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JONCZYK v. POLAND - 75870/01 [2006] ECHR 845 (10 October 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/845.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 845
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FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF JOŃCZYK v. POLAND
(Application no. 75870/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 October 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Jończyk v. Poland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Sir Nicolas
Bratza, President,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr M.
Pellonpää,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L.
Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta, judges,
and Mr T.L.
Early, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in
private on 19 September 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an
application (no. 75870/01) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr Marek
Jończyk (“the applicant”), on 27 June 2000.
The applicant was
represented by Mr Z. Huziuk, a lawyer practising in Łódź,
Poland. The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agents, Mr K. Drzewicki and, subsequently, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz,
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On 3 May 2004 the President of the Fourth Section
decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of
proceedings to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 §
3 of the Convention, it was decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1936 and lives
in Łask-Kolumna, Poland.
A. Facts prior to 1 May 1993
In 1983 the applicant was injured in a traffic
accident. He was subsequently granted a special
disability pension from the State Insurance Company (Powszechny
Zakład Ubezpieczeniowy - “PZU”). The applicant
was not satisfied with the amount of the pension and on 31 March
1992 he lodged a claim for a reassessment of
the amount with the Łask District Court (Sąd
Rejonowy). The first hearing was held on 21 April 1993.
B. Facts after 30 April 1993
The trial court held hearings on 17 May and 28 October
1993. A hearing scheduled for 24 December 1993 was adjourned at the
defendant’s request. Subsequently, on 23 March 1994 the court
held a hearing.
On 30 March 1994 the Łask District Court
gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim.
On 25 August 1994, upon the applicant’s
appeal, the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd
Okręgowy) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted
the case in respect of part of the claims to the Łask District
Court.
On 9 December 1994 the District Court held a
hearing.
Between 3 February 1995 and 15 March 1996
the court held six hearings. A hearing listed for 9 June 1995 was
adjourned as the defendant had not been properly summoned. At
a hearing held on 30 June 1995 the applicant requested
that an expert opinion be obtained. On 9 August 1995 the
applicant withdrew his motion concerning matters of evidence. A
hearing scheduled for 20 November 1995 was adjourned as the
applicant’s lawyer had not been properly summoned.
On 28 June 1996 the court ordered that expert evidence
be obtained. On 17 March 1997 the court urged the expert to submit
the opinion. The expert’s report was submitted to the court on
31 December 1997.
Subsequently, hearings were held on 6 February and
4 March 1998. The trial court held four further hearings between
8 April 1998 and 8 February 1999. At a hearing
held on 8 April 1998 the court proposed that the parties conclude a
friendly settlement. The proposal was rejected. A hearing scheduled
for 5 June 1998 was adjourned as both parties failed to appear before
the court.
On 12 February 1999 the District Court gave
judgment. Both parties appealed.
On 30 June 1999 the Sieradz Regional Court
dismissed the applicant’s claim.
The proceedings were terminated by the judgment of the
Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) of 21 January 2000.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
The legal provisions applicable at the material time
as well as matters of practice are set out in paragraphs 26-35 of the
judgment delivered by the Court on 30 May 2006 in the case of Barszcz
v. Poland, no. 71152/01.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF
THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The applicant complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government contested that argument.
The period to be taken into consideration began only
on 1 May 1993, when the recognition by Poland of the right of
individual petition took effect. However, in assessing the
reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must
be taken of the state of proceedings at the time. The Court notes
that the proceedings began on 31 March 1992 and ended on 21 January
2000. They therefore lasted approximately 7 years and 10 months,
out of which a period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days falls within
the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the
length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the
circumstances of the case and with reference to the following
criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant
and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant
in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v.
France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one
in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
Having examined all the material submitted to it, the
Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or
argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in
the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the
Court considers that in the instant case the length of the
proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable
time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION ON
ACCOUNT OF THE UNFAIRNESS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Additionally, the applicant complained under Article 6
§ 1 that he did not have a fair trial, in
particular he alleged that the courts had wrongly
assessed the evidence and had committed errors of fact.
The Court reiterates that according to Article 19 of
the Convention, the Court’s duty is to ensure the observance of
the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties in the
Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors
of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in
so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by
the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention
guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any
rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be
assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by
national law and the national courts (see Garcia Ruiz v. Spain
[GC], no. 30544/96, ECHR 1999-I, § 28).
In the present case, the Court finds no indication that the courts
went beyond the margin of appreciation left to them in respect of the
assessment of evidence, or that the proceedings were otherwise
unfair.
It follows that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §
4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 300,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government considered that the sum in question was
exorbitant and should be rejected. They asked the Court to rule that
the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just
satisfaction. Alternatively, they invited the Court to make an award
of just satisfaction on the basis of its case-law in similar cases
and with reference to national economic conditions.
The Court considers that the applicant must have
sustained some non pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable
basis, it awards him EUR 2,500 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant, who was represented before the Court,
claimed reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred in the
preparation of his application to Strasbourg. He left the amount of
an award to the discretion of the Court.
The Government contested the claim.
The Court reiterates that only legal costs and
expenses found to have been actually and necessarily incurred and
which are reasonable as to quantum are recoverable under Article 41
of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Nikolova v.
Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, § 79, ECHR 1999-II). In the
present case, the Court finds that the applicant has not produced any
evidence supporting his claim as required by Rule 60 § 2 of the
Rules of Court. Accordingly, it makes no award under this head.
C. Default
interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage to be converted into the national currency of
the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 October 2006 pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President