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GRAASSER v. GERMANY - 66491/01 [2006] ECHR 827 (5 October 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/827.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 827
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FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF GRÄSSER v. GERMANY
(Application no. 66491/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5 October 2006
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2
of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Gräßer v. Germany,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen,
President,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs M.
Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr J. Borrego Borrego,
Mrs R.
Jaeger,
Mr M. Villiger, judges,
and Mrs C. Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 May 2003, on 16 September
2004 and on 11 September 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no. 66491/01)
against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with the Court under
Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a German
national, Mr Jürgen Gräßer (“the applicant”),
on 2 February 2001.
The applicant was initially represented by Mr
B. Sauber, a lawyer practising in Saarbrücken, Germany. He
was then represented by Mr A. Keller and Mr D. Sauer,
lawyers of the law firm Keller, Rainer & Kollegen
practising in Heidelberg, Germany. He was then again represented by
Mr B. Sauber. The respondent Government were represented
by their Agent, Mr K. Stoltenberg, Ministerialdirigent,
and, subsequently, Mrs A. Wittling-Vogel, Ministerialdirigentin,
of the Federal Ministry of Justice.
The applicant, invoking Article 6 of the
Convention, alleged that the length of the official liability
proceedings he had brought against the city of Saarbrücken
exceeded a reasonable time.
The application was allocated to the Third Section of
the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within
that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27
§ 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in
Rule 26 § 1.
By a decision of 16 September 2004 the Court declared
the application partly admissible.
The applicant and the Government each filed further
written observations (Rule 59 § 1). The parties replied in
writing to each other's observations.
On 1 April 2006 this case was assigned to the newly
composed Fifth Section (Rule 25 § 1 and Rule 52 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Nonnweiler,
Germany.
A. Background to the case
In 1971, the applicant and a company engaged in
negotiations with the city of Saarbrücken to obtain a building
permit for a plot of land they had bought. In the course of these
negotiations, the applicant and the said company undertook to pay
2,535,000 Deutschmarks (DEM) (approximately 1,296,000 Euros
(EUR)) of the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure
(Erschließung). The applicant also undertook to
construct a shopping centre within two years following the grant of
the building permit.
On 1 April 1974 the applicant applied for the
building permit with the municipal authorities. He offered to submit
a bank security to cover the costs for the provision of the public
infrastructure concerning the shopping centre, estimated to amount to
some DEM 1,500,000. He also suggested that a contract on this
point be signed by him and the city.
In August 1974, following municipal elections, the
city requested the applicant to submit a bank security of
DEM 4,500,000 (approximately EUR 2,300,813) to cover the
costs for the provision of the public infrastructure for the plot of
land as a whole. Upon his refusal to do this, the city refused its
consent to his request for a building permit. It also refused to
conclude a contract concerning the construction of the shopping
centre and the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure.
B. First trial of the applicant's case
On 23 August 1974 the applicant brought an
official liability action (Amtshaftungsklage) for compensation
in the Saarbrücken Regional Court against the city of
Saarbrücken. He complained that the city's sudden decision to
request a bank security of DEM 4,500,000, thereby setting up
further inequitable conditions for its agreement to the applicant's
building project, was a result of informal negotiations between
different local political parties before the municipal elections. It
constituted a voluntary breach of the principle of continuity in
administrative actions.
On 24 February 1975 the local building
authorities refused to grant the applicant the requested building
permit. This decision was later confirmed by the administrative
courts.
On 21 March 1975 the Saarbrücken Regional
Court dismissed the applicant's official liability action. According
to the Regional Court, nothing suggested that the city of Saarbrücken
had acted in breach of its obligations as a public organ.
On 27 June 1975 the applicant lodged an appeal
against this decision with the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal
(Fourth Senate).
In autumn 1976 the applicant's real estate concerned
was sold by compulsory auction.
On 3 February 1978 the Saarbrücken Court of
Appeal (Fourth Senate) dismissed the applicant's appeal as
ill-founded.
