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JUSSILA v. FINLAND - 73053/01 [2006] ECHR 996 (23 November 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/996.html
Cite as:
9 ITL Rep 662,
[2009] STC 29,
(2007) 45 EHRR 39,
[2006] ECHR 996
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GRAND
CHAMBER
CASE OF
JUSSILA v. FINLAND
(Application
no. 73053/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
23
November 2006
This
judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Jussila v. Finland,
The
European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed
of:
Mr J.-P. Costa,
President,
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
Mr B. Zupančič,
Mr P.
Lorenzen,
Mr L. Caflisch,
Mr L. Loucaides,
Mr I. cabral
barreto,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr M.
Pellonpää,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A.
Mularoni,
Mrs E. fura-sandström,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr D.
Spielmann,
Mr J. Šikuta, judges,
and Mr E.
Fribergh, Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 5 July and 25 October 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 73053/01) against the Republic
of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Finnish national, Mr Esa Jussila (“the
applicant”), on 21 June 2001.
The
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by
Mr Pirkka Lappalainen, a lawyer practising in Nokia. The Finnish
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their
Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
The
applicant alleged that he did not receive a fair hearing in the
proceedings in which a tax surcharge was imposed as he was not given
an oral hearing.
The
application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52
§ 1 of the Rules of Court). On 9 November 2004 it was declared
partly admissible by a Chamber of that Section, composed of Judges
Bratza, Pellonpää, Casadevall, Maruste, Traja, Mijović
and Šikuta, together with the Section Registrar Mr M. O'Boyle.
The Chamber joined to the merits the question of the applicability of
Article 6 of the Convention. On 14 February 2006 the
Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber,
neither of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30
of the Convention and Rule 72).
The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined
according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the
Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. Mr C.L. Rozakis, who
was unable to attend the deliberations on 25 October 2006, was
replaced by Mr I. Cabral Barreto, substitute judge (Rule 24 §
3). Mr A. Kovler, who was likewise unable to attend those
deliberations, was replaced by Mrs E. Fura-Sandström, substitute
judge (Rule 24 § 3).
The
applicant and the Government each filed written observations on the
merits. The parties replied in writing to each other's observations.
A
hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building,
Strasbourg, on 5 July 2006 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr a. kosonen of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Agent,
Mrs l. halila,
Mr p.
pykönen, Advisers;
(b) for the applicant
Mr p. lappalainen, member
of the Bar, Counsel.
The
Court heard addresses by Mr Kosonen and Mr Lappalainen and their
replies to questions put by judges.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Tampere,
Finland.
On
22 May 1998 the Häme Tax Office (verotoimisto, skattebyrån)
requested the applicant, who ran a car repair shop, to submit his
observations regarding some alleged errors in his value added tax
(VAT) declarations (arvonlisävero, mervärdesskatt)
for the fiscal years 1994 and 1995.
On
9 July 1998 the Tax Office found that there were deficiencies in the
applicant's book-keeping in that, for instance, receipts and invoices
were inadequate. The Tax Office made a reassessment of the VAT
payable basing itself on the applicant's estimated income, which was
higher than the income he had declared. It ordered him to pay, inter
alia, tax surcharges (veronkorotus, skatteförhöjning)
amounting to ten per cent of the reassessed tax liability (the
additional tax surcharges levied on the applicant totalled 1,836
Finnish Marks (FIM), corresponding to 308.80 euros (EUR)).
The
applicant appealed to the Uusimaa County Administrative Court
(lääninoikeus, länsrätten) (which later
became the Helsinki Administrative Court; hallinto-oikeus,
förvaltningsdomstolen). He requested an oral hearing and
that the tax inspector as well as an expert appointed by the
applicant be heard as witnesses. On 1 February 2000 the
Administrative Court took an interim decision inviting written
observations from the tax inspector and after that an expert
statement from an expert chosen by the applicant. The tax inspector
submitted her statement of 13 February 2000 to the Administrative
Court. The statement was further submitted to the applicant for his
observations. On 25 April 2000 the applicant submitted his own
observations on the tax inspector's statement. The statement of the
expert chosen by him was dated and submitted to the court on the same
day.
On
13 June 2000 the Administrative Court held that an oral hearing was
manifestly unnecessary in the matter because both parties had
submitted all the necessary information in writing. It also rejected
the applicant's claims.
On
7 August 2000 the applicant requested leave to appeal renewing at the
same time his request for an oral hearing. On 13 March 2001 the
Supreme Administrative Court refused him leave to appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Assessment and imposition of tax surcharges
Section
177 (1) of the Value-Added Tax Act (arvonlisäverolaki,
mervärdesskattelagen; Act no. 1501/1993) provides that if a
person obliged to pay taxes has failed to pay the taxes or clearly
paid an insufficient amount of taxes or failed to give required
information to the tax authorities, the Regional Tax Office
(verovirasto, skatteverket) must assess the amount of unpaid
taxes.
