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MATIJASEVIC v. SERBIA - 23037/04 [2006] ECHR 792 (19 September 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/792.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 792
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SECOND SECTION
CASE OF MATIJAŠEVIĆ v. SERBIA
(Application no. 23037/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 September 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Matijašević v. Serbia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P. Costa,
President,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mrs A.
Mularoni,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D.
Popović
and Mrs
S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 29 August 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no. 23037/04)
against the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, subsequently
succeeded by Serbia (see paragraphs 22-25 below), lodged with the
Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by, at
that time, a citizen of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Mr
Milija Matijašević (“the applicant”), on 20
May 2004.
The applicant was represented by Mr V. Beljanski, Mr S.
Beljanski and Ms G. Francuski, all lawyers practising in Novi Sad.
The Government of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro,
initially, and the Government of Serbia, subsequently, (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr S. Carić.
On 8 June 2005 the Court decided to communicate the
application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 §
3 of the Convention, it was decided that the merits of the
application would be examined together with its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently serving
a prison sentence.
On 7 May 2003 the applicant was arrested and remanded
in custody by the investigating judge of the District Court in Novi
Sad on suspicion of fraud and murder offences.
On 4 November 2003 the District Public Prosecutor’s
Office in Novi Sad issued an indictment against the applicant,
charging him with fraud and incitement to commit murder.
On 2 April 2004 the three-judge panel of the District
Court in Novi Sad extended the applicant’s detention on remand
for another two months. In its reasoning, justifying this decision,
the panel relied on the applicant’s prior convictions as well
as his persistent anti-social behaviour. In addition, the panel
expressly stated that the applicant had “committed the criminal
offences which are the subject of this prosecution” (“počinio
kriv. dela koja su predmet ove optužbe”) and concluded that
the applicant, if released, would be likely to continue committing
crimes.
On 16 April 2004 the applicant appealed to the Supreme
Court of Serbia, requesting that his detention be terminated or,
alternatively, that the remand decision be quashed and the case
remitted to the District Court in Novi Sad for reconsideration. He
argued, inter alia, that, since the impugned decision had
prejudged the outcome of the pending criminal case, it had blatantly
breached his fundamental right to be presumed innocent as “guaranteed
in the Criminal Procedure Code, the Constitution of the Republic of
Serbia and indeed Article 6 § 2 of the European Convention of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.
On 22 April 2004 the Supreme Court of Serbia rejected
the appeal, focusing exclusively on the applicant’s prior
criminal convictions and the alleged danger that he would commit
other crimes if released. It did not refer to the applicant’s
submission concerning the presumption of innocence.
On 27 May 2004 the District Court in Novi Sad found
the applicant guilty of incitement to murder and sentenced him to
eight years in prison.
On 23 September 2004 the Supreme Court of Serbia
upheld the judgment of the District Court in Novi Sad. As stated by
the applicant in a separate case currently pending before this Court
(application no. 31617/05), his lawyer received this decision on
7 March 2005.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civic Freedoms
of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Povelja o ljudskim i
manjinskim pravima i građanskim
slobodama državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora; published in the
Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - OG SCG - no. 6/03)
Articles 19 and 9 § 2 of the Charter provided as
follows:
Article 19
“Everyone is deemed innocent until his guilt of a
criminal offence is proven by a final decision of a court of law.”
Article 9 § 2
“Everyone who believes that any of his human or
minority rights guaranteed by this Charter has been violated or
denied by an individual act or action of a State Union institution,
or a member state body or organization exercising public powers,
shall have the right to submit a complaint to the Court of Serbia and
Montenegro, if no other legal redress is provided in a member state,
in accordance with the Constitutional Charter.”
B. Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia
and Montenegro (Ustavna povelja državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora;
published in OG SCG no. 1/03)
The relevant part of Article 46 of the Constitutional
Charter provided as follows:
“The Court of Serbia and Montenegro: ...