On 7 February 1980, following the applicant's
appeal on points of law, the Federal Court of Justice quashed this
decision and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal (Fourth
Senate). It requested the Court of Appeal to examine whether the city
had discontinued abruptly the contractual negotiations with the
applicant for arbitrary reasons, because the city was liable to pay
damages to the applicant if it had done so.
C. First retrial of the applicant's case
On 23 October 1981 the Saarbrücken Court of
Appeal (Fourth Senate) again dismissed the applicant's appeal.
It found that, even assuming that the city had breached its duty as a
public organ to act in a consistent manner, the applicant had failed
to establish that there was a causal link between the city's conduct
and the damage sustained by him.
On 14 October 1982 the Federal Court of Justice
decided partly to admit the applicant's renewed appeal on points of
law.
On 5 May 1983 the Federal Court of Justice partly
quashed the Court of Appeal's decision and remitted the case to the
Seventh Senate of that court. It found that the Court of Appeal, in
its finding that a causal link was missing between the city's conduct
and the damage sustained by the applicant, erroneously did not assess
the evidence offered by him.
D. Second retrial of the applicant's case
On 10 July 1984 the Saarbrücken Court of
Appeal (Seventh Senate) amended the Regional Court's decision of
21 March 1975. It declared that the applicant was entitled to
compensation, but did not yet assess the exact amount of the damages
payable (Grundurteil). The Court of Appeal found that the city
of Saarbrücken had unforeseeably and without legitimate reasons
requested the applicant to submit a bank security of DEM 4,500,000,
thereby willingly causing the breakdown of the negotiations about the
grant of a building permit. Therefore, it breached its duty as a
public organ to act in a consistent manner.
On 11 July 1985 the Federal Court of Justice
refused to admit the appeal on points of law lodged by the city of
Saarbrücken.
On 19 December 1985 the Federal Constitutional
Court refused to admit the city's constitutional complaint.
On 8 July 1986 the Saarbrücken Court of
Appeal ordered the city of Saarbrücken to pay DEM 5,798,142
(approximately EUR 2.964.543) plus interest to the applicant and
dismissed the remainder of his claim.
On 22 June 1989, following both parties' appeals
on points of law, the Federal Court of Justice quashed the Court of
Appeal's decision as far as the amount of damages was concerned and
remitted the case to the Court of Appeal.
E. Third retrial of the applicant's case
On 9 January 1995 the Court of Appeal (renamed
Saarland Court of Appeal) ordered that an expert report be prepared
on the amount of damages sustained by the applicant.
On 12 January 1999 the Court of Appeal ordered
that a further expert report be prepared on the amount of damages
sustained by the applicant, taking into consideration additional
tax-related aspects.
On 20 July 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court
allowed the applicant's constitutional complaint about the length of
the official liability proceedings (see in detail paragraphs 36-37
below).
On 25 and 26 September 2000, two different
Senates of the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's challenges of
the judges of the Court of Appeal on grounds of bias as ill-founded.
On 20 November 2001 the Saarland Court of Appeal
(Seventh Senate), after having held a hearing, dismissed the
applicant's action for compensation. It found that it was not
established that the applicant would have been in a financial
position to realise his building project if he had been granted the
building permit, regardless of the city's behaviour. The city's
actions thus had not caused any financial losses to him. The court
ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the court proceedings
(amounting to some EUR 2,512,222).
On 24 April 2003 the Federal Court of Justice
refused to admit the applicant's appeal on points of law against the
Saarland Court of Appeal's judgment of 20 November 2001. It
fixed the value in dispute (Streitwert) at some
EUR 109,000,000 and ordered the applicant, being the party
failing in his action, to bear the costs of the proceedings
(amounting to another approximately EUR 657,322).
On 28 May 2003 the applicant lodged a
constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court,
claiming that his property rights, his rights to be heard, to a fair
trial and to a decision by the judge having jurisdiction
(gesetzlicher Richter) had been violated.
On 28 July 2003 (decision served on 4 August
2003) the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the
applicant's constitutional complaint. It found that he failed
sufficiently to substantiate his complaint, which therefore was
inadmissible.
On 24 February 2004 the Saarbrücken District
Court decided to start insolvency proceedings against the applicant.
F. Proceedings concerning the length of the official
liability proceedings
On 24 February 2000 the applicant lodged a
constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court,
arguing that his right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been
violated in the official liability proceedings pending in the
Saarland Court of Appeal.
On 20 July 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court
held that the applicant's right to an effective judicial remedy under
the Basic Law had been violated in that the Saarland Court of Appeal
did not render a decision on the amount of compensation to be granted
to the applicant within a reasonable time. In its reasoning, it found
that, despite the complexity of the case, the length of the
proceedings, which had been pending since 1974, was obviously
excessive. It concluded that, pursuant to Section 95 para. 1
of the Federal Constitutional Court Act
(Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz), it was restricted to the
finding of a violation of the Basic Law. The Court of Appeal was now
obliged to take effective measures in order to terminate the
proceedings as soon as possible.
On 24 April 2001 the applicant brought another
official liability action under Article 34 of the Basic Law
taken in conjunction with Section 839 of the Civil Code against
the Land Saarland with the Karlsruhe Regional Court. He
applied for a declaration (Feststellungsklage) that the Land
Saarland was liable to compensate him for the damage which has been
and will be caused by the excessive length of the proceedings before
the Saarland Court of Appeal.
On 9 November 2001 the Karlsruhe Regional Court
allowed the applicant's action and ordered the defendant Land
to pay the costs of the proceedings.
On 20 December 2001 the Land Saarland
lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Karlsruhe Regional Court
of 9 November 2001 with the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal. The
proceedings, which had been suspended on the motion of both parties
awaiting the outcome of the official liability proceedings against
the city of Saarbrücken, are to date still pending.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A detailed survey of the relevant provisions of the
Federal Constitutional Court Act, the provisions governing State
liability and the case-law of the domestic courts concerning the
length of civil proceedings can be found in the Court's judgment in
the case of Sürmeli v. Germany ([GC], no. 75529/01,
§§ 62-74, 8 June 2006).
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
The Court observes that in its admissibility decision
in the present case the Chamber joined to the merits the Government's
objection that the applicant lost his status as a “victim”
within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. The Chamber
found that this question was closely linked to that of whether there
had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention due to an excessive length of the official liability
proceedings.
The Government maintained that the applicant lost his
status as a “victim” of an alleged violation of his right
under Article 6 § 1 within the meaning of Article 34
of the Convention. They pointed out that in its decision of 20 July
2000, the Federal Constitutional Court had found that the proceedings
before the Saarland Court of Appeal, which had been pending since
1989, had lasted unreasonably long and had breached the applicant's
Basic Law rights. Thereby, the Constitutional Court also implicitly
established a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
The Government further argued that a constitutional
complaint was to be regarded as an effective remedy affording
adequate redress for an excessive duration of civil proceedings. The
Federal Constitutional Court was capable of preventing the
continuation of the alleged violation of the right to be heard within
a reasonable time by calling on the civil courts to take suitable
measures to speed up and terminate the proceedings. Moreover, the
mere finding of a violation of this right by the Federal
Constitutional Court – which, admittedly, lacked the competence
to award damages –, at least taken in conjunction with a fresh
official liability action in the civil courts for damages sustained
because of the length of the proceedings, provided the applicant with
adequate redress. The applicant had indeed brought an official
liability action against the Land Saarland for damages
sustained because of the excessive length of the proceedings, which
had been successful at first instance. In any event, the applicant
did not sustain any pecuniary damage by the length of the proceedings
in the domestic courts.
The applicant contested this view. He pointed out that
the Federal Constitutional Court did not explicitly find a violation
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Moreover, that
court was not entitled to award him compensation for the damage
sustained by the breach of his right to a hearing within a reasonable
time.
The Court reiterates that a decision or measure
favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive
him of his status as a “victim” for the purposes of
Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities
have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then
afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, inter
alia, Eckle v. Germany, judgment of 15 July 1982,
Series A no. 51, p. 30, § 66; Amuur v.