Section
179 provides that a tax assessment may be conducted where a person
has failed to make the required declarations or has given false
information to taxation authorities. The taxpayer may be ordered to
pay unpaid taxes or taxes that have been wrongly refunded to the
person.
Section
182 provides, inter alia, that a maximum tax surcharge of
20 per cent of the tax liability may be imposed if the person
has without a justifiable reason failed to give a tax declaration or
other document in due time or given essentially incomplete
information. The tax surcharge may amount at the most to twice the
amount of the tax liability, if the person has failed without a
justifiable reason to fulfil his or her duties fully or partially
even after being expressly asked to provide information.
In
for example the Finnish judicial reference book Encyclopædia
Iuridica Fennica a tax surcharge is defined as an administrative
sanction of a punitive nature imposed on the tax payer for conduct
contrary to tax law.
Under
Finnish practice, the imposition of a tax surcharge does not prevent
the bringing of criminal charges for the same conduct.
B. Oral hearings
Section
38 (1) of the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act
(hallintolainkäyttölaki, förvaltningsprocesslagen;
Act no. 586/1996) provides that an oral hearing must be held if
requested by a private party. An oral hearing may however be
dispensed with if a party's request is ruled inadmissible or
immediately dismissed or if an oral hearing would be clearly
unnecessary due to the nature of the case or other circumstances.
The
explanatory part of the Government Bill (no. 217/1995) for the
enactment of the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act considers the
right to an oral hearing as provided by Article 6 and the possibility
in administrative matters to dispense with the hearing when it would
be clearly unnecessary, as stated in section 38(1) of the said Act.
There it is noted that an oral hearing contributes to a focussed and
immediate procedure but since it does not always bring any added
value, it must be ensured that the flexibility and cost effectiveness
of the administrative procedure is not undermined. An oral hearing is
to be held when it is necessary for the clarification of the issues
and the hearing can be considered beneficial for the case as whole.
During
the period 2000 to 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court did not hold
any oral hearings in tax matters. As to the eight Administrative
Courts, appellants requested an oral hearing in a total of 603 cases.
The courts held an oral hearing in 129 cases. There is no information
as to how many of these taxation cases concerned the imposition of a
tax surcharge. According to the Government's written submission of
12 July 2006, the Administrative Courts had so far in 2006
held a total of 20 oral hearings in tax matters. As regards the
Helsinki Administrative Court in particular, in 2005, it examined a
total of 10,669 cases out of which 4,232 were tax matters. Out
of the last mentioned group of cases 505 concerned VAT. During that
year the Administrative Court held a total of 153 oral hearings out
of which three concerned VAT.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complains that the tax surcharge proceedings were unfair as
the courts did not hold an oral hearing in his case. The Court has
examined this complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, which
reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.”
A. The parties' submissions
1. The applicant
The
applicant contested the Government's submissions as giving misleading
erroneous interpretations of domestic and Convention law. According
to the applicant, his case required, both under the domestic
legislation and under Article 6 of the Convention, a mandatory oral
hearing due to his need for legal protection and the fact that the
credibility of witness statements played a significant role in the
determination of the case. According to the applicant, the matter did
not concern EUR 308.80 only but altogether a financial liability of
EUR 7,374.92. The applicant maintained that the lack of an oral
hearing de facto placed the burden of proof on him. He also
emphasised the importance of the threat of the punishment and the
impact on his business from having to pay unjustified taxes without
legal basis.
In
his oral submissions, the applicant pointed out that he had not
“opted for” the liability to pay VAT. On the contrary, as
the annual turnover exceeded the threshold laid down by the Value
Added Tax Act, it was compulsory to file a VAT return.
2. The Government
The
Government recalled the fundamental nature of the obligation on
individuals and companies to pay tax. Tax matters formed part of the
hard core of public-authority prerogatives, with the public nature of
the relationship between the taxpayer and the tax authority remaining
predominant. An extension of the ambit of Article 6 § 1 under
its criminal heading to cover taxes could have far-reaching
consequences for the State's possibilities to collect taxes.
The
Government noted that, under the Finnish legal system, tax surcharges
belonged to administrative law. They were not imposed under criminal
law provisions but in accordance with various tax laws. Moreover,
they were determined by the tax authorities and the administrative
courts, and they were in all respects treated differently from
court-imposed sanctions. The surcharge in issue in this case was
targeted at a given group with a particular status, namely citizens
under the obligation to pay VAT and registered as subject to VAT. It
was not therefore imposed under a general rule. The main purpose of
the surcharges was to protect the fiscal interests of the State and
to exert pressure on taxpayers to comply with their legal
obligations, to sanction breaches of those obligations and to prevent
re-offending. However this aspect was not decisive. They emphasised
that the penalty imposed did not reach the substantial level
identified in Bendenoun v. France (judgment of 24 February
1994, Series A no. 284). The tax surcharges could not be converted
into a prison sentence and the amount of the tax surcharge in the
present case was low, ten per cent, which amounted to the equivalent
of EUR 308.80, with an overall maximum possible of 20 per cent
applicable.
