public office.
The House of Lords also considered that any breach of a fundamental human or constitutional right would be covered by section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. It could reasonably be inferred that Parliament had intended that infringements of the core human and constitutional rights protected by the Act should be remedied under it and not by the development of parallel remedies. As it was held that there was no existing right to damages where misfeasance in public office had caused no material damage to the victim, the European Court of Human Rights could be expected to award compensation for non-pecuniary loss in cases where the evidence showed an egregious and deliberate abuse of power by a public officer.
However, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe commented that if the Home Office were successful in their appeal, the applicant would have no private law remedy at his disposal and that judicial review would not offer him a prospect of damages. He further considered that judicial review, with the preliminary filter of the need for leave and little prospect of obtaining an order for cross-examination of witnesses, was hardly a satisfactory substitute for an action in the county court. It was also noted that no disciplinary action had been taken against the officers in question and that there had been no prosecution, in which a different burden of proof would apply. Furthermore, it was observed that two of the incidents in which the applicant had succeeded in establishing bad faith had occurred before the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998.
The House of Lords ultimately ruled that the tort of misfeasance in public office was never actionable without proof of material damage as its function was to compensate the claimant and not punish the public officer. Consequently, it was held that the Home Office's appeal should be allowed, that the Court of Appeal's order should be set aside save as to costs and that the order of the County Court judge should be restored.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
Rule 39 of the Prison Rules 1999 (SI 1999/728) which replaces rule 37A of the Prison Rules 1964 (SI 1964/388) in identical terms provides as follows:
“(1) A prisoner may correspond with his legal adviser and any court and such correspondence may only be opened, read or stopped by the governor in accordance with the provisions of this rule.
(2) Correspondence to which this rule applies may
be opened if the governor has reasonable cause to believe that it
contains an illicit enclosure and any such enclosures shall be dealt
with in accordance with the other provision of these Rules.
(3)
Correspondence to which this rule applies may be opened, read and
stopped if the governor has reasonable cause to believe its contents
endanger prison security or the safety of others or are otherwise of
a criminal nature.
(4) A prisoner shall be given the opportunity to be present when any correspondence to which this rule applies is opened and shall be informed if it or any enclosure is to be read or stopped.
(5) A prisoner shall on request be provided with any writing materials necessary for the purposes of paragraph (1).
(6) In this rule, "court" includes the European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice; and 'illicit enclosure' includes any article possession of which has not been authorised in accordance with the other provisions of these Rules and any correspondence to or from a person other than the prisoner concerned, his legal adviser or a court.”
Standing Order 5 includes a direction that an envelope carrying correspondence between an inmate and his/her legal adviser should be marked with a reference to the above Rule. It further explains the effect of the new Rule as follows:
“Prison Rule 37A [now Rule 39] ... applies to all correspondence between an inmate and his or her legal adviser or a court (including the European bodies referred to in the Rules). Such correspondence carries special privileges under the Rules and may not be read or opened for examination unless in accordance with instructions laid down by Prison Service Headquarters...”
Home Office instruction (113/1995, 21 December 1995) to prison governors requires them to protect such correspondence against inadvertent or deliberate opening by, in particular, the training of staff handling prisoners' mail.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the interference with his legally privileged correspondence deprived him of his right of access to court.
He also complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the interception of his mail constituted an unlawful interference with his right to respect for his correspondence which furthermore was not justified under the second paragraph of this provision. He claims in this connection that the interference with his correspondence was in bad faith and in deliberate breach of the applicable rules.
The applicant finally complains under Article 13 of the Convention that he had no effective domestic remedy available to him. He alleges in this regard that the domestic courts were unable to give a declaration as to infringements of Convention Articles as the Human Rights Act 1998 was not yet in force at the relevant time.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES