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JASINSKI v. POLAND - 72976/01 [2007] ECHR 1057 (6 December 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/1057.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 1057
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF JASIŃSKI v. POLAND
(Application
no. 72976/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
6
December 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Jasiński v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič,
President,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Mrs E.
Fura-Sandström,
Mrs A. Gyulumyan,
Mr E. Myjer,
Mr David
Thór Björgvinsson, judges,
and Mr S. Quesada,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 15 November 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 72976/01) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr
Andrzej Jasiński (“the applicant”), on 29 November
1999.
The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr Z.
Terlik, a lawyer practising in Olsztyn. Since the applicant's
representative had not submitted any observations on the
admissibility and merits of the case, the legal aid fees had not been
paid to him. The Polish Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention on account of injuries sustained by him during his arrest
by the police on 16 August 1999. He further complained of censorship
of his correspondence with the Court.
On
6 October 2005 the Court decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3
of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
1. Events relating to the police intervention
The
applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Kamińsk.
On
the night of 16 August 1999 the applicant and five other men
were drinking in a bar, “U Rysia”, in Suwałki.
Around midnight a fight broke out outside the bar. Two police
officers, K.T and R.Z., saw the fight. They parked their car and
approached the fighting men. They saw that one man was lying on the
ground (later it turned out that it was the applicant), while two
others were kicking and beating him. As the police officers were in
plain clothes they showed their police identification cards and
ordered the men to stop fighting.
Subsequently,
several other police cars and an ambulance arrived. There were
fourteen police officers at the scene. The arrival of the policemen
caused some persons to run away, whereas the applicant himself went
into the bar. The applicant refused to go to the hospital, claiming
that he was not injured. He was also verbally aggressive towards the
police officers. Police officer K.T. attempted to apprehend him and a
struggle ensued. Two other police officers, M.S. and M.K., then tried
to overpower the applicant, but to no effect as he was very
aggressive. The police officers resorted to the use of truncheons.
The applicant was handcuffed and placed in a police car. As he
refused to get in the car he was again hit with a truncheon on his
legs. He was then driven to a sobering-up centre in Suwałki.
Upon his arrival, the applicant was allegedly still aggressive and
therefore was again hit with a truncheon.
Detention Card (karta pobytu) no. 1186/99, which contains
the record of the applicant's presence at the Suwałki
sobering up centre, provides, inter alia, the following
description of his medical condition:
“recent truncheon marks on the skin of the head
and the back”
The
Detention Card also provides that at the time of the applicant's
arrival at the centre his breath test showed a blood alcohol level of
2.01 ‰.
On
17 August 1999 the applicant was examined by a medical doctor.
In his report the doctor wrote:
“Numerous bruises are observed, in particular: on
both sides of the head and left part of the neck, bruises in the
shape of stripes on the right of the chest, right shoulder, right
shoulder blade, round bracelet bruises on both wrists, most probably
from handcuffs and round bruises above wrists, single bruises in the
shape of stripes on the left buttock, thigh and the lower leg. “
The
applicant and five other men (“K.P”, “S.S.”,
“A.P.”, “R.W.”, and “K.K.”)
arrested with him on the night of 16 August 1999 reported
the incident to the prosecution authorities. On 17 August 1999
and 18 August 1999, K.P. and S.S. respectively lodged
complaints with the Suwałki District Prosecution Office
(Prokuratura Rejonowa w Suwałkach). They alleged that
they had been beaten by the police officers during the arrest on
16 August. On 18 August 1999 an investigation was
instituted. Subsequently, on 23 August 1999 the applicant
presented himself at the Prosecution Office and lodged a complaint
about the police. He complained that upon his arrival at the
sobering-up centre he had been dragged out of the police car, pushed
on the ground and beaten and kicked by the police officers. He
claimed that during the whole incident he had been handcuffed. Three
further victims of the alleged police ill-treatment lodged their
complaints with the Suwałki District Prosecutor on the following
dates: A.P. on 20 August, R.W. on 23 August and K.K. on
24 August.
During
the course of investigation proceedings the Prosecutor heard evidence
from the applicant and five other alleged victims, from the
fourteen police officers who took part in the intervention,
employees of the sobering up-centre, the ambulance personnel, the
owner of the bar “U Rysia” and his family, and other
clients of the bar who were present during the intervention.
As
there were discrepancies between the medical reports produced by the
applicant and the other men and their detention cards from the
sobering up centre, the prosecution also obtained a medical
report which was submitted on 3 December 1999. It reads in
so far as relevant:
“The bruises and haematomas on the applicant's
head and neck were caused by a blow with a hard and blunt object, and
they could have been caused by kicking during the incident that took
place in front of the Bar “U Rysia”. Stripe shaped
bruises were caused by blows with a hard, blunt and long object,
which could have been a police truncheon. The injuries sustained by
the applicant caused bodily harm lasting no longer than seven days
(Art. 157 § 2 criminal code).”
On
16 December 1999 the Suwałki District Prosecutor
discontinued the investigation into the allegations made by the
applicant and the five other men and refused to prosecute the police
officers involved in the incident of 16/17 August 1999. In
its decision the Prosecutor stated that while it is true that the
policeman used physical force against the applicant and five other
men, the use of force was justified under the circumstances of the
instant case. The testimonies of the police officers were credible
and coherent. On the other hand the victims' testimonies were highly
doubtful. In particular, except for one, they all claimed that no
fight had taken place and that the injuries that they sustained had
been the result of the police intervention. One victim, K.P.,
expressly stated that “all those involved in the fight were
apprehended by the police”. Finally, the Prosecutor observed
that there was not enough evidence to lead to the conclusion that the
police officers had committed an offence described in Article 231
of the Criminal Code.
On
17 December 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal against this
decision with the Suwałki Regional Prosecutor. The Regional
Prosecutor advised the applicant that he could not see any grounds
for allowing his appeal and had therefore transmitted it along with
the case file to the Suwałki District Court (Sąd
Rejonowy).
On
24 February 2000 the Suwałki District Court upheld the
Prosecutor's decision. The court held that the prosecutor's decision
was well reasoned. It further stressed that when testifying, the
policemen had admitted that they had used force while arresting the
applicant and five other persons. There was no further evidence to
lead to the conclusion that the police officers had lied when
testifying. This decision was final.
2. Monitoring of the applicant's correspondence
At
the time of lodging his application with the Court the applicant was
detained in the course of criminal proceedings against him. As of an
unknown date in 2003 he has been serving a prison sentence.
On
20 December 1999, the Registry of the Court received the
applicant's first letter dated 29 November 1999. The letter
was delivered in an envelope bearing a red stamp which read “Censored
on 7 December 1999, Prosecutor of the Regional Prosecution Office”
and an illegible signature (Cenzurowano 7 grudnia 1999,
Prokurator Prokuratury Okręgowej).
On
23 March 2000, 22 June 2000, the Registry of the Court received
another two letters from the applicant. They were all delivered in
envelopes bearing a red stamp “censored (cenzurowano)”.
They also bear a stamp “Remand Centre in Suwałki (Areszt
Śledczy w Suwałkach) and another red stamp reading
“Censored on... Prosecutor of the Regional Prosecution Office”,
a handwritten date and a signature.
In
his correspondence with the Registry, the applicant stated that all
letters sent to him by the Court had been censored by the Regional
Court in Suwałki. In this respect he submitted an envelope from
the Registry of the Court which was sent to him on 9 January 2003.
That envelope is marked with a purple stamp which reads “Censored”;
it also bears a handwritten date, 15 January 2003, and an illegible
signature.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
1. The Criminal Code 1997
The
relevant parts of Article 157, provide:
Ҥ 2 A person who causes bodily
harm or ill health lasting no longer than 7 days shall be liable
to a fine, a penalty of the restriction of liberty or imprisonment
for a term not exceeding 2 years.
§ 3 If a person who committed an act
described in (...) § 2 acts without intent, he shall be
liable to a fine, a penalty of the restriction of liberty or
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year.
§ 4 The prosecution of a crime described
in § 2 or 3, if bodily harm or ill health occasioned
lasted no longer than 7 days, shall take place under private
indictment. ...”
