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CHRAIDI v. GERMANY - 65655/01 [2006] ECHR 899 (26 October 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/899.html
Cite as:
(2008) 47 EHRR 2,
[2006] ECHR 899
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF CHRAIDI v. GERMANY
(Application
no. 65655/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
26 October
2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Chraidi v. Germany,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mr K.
Jungwiert,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr J.
Borrego Borrego,
Mrs R. Jaeger,
Mr M. Villiger, judges,
and Mrs C. Westerdiek, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 2 October 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 65655/01) against the Federal
Republic of Germany lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a stateless person, Mr
Yasser Chraidi (“the applicant”), on 27 November 2000.
The
applicant was represented by Mr Lammer, a lawyer practising in
Berlin. The German Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs A. Wittling-Vogel,
Ministerialrätin, of the Federal Ministry of Justice.
On
21 November 2005 the Court decided to communicate the application.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
On
1 April 2006 this case was assigned to the newly composed Fifth
Section (Rule 25 § 1 and Rule 52 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5.
The applicant, Mr Yasser Chraidi, was born in 1959 in Lebanon. When
lodging his application, he was detained in Berlin. He is presently
living in Lebanon.
6. On 1 August 1984 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court issued an
arrest warrant against the applicant on the ground that he was
strongly suspected of having murdered E.
7. On 19 July 1990 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court issued a
further arrest warrant against the applicant and five other suspects,
born in Lebanon, Libya or Morocco. The court accused the applicant of
having prepared, with others, the bomb attack of the discotheque “La
Belle” in Berlin on 5 April 1986 in order to kill as many
members of the American armed forces as possible. During this
terrorist attack three persons had been killed and 104 persons had
been seriously injured.
8. On 1 September 1992 the applicant was arrested by the police in
Lebanon and subsequently taken into detention with a view to
extradition.
9. On 21 June 1994 a Lebanese court acquitted the applicant as
regards E's murder but convicted him of forgery and sentenced him to
one year and six months' imprisonment.
10. On 24 May 1996 the applicant was extradited to Germany and
subsequently held in detention on remand on account of the arrest
warrant of 1990.
On 25 November 1996 the Berlin Court of Appeal ordered
the applicant's further detention on remand. It held that the
reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences
with which he had been charged resulted inter alia from the
confession of one of the other suspects. The danger of absconding
still persisted as the applicant had been extradited to Germany only
in May 1996 and because he neither had a fixed dwelling nor social
bonds in Germany which would prevent him from absconding if released.
The court moreover referred to the impending lifelong prison sentence
and underlined that more lenient preventive measures would not be
suitable. Finally, there had been no breach of the obligation to
proceed speedily (Beschleunigungsgebot).
12. On 30 January 1997 the Public Prosecutor lodged the bill of
indictment. On 5 September 1997 the Berlin Regional Court
opened the main proceedings against the applicant and four other
accused. Between 1997 and 2000 the Berlin Court of Appeal repeatedly
ordered the applicant's further detention on remand.
13. On 13 January 2000 the Berlin Regional Court rejected the
applicant's request for release. It held that there was still a
danger of his absconding. Furthermore, the reasonable suspicion that
the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been
charged persisted. The continued detention was also proportionate
having regard to the serious nature of those offences, the
prospective sentence, the importance of the case and the particular
public interest in the prosecution of these offences. Furthermore,
there had been no breach of the obligation to proceed speedily.
14. On 1 March 2000 the Berlin Court of Appeal upheld the decision.
Concerning the suspicions as regards the applicant, the court pointed
out that it was bound to the assessment of the Regional Court.
Furthermore, the danger of absconding persisted in view of the
impending lifelong prison sentence. The objective of the detention on
remand could accordingly not be accomplished by alternative, less
radical, preventive measures. Although the applicant had already been
detained since 8 January 1994, his further detention remained
proportionate having regard to the importance of the case, the
character and seriousness of the offences and the particular public
interest in the prosecution of these offences. Referring to the
principle of proportionality the court underlined that a detainee's
right to liberty could outbalance the public interest in the
prosecution, as time passed, if there was for instance an imminent
risk of irreparable damage to his health. In the present case
however, nothing suggested that the applicant's life or health was at
risk. Moreover, given that the Regional Court had continuously held
two hearings per week since November 1997, the length of proceedings
could not be considered disproportionate.