Assuming
Article 6 was applicable, the Government maintained that the
obligation under Article 6 § 1 to hold a public hearing was not
an absolute one. A hearing might not be necessary due to the
exceptional circumstances of the case, for example when it raised no
questions of fact or law which could not be adequately resolved on
the basis of the case file and parties' written observations. Besides
the publicity requirement there were other considerations, including
the right to a trial within a reasonable time and the related need
for an expeditious handling of the courts' case-load, which had to be
taken into account in determining the necessity of public hearings in
proceedings subsequent to the trial at first-instance level.
The
Government maintained that in the present case the purpose of the
applicant's request for an oral hearing was to challenge the
reliability and accuracy of the report on the tax inspection by
cross-examining the tax inspector and the expert. They noted that the
Administrative Court took the measure of inviting written
observations from the tax inspector and after that a statement from
an expert chosen by the applicant. An oral hearing was manifestly
unnecessary as the information provided by the applicant himself
formed a sufficient factual basis for the consideration of the case.
The issue at hand was rather technical, being based on the report of
the tax inspector. Such a dispute could be better dealt with in
writing than in oral argument. There was nothing to indicate that
questions of fact or law would have emerged, which could not have
been adequately resolved on the basis of the case file and the
written observations of the applicant, the tax inspector and the
expert. No additional information could have been gathered by
hearing, as required by the applicant, the tax inspector or the
expert personally. Furthermore, the applicant was given the
possibility of putting forward any views in writing which in his
opinion would be decisive for the outcome of the proceedings. He also
had the possibility to comment on all the information provided by the
tax authorities throughout the proceedings. Further, he was able to
appeal to the County Administrative Court and Supreme Administrative
Court both of which had full jurisdiction on questions of fact and
law and could quash the decisions of the tax authorities. The
Government concluded that there were circumstances which justified
dispensing with a hearing in the applicant's case.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Applicability of Article 6
The
present case concerns proceedings in which the applicant was found,
following errors in his tax returns, liable to pay VAT and an
additional ten per cent surcharge. The assessment of tax and the
imposition of surcharges fall outside the scope of Article 6 under
its civil head (see Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC], no. 44759/98, §
29, ECHR 2001 VII). The issue therefore arises in this case
whether the proceedings were “criminal” within the
autonomous meaning of Article 6 and thus attracted the guarantees of
Article 6 under that head.
30. The
Court's established case-law sets out three criteria to be considered
in the assessment of the applicability of the criminal aspect. These
criteria, sometimes referred to as the “Engel criteria”
were most recently affirmed by the Grand Chamber in Ezeh and
Connors v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 39665/98 and
40086/98, § 82, ECHR 2003 X):
“... [I]t is first necessary to know whether the
provision(s) defining the offence charged belong, according to the
legal system of the respondent State, to criminal law, disciplinary
law or both concurrently. This however provides no more than a
starting point. The indications so afforded have only a formal and
relative value and must be examined in the light of the common
denominator of the respective legislation of the various Contracting
States.
The very nature of the offence is a factor of greater
import. ...
However, supervision by the Court does not stop there.
Such supervision would generally prove to be illusory if it did not
also take into consideration the degree of severity of the penalty
that the person concerned risks incurring. ...”
The
second and third criteria are alternative and not necessarily
cumulative. It is enough that the offence in question is by its
nature to be regarded as criminal or that the offence renders the
person liable to a penalty which by its nature and degree of severity
belongs in the general criminal sphere (see Ezeh and Connors,
cited above, § 86). The relative lack of seriousness of the
penalty cannot divest an offence of its inherently criminal character
(see Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February
1984, Series A no. 73, § 54; also Lutz v. Germany,
judgment of 25 August 1987, Series A no. 123, § 55). This does
not exclude a cumulative approach where separate analysis of each
criterion does not make it possible to reach a clear conclusion as to
the existence of a criminal charge (see Ezeh and Connors,
§ 86, citing, inter alia, Bendenoun v. France,
§ 47).