France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1996-III, p. 846, § 36; Dalban
v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 44,
ECHR 1999-VI).
The Court observes that in its decision of 20 July
2000 the Federal Constitutional Court found that the applicant's
right to an effective judicial remedy under the Basic Law was
violated because the length of the proceedings brought by the
applicant, which were pending since 1974, was clearly excessive. It
accepts that thereby, that court has acknowledged in substance in a
sufficiently clear way a violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention, irrespective of the fact that this Convention Article
was not expressly referred to.
In assessing whether the redress afforded to the
applicant by the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court
granting his complaint about the duration of the proceedings was
sufficient to make him lose his status as a “victim”
within the meaning of Article 34, the Court refers to its
findings in the case of Sürmeli v. Germany ([GC],
no. 75529/01, 8 June 2006). In that case the Court
found in relation to that applicant's complaint under Article 13
that a constitutional complaint was not capable of affording redress
for the excessive length of pending civil proceedings
(ibid., §§ 103 108). In particular,
the Federal Constitutional Court was not empowered to set deadlines,
or to order specific measures to speed up the proceedings effectively
(ibid., §§ 105-107). This had indeed been
illustrated in the present application, in which the case had been
pending for another sixteen months in the Saarland Court of Appeal
and had been terminated at last instance in the civil courts only
some two years and nine months after the Federal Constitutional
Court's decision finding that the length of the proceedings was
excessive (see also ibid., § 106). Moreover, the
Federal Constitutional Court was not authorised to award compensation
(ibid., § 105). Applying the findings in the
Sürmeli case mutatis mutandis to the present
question under Article 34, the Court considers that the mere
finding of a violation of his basic rights by the Federal
Constitutional Court did not afford redress and that, consequently,
the applicant did not lose his status as a “victim”
within the meaning of Article 34.
As to the Government's argument that the applicant had
been afforded sufficient redress because he had won his official
liability action in the Karlsruhe Regional Court for compensation of
damage sustained because of the length of the proceedings the Court
observes that these proceedings are apparently still pending in the
Karlsruhe Court of Appeal. To date, no compensation has been paid to
the applicant. In any event, in these proceedings the applicant would
not be able to obtain compensation for non-pecuniary damage which,
however, as the Court has previously observed, litigants sustain in
the first place in cases concerning the length of civil proceedings
(see, inter alia, Hartman v. the Czech Republic,
no. 53341/99, § 68, ECHR 2003-VIII; Sürmeli,
cited above, § 113). In these circumstances, the German
authorities cannot be taken to have provided the applicant with
adequate redress for the breach of his right to a hearing within a
reasonable time under Article 6 § 1.
Accordingly, the applicant has not lost his status as
a “victim” of a violation of his right under Article 6
for the purposes of Article 34 and the Government's objection in
this respect must be dismissed.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant claimed that the length of the official
liability proceedings he had brought against the city of Saarbrücken
had exceeded a reasonable time and that there had accordingly been a
breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in
so far as relevant, provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Period to be taken into consideration
The period to be taken into consideration in
determining whether the proceedings satisfied the “reasonable
time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1
started on 23 August 1974, when the applicant brought his
official liability action against the city of Saarbrücken in the
Saarbrücken Regional Court. It ended when the decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court refusing to admit the applicant's
constitutional complaint concerning the fairness of the proceedings
was served on him, that is, on 4 August 2003. The
proceedings thus lasted for approximately 28 years and eleven
months, involving four levels of jurisdiction. The Court considers
this to be an inordinately lengthy period of time which would require
particularly convincing grounds of justification.
B. The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
The Government argued that the duration of the
official liability proceedings against the city of Saarbrücken
before the German courts between August 1974 and June 1989 and
between July 2000 and April 2003 had not been excessive. The
applicant's case had been very complex, both as regards the
fact-finding, which necessitated the taking of expert evidence, and
as regards the application of the law.
The Government submitted that the German courts had
not unreasonably delayed the proceedings between August 1974 and June
1989, as they had taken eleven decisions during that period of time.
