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VAIVADA v. LITHUANIA - 66004/01 [2006] ECHR 992 (16 November 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/992.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 992
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF VAIVADA v. LITHUANIA
(Applications
nos. 66004/01 and 36996/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
16
November 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Vaivada v. Lithuania,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič,
President,
Mr J. Hedigan, appointed to sit in respect
of Lithuania,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr V.
Zagrebelsky,
Mr E. Myjer,
Mr David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Mrs I. Ziemele, judges,
and Mr V.
Berger, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 24 October 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in applications (nos. 66004/01 and 36996/02) against
the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Lithuanian nationals, Mr
Valdas Vaivada and Mr Raimondas Vaivada (“the applicants”)
on 7 September 2000.
The
first applicant was represented by Mr G. Byčius, a lawyer
practising in Jurbarkas. The second applicant was represented by
Mr
V. Gustas, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms D.
Jočienė.
The
applicants alleged, in particular, that their detention on remand
from 1 March to 15 April 1998 had been unlawful, and that they had
been unable to contest the lawfulness of the detention orders until 1
January 1999, in breach of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the
Convention.
By
a decision of 24 November 2005 the Court declared the applications
partly admissible.
The
Government, but not the applicants, filed additional observations on
the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
second applicant is the first applicant's uncle.
The
second applicant, who then had a criminal record of two previous
convictions, was arrested on 18 July 1997 and questioned in the
context of criminal proceedings for theft. He was released on 21 July
1997.
The
first applicant, then having a criminal record of four convictions,
was arrested on 19 July 1997 and questioned in the context of another
set of criminal proceedings for theft. He was released on 21 July
1997.
On
22 July 1997 the second applicant was arrested in the context of
criminal proceedings for murder of VB, a third person. On the same
date the Tauragė District Court ordered his detention on remand
for two months on the ground that he might abscond from the
investigation and commit fresh crimes.
On
31 July 1997 the second applicant was charged with murder.
On
2 August 1997 the first applicant was arrested in the context of
criminal proceedings for attempted robbery.
On
4 August 1997 the Tauragė District Court ordered the first
applicant's detention on remand for two months because of the danger
of his absconding, committing fresh crimes and obstructing the
investigation.
On
11 August 1997 the second applicant was also questioned in the
attempted robbery case.
On
13 August 1997 a prosecutor charged the first applicant with
attempted robbery.
On
15 August 1997 the Tauragė District Court ordered compulsory
psychiatric examination of the second applicant.
On
19 August 1997 the Klaipėda Regional Court rejected the first
applicant's appeal against the detention order.
On
21 August 1997 the two criminal cases for murder and attempted
robbery were joined.
On
15 September 1997 the Tauragė District Court extended the term
of the second applicant's remand in custody until 22 November 1997 on
the same grounds.
On
2 October 1997 the Tauragė District Court extended the first
applicant's remand in custody until 2 December 1997 on the same
grounds.
On
21 October 1997 two more criminal cases, concerning unlawful
possession of firearms and robbery, were joined to the criminal
proceedings against the applicants.
On
19 November 1997 the Tauragė District Court extended the term of
the second applicant's detention until 21 January 1998 on the ground
that he may abscond from the investigation, commit fresh crimes and
influence witnesses.
On
27 November 1997 the court prolonged the first applicant's remand in
custody for two months on the same grounds.
On
20 January 1998 the Šiauliai Regional Court extended the term
of both applicants' detention on remand until 1 March 1998 because of
the danger of their absconding and influencing the investigation.
On
18, 24 and 25 February 1998 a number of new alleged episodes from
other criminal cases, namely in relation to damaging property of
another, assault, unlawful possession of weapons, causing bodily
harm, aggravated murder, attempted robbery and theft were joined in
the criminal proceedings against the applicants.
On
26 February 1998 the investigation was concluded, and the applicants
and their defense counsel had access to the case-file.
On
27 February 1998 a prosecutor rejected the applicants' request to
discontinue the proceedings.
On
2 March 1998 the bill of indictment was confirmed, and the case was
sent to the Klaipėda Regional Court.
On
15 April 1998 the Klaipėda Regional Court committed the
applicants for trial. It further stated in the decision that their
remand measures should remain unchanged pending the adoption of a
judgment in the case.
On
21 September 1998 the Klaipėda Regional Court returned the case
to the prosecutors for further investigative measures to be carried
out. Thereafter the courts extended the term applicant's detention on
various occasions.
A
new bill of indictment was confirmed on 29 December 1998.
On
11 May 1999 the case was transmitted to the Šiauliai Regional
Court.
On
13 March 2000 the court returned the case for further investigation
to be carried out in view of the prosecutors' request to bring a
fresh charge against the first applicant. Subsequently, the charges
against the applicants were again reformulated.
