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TAMAMBOCA AND GUL v. TURKEY - 1636/02 [2007] ECHR 1036 (29 November 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/1036.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 1036
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF TAMAMBOĞA AND GÜL v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 1636/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
29
November 2007
This judgment will
become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Tamamboğa and Gül v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr B.M.
Zupančič, President,
Mr C.
Bîrsan,
Mr R.
Türmen,
Mr E.
Myjer,
Mr David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Mrs I.
Ziemele,
Mrs I.
Berro-Lefèvre, judges,
and
Mr S. Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 8 November 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 1636/02) against the Republic
of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by two Turkish nationals, Mr Mustafa Tamamboğa
and Mr Eyüp Gül (“the applicants”), on
10 October 2001.
The
applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by Mr
M.A. Altunkalem, a lawyer practising in Diyarbakır. The Turkish
Government (“the Government”) did not designate an Agent
for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court.
On
6 June 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicants were born in 1973 and 1974 respectively. The first
applicant lives in İzmir. By a letter dated 28 August 2006 the
Court was informed that the second applicant was purging his sentence
in Bolu prison.
The
applicants were arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion
of membership of an illegal armed organisation, namely the PKK, on 25
and 26 July 1993 respectively. They were remanded in custody on
5 August 1993.
On
31 August 1993 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State
Security Court filed an indictment against twenty-one persons,
including the applicant. He accused the applicants of membership of
an illegal armed organisation and of aiding and abetting that
organisation. The charges included, in particular, bombings of
various public and private establishments between July 1992 and
June 1993.
The
first hearing, held before the Diyarbakır State Security Court
on 3 September 1993, in the applicants' absence, was taken up
with procedural matters such as the measures to be taken for securing
the presence of the accused.
Between
3 September 1993 and 23 January 1996, the first-instance court held
hearings on a regular basis during which the judges dealt mostly with
procedural matters. It also heard the accused and their
representatives who were present on the date of the hearings. At the
end of each hearing, the court considered releasing the applicants
pending trial both ex officio as well as upon their requests. At each
hearing, the court, relying on the nature of the offence, the state
of the evidence and the content of the case-file, decided to prolong
their remand in custody.
During
this time the court also heard two witnesses, on 25 November
1993 and 13 January 1994, who stated that they did not know any of
the accused or whether they had any organisational link with the
armed organisation. On 28 March 1995 the public prosecutor submitted
his observations on the merits. On 7 November 1995 the court decided,
upon the request of the accused, to hear a witness, Mr O.B. who was
being tried before another court. In the hearing held on 19 December
1995, the court heard Mr O.B. who stated, inter alia, that he knew
the second applicant from school. He claimed that the applicant used
to talk about the PKK but that he did not know anything about him
being a member of or participating in the activities of that
organisation. Upon this statement the second applicant maintained
that he was not a member of the organisation as was confirmed by the
witness and that it was normal to talk like that at school. At this
hearing the prosecutor reiterated his observations of 28 March
1995.
In
a hearing held on 23 January 1996 the first applicant's
representative submitted his observations on the merits. The court
also heard the accused. On the same day, the Diyarbakır State
Security Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them
to life imprisonment.
On
14 July 1997 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in respect
of fourteen of the accused, including the applicants.
The
case was sent back to the Diyarbakır State Security Court where
the proceedings against the applicants commenced on 29 July
1997.
Between
29 July 1997 and 15 May 2001, the first-instance court held hearings
on a regular basis during which the judges dealt with procedural
matters and adjourned many hearings, since one of the co-accused
could not be found and the statements of another one residing in
Germany could not be taken. It also heard the accused and their
representatives who were present on the date of the hearings and the
public prosecutor, both parties relying on previous submissions. The
applicants failed to attend some of the hearings. At the end of each
hearing, the court also considered releasing the applicants pending
trial both ex officio as well as upon their own requests. At each
hearing the court, relying on the nature of the offence, the state of
the evidence and the content of the case-file, decided to prolong
their remand in custody.
During
this time in a hearing held on 7 July 1999 the judge who had been
appointed to replace the military judge, sat as a member of the trial
court for the first time. On 16 November 1999 the public prosecutor
read out his observations on the merits.