2. Use of force by the police
The
relevant parts of Section 16 of the Police Act of 6 April
1990 read as follows:
If
a lawful order given by a police authority or a policeman has not
been complied with, policemen may apply the following coercive
measures:
1) physical, technical and chemical means of
restraining or escorting persons or of stopping vehicles;
2) truncheons;
3) water cannons;
4) police dogs and horses;
5) rubber bullets fired from fire-arms;
Policemen
may apply only such coercive measures that correspond to the
exigencies of a given situation and are necessary to ensure their
orders are obeyed.”
Paragraph 5
of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 17 September
1990 on the Use of Coercive Measures by the Police provides:
Physical
force shall be used in order to restrain a person, to counter an
attack or to make [a person] obey an order.
When
using physical force, no one shall hit a person, unless he has to do
so in self-defence or in order to counter an unlawful attack against
life, health or property of others.”
The
relevant part of paragraph 6 of the Ordinance provides as
follows:
“Handcuffs may be used (...) in order to prevent
an escape or to prevent an active assault or active resistance. ...”
3. Sobering-up centres
According
to Section 39 of the Law of 26 October 1982 on
Education in Sobriety and Counteracting Alcoholism,
sobering-up centres are operated by local authorities.
The relevant parts of Article 40 of the Law provide:
“1. Intoxicated persons who behave
offensively in a public place or a place of employment, are in a
condition endangering their life or health, or are themselves
endangering other persons' life or health, may be taken to a
sobering-up centre or a public health care facility, or to their
place of residence.
(...)
3. [Intoxicated] persons who have been taken
to a sobering-up centre or a police station shall remain there until
they are sober but no longer than twenty-four hours. ...”
4. Monitoring of correspondence.
The
relevant domestic law concerning the censorship of correspondence is
set out in the Court's judgment in the case of Michta v. Poland,
no. 13425/02, §§ 33 39, 4 May 2006.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police
officers in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads
as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A. Admissibility
26. The
Government raised a preliminary objection that the applicant had not
exhausted all available domestic remedies in respect of his
allegations of ill-treatment. They argued that under
Article 55 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings
taken in conjunction with Article 330 § 2, the
applicant, after the investigation had been discontinued, could have
brought a private action against the alleged culprits.
The
Court recalls that the aim of the rule of exhaustion of domestic
remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention is to afford Contracting States an opportunity to put
matters right through their own legal system before having to answer
to an international body for their acts. However, although Article 35
§ 1 requires that the complaints intended to be brought
subsequently before the Court should have been made to the
appropriate domestic body, it does not require that in cases where
the national law provides for several parallel remedies in the sphere
of both civil and criminal law, the person concerned, after a
sustained but eventually unsuccessful attempt to obtain redress
through one such remedy, must necessarily try all other means (see
H.D. v. Poland, no. 33310/96, 7 June 2001, and
Olszewski v. Poland (dec.), no. 55264/00,
13 November 2003)
The
Court does not therefore consider that, after the prosecuting
authorities had discontinued the investigation instituted at the
applicant's request, he was required to bring private prosecution
against the police officers in order to fulfil his obligation under
Article 35 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, decision
in the H.D., cited above).
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Alleged ill-treatment by the police
(a) The parties' submissions
The
applicant submitted that during the police intervention on
16 August 1999 he had been beaten by police officers. First
he had been beaten up while he had been struggling with other men in
front of the bar “U Rysia”. Subsequently, upon his
arrival at the sobering up-centre he had been dragged out of the car
and thrown on his knees. The policemen had been beating him with
their fists and truncheons, they also kicked him. The applicant
claimed that the fact that he had been intoxicated at the time of his
arrest had not been of any relevance. He concluded that there had
been a violation of Article 3.
31. The
Government maintained that the applicant had not been subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. They
submitted that the police officers had not denied the use of physical
force. Nevertheless, the force used in the instant case had been
proportionate and not excessive. In particular they referred to the
trial court's decision that the facts established during the
investigation had given no reason to conclude that the police
officers had abused their powers and had acted against Polish law.
32.
In addition the Government maintained that during the intervention
the applicant had behaved in an aggressive manner and had refused to
obey the police orders. In conclusion, the Government
submitted that no substantive violation of Article 3 had
occurred in the present case.
