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OSUCH v. POLAND - 31246/02 [2006] ECHR 979 (14 November 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/979.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 979
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF OSUCH v. POLAND
(Application
no. 31246/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
14
November 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Osuch v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J.
Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr S.
Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović, judges,
and
Mrs F. Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 24 October 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 31246/02) against the Republic
of Poland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Polish national, Mr Piotr Osuch (“the
applicant”), on 29 July 2002.
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz, of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
On
18 October 2005 the Court declared the application partly
inadmissible and decided to communicate the complaint concerning the
excessive length of the applicant’s detention on remand to the
Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Warsaw, Poland.
On
10 March 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery and
extortion. He was also suspected of being a member of an organised
criminal group.
On
12 March 1999 the Warsaw District Court (Sąd Rejonowy)
ordered that the applicant be detained until 9 June 1999. The court
found that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had
committed the offences in question.
On 1 June 1999 the District Court prolonged the
applicant’s detention. It referred to the interests of the
pending investigation, such as the need to obtain additional
evidence. The court also considered that the applicant, if released,
could induce witnesses to give false testimony.
The
applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged several times
by the District Court for the same reasons as before.
On
27 August 1999 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator
Okręgowy) lodged with the Warsaw District Court a bill of
indictment against the applicant and six other persons. They were
indicted of several counts of robbery, extortion, and membership of
an organised criminal group.
The
applicant’s detention was subsequently extended by the Warsaw
Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 6 March, 26 June, 28
September and 30 November 2001. The court considered that keeping the
applicant in custody was justified by the existence of strong
evidence against him and the gravity of the charges. It was also
necessary as he could obstruct the proper course of the proceedings
or induce witnesses to give false testimony. The applicant’s
appeals against those decisions were dismissed.
On 16 January 2002 the Warsaw District Court convicted
the applicant of several counts of robbery and extortion committed in
an organised criminal group. The applicant was sentenced to 9 years’
imprisonment.
The
Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) upheld the
first-instance judgment on 6 February 2003.
On
28 October 2003 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy)
dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The
relevant provisions of the domestic law relating to preventive
measures are set out in several judgments (see, among others,
Jaworski v. Poland, no. 25715/02, §§ 20-27, 28 March
2006).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 3 and 5 and under
Article 3 of the Convention that the length of his pre-trial
detention was excessive. The Court considers that this complaint
falls to be examined under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,
which reads as follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be
... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
15. The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
The
Court observes that the applicant’s detention lasted from
10 March 1999 to 16 January 2002, when the first-instance
judgment was given. Accordingly, the period of his detention amounts
to approximately 2 years and 10 months.
2. The
reasonableness of the length of detention
(a) The parties’ arguments
The
Government maintained that the length of the applicant’s
detention was not excessive. They stated that there were relevant and
sufficient grounds for justifying his detention during the entire
period at issue. It was necessary to ensure the proper course of the
proceedings, especially in view of the gravity of the charges and the
severe penalty that could be expected. The Government drew attention
to the fact that the applicant had been charged with membership of an
organised criminal group. There was therefore a serious risk that, if
released, he would attempt to put pressure on witnesses or obstruct
the proceedings.
The
Government argued that the domestic authorities showed due diligence
when dealing with the case. They stressed that it was an extremely
complex one as it concerned organised crime. They further maintained
that all the applicant’s requests for release and appeals
against decisions prolonging his detention were thoroughly examined
by the competent courts.
The
applicant contested these arguments. He submitted that his detention
had been inordinately lengthy.
(b) The Court’s assessment
(i) Principles established under the
Court’s case-law
The
Court reiterates that the question whether a period of detention is
reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract but must be considered
in each case according to its special features. Continued detention
can be justified in a given case only if there are specific
indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which,
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of
respect for individual liberty laid down in Article 5 of the
Convention (see, among other authorities, Kudła v. Poland
[GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 110-111, ECHR 2000-X).
Under
Article 5 § 3 the national judicial authorities must ensure that
the pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a
reasonable time. To this end they must, paying due regard to the
principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts
arguing for a departure from the rule in Article 5 and must set
them out in their decisions on the applications for release.
The
persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the
lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of
time it no longer suffices. The Court must then establish whether the
other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify
the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant”
and “sufficient”, the Court must also be satisfied that
the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in
the conduct of the proceedings (see, for instance, Jabłoński
v. Poland, no. 33492/96, § 80, 21 December 2000).
(ii) Application of the principles to the
circumstances of the present case
The
Court observes that in their decisions concerning the applicant’s
detention the judicial authorities relied on the reasonable suspicion
that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been
charged, their serious nature and the heavy penalty which could be
expected. They also referred to the risk that the applicant, if
released, might obstruct the proper conduct of the trial or induce
witnesses to give false testimony. They repeated those grounds in
nearly all the decisions concerning the applicant’s detention
(see paragraphs 6-8 and 10 above).
The
Court agrees that the strong suspicion against the applicant of
having committed serious offences could have initially warranted his
detention. However, with the passage of time, the initial
grounds for pre-trial detention become less relevant and the domestic
courts should rely on other “relevant” and “sufficient”
grounds to justify the deprivation of liberty.
The Government pointed out that the applicant had been
charged with being a member of an organised criminal group. The Court
accepts that in cases concerning organised crime, involving numerous
accused, the process of gathering and hearing evidence is often a
difficult task. Moreover, the Court considers that in cases such as
the present one, concerning organised criminal groups, the risk that
a detainee if released might put pressure on witnesses or other
co-accused, or might otherwise obstruct the proceedings, is often
particularly high. All these factors can justify a relatively longer
period of detention on remand. However, they do not give the
authorities unlimited power to prolong this preventive measure (see
the Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04, §§ 37-38, 4
May 2006). Moreover, the Court cannot but note that there is no
indication that before his arrest the applicant tried to induce
witnesses or to obstruct the course of the proceedings in any other
way.
It
should be noted that during the entire period of his detention, the
authorities did not envisage the possibility of imposing on the
applicant other measures – such as bail or police supervision –
expressly foreseen by Polish law to secure the proper conduct of
criminal proceedings.
In that context, the Court would reiterate that under
Article 5 § 3 the authorities, when deciding whether a
person should be released or detained, are obliged to consider
alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial. Indeed,
that provision proclaims not only the right to “trial within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial” but also lays down
that “release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for
trial” (see the Jabłoński judgment cited
above, § 83).
In
the circumstances, the Court finds that the grounds given for the
applicant’s pre-trial detention were not “relevant”
and “sufficient” to justify holding him in custody for a
period of 2 years and 10 months.
There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in respect of pecuniary
and non-pecuniary damage.
The Government considered that the sum claimed by the
applicant was excessively high. They asked the Court to rule that a
finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant has suffered
some non-pecuniary damage – such as distress resulting from the
protracted length of his detention – which is not sufficiently
compensated by the finding of a violation of the Convention.
Considering the circumstances of the case and making its assessment
on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,000 under
this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed 200 PLN for each hearing that took place
before the domestic courts. He submitted that about 40 hearings were
held during the course of the proceedings.
The
Government contested these claims.
The
Court reiterates that only legal costs and expenses found to have
been actually and necessarily incurred and which are reasonable as to
quantum are recoverable under Article 41 of the Convention (see,
among other authorities, Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no.
31195/96, § 79, ECHR 1999-II). In the present case, the Court
finds that he has not produced any evidence supporting his claim as
required by Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it
makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted
into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate
applicable on the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be
chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 14 November 2006,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Nicolas Bratza
Deputy
Registrar President