British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
European Court of Human Rights
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
European Court of Human Rights >>
SURYOVA v. SLOVAKIA - 72019/01 [2006] ECHR 912 (31 October 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/912.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 912
[
New search]
[
Contents list]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF ŠČURYOVÁ v. SLOVAKIA
(Application
no. 72019/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
31
October 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Ščuryová
v. Slovakia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J.
Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr M. Pellonpää,
Mr K.
Traja,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr J. Šikuta, judges,
and
Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 10 October 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 72019/01) against the
Slovak Republic lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Slovakian national, Mrs Božena
Ščuryová (“the applicant”), on 13
November 2000.
The
Slovakian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by Mrs A. Poláčková, their Agent.
On
1 December 2005 the
Court decided to communicate to the Government the complaint
concerning the length of the proceedings on the increase of the
amount of maintenance contributions and of the divorce proceedings.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was decided
to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at
the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Čadca.
A. Factual Background
The
applicant was married to Mr Š with whom she lived in a common
household. There were three children of the marriage: L, B and A. The
children were born in 1976, 1977 and 1983 respectively.
In
1993 Š. opened a business. In connection with that initiative,
on the applicant's request, the Čadca District Court (Okresný
súd) dissolved their matrimonial property regime under
Article 148 § 2 of the Civil Code. From that year on the
applicant and Š never lived together.
In
1994 the District Court ordered that Š contribute towards the
children's maintenance by making monthly payments. At the same time,
it dismissed as premature the parents'
respective claims for
custody and care of the children.
In
1995 the applicant set up a commercial limited liability company
(company B) of which she is the sole owner and statutory
representative.
In
1996 the applicant and Š set up a commercial limited liability
company (company E). They are the sole owners and Š is the
statutory representative.
In
1999, acting in the name and on behalf of company E, Mr Š
transferred the ownership of immovable property from the company to
L.
B. Increase of maintenance prior to divorce
On
3 February 1998 the applicant filed a motion pursuant to Article 50
§ 1 of the Family Code with the District Court for an order
entrusting her with the care of A prior to the pronouncement of the
divorce. She also sought an increase of the amount of Š's
monthly contributions towards A's maintenance on the ground
that since the judgments of 1994 the situation had changed.
On
19 May 1998 the District Court entrusted A to the care of the
applicant and increased the amount of the maintenance contributions.
On
31 August 1998, on the applicant's appeal, the Žilina Regional Court
(Krajský súd) quashed the ruling concerning
maintenance payments and remitted this matter to the District Court
for the taking of further evidence and re-examination.
On
2 March 2000 the District Court again determined the amount of the
monthly contributions which Š had to make towards the
maintenance of A.
On
31 October 2000, on appeals by both parents, the Regional Court
quashed the judgment of 2 March 2000 as the facts of the case had
still not been adequately established. The case was remitted to the
District Court for re-examination. The latter held hearings on 23
June and 7 September 2004.
On
26 October 2005 the Regional Court dismissed as unfounded the
defendant's challenge against the District Court judge for bias.
The
District Court held another hearing on 1 February 2006. It was
adjourned and the proceedings are still pending.
C. Proceedings concerning divorce and related matters
On
14 May 1998 Š lodged a petition for divorce and requested
a judicial determination of the arrangements to be made in
respect of A.
On
28 July 1998 the District Court pronounced the dissolution of the
marriage, entrusted A to the care of the applicant and ordered Š
to pay, on a monthly basis, an amount of money to the applicant
as a contribution towards the maintenance of A. The ruling concerning
the divorce and care of A became final and binding on 31 August 1998.
The applicant appealed against the maintenance order and sought a
higher amount.
On
30 July 1999 the Regional Court quashed the maintenance order and
remitted this issue to the District Court for the taking of further
evidence and re-examination.
On
2 May 2000 the District Court again determined the amount of the
monthly contributions which Š had to pay in respect of A's
maintenance.
On
30 October 2000 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 2 May
2000 as the facts of the case had still not been adequately
established. The case was remitted to the District Court for
re-examination.
On
29 October 2002 the District Court for the third time determined the
amount which Š. had to pay every month in respect of the
maintenance of A. On 8 July 2004 the District Court corrected
a clerical error in the operative part of the judgment.
In
the meantime, on 16 June 2004 the applicant lodged an “appeal”
against the judgment of 29 October 2002. She claimed that a copy of
that judgment had been made available to her no earlier than 2 June
2004.