- decides with respect to complaints filed by citizens
in cases where an institution of Serbia and Montenegro has infringed
their rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitutional Charter,
if no other legal redress has been provided; ...”
C. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Ustav Republike
Srbije; published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia -
OG RS - no. 1/90)
Article 23 § 3 of this Constitution provides as
follows:
“No one shall be considered guilty of a criminal
offence until so proven by a final decision of a court of law.”
D. Obligations Act (Zakon o obligacionim odnosima;
published in the Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia - OG SFRY - nos. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89, 57/89 and the
Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - OG FRY - no.
31/93)
Under Articles 199 and 200 of the Obligations Act,
inter alia, anyone who has suffered fear, physical pain or,
indeed, mental anguish as a consequence of a breach of “personal
rights” (“prava ličnosti”)
may, depending on their duration and intensity, sue for financial
compensation before the civil courts and, in addition, request other
forms of redress “which may be capable” of affording
adequate non-pecuniary satisfaction.
Court of Serbia and Montenegro Act (Zakon o Sudu Srbije i Crne
Gore, published in OG SCG no. 26/03)
The relevant provisions of this legislation were as
follows:
Article 62 § 1
“A citizen’s complaint may be filed by
anyone who considers that an individual act or action of an
institution of Serbia and Montenegro, or a member State body or
organization exercising public powers, has violated his human or
minority right, if no other avenue of legal redress is provided or if
redress has not been secured within a member State.”
Article 64
“A citizen’s complaint may be filed within
three months of the date of receipt of the individual decision or the
commission or cessation of an action in violation of a human or
minority right guaranteed by the Constitutional Charter.”
Article 65 §§ 1 and 2
“If the Court finds that an individual decision or
action is in violation of a human or minority right guaranteed by the
Constitutional Charter, it may annul the individual decision in
question, ban the continuation of such actions or order the
implementation of other specific measures and, in view of the
circumstances of each case, order the removal of all consequences
stemming from such decisions and/or actions.
The decision of the Court accepting a citizen’s
complaint shall constitute a legal basis for requesting compensation
or the removal of other adverse consequences before a competent body,
in accordance with law.”
III. REPORTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
In a Council of Europe report on the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro of 30 April 2004, it was stated that the Court
of Serbia and Montenegro had still not been established and that the
setting-up of such a court had not been considered a priority by the
State Union authorities since the accession to the Convention (Serbia
and Montenegro: Compliance with obligations and commitments and
implementation of the post-accession co-operation programme, document
presented by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, fourth
report, February - April 2004, § 27).
In a subsequent report of 13 July 2005, the Council of
Europe found that the Court of Serbia and Montenegro had at last
started operating in January 2005. The court’s financing,
however, had not been fully secured. Finally, 200 individual human
rights complaints had been registered as cases, but no decisions had
yet been rendered (Serbia and Montenegro: Compliance with obligations
and commitments and implementation of the post-accession co-operation
programme, document presented by the Secretary General, eight report,
March 2005 - June 2005, §§ 14 and 44).
IV. RESERVATION UNDER ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
In its reservation contained in the instrument of
ratification of the Convention and its Protocols, deposited with the
Council of Europe on 3 March 2004, the Government of the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro stated that “the provisions of
Article 13 shall not apply in relation to the legal remedies within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Serbia and Montenegro, until the
said Court becomes operational in accordance with Articles 46 to 50
of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro (Službeni
list Srbije i Crne Gore, no. 1/03)”.
20. This
reservation was withdrawn by a letter from the Permanent
Representation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, dated
11 July 2005, registered at the Secretariat General on 15
July 2005.
V. LETTER OF THE COURT OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO DATED 16
JANUARY 2006
(MATIJAŠEVIĆ v. SERBIA23037/04)
SECOND SECTION
CASE OF MATIJAŠEVIĆ v. SERBIA
(Application no. 23037/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 September 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Matijašević v. Serbia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P. Costa,
President,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mrs A.
