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BALCIK AND OTHERS v. TURKEY - 25/02 [2007] ECHR 1024 (29 November 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/1024.html
Cite as:
[2007] ECHR 1024
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF BALÇIK AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 25/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
29
November 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Balçık and Others v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič,
President,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr R.
Türmen,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
Mrs A.
Gyulumyan,
Mr David Thór Björgvinsson,
Mrs I.
Ziemele, judges,
and Mr S. Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 8 November 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 25/02) against the Republic of
Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by seven Turkish nationals, Mr Erkal Balçık,
Mr Kubilay İyit, Ms Filiz Kalkan, Ms Semiha Kırkoç,
Ms Meral Kalanç, Ms Sema Gül and Ms Gülsen
Dinler (“the applicants”), on 20 September 2001.
The
applicants were granted legal aid. The first applicant was
represented by Mr Zeynel Polat, a lawyer practising in Istanbul and
the remaining six applicants were represented by Mrs G. Altay, a
lawyer also practising in Istanbul. The Turkish Government (“the
Government”) did not designate an Agent for the purposes of the
proceedings before the Court.
On
12 April 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicants were born in 1967, 1979, 1971, 1963, 1979, 1973 and 1972
respectively and live in Istanbul.
Upon
receipt of intelligence reports that on 5 August 2000 a group of
demonstrators would gather in the İstiklal Street in Istanbul to
read a press declaration and block the tram line to protest against
F-type prisons, police officers and members of the “Rapid
Intervention Force” (çevik kuvvet) were deployed
in the area. At noon, the applicants, together with thirty-nine
others, gathered in İstiklal Street to make a press declaration
to protest against F-type prisons. The police asked the group to
disperse and to end the gathering and informed them that the
demonstration was unlawful since no advance notice had been submitted
to the authorities. The demonstrators refused to obey and attempted
to march along İstiklal Street, chanting slogans and reading out
a press declaration. Subsequently, at about 12.30 p.m. the police
dispersed the group, allegedly by using truncheons and tear-gas. The
applicants were arrested along with thirty-nine other persons. The
applicants Sema Gül and Semiha Kırkoç were
subsequently taken to the Taksim Hospital.
The
doctor who examined Sema Gül noted the following:
“There are bruises on both arms and a swelling on
the left foot.”
As
regards Semiha Kırkoç, the doctor noted the following:
“There is a 4 cm long laceration on the left
parietal region...”
There
were no medical reports in respect of the remaining applicants.
The
incident report dated 5 August 2000 stated that the security forces
had to use force to disperse the group as they refused to obey the
warnings. It was further indicated that one police officer was
wounded during the incident.
The
applicants were subsequently taken to Beyoğlu central police
directorate and Karaköy police station, where they were kept for
one day.
The
next day, they were released upon the order of the Beyoğlu
public prosecutor.
On
an unspecified date, the applicants filed a petition with the Beyoğlu
public prosecutor against the police officers who had carried out the
arrest. In their petition, they complained, inter alia, of the
unlawfulness of their arrest and the excessive use of force by the
police officers during and after the arrest.
On
5 January 2001 the Beyoğlu public prosecutor issued a decision
of non-prosecution in respect of the police officers who had been on
duty at the relevant time. In his decision, the public prosecutor
considered that the force used by the security forces was in line
with Article 16 of the Law No. 2559 on the Duties and Powers of the
Police and had not been excessive. In the public prosecutor's
opinion, the injuries sustained by the complainants had been caused
by the use of force which was proportionate.
The
applicants filed an objection against the public prosecutor's
decision.
On
25 June 2001 the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the applicants'
objection.
Meanwhile,
on 14 August 2000, the Beyoğlu public prosecutor filed a bill of
indictment with the Beyoğlu Criminal Court. The public
prosecutor accused the applicants under Article 28 § 1 of Law
no. 2911 of taking part in an illegal demonstration without prior
authorisation and not dispersing despite the police officers'
warning.
On
19 September 2005 the Beyoğlu Criminal Court acquitted the
applicants. The court held that making a press statement was a
constitutional right and that prior authorisation was not needed to
use this right. The court further observed that it was not certain
that the warning given to the accused to disperse could be heard by
all the demonstrators. It concluded that the accused had used their
constitutional rights and, consequently, had not committed any
offence.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Constitutional guarantees
Article
34 of the Constitution provides:
“Everyone has the right to hold unarmed and
peaceful meetings and demonstration marches without prior permission.
...
The formalities, conditions, and procedures governing
the exercise of the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches
shall be prescribed by law.”
B. The Demonstrations Act
At
the material time section 10 of the Assemblies and Marches Act (Law
no. 2911) was worded as follows:
“In order for a meeting to take place, the
governor's office or authorities of the district in which the
demonstration is planned must be informed, during opening hours and
at least seventy-two hours prior to the meeting, by a notice
containing the signature of all the members of the organising
board...”
Section
22 of the same Act prohibited demonstrations and processions on
public streets, in parks, places of worship and buildings in which
public services were based. Demonstrations organised in public
squares had to comply with security instructions and not disrupt
individuals' movement or public transport. Finally, section 24
provided that demonstrations and processions which did not comply
with the provisions of this law would be dispersed by force on the
order of the governor's office and after the demonstrators had been
warned.
C. Law No. 2559 on the Duties and Powers of the Police
Article 16
“The police may use firearms in the event of:
(a) Self defence, ...
(h) if a person or a group resists the police
and prevents them from carrying out their duties or if there is an
attack against the police.”
Additional Article 6 (dated 16 June 1985)
“In cases of resistance by persons whose arrest is
necessary or by groups whose dispersal is necessary or of their
threatening to attack or carrying out an attack, the police may use
violence to subdue these actions.
Use of violence refers to the use of bodily force,
physical force and all types of weapons specified in the law and it
gradually increases according to the nature and level of resistance
and attack in such a way as to restore calm.
In cases of intervention by group forces, the extent of
the use of force and the equipment and instruments to be used are
determined by the commander of the intervening force.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the
force used during their arrest was excessive and disproportionate and
constituted ill-treatment. Article 3 reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
1. The Government's preliminary objections
The
Government asked the Court to dismiss this complaint for failure to
comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They argued
that the applicants could have sought reparation for the harm
allegedly suffered by instituting an action in the administrative
courts. They further maintained that this part of the application was
not lodged within the six-month time-limit.
As
regards the Government's preliminary objection concerning the
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court reiterates that it has
already examined and rejected the Government's preliminary objections
in similar cases (see, in particular, Karayiğit v. Turkey
(dec.), no. 63181/00, 5 October 2004). It finds no
particular circumstances in the instant case which would require it
to depart from its findings in the above-mentioned application.
Consequently, it rejects this part of the Government's preliminary
objection.
As
regards the Government's second objection concerning the six-month
rule, the Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention, it may deal with an application within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken. In the
instant case, the final decision concerning the applicants'
allegations of ill-treatment was delivered on 25 June 2001 by the
Istanbul Assize Court. As the application was lodged with the Court
on 20 September 2001, this part of the application was introduced
with the Court within the six-month time-limit. In view of the
foregoing, the Court also rejects this part of the Government's
objections.
2. As regards the applicants Mr Erkal Balçık,
Mr Kubilay İyit, Ms Filiz Kalkan, Ms Meral Kalanç and Ms
Gülsen Dinler
The
Court recalls that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by
appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, it has generally
applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”
(see Talat Tepe v. Turkey, no. 31247/96, § 48,
21 December 2004). Such proof may, however, follow from the
coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences
or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Labita v. Italy
[GC], no. 26772/95, § 121, ECHR 2000 IV).
In
the instant case, the applicants Mr Erkal Balçık, Mr
Kubilay İyit, Ms Filiz Kalkan, Ms Meral Kalanç and Ms
Gülsen Dinler complained that they had been injured as a result
of the excessive use of force by the police to disperse the
demonstration. Nonetheless, several elements cast doubt on the
veracity of the applicants' claims. The Court observes that, although
the applicants were released the day after the incident, they have
not submitted any medical reports in support of their complaint nor
adduced any material which could add probative weight to their
allegations. There is nothing in the case file to show that the
applicants had been injured as alleged during the incident.
In
view of the above, the Court concludes that the applicants, Mr Erkal
Balçık, Mr Kubilay İyit, Ms Filiz Kalkan, Ms Meral
Kalanç and Ms Gülsen Dinler, have not substantiated their
claims and this part of the application should therefore be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. As regards the applicants Ms Semiha Kırkoç
and Ms Sema Gül
The Court notes that the Article 3 complaint lodged by
Ms Semiha Kırkoç and Ms Sema Gül is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
As
the Court has underlined on many occasions, Article 3 enshrines one
of the most fundamental values of democratic societies, making no
provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible
under Article 15 § 2 (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no.
25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V; Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria,
judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1998-VIII, p. 3288, § 93).
As
stated above, in assessing evidence, the standard of proof “beyond
reasonable doubt” is generally applied (see Ireland v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, pp.
64-65, § 161). However, such proof may follow from the
coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences
or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Salman v.
Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII). Further,
where allegations are made under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention,
the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny (see, mutatis
mutandis, Ribitsch v. Austria, judgment of 4 December
1995, Series A no. 336, p. 24, § 32).
The Court notes that in the present case it is
undisputed between the parties that the injuries observed on the two
applicants, namely on Ms Semiha Kırkoç and Ms Sema Gül,
had been caused as a result of the use of force by the police during
the incident on 5 August 2000. This is also indicated by the incident
report which stated the police had to use force to disperse the group
of demonstrators.
Having regard to the above, the Court considers that
the burden rests on the Government to demonstrate with convincing
arguments that the use of force was not excessive.
The
Court observes that, although no prior notification was given to the
authorities about the meeting, the police had received intelligence
reports that there would be a gathering in the İstiklal Street
on 5 August 2000. The security forces were thus able to take
preventive measures. The area concerned was secured by numerous
police officers and members of the rapid intervention force. As a
result, in the particular circumstances of the present case, it
cannot be said that the security forces were called upon to react
without prior preparation (see Rehbock v. Slovenia,
no. 29462/95, § 72, ECHR 2000 XII). The Court
notes that the group did not obey the police warnings to disperse.
However, as explained in detail below (see paragraphs 51-54 below),
there is nothing in the case file to suggest that the demonstrators
presented a danger to public order. At this point, the Court also
refers to the judgment of the Beyoğlu Criminal Court dated
19 September 2005 by which the applicants were acquitted of the
charges against them. The domestic court held that, by making a press
declaration, the accused had exercised their constitutional rights
and had not committed any offence.
In these circumstances, the Court finds that the
Government have failed to furnish convincing or credible arguments
which would provide a basis to explain or to justify the degree of
force used against the applicants, whose injuries are corroborated by
medical reports. As a result, it is concluded that the injuries of Ms
Semiha Kırkoç and Ms Sema Gül were the result of
treatment for which the State bore responsibility.
It follows that there has been a violation of Article
3 in respect of Ms Semiha Kırkoç and Ms Sema Gül.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 9, 10 AND 11 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants alleged that the police intervention in the meeting
constituted a violation of their freedom of thought, freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly. In this respect, they invoked
Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention.
The
Court considers that the applicants' complaints should be examined
from the standpoint of Article 11 alone, which reads:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the
exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration
of the State.”
A. Admissibility
The
Government suggested that, since the applicants were acquitted of the
charges against them in 2005, they could no longer be considered as
victims within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.
The
Court considers that the Government's argument alleging that the
applicants could not claim that they had been victims of a breach of
their right under Article 11 of the Convention raises a question
which is closely linked to the merits of the complaint. It therefore
joins the preliminary objection of the Government to the merits
(Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, no. 1543/06, §§
45-48, 3 May 2007).
The
Court further notes that this part of the application is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Existence of any interference with the applicants'
rights
The
Court recalls in the first place that according to the Convention
organs' constant approach, the word “victim” of a breach
of rights or freedoms denotes the person directly affected by the act
or omission which is in issue (see Marckx v. Belgium, judgment
of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, § 27; Dudgeon v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45, §
41).