On
1 December 2004 the Regional Court declared the applicant's appeal
inadmissible. It observed that a copy of the judgment of
29 October 2002 had been served on her legal representative
on 11 February 2003 and that, accordingly, the 15 days'
period for filing an appeal had expired on 26 February 2003. The
applicant's appeal of 16 June 2004 was therefore belated.
D. Maintenance enforcement
On
3 September 1998 and 8 March 2001, respectively, A lodged two
petitions against Š. seeking the judicial enforcement of her
claim to two sums of money due to her under the judgment of 1994 (see
above under heading “A”).
On
10 September 1998 and 29 March 2001, respectively, the District Court
issued two enforcements warrants for the seizure of money from the
defendant's bank account. Both enforcements appear to be still
pending.
E. Other civil proceedings
On
6 July 1998 the applicant filed a petition for dissolution of her
co-ownership regime with Š and for distribution of the
property. In December 1999 the applicant provided further and better
particulars of her claim. The proceedings appear to be still pending.
On
10 February 2000 the applicant brought an action in the District
Court challenging the transfer in 1999 of the immovable property from
company E to L. An interim injunction was issued, and later quashed
on appeal, prohibiting L from disposing of the property. On 29
October 2002 the District Court dismissed the action.
On
11 February 2000 company B lodged an action against Š seeking
an order for payment of an amount of money owed under a contract of
sale of 1997. The action was granted by way of a payment order
(platobný rozkaz), which was then quashed on the
defendant's protest (odpor). The proceedings appear to be
still pending.
F. Criminal proceedings
The
applicant filed numerous criminal complaints against Š
alleging that he was in default with payments of maintenance in
respect of A and B. Š was found guilty of neglecting his
alimentary duty within the meaning of Article 213 § 1 of the
Criminal Code and sentenced by a penal order (trestný
rozkaz) of the District Court of 29 July 2002 to 4 months'
imprisonment suspended for 1 year. On 30 October 2002 another charge
of neglecting his alimentary duty in respect of A was brought against
him.
On
26 April 2000 the applicant filed a criminal complaint against Š
in connection with the transfer of the immovable property from
company E. to L. The matter was investigated by the Čadca
District Office of Investigation which concluded, on 17 November
2000, that there was no criminal case to answer. This decision was
upheld on appeal on 5 January 2001 by the Čadca
District Prosecutor.
The
applicant filed several criminal complaints against Š and L
accusing them of having broken into her house and having taken and
damaged her property and of having behaved abusively towards her. On
26 October and 2 November 1999 the Čadca District Police
decided not to act on these complaints as there was no criminal case
to answer. The allegations of abusive behaviour were referred for
examination to the minor offences authority. The applicant's repeated
appeals were dismissed as unfounded by the District Prosecutor on 22
and 23 November and 21 December 1999 and by the Žilina Regional
Prosecutor on 23 August 2000. The matter was not of a criminal nature
and concerned the division and distribution of the property in the
co-ownership of the applicant and Š, a matter which fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
G. Constitutional complaint
In
January 2003 the applicant wrote to the Constitutional Court (Ústavný
súd). In substance she complained of the length of the
above civil and criminal proceedings and/or of the inactivity of the
official authorities.
On
1 April 2003, through the intermediary of a lawyer, the applicant
submitted a formal constitutional complaint under Article 127 of the
Constitution in which she complained of delays in the proceedings
concerning the increase of the maintenance contributions, the divorce
proceedings and the two sets of enforcement proceedings.
On
17 December 2003 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint
admissible is so far as it concerned the proceedings on the increase
of maintenance and the divorce proceedings. The complaint was
inadmissible in so far as it related to the enforcement proceedings.
The latter proceedings concerned the claims of A, who had reached the
age of majority in the meantime. The applicant was not a party to
these proceedings. She had no standing to complain about them in her
own name.
On
7 April 2004 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court
had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified
delay under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution in the two sets
of proceedings under review. The subject matter of these proceedings
was interconnected, was factually complex and called for special
diligence. The District Court had failed to handle them with the
requisite expedition and their overall length, as such, was
excessive. The Constitutional Court consequently ordered that the
District Court proceed with the maintenance proceedings without delay
and ordered that it pay the applicant 30,000
Slovakian korunas (SKK) in compensation for her non-pecuniary damage
and reimburse her legal costs. The amount of just satisfaction was
determined on an “equitable basis” and with
reference to Article 41 of the Convention.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that in the above proceedings (headings “B”
– “F” above) she had not had a fair hearing within
a reasonable time, as required under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
1. Fairness and length of the enforcement proceedings
and the proceedings in the action of 11 February 2000
In
so far as the applicant complained of the unfairness and length of
the two sets of enforcement proceedings described under heading “D”
above, it is observed that she was not a party to those proceedings.