Mularoni,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D.
Popović
and Mrs
S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 29 August 2006,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The case originated in an application (no. 23037/04)
against the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, subsequently
succeeded by Serbia (see paragraphs 22-25 below), lodged with the
Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by, at
that time, a citizen of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Mr
Milija Matijašević (“the applicant”), on 20
May 2004.
- The applicant was represented by Mr V. Beljanski, Mr S.
Beljanski and Ms G. Francuski, all lawyers practising in Novi Sad.
The Government of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro,
initially, and the Government of Serbia, subsequently, (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr S. Carić.
- On 8 June 2005 the Court decided to communicate the
application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 §
3 of the Convention, it was decided that the merits of the
application would be examined together with its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently serving
a prison sentence.
- On 7 May 2003 the applicant was arrested and remanded
in custody by the investigating judge of the District Court in Novi
Sad on suspicion of fraud and murder offences.
- On 4 November 2003 the District Public Prosecutor’s
Office in Novi Sad issued an indictment against the applicant,
charging him with fraud and incitement to commit murder.
- On 2 April 2004 the three-judge panel of the District
Court in Novi Sad extended the applicant’s detention on remand
for another two months. In its reasoning, justifying this decision,
the panel relied on the applicant’s prior convictions as well
as his persistent anti-social behaviour. In addition, the panel
expressly stated that the applicant had “committed the criminal
offences which are the subject of this prosecution” (“počinio
kriv. dela koja su predmet ove optužbe”) and concluded that
the applicant, if released, would be likely to continue committing
crimes.
- On 16 April 2004 the applicant appealed to the Supreme
Court of Serbia, requesting that his detention be terminated or,
alternatively, that the remand decision be quashed and the case
remitted to the District Court in Novi Sad for reconsideration. He
argued, inter alia, that, since the impugned decision had
prejudged the outcome of the pending criminal case, it had blatantly
breached his fundamental right to be presumed innocent as “guaranteed
in the Criminal Procedure Code, the Constitution of the Republic of
Serbia and indeed Article 6 § 2 of the European Convention of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.
- On 22 April 2004 the Supreme Court of Serbia rejected
the appeal, focusing exclusively on the applicant’s prior
criminal convictions and the alleged danger that he would commit
other crimes if released. It did not refer to the applicant’s
submission concerning the presumption of innocence.
- On 27 May 2004 the District Court in Novi Sad found
the applicant guilty of incitement to murder and sentenced him to
eight years in prison.
- On 23 September 2004 the Supreme Court of Serbia
upheld the judgment of the District Court in Novi Sad. As stated by
the applicant in a separate case currently pending before this Court
(application no. 31617/05), his lawyer received this decision on
7 March 2005.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civic Freedoms
of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Povelja o ljudskim i
manjinskim pravima i građanskim
slobodama državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora; published in the
Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - OG SCG - no. 6/03)
- Articles 19 and 9 § 2 of the Charter provided as
follows:
Article 19
“Everyone is deemed innocent until his guilt of a
criminal offence is proven by a final decision of a court of law.”
Article 9 § 2
“Everyone who believes that any of his human or
minority rights guaranteed by this Charter has been violated or
denied by an individual act or action of a State Union institution,
or a member state body or organization exercising public powers,
shall have the right to submit a complaint to the Court of Serbia and
Montenegro, if no other legal redress is provided in a member state,
in accordance with the Constitutional Charter.”
B. Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia
and Montenegro (Ustavna povelja državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora;
published in OG SCG no. 1/03)
- The relevant part of Article 46 of the Constitutional
Charter provided as follows:
“The Court of Serbia and Montenegro: ...
- decides with respect to complaints filed by citizens
in cases where an institution of Serbia and Montenegro has infringed
their rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitutional Charter,
if no other legal redress has been provided; ...”
C. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Ustav Republike
Srbije; published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia -
OG RS - no. 1/90)
- Article 23 § 3 of this Constitution provides as
follows:
“No one shall be considered guilty of a criminal
offence until so proven by a final decision of a court of law.”
D. Obligations Act (Zakon o obligacionim odnosima;
published in the Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia - OG SFRY - nos. 29/78, 39/85, 45/89, 57/89 and the
Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - OG FRY - no.
31/93)
- Under Articles 199 and 200 of the Obligations Act,
inter alia, anyone who has suffered fear, physical pain or,
indeed, mental anguish as a consequence of a breach of “personal
rights” (“prava ličnosti”)
may, depending on their duration and intensity, sue for financial
compensation before the civil courts and, in addition, request other
forms of redress “which may be capable” of affording
adequate non-pecuniary satisfaction.
Court of Serbia and Montenegro Act (Zakon o Sudu Srbije i Crne
Gore, published in OG SCG no. 26/03)
- The relevant provisions of this legislation were as
follows:
Article 62 § 1
“A citizen’s complaint may be filed by
anyone who considers that an individual act or action of an
institution of Serbia and Montenegro, or a member State body or
organization exercising public powers, has violated his human or
minority right, if no other avenue of legal redress is provided or if
redress has not been secured within a member State.”
Article 64
“A citizen’s complaint may be filed within
three months of the date of receipt of the individual decision or the
commission or cessation of an action in violation of a human or
minority right guaranteed by the Constitutional Charter.”
Article 65 §§ 1 and 2
“If the Court finds that an individual decision or
action is in violation of a human or minority right guaranteed by the
Constitutional Charter, it may annul the individual decision in
question, ban the continuation of such actions or order the
implementation of other specific measures and, in view of the
circumstances of each case, order the removal of all consequences
stemming from such decisions and/or actions.
The decision of the Court accepting a citizen’s
complaint shall constitute a legal basis for requesting compensation
or the removal of other adverse consequences before a competent body,
in accordance with law.”
III. REPORTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
- In a Council of Europe report on the State Union of
Serbia and Montenegro of 30 April 2004, it was stated that the Court
of Serbia and Montenegro had still not been established and that the
setting-up of such a court had not been considered a priority by the
State Union authorities since the accession to the Convention (Serbia
and Montenegro: Compliance with obligations and commitments and
implementation of the post-accession co-operation programme, document
presented by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, fourth
report, February - April 2004, § 27).
- In a subsequent report of 13 July 2005, the Council of
Europe found that the Court of Serbia and Montenegro had at last
started operating in January 2005. The court’s financing,
however, had not been fully secured. Finally, 200 individual human
rights complaints had been registered as cases, but no decisions had
yet been rendered (Serbia and Montenegro: Compliance with obligations
and commitments and implementation of the post-accession co-operation
programme, document presented by the Secretary General, eight report,
March 2005 - June 2005, §§ 14 and 44).
IV. RESERVATION UNDER ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
- In its reservation contained in the instrument of
ratification of the Convention and its Protocols, deposited with the
Council of Europe on 3 March 2004, the Government of the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro stated that “the provisions of
Article 13 shall not apply in relation to the legal remedies within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Serbia and Montenegro, until the
said Court becomes operational in accordance with Articles 46 to 50
of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro (Službeni
list Srbije i Crne Gore, no. 1/03)”.
20. This
reservation was withdrawn by a letter from the Permanent
Representation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, dated
11 July 2005, registered at the Secretariat General on 15
July 2005.
V. LETTER OF THE COURT OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO DATED 16
JANUARY 2006
- In this letter, the Court of Serbia and Montenegro
clarified that it was yet to rule in respect of a single “citizen’s
appeal”. In so doing, it pointed out that the reason for this
was the proposed modification of the relevant legislation regulating
the court’s work which, at the time, was still pending
(Statement No. 20/60, provided in the context of a separate
application pending before this Court; application no. 2361/05).
VI. THE SUCCESSION OF SERBIA
- The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro ratified the
Convention on 3 March 2004.