On
15 May 2001 the Diyarbakır State Security Court decided to
disjoin the case of the two co accused who could not be found.
On the same day the court convicted the applicants as charged and
sentenced them to life imprisonment.
On
7 November 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in
respect of the first applicant and upheld it in respect of the second
applicant.
On
24 January 2002 the principal public prosecutor at the Court of
Cassation dismissed the second applicant's request for a
rectification of the Court of Cassation's decision.
On
7 February 2002 the case was sent back to the first-instance court
where the first applicant was tried alone.
Between
7 February 2002 and 10 September 2002, the first-instance court held
hearings on a regular basis.
During
this time on 12 March 2002 the applicant repeated his earlier
submissions. The prosecutor requested time to prepare his
observations on the merits. In the hearing held on 14 May 2002 the
prosecutor submitted his observations on the merits of the case. The
applicant was given time to prepare his observations on the merits.
The court, taking into account the amount of time the first applicant
had spent in remand in custody, ordered his release pending trial.
On
10 September 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted
the first applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years and
six months' imprisonment. On 17 March 2003 the Court of Cassation
upheld this judgment.
By
an additional judgment, the first applicant's sentence was reduced to
six years and three months' imprisonment on 22 June 2005.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The relevant domestic law and practice in force at the
material time are outlined in the following judgments: Öcalan
v. Turkey ([GC], no. 46221/99, §§ 52 54,
ECHR 2005 IV, and Çobanoğlu and Budak v. Turkey,
no. 45977/99, §§ 29-30, 30 January 2007.
By
Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Journal on 30
June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 5 § 3 AND 6 § 2
OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that their remand in custody exceeded the
“reasonable time” requirement as provided in Article 5 §
3 of the Convention. They further submitted under Article 6 § 2
of the Convention that their lengthy remand in custody violated their
right to be presumed innocent.
The
Court considers that these complaints should be examined from the
standpoint of 5 § 3 alone, which reads:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
The
Government asked the Court to dismiss this part of the application
for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, under Article 35 § 1
of the Convention. In this regard, the Government maintained that the
applicants failed to object to their continued remand in detention
pursuant to Articles 298 and 299 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CCP).
The
Court reiterates that it has already examined and rejected the
Government's preliminary objections in similar cases (see, in
particular, Koşti and Others v. Turkey, no. 74321/01,
§§ 19-24, 3 May 2007). The Court finds no
particular circumstances in the instant case which would require it
to depart from its findings in the above mentioned application.
Consequently,
the Court rejects the Government's preliminary objection. It further
notes that this complaint is not inadmissible on any other grounds
and must, therefore, be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government maintained that the length of the applicants' remand in
custody was reasonable. In particular, they submitted that the
seriousness of the crime and the special circumstances of the case
justified their continued remand in custody and that the domestic
authorities displayed diligence when considering the applicants
continued detention.
The
applicants maintained their allegations.
The
Court reiterates that it falls in the first place to the domestic
judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the detention
of an accused person pending trial does not exceed a reasonable time.
To this end they must examine all the facts arguing for or against
the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying,
with due regard to the principle of presumption of innocence, a
departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty, and set
them out in their decisions on the applications for release. It is
primarily on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions, and
of the established facts mentioned by the applicants in their
appeals, that the Court must determine whether or not there has been
a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Sevgin
and İnce v. Turkey, no. 46262/99, § 61,
20 September 2005).
The
persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a sine qua non for the validity of the
continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time, it no longer
suffices; the Court must then establish whether the other grounds
cited by the judicial authorities continued to justify the
deprivation of liberty (see, among other authorities, Ilijkov v.
Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, § 77, 26 July 2001, and Labita
v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, §§ 152-153,
ECHR 2000-IV).
The
first applicant's remand in custody consisted of three periods of
pre-trial detention and lasted around six years and ten months in
total. The second applicant's remand in custody consisted of two
periods of pre-trial detention and lasted around six years and four
months in total (see, in particular, Solmaz v. Turkey, no.