It was her daughter, A, who sought enforcement of her maintenance
claims against Š. It is also to be noted that A was born in
1983 and that, during the enforcement proceedings, she reached the
age of majority (see the Constitutional Court's judgment of 7 April
2004). In these circumstances the applicant herself cannot claim to
be a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the
Convention of a violation of her own right to a hearing within a
reasonable time in these proceedings (see, for example, Macková and
Macko v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 51543/99, 1 April 2003).
As
to the length of the proceedings in the action of 11 February 2000,
described under heading “E” above, the applicant in her
personal capacity was not a party to these proceedings. It was
company B which sued Š. The applicant herself therefore cannot
claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34
of the Convention of a violation of her own right to a hearing within
a reasonable time in these proceedings (see, for example, Agrotexim
and Others v. Greece, judgment of 24 October 1995,
Series A no. 330 A, pp. 22-26, §§ 59-72 and Veselá
and Loyka v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 54811/00, 13 December 2005).
It
follows that the complaint of the unfairness and length of the
enforcement proceedings and of the proceedings in the action of
11 February 2000 is incompatible ratione personae with
the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 §
3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
2. Fairness and length of the criminal proceedings
As
to the criminal proceedings complained of, which are described under
heading “F” above, it is to be noted that they did not
concern a criminal charge against the applicant and, therefore,
Article 6 § 1 under its “criminal head” is not
applicable to them.
The
Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1, under its “civil
head”, applies only to proceedings concerning the
“determination” of a “civil right” which can
be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under
domestic law (see among other authorities Acquaviva v. France,
judgment of 21 November 1995, Series A no. 333, p. 14, §
46).
The
applicant has not shown that in the proceedings in question she has
submitted any claim for damages in connection with the alleged
offences (see Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 70,
ECHR 2004 I).
It
follows that the complaint of the unfairness and length of `these
proceedings is incompatible ratione materiae with the
provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 §
3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
3. Length of the proceedings in the actions of 6 July
1998 and 10 February 2000
As
to the length of these proceedings (heading “E” above),
the applicant has failed to show that she complained to the
Constitutional Court under Article 127 of the Constitution (see
Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), nos.
57984/00, 60226/00, 60237/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00 and
68563/01, ECHR 2002 IX) in accordance with the applicable
requirements (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of
16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1996 IV, p. 1210, § 66).
It
follows that this part of the application must be rejected under
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
4. Fairness of the proceedings in the actions of 6 July
1998 and 10 February 2000 and in the proceedings on the increase
of maintenance and the divorce proceedings
As
the proceedings in the action of 6 July 1998 and the proceedings on
the increase of maintenance are still pending, the complaint of their
unfairness is premature (see Macková and Macko, cited
above).
The
applicant has not shown that she appealed against the judgment of 29
October 2002 in the action of 10 February 2000.
As
for the divorce proceedings, it is to be noted that the applicant
failed to lodge her appeal against the judgment of 29 October 2002
within the applicable time-limit (see Akdivar and Others,
cited above, § 66).
It
follows that this part of the application must be rejected under
Article 35 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention
for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
5. Length of the proceedings on the increase of
maintenance contributions and the divorce proceedings
The
Government objected that, to the extent the proceedings had been
reviewed and the applicant granted compensation by the Constitutional
Court, she could no longer be considered a “victim”
within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. They further
submitted that the applicant could have raised the issue of recurring
delays in the proceedings on the increase of maintenance
contributions in the period after the Constitutional Court's judgment
(nález) of 7 April 2004 by way of a fresh complaint
under Article 127 of the Constitution. As she had not done so,
she had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
The
applicant reiterated her complaint. She argued that the amount of
just satisfaction awarded to her by the Constitutional Court was
unacceptably low and that the injunction imposed by it on the
District Court to proceed with the maintenance contributions case
promptly had been ineffective, given that the proceedings had not
been accelerated.
The
Court observes that, in view of the Constitutional Court's judgment
of 7 April 2004, a question arises whether the applicant can still
claim to be a “victim”, within the meaning of Article 34
of the Convention, of a violation of her right to a hearing within a
reasonable time as regards the maintenance increase proceedings and
the divorce proceedings.
The
Court observes that in the present case the applicant's status as
a “victim” depends on whether the redress afforded
to her at the domestic level was adequate and sufficient having
regard to Article 41 of the Convention. This issue falls to be
determined in the light of the principles established under the
Court's case law (see, most recently, Scordino v. Italy (no.
1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006-... and
Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 69-98,
ECHR 2006-...).