- Following a referendum, on 3 June 2006 Montenegro
declared its independence from the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro whereby the latter ceased to exist together with all of
its bodies including the Court of Serbia and Montenegro.
- On 5 June 2006 the President of Serbia informed the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe that Serbia was the sole
successor of the former State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
- In its decision of 14 June 2006 the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, inter alia, noted: i) that
“Serbia ... [had continued] ... the membership of [the State
Union of] Serbia and Montenegro in the Council of Europe with effect
from 3 June 2006”, and ii) that it had remained a party to a
number of Council of Europe conventions signed and ratified by the
former State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, including the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE
CONVENTION
- Under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, in his
application introduced on 20 May 2004, the applicant complained that
in the course of reviewing his detention on remand, on 2 April 2004,
the District Court in Novi Sad declared him guilty before his guilt
had been proven according to law and, further, that on 22 April 2004
the Supreme Court of Serbia failed to rectify this “error”
on appeal. Article 6 § 2 reads as follows:
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
A. Admissibility (exhaustion of domestic remedies)
1. Arguments of the parties
- The Government submitted that the applicant did not
exhaust all available and effective domestic remedies. In particular,
that he had failed to file a civil claim under Articles 199 and 200
of the Obligations Act, as well as a “citizen’s
complaint” (appeal) with the Court of Serbia and Montenegro
(see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). Further, Article 19 of the Charter
on Human and Minority Rights and Civic Freedoms (see paragraph 12
above) enshrined the presumption of innocence, which is why the
present case was clearly within the said court’s competence
ratione materiae. Finally, the Government submitted that the
Court of Serbia and Montenegro Act was being reviewed and its
jurisdiction could, in due course, be amended so that the citizen’s
complaints could be considered by the court’s plenary session
instead of the chambers and, further, that its rulings adopted within
such a procedure would formally be “decisions” rather
than “judgments”.
- The applicant stated that a citizen’s complaint,
alleging an individual human rights violation, referred to by the
Government, was a remedy which was neither available in his case nor
effective in general. The applicant recalled that he had
lodged his application with the Court on 20 May 2004 but that the
respondent Government had since conceded that the Court of Serbia and
Montenegro was not in operation before 7 July 2004. Further,
even though this court had yet to issue a single judgment in respect
of a citizen’s complaint, the Government had already started
discussing amendments to the relevant legislation, thereby implicitly
acknowledging its ineffectiveness to date. Finally, the
applicant maintained that, given the relevant domestic law, it was
unclear whether a citizen’s complaint could be filed once all
other legal remedies have been exhausted or only where no such
remedies existed in the first place. In any event, there was no
jurisprudence which could have provided any guidance in this respect.
2. Relevant principles
- The Court recalls that the rule
of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1
of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring a case against the
State before an international judicial body to use first the remedies
provided by the national legal system, thus dispensing States from
answering before an international body for their acts before they
have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal
systems. In order to comply with the rule, normal recourse should be
had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to
afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged (see Assenov
and Others v. Bulgaria,
no. 24760/94, § 85, ECHR 1999-VIII).
- Further, the existence of such remedies must be
sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing
which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness
(see, mutatis mutandis, the Van Droogenbroeck v.
Belgium judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50, p. 30, §
54).
- Finally, where there are several
effective remedies available, it is for the applicant to select which
remedy to pursue in order to comply with the requirements of Article
35 § 1 of the Convention (see Airey v. Ireland judgment
of 7 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 12, § 23).
3. Application of these principles to the present case
- The Court notes that the Government were unable to
cite any domestic jurisprudence where a claim based on Articles 199
and 200 of the Obligations Act had been successfully brought in a
case such as the applicant’s. However, even assuming that this
remedy could have provided the applicant with redress, the Court
considers that, having exhausted the effective remedies in the
context of his detention, the applicant could not in addition have
been reasonably expected to embark upon yet another avenue of
“potential redress”.