27561/02, §§ 23-36, 16 January 2007 as regards the
calculation of periods of pre-trial detention). During this time, the
first-instance court considered the applicants' continued detention
at the end of each hearing, either on its own motion or upon the
request of the applicants. It notes however, from the material in the
case file, that the court ordered the applicants' continued detention
on remand using identical, stereotyped terms, such as “having
regard to the nature of the offence and the state of evidence”.
The
Court takes note of the seriousness of the offence attributed to the
applicants and the severity of the relevant punishment. However, it
reiterates that the issue of whether a period of detention is
reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract. Whether it is
reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in
each case according to its special features. Continued detention can
be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications
of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding
the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for
individual liberty (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no.
30210/96, § 110, ECHR 2000-XI). In this connection,
the Court further reiterates that the Convention case-law has
developed four basic acceptable reasons for refusing bail: the risk
that the accused will fail to appear for trial; the risk that the
accused, if released, would take action to prejudice the
administration of justice or commit further offences or cause public
disorder (see, in particular, Smirnova v. Russia, nos.
46133/99 and 48183/99, § 59, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts)). In
the instant case, the Court notes the lack of such reasoning in the
domestic court's decisions to prolong the applicants' remand in
custody. There is also no evidence that the authorities took into
account the time which had elapsed as a criterion in the applicants'
favour.
Finally,
although, in general, the expression “the state of the
evidence” may be a relevant factor for the existence and
persistence of serious indications of guilt, in the present case it
nevertheless, alone, cannot justify the length of the detention of
which the applicant complains (see Letellier v. France,
judgment of 26 June 1991, Series A no. 207, § 43, Tomasi
v. France, judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A, and
Mansur v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A no. 319-B,
§ 55).
The
foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to
conclude that the grounds given for the applicants' remand in
detention were not “sufficient” and “relevant”
to justify holding them in custody for almost six years and ten
months and six years and four months respectively.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that they had been denied a fair hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of a
military judge sitting on the bench of the Diyarbakır State
Security Court which tried them. They further complained that the
length of the criminal proceedings brought against them was excessive
and that there was no effective remedy in domestic law whereby they
could challenge it. The applicants relied on Articles 6 § 1 and
13 of the Convention, which reads:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established
by law.”
Article 13
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
The
Government asked the Court to dismiss this part of the application
for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, under Article 35 § 1
of the Convention. They maintained, firstly, that the proceedings
were still pending before the domestic courts when the applicants
introduced their application before the Court. Secondly, they failed
to raise the substance of their complaint concerning the length of
the proceedings before the domestic courts.
The
Court reiterates that it has already examined and rejected the
Government's preliminary objections in similar cases (see, in
particular, Vehbi Ünal v. Turkey, no. 48264/99, §
38, 9 November 2006, and Mete v. Turkey,
no. 39327/02, §§ 18-19, 25 October 2005). The Court finds
no particular circumstances in the instant case which would require
it to depart from its findings in the above-mentioned applications.
Consequently,
the Court rejects the Government's preliminary objection. It further
notes that this part of the application is not inadmissible on any
other grounds and must, therefore, be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Independence and impartiality of the State Security
Court
The
Government maintained that, by Law no. 4388 of 18 June 1999,
amendments were made to remove military judges from the bench of the
State Security Courts with a view to complying with the requirements
of the Convention. In this connection they pointed out that, in the
present case, the military judge sitting on the bench of the
Diyarbakır State Security Court had been replaced by a civilian
judge in the course of the proceedings and that the applicants were
convicted by a State Security Court which was composed of three
civilian judges.
The
applicants maintained their allegations.
The
Court has consistently held that certain aspects of the status of
military judges sitting as members of the State Security Courts
rendered their independence from the executive questionable (see
Incal v. Turkey, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV, § 68, Çıraklar
v. Turkey, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VII,
§ 39). The Court also found in Öcalan v. Turkey,
§§ 114-115, mentioned above, that when a military
judge participated in one or more interlocutory decisions that
remained in effect during the criminal proceedings in question, the
military judge's replacement by a civilian judge in the course of
those proceedings, before the verdict was delivered, failed to
dissipate the applicant's reasonably held concern about that trial
court's independence and impartiality, unless it was established that
the procedure subsequently followed in the State Security Court
sufficiently allayed that concern.