The
Court has considered whether its case-law supports a different
approach in fiscal or tax cases. It recalls that in the Bendenoun
judgment, which concerned the imposition of tax penalties or
surcharge for evasion of tax (VAT and corporation tax in respect of
the applicant's company and his personal income tax liability), the
Court did not refer expressly to Engel and listed four
elements as being relevant to the applicability of Article 6 in that
case: that the law setting out the penalties covered all citizens in
their capacity as taxpayers, that the surcharge was not intended as
pecuniary compensation for damage but essentially as a punishment to
deter re-offending; that it was imposed under a general rule whose
purpose is both deterrent and punitive; and that the surcharge was
substantial (422,534 French francs (FRF) in respect of the
applicant and FRF 570,398 in respect of his company, corresponding to
EUR 64,415 and EUR 86,957 respectively). These factors may be
regarded however in context as relevant in assessing the application
of the second and third Engel criteria to the facts of the
case, there being no indication that the Court was intending to
deviate from previous case-law or to establish separate principles in
the tax sphere. It must further be emphasised that the Court in
Bendenoun did not consider any of the four elements as being
in themselves decisive and took a cumulative approach in finding
Article 6 applicable under its criminal head.
In
Janosevic v. Sweden (no. 34619/97, ECHR 2002 VII), the
Court made no reference to Bendenoun or its particular
approach but proceeded squarely on the basis of the Engel
criteria identified above. While reference was made to the severity
of the actual and potential penalty (a surcharge amounting to 161,261
Swedish crowns (SEK), corresponding to EUR 17,284, was involved
and there was no upper limit on the surcharges in this case), this
was as a separate and additional ground for the criminal
characterisation of the offence which had already been established on
examination of the nature of the offence (Janosevic, §§
68-69; see also Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. Sweden
(no. 36985/97, 23 July 2002 decided on a similar basis at the
same time).
In
the subsequent case of Morel v. France ((dec.), no.
54559/00, ECHR 2003 IX), however, Article 6 was found not to
apply in respect of a ten per cent tax surcharge (FRF 4,450,
corresponding to EUR 678), which was “not particularly
high” and was therefore “a long way from the 'very
substantial' level” needed for it to be classified as criminal.
The decision, which applied the Bendenoun rather than the
Engel criteria attaches paramount importance to the
severity of the penalty to the detriment of the other Bendenoun
criteria, in particular that concerning the nature of the offence
(and the purpose of the penalty) and makes no reference to the recent
Janosevic case. As such, it seems more in keeping with
the Commission's approach (see Bendenoun v. France, no.
12547/86, Commission's report of 10 December 1992, Decisions and
Reports (DR) in which the Commission based the applicability of
Article 6 chiefly on the degree of severity of the penalty, unlike
the Court in the same case, which weighed up all the aspects of the
case in a strictly cumulative approach). Morel is an exception
among the reported cases in that it relies on the lack of severity of
the penalty as removing the case from the ambit of Article 6,
although the other criteria (general rule, not compensatory in
nature, deterrent and punitive purpose) had clearly been fulfilled.
35. The
Grand Chamber agrees with the approach adopted in the Janosevic
case, which gives a detailed analysis of the issues in a judgment on
the merits after the benefit of hearing argument from the parties
(cf. Morel which was a decision on inadmissibility). No
established or authoritative basis has therefore emerged in the
case-law for holding that the minor nature of the penalty, in
taxation proceedings or otherwise, may be decisive in removing an
offence, otherwise criminal by nature, from the scope of Article 6.
Furthermore,
the Court is not persuaded that the nature of tax surcharge
proceedings is such that they fall, or should fall, outside the
protection of Article 6. Arguments to that effect have also failed in
the context of prison disciplinary and minor traffic offences (see,
variously, Ezeh and Connors and Öztürk, cited
above). While there is no doubt as to the importance of tax to the
effective functioning of the State, the Court is not convinced that
removing procedural safeguards in the imposition of punitive
penalties in that sphere is necessary to maintain the efficacy of the
fiscal system or indeed can be regarded as consonant with the spirit
and purpose of the Convention. In this case the Court will therefore
apply the Engel criteria as identified above.
Turning
to the first criterion, it is apparent that the tax surcharges in
this case were not classified as criminal but as part of the fiscal
regime. This is however not decisive.
The
second criterion, the nature of the offence, is the more important.
The Court observes that, as in the Janosevic and Bendenoun
cases, it may be said that the tax surcharges were imposed by general
legal provisions applying to taxpayers generally. It is not persuaded
by the Government's argument that VAT applies to only a limited group
with a special status: as in the previously-mentioned cases, the
applicant was liable in his capacity as a taxpayer. The fact that he
opted for VAT registration for business purposes does not detract
from this position. Further, as acknowledged by the Government, the
tax surcharges were not intended as pecuniary compensation for damage
but as a punishment to deter re-offending. It may therefore be
concluded that the surcharges were imposed by a rule whose purpose
was deterrent and punitive. Without more, the Court considers that
this establishes the criminal nature of the offence. The minor nature
of the penalty renders this case different from Janosevic and
Bendenoun as regards the third Engel criterion but does
not remove the matter from the scope of Article 6. Hence, Article 6
applies under its criminal head notwithstanding the minor nature of
the tax surcharge.