In
the present case, there is no dispute between the parties as to the
initial existence of an interference with the applicants' right of
assembly. The Court acknowledges that the domestic court acquitted
the applicants of the charges against them. However it cannot
overlook the fact that this decision was delivered on 19 September
2005, almost 5 years after the incident. It also notes that by
participating in this meeting, the applicants aimed to draw attention
to F-type prison conditions, which was a topical issue at the time.
In the Court's view, the interference in the meeting, the force used
by the police to disperse the participants and the subsequent
prosecution could have had a chilling effect and discouraged the
applicants from taking part in similar meetings (see Bączkowski
and Others, cited above, § 67-68).
In
view of the above, the Court considers that the applicants were
negatively affected by the police intervention and subsequent
criminal proceedings brought against them, irrespective of the final
result.
2. Justification for the interference
The
Government stated that the meeting in question had been organised
unlawfully in that no advance notification had been sent to the
relevant authorities. They pointed out that the second paragraph of
Article 11 imposed limits on the right of peaceful assembly in
order to prevent disorder.
The
Court reiterates that an interference will constitute a breach of
Article 11 unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one
or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2 and is “necessary in
a democratic society” for the achievement of those aims.
In
this connection, it is noted that the interference in the present
case had a legal basis, namely section 22 of Law No. 2911 (Assemblies
and Marches Act), and was thus “prescribed by law” within
the meaning of Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. As concerns
legitimate aim, the Government submitted that the interference
pursued the legitimate aim of preventing public disorder and the
Court finds no reason to differ.
Turning
to the question of whether the interference was “necessary in a
democratic society, the Court refers in the first place to the
fundamental principles underlying its judgments relating to
Article 11 (see Djavit An v. Turkey, no.
20652/92, §§ 56 57, ECHR 2003 III; Piermont
v. France, judgment of 27 April 1995, Series A no. 314,
§§ 76 77; and Plattform “Ärzte für
das Leben” v. Austria, judgment of 21 June 1988,
Series A no. 139, p. 12, § 32). It is clear from this
case-law that the authorities have a duty to take appropriate
measures with regard to lawful demonstrations in order to ensure
their peaceful conduct and the safety of all citizens (see
Oya Ataman v. Turkey, no. 74552/01, § 35,
ECHR 2006 ....).
The
Court also notes that States must not only safeguard the right to
assemble peacefully, but also refrain from applying unreasonable
indirect restrictions upon that right. Finally, it considers that,
although the essential object of Article 11 is to protect the
individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities with
the exercise of the rights protected, there may in addition be
positive obligations to secure the effective enjoyment of these
rights (see Djavit An, cited above, § 57; Oya Ataman,
cited above, § 36).
As
a preliminary point, the Court considers that these principles are
also applicable with regard to demonstrations and processions
organised in public areas. It notes, however, that it is not contrary
to the spirit of Article 11 if, for reasons of public order and
national security, a priori, a High Contracting Party requires
that the holding of meetings be subject to authorisation and
regulates the activities of associations (see Djavit An,
cited above, §§ 66 67).
Having
regard to the domestic legislation, the Court observes that at the
material time no authorisation was required for the holding of public
demonstrations; however, notification was required seventy-two hours
prior to the event. In principle, regulations of this nature should
not represent a hidden obstacle to the freedom of peaceful assembly
as it is protected by the Convention. It goes without saying that any
demonstration in a public place may cause a certain level of
disruption to ordinary life and encounter hostility. In the Court's
opinion, it is important that preventive security measures such as,
for example, the presence of first-aid services at the site of
demonstrations, be taken in order to guarantee the smooth conduct of
any event, meeting or other gathering, be it political, cultural or
of another nature. This being so, associations and others organising
demonstrations, as actors in the democratic process, should respect
the rules governing that process by complying with the regulations in
force (see Oya Ataman, cited above, §§ 38 and 39).
It
appears from the evidence before the Court that, in the instant case,
the group of demonstrators was informed by the police that their
march was unlawful and would disrupt public order at a busy time of
the day, and had been ordered to disperse. The applicants and other
demonstrators did not comply with these orders and attempted to
continue their march.