On
11 July 2000 a new bill of indictment was confirmed, and the case was
sent to the Šiauliai Regional Court.
On
10 April 2001 the applicants were convicted: a) the first applicant
on one count of attempted robbery; b) the second applicant on five
counts of murder, attempted robbery, causing bodily harm, and
unlawful possession of two types of weapons.
On
3 December 2001 the Court of Appeal amended the first applicant's
conviction, but his sentence of imprisonment remained unchanged. The
Court of Appeal also reclassified the second applicant's actions to
aggravated murder, sentencing him to 13 years' imprisonment.
On
30 April 2002 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Court of
Appeal insofar as it concerned the second applicant's conviction for
aggravated murder, reinstating his sentence of 7 years and 6 months'
imprisonment as it had been imposed by the first instance court.
On
an unspecified date the second applicant completed the sentence, and
was released from prison.
II. Relevant domestic law and practice
The
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Baudžiamojo proceso
kodeksas) applicable at the material time (repealed by entry into
force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure on 1 May 2003):
Article
104 (in force from 21 June 1996) reads:
“Detention on remand shall be used only ... in
cases where a statutory penalty of at least one year's imprisonment
is envisaged.
...
The grounds for detention on remand shall be the
reasoned suspicion that the accused will:
(1) abscond from the investigation and trial;
(2) obstruct the determination of the truth in the case
[influence other parties or destroy evidence];
(3) commit new offences ... whilst suspected of having
committed crimes provided in Articles ... [274] [cheating,] 275
[embezzlement] of the Criminal Code ...”
Article
104-1 (in force from 21 June 1996 to 24 June 1998) reads:
“... [T]he arrested person shall be brought before
a judge within not more than 48 hours ... The judge must hear
the person as to the grounds of the arrest. The prosecutor and
counsel for the arrested person may take part in the inquiry. After
having questioned the arrested person, the judge may maintain the
arrest order by designating the term of detention, or may vary or
revoke the remand measure. ...
After the case has been transmitted to the court ...
[it] can order, vary or revoke the detention on remand.”
Pursuant
to the amended Article 104-1 (in force from 24 June 1998 until 1 May
2003), the prosecutor and defence counsel must take part in the first
judicial inquiry of the arrested person, unless the judge decides
otherwise. The amended provision also permits the court to extend the
detention on remand before its expiry.
Article
106 § 3 (in force from 21 June 1996 to 24 June 1998) reads:
“For the purpose of extending the term of
detention on remand [at the stage of pre-trail investigation a judge]
must convene a hearing to which defence counsel and the prosecutor
and, if necessary, the detained person shall be called.”
The
Code in force since 24 June 1998 makes obligatory the attendance of
the detainee at the remand hearings.
Article
109-1 (in force from 21 June 1996 to 24 June 1998) reads:
“An arrested person or his counsel shall have the
right during the pre-trial investigation to lodge [with an appellate
court] an appeal against the detention on remand ... . With a view to
examining the appeal, there may be convened a hearing, to which the
arrested person and his counsel or only counsel shall be called. The
presence of a prosecutor is obligatory at such a hearing.
The decision taken by [the appellate judge] is final and
cannot be the subject of a cassation appeal.
A further appeal shall be determined when examining the
extension of the term of the detention on remand.”
Pursuant
to the amended Article 109-1 (in force from 24 June 1998 to 1 May
2003), an appeal may be submitted to a higher court, which would hold
a hearing against a decision ordering or extending the term of
detention both at the stage of pre-trial investigation and trial, in
the presence of the detainee and his counsel, or only his counsel.
Article
226 § 6 (in force until 24 June 1998) reads:
“The period when the accused and his counsel have
access to the case-file is not counted towards the overall term of
pre-trial investigation and detention. Where there are several
accused persons, the period during which all the accused and their
counsel have access to the case-file is not counted towards the
overall term of pre-trial investigation and detention.”
Since
24 June 1998 this period is no longer relevant for remand decisions.
Article
372 § 4 (in force until 1 January 1999) reads:
“Decisions of courts ... ordering, varying or
revoking a remand measure ... cannot be the subject of appeal ...”
Pursuant
to the general provision of Article 399, a first instance decision
was not effective pending the time-limit for an appeal against that
decision or during the appeal proceedings. Only those decisions
against which no appeal was possible, including remand decisions
under the former Article 372 § 4, became effective and were
executed on the date when they were taken. Pursuant to the amended
Article 104-3 § 3 (version in force from
21 December 1999
until 1 May 2003), all decisions of detention on remand become
effective and are executed on the date when they are taken,
regardless of the fact that an appeal is possible against any such
decision under the amended Article 109-1 (as in force from 24 June
1998 to 1 May 2003, see above).