- The said civil claim, in the specific circumstances of
the present case, was thus not necessary to exhaust, pursuant to
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
34. As regards a “citizen’s complaint” with
the Court of Serbia and Montenegro, it is noted that on 15 July 2005
the respondent State withdrew its reservation contained in the
instrument of ratification of the Convention. Thereby, in the Court’s
view, the Government implicitly accepted that, prior to that date,
the said court could not have been considered effective or even
available (see paragraphs 19-20 above).
- Further, on 16 January 2006, the Court of Serbia and
Montenegro itself acknowledged that it had yet to rule on a single
“citizen’s complaint” alleging an individual human
rights violation. Moreover, it was apparently awaiting the adoption
of amendments to the Court of Serbia and Montenegro Act, at some
point in the unforeseeable future (see paragraph 21 above).
- Finally, on 3 June 2006 Montenegro declared its
independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro whereby
the latter ceased to exist, as did all of its bodies including the
Court of Serbia and Montenegro (see paragraphs 22-25 above).
- The Court therefore considers that the applicant was
not obliged to exhaust a remedy which was both unavailable at the
material time and had remained ineffective until the very break up of
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.
4. Conclusion
- The Court concludes that the complaint cannot be
declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in
accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Accordingly
the Government’s objection must be dismissed.
- The Court also considers that the complaint raises
questions of law which are sufficiently serious for its determination
to depend on an examination of the merits, no other ground for
declaring it inadmissible having been established. The Court
therefore declares the complaint admissible.
B. Merits
1. Arguments of the parties
- The applicant submitted in particular that, in the
course of reviewing his detention on remand, on 2 April 2004 the
District Court in Novi Sad declared him guilty before his guilt was
proven according to law; that it did so by stating that he had
“committed the criminal offences which are the subject of this
prosecution”, and that on 22 April 2004 the Supreme Court of
Serbia failed to rectify this “error” on appeal.
- The Government submitted that the impugned wording of
the District Court in Novi Sad was an obvious mistake, i.e. “an
imprecise formulation”, and that it should instead have said
that there was “a reasonable suspicion” that the
applicant had committed the crimes of which he was charged.
- The applicant maintained that the District Court’s
reasoning could not be dismissed as a mere mistake. He submitted that
there is a fundamental difference between a statement that someone
has committed a crime and an assertion that he is simply suspected of
having done so. In any event, even though the decision at issue was
appealed to the Supreme Court, via the District Court, neither court
did anything to rectify the “error”. On the contrary, the
Supreme Court rejected the appeal, although it had contained explicit
complaints concerning the breach of the presumption of innocence.
- The Government recalled that on 27 May 2004 the
District Court in Novi Sad found the applicant guilty of incitement
to murder and sentenced him to eight years in prison, that conviction
being subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal. They
concluded that, in such circumstances, there could be no violation of
Article 6 § 2 of the Convention and, in so doing, cited the
judgments in Phillips v. the United Kingdom (no.
41087/98, ECHR 2001 VII) and Engel and Others v. the
Netherlands (judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22).
- The applicant emphasised that a subsequent conviction
could not vacate one’s initial right to the presumption of
innocence.
2. Relevant principles
- The Court recalls that the presumption of innocence
under Article 6 § 2 will be violated if a judicial decision or,
indeed, a statement by a public official concerning a person charged
with a criminal offence reflects an opinion that he is guilty before
his guilt has been proved according to law. It suffices, in the
absence of a formal finding, that there is some reasoning suggesting
that the court or the official in question regards the accused as
guilty, while a premature expression by the tribunal itself of such
an opinion will inevitably run foul of the said presumption (see,
among other authorities, Deweer v.
Belgium, judgment of 27 February
1980, Series A no. 35, p. 30, § 56, Minelli
v. Switzerland, judgment of
25 March 1983, Series A no. 62, §§ 27, 30 and 37,
Allenet de Ribemont v. France,
judgment of 10 February 1995, Series A no. 308, p. 16, §§ 35-36
and Karakaş and Yeşilırmak v. Turkey, no.