However,
there is no evidence to suggest that the group presented a danger to
public order, apart from possibly blocking the tram line. The Court
notes that the group in question consisted of forty-six persons, who
wished to draw attention to a topical issue, namely the F-type prison
conditions. It is observed that the rally began at about noon and
ended with the group's arrest within half an hour at 12.30 p.m. The
Court is therefore particularly struck by the authorities' impatience
in seeking to end the demonstration. At this point, the Court also
recalls that although no notification had been given, the authorities
had prior knowledge (see, a contrario, Oya Ataman,
cited above) that such a demonstration would take place on that date
and could have therefore taken preventive measures.
In
the Court's view, where demonstrators do not engage in acts of
violence, it is important for the public authorities to show a
certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the
freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention is not
to be deprived of all substance.
Accordingly,
the Court considers that in the instant case the police's forceful
intervention was disproportionate and was not necessary for the
prevention of disorder within the meaning of the second paragraph of
Article 11 of the Convention.
In
view of the above, the Court therefore dismisses the Government's
preliminary objection regarding the applicant's alleged lack of
victim status and concludes that there has been a violation of
Article 11 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 7, 17 AND 18 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants maintained under Article 7 of the Convention that they had
been arrested and the criminal proceedings had been brought against
them on account of an act which did not constitute a criminal offence
under domestic law. The applicants also complained that the unlawful
restrictions placed on their right to freedom of thought, freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly, the criminal proceedings brought
against them and their inability to raise their complaints before the
domestic judicial authorities into their allegations constituted a
violation of Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention.
The
Court notes that these complaints are linked to the one examined
above and must likewise be declared admissible.
Referring
to its finding of a violation under Article 11 of the Convention (see
paragraphs 52-54 above), the Court considers that it has examined the
main legal question raised in the present application.
Having
regard to the facts of the case and the submissions of the parties,
the Court concludes that there is no need to give a separate ruling
on these complaints (see Uzun v. Turkey, no. 37410/97, §
64, 10 May 2007; Sadak and Others v. Turkey,
nos. 29900/96, 29901/96, 29902/96 and 29903/96, § 73,
ECHR 2001 VIII).
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicants claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested this claim.
The
Court considers that the applicants are sufficiently compensated by
the finding of a violation of Article 11 of the Convention (see Oya
Ataman, cited above, § 48). However, as regards the finding
of a violation of Article 3 in respect of two applicants, namely Ms
Sema Gül and Ms Semiha Kırkoç, the Court, ruling on
an equitable basis, awards these two applicants EUR 3,000 each in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The
first applicant claimed EUR 3,500 and the remaining six applicants
claimed EUR 5,500 for the costs and expenses incurred before the
Court.
The
Government contested these claims.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicants
solely referred to the Istanbul Bar Association's scale of fees and
failed to submit any supporting documents. The Court therefore does
not award any sum under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning Article 3 of
the Convention inadmissible in respect of five applicants, namely Mr
Erkal Balçık, Mr Kubilay İyit, Ms Filiz
Kalkan, Ms Meral Kalanç and Ms Gülsen Dinler and declares
the remainder of the application admissible;
Joins to the merits the Government's preliminary
objection concerning the applicants' victim status in respect of
Article 11 of the Convention and dismisses it;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
3 of the Convention in respect of two applicants, namely Ms Sema
Gül and Ms Semiha Kırkoç;
4. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 11 of the Convention;
Holds that there is no need to examine
separately the applicants' other complaints raised under Articles 7,
17 and 18 of the Convention;
Holds that the finding of a violation in itself
constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage
sustained by five applicants, namely Mr Erkal Balçık,
Mr Kubilay İyit, Ms Filiz Kalkan, Ms Meral Kalanç
and Ms Gülsen Dinler;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on
which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) each to Ms Sema
Gül and Ms Semiha Kırkoç in respect of non-pecuniary
damage; to be converted into New Turkish liras at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement and free of any taxes or charges that may
be payable,
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 November 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Boštjan
M. Zupančič
Registrar President