15. On 24 May 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit
his complaint without giving any reasons. The decision was served on
the applicant's lawyer on 30 May 2000.
16.
On 13 November 2001 the Berlin Regional Court convicted the applicant
of three counts of aiding and abetting murder, on 104 counts of
aiding and abetting attempted murder and of aiding and abetting
causing an explosion (Herbeiführung einer
Sprengstoffexplosion). The court alluded to the historical
background of the case, in particular to the tensions between the
United States and Libya which had arisen following terrorist attacks
in 1985. In January 1986 the United States Government had imposed a
trade embargo on Libya and had ordered the blocking of all Libyan
state assets in United States banks. These measures led to military
interventions and to the planning by Libyan nationals of terrorist
attacks on United States facilities in Germany. The court further
pointed out that the applicant's crimes were punishable with
imprisonment of up to fifteen years and sentenced him to fourteen
years' imprisonment. When determining the sentence, the court took
inter alia into account that the applicant's detention on
remand and the proceedings had lasted unusually long. It further
determined that since 8 January 1994 the applicant had been detained
in Lebanon with a view to extradition in respect of the present case.
This detention had to be deducted from his prison sentence at a ratio
of 1:3 until 30 April 1994 and at a ratio of 1:2 as of 1 May 1994.
The court moreover ordered the applicant's further detention. The
judgment, comprising 380 pages, was served on the applicant's lawyer
on 10 January 2003.
17.
The Berlin Regional Court pronounced its judgment after having held
281 hearings with an average of two hearings per week and having
heard 169 witnesses. The hearings, which had an average duration of
five hours each, were regularly attended by the five accused, their
15 lawyers, 106 joint plaintiffs, their 29 lawyers and three
interpreters.
18.
On 24 June 2004 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant's
and the Public Prosecutor's appeals on points of law.
19.
On 28 April 2005 the applicant was released.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
20.
Section 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides inter alia:
“As long as the accused is in detention on remand,
he may at any time apply for a court hearing as to whether the arrest
warrant is to be revoked or whether its execution is to be suspended
in accordance with Section 116.”
21.
Section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides inter alia:
“No main hearing shall be held in respect of a
person who is absent.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that his detention on remand had lasted
excessively long. He invoked Article 5 § 3 of the Convention
which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
“ (...) Everyone arrested or detained in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. Admissibility
1. Loss of standing as a victim
The
Government contended that the applicant could no longer claim to be a
victim because the Regional Court had explicitly acknowledged that
the applicant's detention on remand had lasted unusually long and had
taken this fact into account when determining the applicant's
sentence.
The
Court recalls that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant
does not in principle deprive the individual concerned of his status
of victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention
(see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 142,
ECHR 2000 IV; Amuur v. France judgment of 25 June 1996,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p.
846, § 36; and Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, §
44, ECHR 1999 VI). However, as the Convention leaves to
each Contracting State, in the first place, the task of securing the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines (see Cordier v.
Germany (dec.), no. 71741/01, 19 January 2006), this
general rule is subject to an exception when the national authorities
have acknowledged either expressly or in substance, and then afforded
redress for, the breach of the Convention (see Eckle v. Germany,
judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, p. 30,
§ 66; Jansen v. Germany (dec.), no. 44186/98,
12 October 2000; Beck v. Norway, no. 26390/95,
§ 27, 26 June 2001). In cases concerning the
failure to observe the reasonable-time requirement guaranteed by
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the national
authorities can afford adequate redress in particular by reducing the
applicant's sentence in an express and measurable manner (see Eckle,
cited above, § 66; Beck, cited above, § 27).
In the Court's view, such a mitigation of the sentence is also
capable of affording adequate redress for a violation of Article 5
§ 3 in cases in which the national authorities had failed
to hear the case of an applicant held in detention on remand within a
reasonable time (see Dzelili v. Germany, no. 65745/01, § 83,
10 November 2005).
Applying
these principles to the present case, the Court observes that,
although the Convention forms an integral part of the law of the
Federal Republic of Germany (see Eckle, cited above, § 67)
and there was accordingly nothing to prevent the Regional Court from
holding, if appropriate, that the length of the detention on remand
had been in breach with the Convention, either expressly or in
substance, the latter court merely conceded that the impugned
detention had lasted “unusually long” (see § 16
above). Furthermore, the Court is not satisfied that the applicant
was afforded adequate redress for the alleged violation because the
Regional Court failed to specify to what extent the applicant's
sentence had been reduced on account of the length of his detention
on remand (see Dzelili, cited above, § 85).
