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JERUZAL v. POLAND - 65888/01 [2006] ECHR 855 (10 October 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/855.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 855
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FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF JERUZAL v. POLAND
(Application no. 65888/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 October 2006
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Jeruzal v. Poland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr M. Pellonpää,
Mr K.
Traja,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 19 September 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an
application (no. 65888/01) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national,
Marianna Jeruzal (“the applicant”), on 31 October
2000.
The Polish Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent, Mr. J. Wołąsiewicz
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On 10 September 2002
the Court decided to give notice of the application to the
Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it
decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at
the same time.
On 13 January 2003 the applicant’s daughter,
Mrs Halina Jeruzal Kuklińska, informed the
Court’s Registry that the applicant had died on
25 November 2002. She stated that she wished to continue
the proceedings before the Court in her late mother’s stead.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1912 and lived in Gdynia in
Poland. She died in 2002.
In 1972 the applicant and her husband transferred the
ownership of their house and land to their son – Z.J., and kept
a lifetime usufruct interest for themselves. Under the terms of the
contract Z.J. was supposed to take care of the applicant and her
husband and to provide them with food and medical care. However, he
had failed to do so. Moreover, on two occasions criminal proceedings
against him, for assault on the applicant, had been discontinued
(pursuant to the relevant amnesty law).
On 2 February 1985 the
applicant sued Z.J. in the Gdańsk
District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) for damages for his failure
to comply with the terms of the contract.
On several occasions before 1 May
1993 the applicant modified her claim.
On 13 July 1993 the
Gdańsk District Court held a hearing and ordered an expert to
prepare an opinion. On 16 December 1993 it ordered an additional
expert opinion to be obtained.
On 1 February 1994, in reply to the
applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings, the
President of the Gdańsk District Court acknowledged that they
were indeed lengthy and promised to supervise their conduct. On
4 March 1994 the court held a hearing.
The hearings set for 3 June 1994,
5 July 1994 and 6 September 1994
were adjourned.
12. The court held
hearings on 20 December 1994 and 6 January 1995.
On 31 January 1995 the Gdańsk District
Court gave judgment. The defendant appealed. On 22 December 1995
the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki)
quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case.
On 24 January 1996 the applicant sent a
letter to the Minister of Justice. She complained about the slow
conduct of the proceedings. On 26 February 1996, in reply
to her complaints, the President of the Gdańsk Court of Appeal
(Sąd Apelacyjny) admitted that the proceedings were
indeed lengthy and gave his assurance that he would supervise their
conduct.
On 23 April 1996 the Gdańsk District
Court held a hearing. On the same date the court ordered an expert to
prepare an opinion. On 31 May 1996 and 2 July 1996
the court held further hearings. On 6 June 1996
the expert submitted his opinion to the court.
On 4 September 1996 the court
ordered yet another expert to prepare an opinion. It was submitted to
the court on 6 May 1997.
On 6 June 1997 the court held a hearing. On
9 June 1997 the case was transferred to the Gdańsk
Regional Court as that court had become competent to consider it. On
30 September 1997 the Gdańsk Regional Court gave
judgment.
Upon the applicant’s
further appeal, the Gdańsk Court of Appeal gave judgment on
21 April 1998.
The defendant lodged a cassation appeal with the
Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). On 25 May 1999
the Supreme Court gave judgment and remitted the case to the Gdańsk
Court of Appeal.
On 29 October 1999 the
Gdańsk Court of Appeal held a hearing and ordered an expert to
prepare an opinion. It was submitted to the court on 13 January 2000.
On 11 May 2000 the
Gdańsk Court of Appeal held a hearing and gave judgment. The
applicant’s legal aid lawyer did not file a cassation appeal.
On 9 October 2000 the applicant asked to be granted leave to file an
appeal out of time and to be assigned another legal aid lawyer. On
14 November 2000 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal rejected
her application. The court considered that in view of the value of
the claim, a cassation appeal in the applicant’s case was
inadmissible in law.