The
Court must therefore consider whether the tax surcharge proceedings
complied with the requirements of Article 6, having due regard to the
facts of the individual case, including any relevant features flowing
from the taxation context.
2. Compliance with Article 6
An
oral, and public, hearing constitutes a fundamental principle
enshrined in Article 6 § 1. This principle is particularly
important in the criminal context, where generally there must be at
first instance a tribunal which fully meets the requirements of
Article 6 (see Findlay v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1997 I, § 79) and where an applicant has an entitlement to
have his case “heard”, with the opportunity inter alia
to give evidence in his own defence, hear the evidence against him
and examine and cross-examine the witnesses.
That
said, the obligation to hold a hearing is not absolute (see Håkansson
and Sturesson v. Sweden, judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A
no. 171-A, § 66). There may be proceedings in which an oral
hearing may not be required: for example where there are no issues of
credibility or contested facts which necessitate a hearing and the
courts may fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the
parties' submissions and other written materials (see, for example,
Döry v. Sweden, no. 28394/95, § 37, 12 November
2002; Pursiheimo v. Finland (dec.), no. 57795/00, 25
November 2003; cf. Lundevall v. Sweden, no. 38629/97,
§ 39, 12 November 2002 and Salomonsson v.
Sweden, no. 38978/97, § 39, 12 November 2002, and see
also Göç v. Turkey [GC], no. 36590/97, § 51,
ECHR 2002-V, where the applicant should have been heard on elements
of personal suffering relevant to levels of compensation).
The
Court has further acknowledged that the national authorities may have
regard to the demands of efficiency and economy and found, for
example, that the systematic holding of hearings could be an obstacle
to the particular diligence required in social security cases and
ultimately prevent compliance with the reasonable time requirement of
Article 6 § 1 (see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland,
judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 263, § 58
and the cases cited therein). Although the earlier cases emphasised
that a hearing must be held before a court of first and only instance
unless there were exceptional circumstances that justified dispensing
with one (see, for instance, Håkansson and Sturesson
v. Sweden, cited above, p. 20, § 64; Fredin v.
Sweden (no. 2), judgment of 23 February 1994, Series
A no. 283-A, pp. 10-11, §§ 21-22; and Allan Jacobsson
v. Sweden (no. 2) judgment of 19 February 1998,
Reports 1998-I, p. 168, § 46), the Court has
clarified that the character of the circumstances that may justify
dispensing with an oral hearing essentially comes down to the nature
of the issues to be decided by the competent national court, not to
the frequency of such situations. It does not mean that refusing to
hold an oral hearing may be justified only in rare cases (see Miller
v. Sweden, no. 55853/00, § 29, 8 February 2005).
The overarching principle of fairness embodied in Article 6 is, as
always, the key consideration (see, mutatis mutandis,
Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 52,
ECHR 1999 II; Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00,
§ 90, ECHR 2006 ...).
While
it may be noted that the above-mentioned cases in which an oral
hearing was not considered necessary concerned proceedings falling
under the civil head of Article 6 § 1 and that the requirements
of a fair hearing are the most strict in the sphere of criminal law,
the Court would not exclude that in the criminal sphere the nature of
the issues to be dealt with before the tribunal or court may not
require an oral hearing. Notwithstanding the consideration that a
certain gravity attaches to criminal proceedings, which are concerned
with the allocation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of
a punitive and deterrent sanction, it is self-evident that there are
criminal cases which do not carry any significant degree of stigma.
There are clearly “criminal charges” of differing weight.
What is more, the autonomous interpretation adopted by the Convention
institutions of the notion of a “criminal charge” by
applying the Engel criteria have underpinned a gradual
broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belonging to
the traditional categories of the criminal law, for example
administrative penalties (Öztürk v. Germany), prison
disciplinary proceedings (Campbell and Fell v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A, no. 80),
customs law (Salabiaku v. France, judgment of 7 October 1988,
Series A no 141-A), competition law (Société Stenuit
v. France, judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 232-A)
and penalties imposed by a court with jurisdiction in financial
matters (Guisset v. France, no. 33933/96, ECHR 2000-IX). Tax
surcharges differ from the hard core of criminal law; consequently,
the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply with their
full stringency (see Bendenoun and Janosevic, § 46
and § 81 respectively, where it was found compatible with
Article 6 § 1 for criminal penalties to be imposed, in the first
instance, by an administrative or non-judicial body: a contrario,
Findlay v. the United Kingdom, cited above).
It
must also be said that the fact that proceedings are of considerable
personal significance for the applicant, as in certain social
insurance or benefit cases, is not decisive for the necessity of a
hearing (see Pirinen v. Finland (dec.), no. 32447/02, 16
May 2006).