The
Court therefore considers that the Regional Court's statement
concerning the unusual length of the applicant's detention did not
deprive the latter of his status of victim within the meaning of
Article 34 of the Convention.
2. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
The
Government maintained that the applicant had only exhausted the
domestic remedies with regard to his detention until 24 May 2000,
which was the date of the final decision by a domestic court
concerning his request for release. They underlined that –
following a certain lapse of time after that decision – the
applicant could have lodged a further request for release. As he had
not availed himself of the opportunity to institute fresh proceedings
before the domestic courts after the decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court dated 24 May 2000, he had failed to exhaust
domestic remedies in respect of his detention after that date.
The
applicant did not submit any observations in reply within the
time-limit fixed by the Court.
29.
The Court recalls its case-law pursuant to which an applicant can
usually not be requested to use at very short intervals a remedy,
which by its nature might be repeated an indefinite number of times
(see Rieme v. Sweden, judgment of 22 April 1992, Series A
no. 226 B, § 50; and Guzzardi v. Italy,
judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no. 39, § 80). The
re-examination of a case may, however, be indicated where new facts
have emerged which would furnish a separate basis for a new decision.
In cases of continued detention for instance, the prolongation of the
detention in itself may under certain circumstances justify a
re-examination of the question of release (see Lynas v.
Switzerland, no. 7317/75, Commission decision of 6 October 1976,
Decisions and Reports (DR) 6, p. 154).
In
the present case, the applicant had been held in detention on remand
for exactly four years when the Federal Constitutional Court rejected
his constitutional complaint. Pursuant to the German law, the
applicant could have lodged a further request for release any time
after that decision (see “Relevant domestic law”, §
20, above). However, having regard to the fact, that on 13 November
2001 the Regional Court convicted the applicant and ordered his
further detention because of the persisting danger of absconding, it
is rather doubtful whether such a request in the period of time
preceding the latter decision would have had any prospects of
success. In any event, given that the applicant's detention on remand
within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 ended with his conviction by
the Regional Court on 13 November 2001 (see Labita v. Italy
cited above, § 147) and accordingly eighteen months after the
decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, the Court is not
satisfied that the institution of fresh proceedings would have
shortened the length of the applicant's detention on remand in a
significant manner.
The
Court therefore holds that the Government's preliminary objection
concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
The
Court further notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that
it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into consideration
The
period to be taken into consideration under Article 5 § 3
started with the applicant's transfer to Germany on 24 May 1996 (see
Nedyalkov v. Bulgaria, no. 44241/98, § 61, 3
November 2005; and De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium,
judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, p. 39, § 71) and
ended on 13 November 2001 with the applicant's conviction by the
Berlin Regional Court (see § 30 above). The applicant's
detention on remand thus lasted five years and almost six months.
2. The reasonableness of the length of detention
The
applicant submitted that the length of his detention on remand could
not be regarded as justified for the purposes of Article 5 § 3
of the Convention. The Government contested this view.
The
Court recalls that the issue of whether a period of detention is
reasonable cannot be assessed in abstracto. Whether it is
reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in
each case according to its special features and on the basis of the
reasons given in the domestic decisions and of the well-documented
facts mentioned by the applicant in his applications for release.
Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there
are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest
which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the
rule of respect for individual liberty (see, W. v. Switzerland,
judgment of 26 January 1993, Series A no. 254-A,
p. 15, § 30; and Labita, cited above, § 152).
The
persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has
committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the
lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of
time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must
establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities
continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds
were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court
must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities
displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the
proceedings (see I.A. v. France, judgment of 23 September
1998, Reports 1998-VII, p. 2979, § 102; and
Labita, cited above, § 153).
a. General approach
37
. The
Court notes at the outset that the present case relates to large
scale offences committed in the context of international terrorism.
States combating such terrorism may be faced with extraordinary
difficulties. The Court whose role it is to examine such measures by
Convention States as to their conformity with the Convention is not
oblivious of these difficulties. It sees no reason to depart from the
general approach it has adopted in previous cases of a similar nature
(see Klass and Others v. Germany, judgment of 6 September
1978, Series A no. 28, p. 23 and 27-28, § 48-49 and 59;
Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of
29 November 1988, Series A no. 145 B, § 48;
Murray v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1994,
Series A no. 300 A, § 47; Pantano v. Italy, no.