(b) The Court's assessment
The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a
minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of
Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of
the treatment, its physical and/or mental effects and, in some cases,
the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Ireland v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A
no. 25, p. 65, § 162).
The
Court also points out that where an individual, when taken into
police custody, is in good health, but is found to be injured at the
time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible
explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear
issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see Tomasi
v. France, judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A
no. 241 A, pp. 40-41, §§ 108 11,
and Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 87,
ECHR 1999 V).
In
assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of
proof “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Ireland v. the
United Kingdom, cited above, pp. 64 65, § 161).
However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently
strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted
presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in
large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in
the case of persons within their control in custody, strong
presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring
during such detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as
resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing
explanation (see Ribitsch v. Austria, judgment of
4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, pp. 25-26, § 34,
Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100,
ECHR 2000 VII).
Turning
to the circumstances of the present case the Court observes that the
parties have not disputed that some of the impugned injuries could
have been caused by the police officers by way of their using
truncheons (see paragraphs 30, 31 above).
The
Court notes that the applicant does not dispute that he showed some
form of resistance to the police officers who detained him on
16 August 1999 (see paragraph 7 above). In addition
the arrest occurred after the applicant had been involved in a fight.
While fourteen police officers outnumbered the applicant and five
other men involved in the struggle, account must be taken of the fact
that the applicant effectively resisted the actions of the police
officers by refusing to comply with their orders, resisting the
attempts of the policemen to apprehend him and behaving aggressively
(see paragraphs 6, 7 above). Thus, it could be considered reasonable
for the police officers to use a certain degree of physical force in
order to overpower him and carry out the arrest and detention (see.
Berliński v. Poland, nos. 27715/95 and
30209/96, § 61-64, 20 June 2002).
The
Court further observes that the prosecution service and the District
Court reached the conclusion that some of the bruises and marks on
the applicant's skin resulted from the justified use of force by the
police officers when they were overpowering him. On the other hand
some of the injuries could have been caused by kicking during the
incident that took place in front of the bar (see paragraphs 13-16
above). In reaching that conclusion the domestic authorities had the
benefit of hearing various witnesses give evidence and of evaluating
their credibility.
In
these circumstances, the Court considers that the recourse to
physical force in this case was made necessary by the applicant's own
conduct. Therefore, while the applicant admittedly suffered as a
result of the incident of 16 August 1999, the use of force against
him cannot be held to have been excessive.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that there has been
no violation of the substantive limb of Article 3 of the
Convention.
2. Adequacy of the investigation
(a) The parties' submissions
41. The
applicant maintained that the investigation into his allegations had
not been effective and thorough.
42. The
Government did not agree with this assertion. They considered that
the investigation into the applicant's allegations had been thorough
and effective. It had been completed four months after the impugned
events occurred. In the course of the investigation all those
involved in the clash, the intervening policemen, the employees of
the sobering-up centre and other relevant witnesses had given
evidence. In addition, the prosecutor had obtained a medical expert's
opinion to assess the applicant's allegation of ill-treatment.
Lastly, they stressed that the applicant had had an opportunity to
review the decision of the District Prosecutor before the Regional
Prosecutor and finally before the District Court. They concluded that
the investigation in the present case had complied with the Article 3
requirements.
(b) The Court's assessment
The Court reiterates that where an individual raises
an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the
police in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in
conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the
Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”, requires
by implication that there should be an effective official
investigation. This investigation should be capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those responsible (see Assenov
and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII, p. 3290,
§ 102, and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95,
§ 131, ECHR 2000 IV).
44. Turning
to the facts of the present case the Court observes that a number of
witnesses were questioned and an expert opinion was produced in the
context of the investigation into the applicant's allegations of
ill-treatment on 16 August 1999 (see paragraphs 12 and 13
above). Subsequently, the prosecution decided not to charge the
policemen and to discontinue the investigation because of the lack of
the unequivocal evidence of the officers' guilt. The
district prosecutor's investigation was completed on 16 December
1999, that is, four months after the impugned events. In addition,
the decision of the prosecution service was verified by the District
Court.
In
view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the investigation in
the applicant's case was effective and capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those allegedly responsible. This
conclusion is based on the number of witnesses questioned by the
prosecutor, the documents taken into account and the promptness of
the investigation.