Other
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was in
force until 1 May 2003:
Article
52 § 2 (3) and (8) and Article 58 § 2 (8) and (10) provide,
respectively, that the accused and their counsel have the right to
“submit requests” and to “appeal against acts and
decisions of an interrogator, investigator, prosecutor and court.”
Article
249 § 1 reads:
“A judge individually or a court in a directions
hearing, in deciding whether to commit the accused for trial, shall
determine ...
(11) whether the remand measure has been selected
appropriately.”
Article
250 § 1 reads:
“After having decided, that there is a sufficient
basis to commit the accused for trial, a judge individually or a
court in a directions hearing shall determine the questions ...
(2) of the remand measure in respect of the accused ...
.”
Article
267 § 1 reads:
“The defendant has the right to ... 3) submit
requests; ...
(11) appeal against the judgment and decisions of a
court.”
Article
277 reads:
“In the course of the trial, a court may decide to
order, vary or revoke a remand measure in respect of the defendant.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants complained that their detention on remand from
1 March
to 15 April 1998 had been in breach of Article 5 of the Convention,
which provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...”
The
Government admitted that there had been no valid court order as to
the applicants' detention from 1 March to 15 April 1998; they stated
however that the domestic law applicable at the material time could
be interpreted as requiring no further decision to justify the
applicants' detention during that period, in view of the applicants
having access to the case-file and the case being transmitted for
trial.
The
applicants disagreed, stating there had been no valid court orders
authorising their remand in custody.
The
Court recalls that the expressions “lawful” and “in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” in Article 5 §
1 of the Convention essentially refer back to national law and state
the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules
thereof. However, the “lawfulness” of detention under
domestic law is not always the decisive element. The Court must in
addition be satisfied that detention during the period under
consideration was compatible with the purpose of Article 5 § 1
of the Convention, which is to prevent persons from being deprived of
their liberty in an arbitrary fashion. The Court must moreover
ascertain whether domestic law itself is in conformity with the
Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied
therein (Jėčius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97,
31.7.2000, § 56, ECHR 2000-IX).
In
the aforementioned Jėčius case the Court found that
the fact of the case-file being transmitted to the court, or the
existence of the procedural provisions linking the accused's access
to the case-file to the validity of the term of his detention, did
not constitute a “lawful” basis for detention on remand
within the meaning of Article 5 § 1; consequently, those
circumstances could not prolong or replace the valid detention order
(loc. cit., §§ 56-64).
The
Court observes that from 1 March to 15 April 1998 no order was made
by a judge authorising the applicants' detention under Articles 10
and 104-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as then in force (see
paragraphs 23-28 and 38 above); nor was there any other “lawful”
basis for the applicants' remand in custody during that period from
the point of view of Article 5 § 1 (cf., mutatis mutandis,
ibid.).
The
Court therefore finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 §
1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicants also claimed that until 1 January 1999 they had been
unable to take court proceedings to contest the lawfulness of their
detention in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which
provides as follows:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
The
Government argued that the domestic law had afforded the applicants
ample opportunities to contest the lawfulness of their detention,
namely to submit requests for release which could be reviewed by the
domestic courts. The trial courts on many occasions of their own
motion had verified the appropriateness of the applicants' remand in
custody, thereby affording them the guarantees of Article 5 § 4
of the Convention.
The
applicants argued that the absence of a possibility to contest the
lawfulness of their detention due to the statutory bar under the
former provision of Article 372 § 4 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure had violated their rights under Article 5 § 4.
The
Court recalls its previous findings in a number of cases lodged
against Lithuania (see, among other authorities, the aforementioned
Jėčius case, §§ 100-101; also see
Stašaitis v. Lithuania, no. 47679/99, §§
90-92, 21 March 2002) that the then statutory bar under the former
Article 372 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had
effectively deprived the detained persons from the right to take
judicial proceedings to contest the lawfulness of their detention
within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The Court
finds no reason to depart from those findings in the circumstances of
the present case.
There
has thus been a breach of Article 5 § 4.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The
applicants did not specify their claims for damages or legal costs,
although asked by the Court to submit these claims on a number of
occasions following the adoption of the decision on admissibility of
24 November 2005. It is further noted that in his letter of 4
September 2006 the second applicant requested the Court to rule on
the merits of the case, while submitting no claims for just
satisfaction.
In
view of these circumstances, the Court does not consider it necessary
to rule under this head.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 4 of the Convention;
Holds that it is not required to rule under
Article 41 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 November 2006,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Vincent Berger Boštjan M. Zupančič
Registrar President