60851/00, § 70, 6 November 2003; and Van der Tang v.
Spain, judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A no. 321, § 75).
However, in the context of the issues arising in the present case the
Court considers that the specific nature of these offences and in
particular the difficulties intrinsic to the investigations of
offences committed by criminal associations acting on a global scale
call for special consideration. It will bear this context in mind
when assessing the reasonableness of the length of the applicant's
continued detention, in particular the grounds for his detention and
the conduct of the proceedings in the light of the complexity of the
case.
b. Grounds for continued detention
As
regards the grounds for the applicant's continued detention, the
Court notes that the competent judicial authorities advanced three
principal reasons for not suspending the arrest warrant, namely that
the applicant remained under a strong suspicion of having committed
the crimes he was accused of, the serious nature of these offences
and that the applicant would be likely to abscond if released, given
the sentence which he risked incurring if found guilty as charged.
The
Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant
committed the offences he had been charged with, being based on
cogent evidence, persisted throughout the trial leading to his
conviction. It also agrees that the alleged offences were of a
serious nature.
As
regards the danger of the applicant's absconding, the Court observes
that the possibility of a severe sentence alone is not sufficient
after a certain lapse of time to justify the continued detention
based on the danger of flight (see Wemhoff v. Germany,
judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 7, p. 25,
§ 14; B. v. Austria, judgment of 28 March 1990,
Series A no. 175, p. 16, § 44). In the
present case the national courts also relied on other relevant
circumstances, including the fact that the applicant had been
extradited from Lebanon to Germany for the purposes of criminal
proceedings in the context of international terrorism. He neither had
a fixed dwelling nor social bonds in Germany which would prevent him
from absconding if released. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that
a substantial risk of the applicant's absconding persisted over the
total period of his detention and accepts the domestic courts'
finding that no other measures to secure his presence would have been
appropriate. It moreover observes that under German legislation no
hearing can be held against an accused who absconded and whose
whereabouts are unknown (see “Relevant domestic law”
above, § 21).
Consequently,
the Court concludes that there have been relevant and sufficient
grounds for the applicant's continued detention.
c. Conduct of the proceedings
It
remains to be ascertained whether the judicial authorities displayed
“special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings.
The
Court takes the view that the applicant's case had been extremely
complex. It concerned serious charges against him and four
co-defendants and had necessitated the hearing of 169 witnesses.
The case had a terrorist and international background and moreover
involved 106 joint plaintiffs.
As
to the conduct of the proceedings by the judicial authorities, the
parties agreed that no delay in the proceedings were attributable to
the German courts and authorities who had displayed the necessary
diligence throughout the proceedings. The Court notes that, following
the indictment of 30 January 1997, the trial before the Berlin
Regional Court began on 5 September 1997. The hearings took
place on 281 days with an average of two hearings per week until the
Regional Court's decision of 13 November 2001. The hearings
had regularly been attended by five accused, their fifteen lawyers,
106 joint plaintiffs and their 29 lawyers. Accordingly, having regard
to the difficulties intrinsic to the prosecution of offences
committed in the context of international terrorism, the competent
judicial authorities cannot be said to have displayed a lack of
special diligence in handling the applicant's case.
In
the light of these various factors, the Court finds that the
competent national court acted with the necessary special diligence
in conducting the applicant's proceedings.
d. Overall assessment
46. The
Court has found in previous cases that a detention on remand
exceeding five years constituted a violation of Article 5 § 3 of
the Convention (see Korchuganova
v. Russia, no. 75039/01, § 77, 8 June 2006; I.A.
v. France, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998 VII,
§ 112; and Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, § 189,
ECHR 2005 ... (extracts)).
47. The
present case concerned a particularly complex investigation and trial
into serious offences of international terrorism, having caused the
death of three and serious suffering to more than hundred victims.
Having been extradited from Lebanon in 1996, the sole reason for the
applicant's presence in Germany was to stand trial for these
offences.
In
these exceptional circumstances, the Court concludes that the length
of the applicant's detention can still be regarded as reasonable.
There has accordingly been no violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of his detention on remand
violated the presumption of innocence. He relied on Article 6 §
2 of the Convention which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:
“ (...) Everyone charged with a
criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.”