Having regard to the duration of the first trial of the applicant's
case (August 1974 to February 1980) until the remittal of the case by
the Federal Court of Justice, its first retrial (March 1980 to
May 1983) and its second retrial (June 1983 to June 1989)
separately, none of the phases of the applicant's proceedings had
lasted excessively long. Moreover, following the decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court in July 2000 the applicant had
caused considerable delays in the proceedings until July 2003,
in particular by lodging several motions for bias.
The applicant claimed that the length of the official
liability proceedings against the city of Saarbrücken as a
whole, which had lasted for almost thirty years, had been excessive.
He complained in particular that the courts had refused to take any
measures to expedite the proceedings even though, due to the high
value in dispute, his financial existence had been at stake in them.
The Court recalls that the reasonableness of the
length of the proceedings is to be assessed in the light of the
particular circumstances of the case, regard being had to the
criteria laid down in the Court's case-law, in particular the
complexity of the case, the applicant's conduct and that of the
competent authorities. On the latter point, the importance of what
was at stake for the applicant in the litigation has to be taken into
account (see, inter alia, Gast and Popp v. Germany,
no. 29357/95, § 70, ECHR 2000-II; Nuutinen v.
Finland, no. 32842/96, § 110, ECHR 2000 VIII).
The Court accepts that the applicant's case was quite
complex. The official liability proceedings he brought
necessitated, inter alia, findings of fact as to the city's
conduct of contractual negotiations with the applicant relating to a
building permit and the taking of expert evidence as regards the
damages sustained by him, including his ability to finance his
building project. The applicant's conduct of the proceedings, in
particular the motions for bias he brought towards their end, cannot,
however, be considered to have significantly contributed to
their total duration. As to the conduct of the proceedings by the
German courts, the Court confines itself to noting that the overall
length of the proceedings of almost 29 years alone discloses
that the civil courts cannot be considered to have treated the case
with the diligence required. The Court observes in this connection
that the proceedings should have been terminated in a speedy manner,
given that the value in dispute was finally fixed at some
EUR 109,000,000 and that, therefore, the applicant's economic
existence was at stake in them.
Therefore, the Court concludes – as has also
done the Federal Constitutional Court in July 2000 – that
no sufficient grounds of justification have been adduced and that the
length of the applicant's proceedings was plainly excessive. There
has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
The applicant claimed compensation for pecuniary and
non pecuniary damage and the reimbursement of his costs and
expenses.
A. Damage
The applicant, relying on documentary evidence,
claimed a total of EUR 249,292,803.99 for pecuniary damage. It
comprised the loss of property valued at a total of EUR 140,246,630
which had been sold by compulsory auction in order to enforce payment
of the court costs imposed on him in the official liability
proceedings at issue. Moreover, the applicant claimed the
reimbursement of EUR 109,046,173.99 which he had lost due to the
arbitrary dismissal of his official liability action. He argued that
following the lapse of time he had been impeded in establishing even
more clearly that he had been able to finance his building project
and had therefore failed in his action.
The applicant further claimed EUR 29,132,472.90
for non-pecuniary damage. He argued that the excessive length of the
proceedings, in which his economic existence had been at stake, had
ruined his health and destroyed his reputation as a successful
businessman. He stressed that following the unjustified refusal of
the building permit in 1974 he had managed to set up other companies
which were later valued at more than EUR 100,000,000 and which
he lost some thirty years after having instituted the proceedings at
issue due to the levy of execution in order to enforce payment of the
court costs whereby he became insolvent.
In the Government's submission, the applicant did not
sustain any pecuniary damage by the length of the proceedings in the
domestic courts. There was no causal link between the allegedly
excessive length of the proceedings and the damage caused by the loss
of his property taken in execution in order to enforce the court
costs or by the – non-arbitrary – dismissal of his
action.
The Government further argued that the amount of
non-pecuniary damages claimed by the applicant was plainly excessive.