43925/985, § 49, 28 June 2005).
- Article 6 § 2 governs criminal proceedings in
their entirety, “irrespective of the outcome of the
prosecution” (see Minelli
v. Switzerland, cited above, §
30). However, once an accused is found
guilty, in principle, it ceases to apply in respect of any
allegations made within the subsequent sentencing procedure (see
Phillips v. the United Kingdom and Engel and Others
v. the Netherlands, both cited above).
3. Application of these principles to the present case
- In view of the facts of the case, as well as the
above-cited jurisprudence, the Court finds that the District Court in
Novi Sad, in its decision dated 2 April 2004, did pronounce the
applicant’s guilt before it was proven according to law and,
moreover, on 22 April 2004, the Supreme Court of Serbia failed to
rectify this “error” on appeal.
- As regards the Government’s suggestion that the
impugned wording of the District Court was an obvious mistake, namely
“an imprecise formulation”, the Court agrees with the
applicant that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between
a statement that someone is merely suspected of having
committed a crime and a clear judicial declaration, in the absence of
a final conviction, that the individual has committed
the crime in question.
- The fact that the applicant was ultimately found
guilty and sentenced to 8 years in prison cannot vacate the
applicant’s initial right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to law. As noted repeatedly in this Court
jurisprudence, Article 6 § 2 governs criminal proceedings in
their entirety, “irrespective of the outcome of the
prosecution” (see paragraph 46 above).
- Finally, the Court considers the present case, where
the impugned statement was made in the context of detention, clearly
distinguishable from those of Phillips and Engel to
which the Government referred (see paragraph 46 above).
- There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 §
2 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- Following the introduction of the application on 20
May 2004, in his submissions of 28 October 2005, for the first time,
the applicant complained that one of the judges who had proclaimed
him guilty in the District Court on 2 April 2004 was also a member of
the same court’s trial chamber which convicted him on 27 May
2004. The applicant maintained that the breach of his right to be
presumed innocent was thus aggravated and the overall fairness of the
criminal proceedings against him undermined.
- The Court has assumed in favour
of the applicant that these complaints could give rise to a separate
issue under Article 6 § 1. However, since the applicant’s
lawyer received the decision of the Supreme Court of Serbia on 7
March 2005 (see paragraph 11 above), the complaints at issue are out
of time, within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention,
and must, therefore, be rejected in accordance with Article 35
§§ 1 and 4 thereof.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) for the
non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of the violation of his
right to a fair trial as well as his right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty, guaranteed by Article 6 §§ 1 and 2,
respectively.
- The Government deemed the above amount to be
“manifestly unfounded” and declined to provide any
additional comments.
- In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers
that the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the
Convention alone constitutes adequate just satisfaction in respect of
the compensation claimed under this head (see, mutatis mutandis,
Lavents v. Latvia, no. 58442/00, 28 November 2002).
B. Costs
- The applicant also claimed a total of EUR 662 for the
costs of his legal representation before this Court.
- The Government deemed the above amount to be also
“manifestly unfounded” and declined to provide any
additional comments.
- The applicant provided the Court with an itemised and
precise calculation of these costs, fully in accordance with the
“Lawyer’s Remuneration Tariff”, as amended in 2004
and published in OG SCG no. 58/04 (“Tarifa o
nagradama i naknadama troškova za rad advokata”).
- The Court therefore considers that these costs have
been actually and necessarily incurred, and are reasonable as to
quantum. Consequently, it awards the full claim of EUR 662.
C. Default interest
- The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank plus three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 2
of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 2 of the Convention;
3. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes
sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage which the
applicant may have suffered;
- Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes
final, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 662 (six hundred and sixty-two euros) for costs, to
be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may
be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 September 2006,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Dollé J.-P. Costa
Registrar President