While
the Court has found that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention extends
to tax surcharge proceedings, that provision does not apply to a
dispute over the tax itself (see Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC],
cited above). It is, however, not uncommon for procedures to combine
the varying elements and it may not be possible to separate those
parts of the proceedings which determine a “criminal charge”
from those parts which do not. The Court must accordingly consider
the proceedings in issue to the extent to which they determined a
“criminal charge” against the applicant, although that
consideration will necessarily involve the “pure” tax
assessment to a certain extent (see Georgiou v. the United Kingdom
(dec.), no. 40042/98, 16 May 2000 and Sträg
Datatjänster AB v. Sweden (dec.), no. 50664/99, 21 June
2005).
In
the present case, the applicant's purpose in requesting a hearing was
to challenge the reliability and accuracy of the report on the tax
inspection by cross-examining the tax inspector and obtaining
supporting testimony from his own expert since, in his view, the tax
inspector had misinterpreted the requirements laid down by the
relevant legislation and given an inaccurate account of his financial
state. His reasons for requesting a hearing therefore concerned in
large part the validity of the tax assessment, which as such fell
outside the scope of Article 6, although there was the additional
question of whether the applicant's bookkeeping had been so deficient
so as to justify a surcharge. The Administrative Court, which took
the measure of inviting written observations from the tax inspector
and after that a statement from an expert chosen by the applicant,
found in the circumstances that an oral hearing was manifestly
unnecessary as the information provided by the applicant himself
formed a sufficient factual basis for the consideration of the case.
The
Court does not doubt that checking and ensuring that the taxpayer has
given an accurate account of his or her affairs and that supporting
documents have been properly produced may often be more efficiently
dealt with in writing than in oral argument. Nor is it persuaded by
the applicant that in this particular case any issues of credibility
arose in the proceedings which required oral presentation of evidence
or cross-examination of witnesses and it finds force in the
Government's argument that any issues of fact and law could be
adequately addressed in, and decided on the basis of, written
submissions.
The
Court further observes that the applicant was not denied the
possibility of requesting an oral hearing, although it was for the
courts to decide whether a hearing was necessary (see, mutatis
mutandis, Martinie v. France [GC], no. 58675/00,
§ 44, 12 April 2006). The Administrative Court gave such
consideration with reasons. The Court also notes the minor sum of
money at stake. Since the applicant was given ample opportunity to
put forward his case in writing and to comment on the submissions of
the tax authority, the Court finds that the requirements of fairness
were complied with and did not, in the particular circumstances of
this case, necessitate an oral hearing.
There
has, accordingly, been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds by thirteen votes to four that Article 6
of the Convention is applicable in the present case;
2. Holds by fourteen votes to three that there has
been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in
the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 November 2006.
Jean-Paul Costa
President
Erik Fribergh
Registrar
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are
annexed to this judgment:
(a) joint
partly dissenting opinion of Mr Costa, Mr Cabral Barreto and
Mrs Mularoni joined by Mr Caflisch;
(b) partly
dissenting opinion of Mr Loucaides joined by Mr Zupančič
and Mr Spielmann.
J.-P.C.
E.F.
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES COSTA, CABRAL
BARRETO AND MULARONI JOINED BY JUDGE CAFLISCH
(Translation)
1. We
concur with the majority in finding that in this case there has been
no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
However,
we have reached that conclusion because we consider this Article to
be inapplicable.
The
majority refer (see §§ 29-34 of the judgment) to the
Court's relevant case-law, which, until now, we had found to be
relatively clear.
The
assessment of taxes and the possible imposition of surcharges fall
outside the scope of Article 6 § 1 under its civil head, as the
Grand Chamber clearly indicated in the Ferrazzini v. Italy
judgment ([GC], no. 44759/98, ECHR 2001 VII). In paragraph 29 of
that judgment, as the respondent Government rightly pointed out, the
Court considered that “tax matters still form[ed] part of the
hard core of public-authority prerogatives, with the public nature of
the relationship between the taxpayer and the community remaining
predominant”.
In
this case the question was whether or not Article 6 § 1 applied
under its criminal head. The Court, in line with the judgment in
Engel and Others v. the Netherlands (Series A no. 22), takes
three criteria into account, as the Grand Chamber recently confirmed
(see Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos.
39665/98 and 40086/98, § 82, ECHR 2003 X):
the classification
of the “offence” as “criminal” according to
the domestic legal system;
the very nature of
the offence;
the degree of
severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring.
We
agree with the majority that these criteria should be applied.
However, the first and third criteria are clearly not satisfied in
the present case. The majority relied in essence on the nature of the
offence, finding that:
the tax surcharges
had been imposed under general legal provisions applying to
taxpayers generally; and that
the penalties were
both deterrent and punitive.
In
our view, those two aspects do not suffice for a “criminal
charge”, within the meaning of Article 6, to obtain.