As to the applicant's claim for pecuniary damages, the
Court notes that the applicant requests the reimbursement of the
value of property lost due to the enforcement of payment of the court
costs, that is, costs he had to bear because he had failed in his
civil liability action. Likewise, he claims the amount of money which
would have been payable to him if he had succeeded in his action. The
Court is aware that a plaintiff's ability to prove his or her case
may be severely impeded by such a considerable lapse of time between
the impugned State action and the adjudication on a claim arising
therefrom as at issue in the present case. It recalls, however, that
it cannot speculate as to what the outcome of the proceedings would
have been had they satisfied the requirements of Article 6 § 1
as to their length (see, inter alia, Wettstein v.
Switzerland, no. 33958/96, § 53, ECHR 2000 XII;
Sürmeli, cited above, § 144). The question
whether the dismissal of the applicant's claim was well-founded
concerns the fairness of the proceedings which is not the
subject-matter of the present application. Consequently, there is
insufficient proof of a causal connection between the excessive
length of the proceedings and the alleged pecuniary damage.
Accordingly, the Court cannot make an award under this head.
As to the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damages,
the Court observes that the applicant suffered a particularly grave
violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time under
Article 6. He undoubtedly suffered distress resulting from the
protracted length of the proceedings, which he had to conduct for
almost all his working life. Throughout these proceedings, his
economic existence had been at stake, which is illustrated by the
fact that he went bankrupt following the levy of execution to enforce
payment of heavy court costs. In the light of the foregoing, in
particular the excessive length of the proceedings, the Court,
deciding on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 45,000
in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, together with any tax that
may be chargeable on that amount.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant, relying on documentary evidence,
claimed a total of EUR 21,900,508.81 for costs and expenses
incurred in the proceedings before the domestic courts. He argued
that the official liability proceedings at issue in the German courts
would have cost EUR 20,695,738.11 less if they had been
terminated within eight years. In particular, the value in dispute,
and consequently, the court costs and the lawyers' fees, had risen in
the course of the years, not least due to the interest accrued. In
addition to that, he claimed EUR 1,204,770.70 in costs for legal
representation incurred in the proceedings instituted against the
Land Saarland in the Karlsruhe Regional Court (see above at
paragraphs 38-40).
Moreover, the applicant requested the reimbursement of
his costs for legal representation incurred in the proceedings before
this Court, amounting to 25 per cent of the damages awarded by the
Court, that is, to up to EUR 100,000,000.
The Government argued with respect to the costs of the
proceedings in the domestic courts that there was no causal link
between the mere length of these proceedings and the damage alleged
by the applicant.
In the Government's view, the costs allegedly incurred
by the applicant in the proceedings before this Court were excessive.
With regard to the sums claimed in respect of the
costs of the proceedings at issue in the domestic courts, the Court,
having regard to the material before it, considers that it is not in
a position to calculate the exact amount of additional costs accrued
only because of the length of these proceedings. However, seeing that
in length-of-proceedings cases the protracted examination of a case
beyond a “reasonable time” involves an increase in the
applicant's costs (see Maurer v. Austria, no. 50110/99,
§ 27, 17 January 2002; Sürmeli, cited
above, § 148), the Court, having regard to the sums awarded
in similar cases, awards the applicant EUR 10,000 under this
head, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
As to the costs of legal representation in the
proceedings instituted against the Land Saarland in the
Karlsruhe Regional Court, the Court observes that these costs have
been incurred to obtain redress for the violation of Article 6
of the Convention. However, the applicant succeeded in his action in
these proceedings and the defendant Land was ordered to pay
their costs. Consequently, additional costs of legal representation
claimed by the applicant cannot be considered to have been reasonable
as to quantum and the Court therefore does not make a further award
under this head.
As to the costs incurred in the proceedings before
this Court, the Court, having regard to its case-law and making its
own assessment, awards the applicant EUR 4,000, plus any tax
that may be chargeable.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that the applicant may claim to be a
“victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the
Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 45,000 (fourty-five thousand euros) in
respect of non pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 14,000 (fourteen thousand euros) in respect
of costs and expenses;
(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 October 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President