The
Court observes that the applicants' trial commenced before the
Diyarbakır State Security Court whose composition included a
military judge. On 7 July 1999 the military judge sitting on the
bench of this court was replaced by a civil judge. Consequently, when
the applicants were convicted on 15 May 2001, the Diyarbakır
State Security Court was composed of three civilian judges. As the
regards the first applicant, the Court notes that his conviction was
subsequently quashed by the Court of Cassation and that as a result
he was once again tried before the Diyarbakır State Security
Court, which was composed from the outset of three civilian judges.
In
the instant case, the Court notes that before his replacement, the
military judge sat at the bench of the State Security Court between
3 September 1993 and 7 July 1999 where the court held hearings
on regular intervals. At these hearings, the domestic court heard the
accused, including the applicants, on many occasions as well as
witnesses, whose testimonies did not have any bearing on their case
and mostly took some minor procedural acts during this period.
However, no interlocutory decisions of importance, in particular for
the rights of the defence of the applicants, were taken by the
domestic court during these hearings. In this connection, the Court
notes that after the military judge was replaced by a civilian judge,
the domestic court continued to hold regular hearings during which
time it heard the accused, including the applicants, a number of
times. Furthermore, the final submissions of both the public
prosecutor and the applicants were read out before the court,
composed of three civilian judges. The Court takes note of the
respective importance of the procedural acts which took place before
and after the replacement of the military judge. It finds that, in
the instant case, none of the acts which took place with the
participation of the military judge required an immediate renewal
after his replacement by a civilian judge (see, for example,
Kabasakal and Atar v. Turkey, nos. 70084/01 and 70085/01,
§ 34, 19 September 2006).
In
view of the overall proceedings, the Court finds that, in the
particular circumstances of the case, the replacement of the military
judge in the course of the proceedings disposed of the applicants'
reasonably held concern about the trial court's independence and
impartiality (see, among others, Osman v. Turkey, no. 4415/02,
§ 17, 19 December 2006).
In
the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the applicants'
complaint concerning the independence and impartiality of the
Diyarbakır State Security Court should be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.
2. Length of the criminal proceedings
The
Government maintained that, in the circumstances of the present case,
the length of the criminal proceedings could not be considered
unreasonably long. In this respect, they referred to the number of
the co accused and the time spent gathering evidence. The
Government further submitted that the applicants and the co-accused
had contributed to the prolongation of the proceedings by failing to
attend to a number of hearings. They maintained that the applicants
could have asked the first-instance court to speed up the
proceedings.
The
applicants maintained their allegations.
(a) Article 6 § 1
(i) Period to be taken into consideration
As
regards the first applicant, the period to be taken into
consideration in determining whether the proceedings satisfied the
“reasonable time” requirement laid down by Article 6 §
1 began on 25 July 1993, with his arrest, and ended on 17 March
2003, when the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the
first-instance court. The period under consideration thus lasted
approximately nine years and eight months' before two instances who
examined the case three times.
As
to the second applicant, the period to be taken into consideration in
determining whether the proceedings satisfied the “reasonable
time” requirement laid down by Article 6 § 1 began on 26
July 1993, with his arrest, and ended on 7 November 2001, when the
Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.
The period under consideration thus lasted approximately eight years
and three months' before two instances who examined the case twice.
(ii) Reasonableness of the length of the
proceedings
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the
length of
proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the
case and with reference to the criteria established by its case-law,
particularly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the
applicants and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for
the applicants in the dispute (see, among many others, Sekin
and Others v. Turkey,
no. 26518, § 35, 22 January 2004).
The Court considers that, even though the case
involved a certain degree of complexity since it involved the
prosecution of a certain number of accused for charges regarding
their involvement in the activities of an illegal armed organisation,
it cannot be said that this in itself justified the total
length of
the proceedings.
As
regards the conduct of the applicants, the Court does not find that
they contributed significantly to the prolongation of the proceedings
by their failure to attend a number of hearings since none of them
were adjourned on this ground.