Firstly,
why would it not be possible to impose administrative penalties (in
the form of surcharges) on all taxpayers who break the law, and what
legal reasoning leads to the conclusion that such administrative
penalties are therefore criminal in nature?
Secondly,
purely administrative penalties, as well as criminal penalties, can
have a deterrent purpose and a punitive purpose. The Court has indeed
reached findings to this effect in the past (see, among other
authorities, Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21
February 1984, Series A no. 73, § 53, and Janosevic v.
Sweden, no. 34619/97, § 68, ECHR 2002 VII). By
contrast, in Bendenoun v. France (Series A no. 284, § 47),
which is cited in paragraph 31 of the judgment, the Court carried out
a finer and, in our opinion, fairer analysis, taking into
consideration, in the tax field (the specific nature of which
is emphasised in the Ferrazzini judgment, cited above) a
fourth criterion, in addition to the three Engel criteria,
namely the fact that the surcharges were “very substantial”.
In that same paragraph of the Bendenoun judgment, the Court
concluded as follows: “Having weighed the various aspects of
the case, the Court notes the predominance of those which have a
criminal connotation. None of them is decisive on its own, but
taken together and cumulatively they made the 'charge' in issue a
'criminal' one within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 ..., which was
therefore applicable” (emphasis added). A contrario,
where, as in this case, that fourth criterion, specific as it is to
criminal penalties, is found to be lacking, the “criminal
connotation” is significantly diminished, to the point where,
in our view, Article 6 becomes inapplicable.
The
circumstances of the case show that the applicant's situation cannot
be characterised as criminal or as having a “criminal
connotation”. Firstly, he had simply made errors in his
book-keeping which had resulted in incorrect VAT returns being filed.
Does this necessarily constitute a criminal offence? We find
this far from certain. Secondly, the penalty imposed on him
represented 10% of the reassessed tax liability, amounting to about
308 euros. Can this really be described as “very substantial”
or even just “substantial”? Whether expressed as a
percentage or as an absolute value, we have serious doubts.
Admittedly,
there was some inconsistency between two lines of case-law that are
both specific to tax litigation, as embodied in the Bendenoun
and Janosevic judgments, hence the relinquishment of
jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber with a view to resolving the
inconsistency within the meaning of Article 30 of the Convention.
However, we are convinced that the Bendenoun line was wiser,
and that in the present case neither the three Engel criteria
nor the additional fourth criterion in Bendenoun were
satisfied, such that Article 6 § 1 did not apply.
It
is, moreover, unfortunate to extend the “criminal” head
of that provision excessively, rather than recognising that the tax
field is a specific one, as the Ferrazzini judgment formally
asserted and as is apparent from other Convention provisions (see the
wording of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1).
If
Article 6 § 1 is not applicable, it evidently cannot have been
breached. That is why we voted with the majority in favour of point 2
of the operative provisions. Accordingly, we do not need to examine
the question that would have arisen if we had found Article 6 §
1 to be applicable under its criminal head, and to decide whether we
would then have agreed with the majority in finding that a public
hearing was not indispensable. That is a highly debatable –
albeit hypothetical – question.
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES
JOINED
BY JUDGES ZUPANČIČ AND SPIELMANN
I
agree with the majority that the present case concerns proceedings
which were criminal and thus attracted the guarantees of Article 6 of
the Convention under that head. However, I am unable to join the
majority in finding that the requirement of an oral hearing could be
dispensed with in this case or any other criminal case.
This
is the first time the Court has found that an oral hearing may not be
required in a criminal case. The Court previously found that the
obligation to hold such a hearing was not absolute in respect of
certain civil proceedings. Without entering into the question whether
the approach regarding civil proceedings was justified or not by the
terms of Article 6 of the Convention, I must, from the outset, stress
the point that there is a great difference between civil proceedings
and criminal proceedings in many respects affecting the requirement
of an oral hearing. First of all because criminal proceedings are
more serious than civil proceedings and entail the attribution of
criminal responsibility with the consequent stigma – a stigma
which exists in any event, regardless of the severity of the relevant
criminal charge, even though it may be more or less serious depending
on the degree of such severity. Secondly, in a criminal trial there
is a confrontation between on the one side the State, exercising its
power to enforce the criminal law, and on the other side the
individual(s). Thirdly, the express terms of Article 6 regarding the
minimum rights of persons charged with a criminal offence, under
paragraph 3 (c), (d) and (e), clearly imply that the oral hearing is
an unqualified and indispensable prerequisite for a fair criminal
trial (“...to defend himself in person; ... to examine ...
witnesses against him; ... to obtain the attendance and examination
of witnesses; ... to have the ... assistance of an interpreter if he
cannot ... speak the language used in Court”).