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
The Court notes at the outset that the applicant died
after the introduction of her application. Subsequently, her
daughter, Mrs Halina Jeruzal Kuklińska,
informed the Court that she wished to pursue the application
introduced by her mother. She explained that during the proceedings
in question, she had taken daily care of the applicant. As a result,
she had experienced in part the frustration and distress which the
applicant herself had suffered due to the protracted length of the
proceedings.
The respondent Government submitted that the
applicant’s daughter could not be considered a person entitled
to pursue the proceedings before the Court on the applicant’s
behalf and invited the Court to strike the application out of its
list of cases.
The Court recalls that when an applicant dies during
the proceedings, the next of kin of the applicant has a
legitimate interest to justify the continuation of the examination of
the case (see, for example, Goc v. Poland (dec.), no.
48001/99, 23 October 2001).
The Court observes that in the present case the
proceedings concerned the applicant’s
pecuniary rights. It further accepts that the applicant’s
daughter has a legitimate interest to pursue the application on her
mother’s behalf.
Accordingly, the applicant’s daughter
has standing to continue the proceedings before the Court in
the applicant’s stead, and the Government’s preliminary
objection should be dismissed.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government contested that argument.
The period to be taken into consideration began only
on 1 May 1993, when the recognition by Poland of the right
of individual petition took effect. However, in assessing the
reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must
be taken of the state of proceedings at the time. The proceedings
ended on 14 November 2000.
Their length accordingly amounted to 7 years, 5 months and 2 weeks.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the
length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the
circumstances of the case and with reference to the following
criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant
and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant
in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v.
France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one
in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having examined all the material submitted to it, the
Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or
argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in
the present case. Having regard to its case law on the subject
and the overall length of the proceedings, the Court considers that
in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 §
1.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the domestic court’s
refusal to grant her legal assistance in connection with the
preparation of a cassation appeal violated her right of access to a
court. She relied on Article 13 of the Convention.
The Court considers that this complaint should be
examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the safeguards
of that provision, implying the full panoply of a judicial procedure,
are stricter than, and absorb, those of Article 13 (see, inter
alia, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 146,
ECHR 2000-XI).
The Court firstly recalls that the right to a court,
embodied by Article 6 of the Convention, is not absolute and may
be subject to limitations. However, the limitations applied cannot
restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or
to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired.
Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 §
1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed
and the aim sought to be achieved (see, inter alia,
Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany
[GC], no. 42527/98, § 44, 12 July 2001, ECHR 2001-VII).
In the instant case, in view of the value of the claim, a cassation
appeal was inadmissible in law. The Gdańsk Court of Appeal
refused to grant the applicant a legal aid lawyer to file a cassation
appeal, relying on the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure relating to the admissibility of appeals.
In this respect the Court reiterates that the rules which govern the
conditions for the admissibility of appeals before the highest
judicial authorities are undoubtedly designed to ensure the proper
administration of justice and compliance with, in particular, the
principle of legal certainty. Those concerned must expect those rules
to be applied (see, mutatis mutandis, Pérez de Rada
Cavanilles v. Spain, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports
1998-VIII, p. 3255, § 45).
In view of the above considerations, it cannot be maintained that the
very essence of the applicant’s right to a court was impaired.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly
ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35
§§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed an amount of PLN 109,200 in
respect of pecuniary damage. This amount corresponded to the amount
of her daily expenses during the proceedings. She also claimed PLN
100,000 in respect of non pecuniary damage.
The Government contested these claims.
The Court does not discern any causal link between the
violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore
rejects this claim.
As regards the non pecuniary damage, the Court
considers that the applicant undeniably suffered non pecuniary
damage – such as distress and frustration resulting from the
protracted length of the proceedings – which is not
sufficiently compensated by a finding of a violation of the
Convention. Taking into account the circumstances of the case, and
making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the
applicant’s daughter EUR 3,300 in respect of non pecuniary
damage sustained by the applicant.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed PLN 10,000 for the costs
and expenses incurred before the domestic courts.
The Government contested these claims.
According to the Court’s case law, an
applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only
in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present
case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the
above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in
the domestic proceedings.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant’s
daughter, Mrs Halina Jeruzal Kuklińska, within
three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR
3,300 (three thousand three hundred euros) in respect of
non pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be
converted into Polish zlotys at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 October 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of
Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President