Concerning the conduct of the authorities, the Court
notes that there were significant periods of delay which are
attributable to them. In this respect, it observes that the
proceedings before the State Security Court, after the first time the
case file was remitted to it, was unduly deferred since the court was
unable to secure the additional defence submissions of two of the
co-accused. The Court finds that the delay in securing testimonies
from the accused must be considered to be attributable to the
domestic court's handling of the proceedings (see, in particular,
Atkın v. Turkey, no. 39977/98, § 44,
21 February 2006).
In
addition, the fact that the second applicant was kept in custody
throughout the proceedings and the first applicant released only
during the last stages required particular diligence on the part of
the courts dealing with the case to administer justice expeditiously
(see Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99, § 132,
ECHR 2002-VI). Recalling that Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention
imposes on the Contracting States the duty to organise their legal
systems in such a way that their courts can meet each of the
requirements of that provision, including the obligation to decide
cases within a reasonable time (see Arvelakis v. Greece, no.
41354/98, § 26, 12 April 2001), the Court considers
that the domestic court could have applied stricter measures to speed
up the proceedings. In particular, it could have decided to sever
much earlier the proceedings in respect of the co-accused who were
not heard by the first-instance court after the case was remitted to
it for the first time. It therefore finds that, in the absence of any
explanation from the Government, the proceedings in the instant case
were unnecessarily prolonged as the national court failed to act with
the necessary diligence in conducting the proceedings against the
applicants.
Finally,
the Court considers that what was at stake for the applicants in
these proceedings was of considerable importance to them.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the
Court considers that, in the instant case, the
length of
the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
(b) Article 13
The
Court has examined similar cases on previous occasions and has found
violations of Article 13 of the Convention in respect of the lack of
an effective remedy under Turkish law whereby the applicants could
have contested the length of the proceedings at issue (see, in
particular, Bahçeyaka v. Turkey, no. 74463/01, §§
26-30, 13 July 2006, and Tendik and Others v. Turkey,
no. 23188/02, §§ 34-39, 22 December 2005). It finds no
reason to depart from that conclusion in the present case.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 13.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
In
their observations dated 5 January 2007 the applicants also
complained under Articles 5 § 3 and 13 of the Convention about
the length of their detention in police custody and the lack of an
effective domestic remedy in this respect.
The
Court finds that these complaints relate to events which intervened
more than six months before being lodged with the Court on 5 January
2005, and it therefore rejects them in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicants claimed, in total, 55,000 euros (EUR) in respect of
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. This sum included loss of
earnings as a result of their lengthy remand in custody.
The
Government contested the amount.
As
regards the alleged pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants, the
Court notes that some of their claims disclose no causal link between
the violation found and the pecuniary damage requested. It further
notes that the applicants have failed to properly substantiate the
remaining claims under this head. The Court accordingly dismisses
them.
However,
the Court accepts that the applicants must have suffered some
non pecuniary damage which cannot be sufficiently compensated by
the finding of a violation alone. Taking into account the
circumstances of the case and having regard to its case-law, it
awards Mr Tamamboğa EUR 6,500 and Mr Gül EUR 5,500 in
respect of non pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicants, who received EUR 850 by was of legal aid from the Council
of Europe, also claimed EUR 2,595 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the Court. The applicants relied on the Diyarbakır Bar
Association's recommended fees list. They also submitted a receipt
concerning translation of documents.
The
Government contested the amount.
Since the applicants submitted no justification as
regards costs and expenses as required by Rule
60 of
the Rules of Court save for a receipt concerning translation of
documents and having regard to the fact that they have already
received a certain amount as legal aid from the Council of Europe,
the Court makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints concerning the length of
the applicants' remand in custody and of the criminal proceedings
against them as well as the lack of an effective domestic remedy in
this respect admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the criminal
proceedings;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 6,500
(six thousand five hundred euros) to Mr Tamamboğa and
EUR 5, 500 (five thousand five hundred euros) to Mr Gül in
respect of non pecuniary damage, to be converted into new
Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of the settlement
and free of any taxes or charges that may be payable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the abovementioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 November 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Boštjan M. Zupančič
Registrar President