The
requirement of a public hearing in judicial proceedings has been
challenged during the drafting of certain international instruments,
but even where this challenge has been successful, as in the case of
the American Convention on Human Rights, the guarantee of a public
hearing has been retained in respect of criminal proceedings.
It
appears from the Court's case-law that whenever the Court has found
that a hearing could be dispensed with in respect of criminal
proceedings at the appeal stage, it has always made it clear that a
hearing should have taken place at first instance (see Axen v.
Germany, judgment of 8 December 1983, Series A no. 72, § 28;
Helmers v. Sweden, judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no.
212 A, § 36; and Jan Åke Andersson v. Sweden,
judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212 B, p. 45, § 27).
In
the case of Jan Åke Andersson (cited above, opinion of
the Commission, p. 55, §§ 48-49), the Commission stated the
following principles:
“48. The right of the accused to be present when a
court determines whether or not he is to be found guilty of the
criminal charges brought against him, and to be able to present to
the court what he finds is of importance in this respect, is not only
an additional guarantee that an endeavour will be made to establish
the truth, but it also helps to ensure that the accused is satisfied
that his case has been determined by a tribunal, the independence and
impartiality of which he could verify. Thereby justice is from the
accused's point of view seen to be done. Furthermore, the object and
purpose of Article 6 taken as a whole require that a person charged
with a criminal offence has a right to take part in a hearing.
Sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 3 guarantee the right to
defend oneself in person and to examine or have examined witnesses
and such rights cannot be exercised without the accused being present
(see also Eur. Court H.R., Colozza judgment of 12 February 1985,
Series A no. 89, p. 14, § 27).
49. The guarantee of a fair and public hearing in
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is one of the fundamental
principles of any democratic society. By rendering the administration
of justice visible publicity contributes to the maintenance of
confidence in the administration of justice. The public nature of the
hearings, where issues of guilt and innocence are determined, ensures
that the public is duly informed and that the legal process is
publicly observable.”
The
Court has found as follows: “In addition, the object and
purpose of Article 6, and the wording of some of the
sub-paragraphs in paragraph 3, show that a person charged with a
criminal offence 'is entitled to take part in the hearing and to have
his case heard' in his presence by a 'tribunal'... The Court infers,
as the Commission did, that all the evidence must in principle be
produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a
view to adversarial argument” (Barberà, Messegué
and Jabardo v. Spain, judgment of 6 December 1988, Series A
no. 146, p. 34, § 78).
Furthermore,
as the Court has held on a number of occasions: “The public
character of proceedings before the judicial bodies referred to in
Article 6 § 1 protects litigants against the administration of
justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the
means whereby confidence in the courts, superior and inferior, can be
maintained. By rendering the administration of justice
visible, publicity contributes to the achievement of the aim of
Article 6 § 1, namely a fair trial, the guarantee of which
is one of the fundamental principles of any democratic society,
within the meaning of the Convention” (see, inter alia,
Axen, cited above, § 25, and Sutter v. Switzerland,
judgment of 22 February 1984, Series A no. 74).
The
majority in this case accept that “... a certain gravity
attaches to criminal proceedings which are concerned with the
allocation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of a
punitive and deterrent sanction ...”, but they proceed to state
that “ that there are criminal cases which do not
carry any significant
degree of stigma ...” and that “[t]ax surcharges [as in
the present case] differ from the hard core of criminal law;
consequently, the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply
with their full stringency ...”.
I
find it difficult, in the context of a fair trial, to distinguish, as
the majority do in this case, between criminal offences belonging to
the “hard core of criminal law” and others which fall
outside that category. Where does one draw the line? In which
category does one place those offences which on their face-value do
not appear severe, but if committed by a recidivist may lead to
serious sanctions? I believe that the guarantees for a fair trial
envisaged by Article 6 of the Convention apply to all criminal
offences. Their application does not and cannot depend on whether the
relevant offence is considered as being in “the hard core of
the criminal law” or whether “it carries any significant
stigma”. For the persons concerned, whom this provision of the
Convention seeks to protect, all cases have their importance. No
person accused of any criminal offence should be deprived of the
possibility of examining witnesses against him or of any other of the
safeguards attached to an oral hearing. Moreover to accept such
distinctions would open the way to abuse and arbitrariness.
I
firmly believe that judicial proceedings for the application of
criminal law, in respect of any offence, by the omnipotent state
against individuals require, more than any other judicial
proceedings, strict compliance with the requirements of Article 6 of
the Convention so as to protect the accused “against the
administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny”.
As rightly pointed out by Trechsel “... the principle of public
trial in criminal cases has an importance which goes beyond personal
interests”.
Therefore,
once it was found (correctly) that the relevant proceedings in this
case were criminal, the requirement of a public hearing in respect of
them became a sine qua non. The failure to fulfil that
requirement amounts, in my opinion, to a breach of Article 6 of the
Convention.