Against
this background, the Court concludes that the investigation into the
applicant's allegations of ill-treatment was thorough and effective.
There has thus been no breach of Article 3 of the Convention in this
respect.
II ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained about censorship of his correspondence with the
Court. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention which provides
in its relevant part:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his ... correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
The
applicant argued that the circumstances of his case disclosed a
breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
The
Government refrained from expressing their opinion on the
admissibility and merits of the complaint. They noted that there had
been stamps reading “censored” on the envelopes of the
applicant's letters to the Court of 8 December 1999 and 16 June
2000, as well as the Court's letter to the applicant of 9 January
2003. However, the copies of these letters which were available to
the Government did not show any signs of censorship.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) Existence of an interference
The
Court first observes that the applicant's letter of 29 November 1999
bears a red stamp reading “Censored on 7 December 1999,
Prosecutor of the Regional Prosecution Office” and an illegible
signature. The stamp appears on the envelope. Similar stamps appear
on the envelopes of the applicant's letters received at the Court on
23 March 2000 and 22 June 2000 (see paragraphs 18
and 19 above)
The
applicant also submitted an envelope from the Court addressed to him,
which bears a purple stamp which reads “Censored”; it
also bears a handwritten date, 15 January 2003, and an illegible
signature (see paragraph 20 above)
The
Court notes that the Government refrained from taking a position on
the question whether there had been an interference with the
applicant's right to respect for his correspondence. The Court has
held on many occasions that as long as the Polish authorities
continue the practice of marking detainees' letters with the
ocenzurowano stamp, the Court has no alternative but to
presume that those letters have been opened and their contents read,
even if there is no separate stamp on the letter as such (see
Matwiejczuk v. Poland, no. 37641/97, § 99,
2 December 2003, and Pisk-Piskowski v. Poland,
no. 92/03, § 26, 14 June 2005)
It
follows that the censoring of the applicant's correspondence with the
Court amounted to an “interference” with his right to
respect for his correspondence under Article 8.
(b) Whether the interference was “in
accordance with the law”
The Court reiterates that any “interference by a
public authority” with the right to respect for correspondence
will contravene Article 8 of the Convention unless it is “in
accordance with the law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate
aims referred to in paragraph 2 of that Article and is
“necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve
them (see, among many other authorities, Silver and Others
v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, Series A
no. 61, p. 32, § 84; Campbell v. the
United Kingdom, 25 March 1992, Series A no. 233,
p. 16, § 34, and Niedbała v. Poland
no. 27915/95, § 78).
The
Court observes that the Government did not indicate a concrete legal
basis in the domestic law for the impugned interference. It further
notes that the impugned interference took place on three occasions
between 7 December 1999 and 15 January 2003 when
the applicant had been detained pending trial or was serving a prison
sentence.
The
Court observes that, according to Article 214 of the Code of
Execution of Criminal Sentences, persons detained pending trial
should enjoy the same rights as those convicted by a final judgment.
Accordingly, the prohibition of censorship of correspondence with the
European Court of Human Rights contained in Article 103 of the
same Code, which expressly relates to convicted persons, was also
applicable to detained persons (see Michta v. Poland
no. 13425/02, § 61, 4 May 2006, and Kwiek
v. Poland, no. 51895/99, § 44, 30 May
2006). Thus, the censorship of the applicant's letters to the Court
was contrary to the domestic law. It
follows that the interference in the present
case was not “in accordance with the law”.
Accordingly,
the Court does not consider it necessary to ascertain whether the
other requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 were
complied with. Consequently the Court finds that there has been a
violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
The
Government submitted that the applicant's claim was excessive. They
asked the Court to rule that a finding of a violation of the
Convention constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction. In the
alternative, they invited the Court to assess the amount of just
satisfaction on the basis of its case-law in similar cases and having
regard to national economic circumstances.
The
Court considers that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage
which is not sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation
of the Convention. Considering the circumstances of the case, and
making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the
applicant EUR 500 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant submitted no claim in respect of costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
8 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 500 (five
hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into Polish zlotys at the rate applicable at the date of the
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 December 2007, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Boštjan M. Zupančič
Registrar President