The Court observes that this complaint is based on the
same facts as the complaint under Article 5 § 3 and must be
likewise declared admissible (see § 32 above).
Given that the Court takes into account the
presumption of innocence while assessing whether the length of the
pre-trial detention was justified (see Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, § 110, ECHR 2000 XI; and Labita, cited
above, § 152), no separate question arises under Article 6 §
2. There is accordingly no need to examine the complaint about the
length of the detention on remand also under that Article.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
In
his first letter to the Court, the applicant submitted that the
length of the criminal proceedings had not been proportionate.
However, he also observed that the German authorities could not be
held responsible for the unusual length of the impugned proceedings.
In his subsequent submissions, the applicant underlined that the
national authorities had observed their obligation to proceed
speedily throughout the proceedings and that the length of the latter
was rather due to the complexity of the case and the quantity of the
persons involved in the proceedings.
The
Government argued that the applicant had obviously not intended to
raise the length-of-proceedings complaint.
The
Court notes that the applicant's submissions concerning the length of
proceedings are controversial as he underlined that the German
authorities and courts could not be held responsible for the unusual
length of proceedings. Furthermore, he failed to submit any
clarification following the Government's allegation that he had not
complained about the length of proceedings. The Court therefore finds
that the applicant failed to substantiate the length-of-proceedings
complaint with sufficient clarity.
55.
Even assuming the exhaustion of domestic remedies, this part of the
application is accordingly manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected as inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Declares unanimously the complaint about the
length of the applicant's detention on remand admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
Holds unanimously that there is no need to examine the
complaint about the length of the applicant's detention on remand
under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 October 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer
Lorenzen
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the following concurring opinion of
Mr Borrego is annexed to this judgment.
P.L.
C. W.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BORREGO BORREGO
For
the purpose of a review under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,
the Court's case-law establishes two criteria: the grounds for the
continuous detention and the conduct of the proceedings. On the basis
of both criteria, the Court examines the particular circumstances of
the case and decides on the reasonableness of the length of the
applicant's detention on remand. In the present case, the Court has
applied these general criteria (paragraphs 37 to 45 of the judgment)
and has examined the unusual, even exceptional, circumstances of this
case (281 hearing-days, among others). The Court, therefore, holds
that there has been no violation of the Convention. This is also my
conclusion.
I
nevertheless respectfully disagree with the preambular paragraph 37
as well as with the use of the words “international terrorism”,
which are repeatedly mentioned, up to four times in all (paragraphs
37, 40, 44 and 47).
Firstly,
I find the initial considerations in paragraph 37 regarding
international terrorism superfluous. In my opinion, they could lead
readers to think that, in addition to the above-mentioned general
criteria which characterize its jurisprudence, the Court has created
a new criterion, concerning a specific category of crime:
international terrorism. I think that international terrorism is not
and should not be considered as a criterion. On the contrary, the
nature of the crime has to be examined as part of the particular
circumstances of every case.
The
very specific and relevant circumstances of the instant case are
weakened by the fact that the two general criteria are locked in
between the initial general approach and the final overall
assessment, which stresses the international terrorism aspect. I am
convinced that there is no violation of the Convention, because the
application of the two general criteria to the present case so
proves. The insistence on referring to international terrorism and
the special weight given to this crime is, in my opinion,
unnecessary, and it can be dangerous for the Convention system.
Finally,
I would like to express my complete disagreement with the expression
“international terrorism”. Not only is it wrong, but it
could lead to misunderstandings. Indeed, it could give rise to
questions or doubts. For instance, one might wonder whether there are
different categories of the crime called terrorism and whether these
different categories have different consequences. One might also
wonder whether terrorism can be considered as “international”,
depending on the terrorists' nationality (in which case, would the
attack of 7 July 2005 in London, where the alleged perpetrators were
British, be considered an example of international terrorism?). Other
questions may arise regarding the different nationality and role
played by those who plan the attack, those who finance it and those
who execute it. And regarding the victims of terrorism, are there
different categories of victim, depending on the type of terrorism?
That would be repugnant.
“Popular
democracy”, “organic democracy” and other similar
expressions became part of European history and we all remember it. I
would therefore gently ask the Court not to insist on qualifying and,
thus, trying to make artificial distinctions with respect to
something that is purely and simply a crime: terrorism.