The
Constitutional Court found unjustified delays in both the proceedings
on increase of maintenance and on divorce and related matters. In
assessing the length of these two sets of proceedings, the
Constitutional Court took into account the fact that they were
closely interconnected. In determining the amount of just
satisfaction, the Constitutional Court considered both sets together.
The Court will follow the same approach.
At
the time of the Constitutional Court's judgment, the length of the
proceedings on the increase of maintenance was about 6 years and 2
months for two levels of jurisdiction. At that time the length of the
divorce proceedings was more than 4 years and 5 months (14 May 1998 –
29 October 2002). The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant
the equivalent of approximately 750 euros (EUR) in respect of her
non pecuniary damage. This amount is less than 20% of what the
Court would generally award in a similar situation in a Slovakian
case. After the Constitutional Court's judgment, the proceedings on
the increase of the maintenance have been pending for more than 2
years and 5 months at a single instance. They have not yet been
completed.
In
these circumstances, the redress obtained by the applicant at the
domestic level must be considered insufficient (see Scordino (no.
1), cited above, §§ 205-06 and 214-15). The applicant
can accordingly still claim to be a “victim” of a
breach of the “reasonable time” requirement.
In
view of the conclusion in the preceding paragraph, the Court
considers that the applicant was not required, for the purposes of
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, to resort to the
remedy under Article 127 of the Constitution anew, as suggested by
the respondent Government (see, a contrario, Šidlová
v. Slovakia, no. 50224/99, §§ 49 and 50,
26 September 2006). The complaint, accordingly, cannot be
rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
As
for the proceedings on the increase of maintenance, the period to be
taken into consideration began on 3 February 1998 and has not yet
ended. It has therefore lasted more than 8 years and 7 months at two
levels of jurisdiction to date. The divorce proceedings started on 14
May 1998 and lasted until 29 October 2002 (3 years and more than 8
months), also before two levels of jurisdiction. The applicant's
appeal of 16 June 2004 was finally determined on 1 December 2004
(more than 3 months).
The
Court notes that the complaint of the length of the two sets of
proceedings specified above is not manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes
that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore
be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
no facts or arguments have been put forward capable of persuading it
to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having
regard to its case law on the subject, the Court considers that
in the instant case the length of the proceedings on the increase of
maintenance payments together with the proceedings concerning divorce
and related matters was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable
time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
In
connection with the proceedings in the action of 10 February 2000
concerning the validity of the transfer of the immovable property
from company E. to L., the applicant also complained of a violation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follow:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
This
complaint has the same factual and legal background as the complaint
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
of the unfairness of the proceedings in the action of 10 February
2000. The Court found that complaint inadmissible for non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies in that the applicant did not show that she had
appealed against the judgment of 29 October 2002 (see paragraphs
47 and 49 above). The Court finds no reasons for reaching a
different conclusion under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
It
follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35
§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF PROTOCOL No. 7 TO
THE CONVNETION
Without
further specification, the applicant also alleged a violation of
Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.
To
the extent this complaint has been substantiated, the Court has found
no indication of a violation of the Article invoked.
It
follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 16,919,400
Slovakian korunas (SKK) in respect of pecuniary damage. This amount
included compensation in respect of outstanding maintenance, the
immovable property in dispute and other material damage. The
applicant also claimed SKK 5,190,000
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested these claims.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
(see paragraph 61 above) and the pecuniary damage alleged; it
therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, the Court considers
that the applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on
an equitable basis, and having regard to its case-law on the
subject (see the recapitulation of the relevant principles and,
mutatis mutandis, their application in Scordino (no. 1),
cited above, §§ 267-272), and taking into account that the
applicant has already obtained some satisfaction under the
Constitutional Court's judgment of 7 April 2004, the Court awards her
EUR 2,150 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed SKK 7,500
for her legal costs in Slovakia and SKK 7,794
for her translation, telecommunications and other administrative
costs incurred before the Court.
The
Government contested the claim as regards the costs at the domestic
level. They accepted that the applicant must have incurred some costs
in the proceedings before the Court and invited the Court to
determine the amount of the compensation in accordance with the
Court's case-law and “the subject value”.
According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is
entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as
it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily
incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case,
regard being had to the information in its possession and the above
criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant,
who was not represented before the Court by a lawyer, the sum of EUR
200 covering costs under all heads.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings on the increase of maintenance payments and
of the divorce proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the above-mentioned
proceedings;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,150 (two
thousand one hundred and fifty euros) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage and EUR 200 (two hundred euros) in respect of costs and
expenses, the above amounts to be converted into the currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement,
plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 31 October 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President