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VASYLYEV v. UKRAINE - 10232/02 [2006] ECHR 775 (13 July 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/775.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 775
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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF VASYLYEV v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 10232/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13
July 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Vasylyev v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S.
Botoucharova,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs M.
Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mr J. Borrego
Borrego,
Mrs R. Jaeger, judges,
and Mrs C. Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 19 June 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 10232/02) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Anatoliy Fedorovych
Vasylyev (“the applicant”), on 4 September 2001.
The
Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agents, Mrs V. Lutkovska and Mrs Z. Bortnovska.
On
2 July 2003 the Court decided to communicate the
application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 §
3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility.
On
1 April 2006 this case was assigned to the newly constituted Fifth
Section (Rule 25 § 5 and Rule 52 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant resides in the town of Vinnytsa. He is a former employee of
the Oil and Gas State Inspection (“the Inspection”) of
the State Oil and Gas Committee “Derzhnaftogazprom” (“the
Committee”).
On
12 July 1999 the Committee decided to liquidate the Inspection.
According to the Government, the liquidation of the Inspection was
not accomplished.
On
20 August 1999 the applicant was dismissed from his
position of the Chief State Inspector of the Vinnytsya Town
Department of the Inspection.
On
25 November 1999 the President of Ukraine liquidated the
Committee and established a liquidation commission for this purpose.
By order of 14 April 2000, the President appointed the
Ministry of Fuel and Gas of Ukraine as the Committee’s
successor.
In
November 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings in the
Leninskyy District Court of Vinnytsya against commission overseeing
the liquidation of the Committee, seeking recovery of salary arrears
in respect of the period before 12 July 1999 and compensation.
On
12 December 2000 the court found in part for the applicant
and ordered the Committee’s liquidation commission (“the
Debtor”) to pay the applicant UAH 1,549
in salary arrears and other payments.
On
9 February 2001 the Shevchenkivskyy District Bailiffs’
Service of Kyiv instituted enforcement proceedings.
On
19 February 2001 the Bailiffs’ Service submitted to
the Debtor’s bank a payment order in respect of the judgment
award.
On
22 February 2001 the bank returned the payment order to the
Bailiffs’ Service on the grounds that the Debtor’s
account had been closed.
On
28 February 2001 the Bailiffs’ Service suspended the
enforcement proceedings pending the results of an enquiry about other
bank accounts which the Debtor might have had.
On
26 March 2001 the Bailiffs’ Service informed the
applicant that no other bank accounts of the Debtor had been found.
On
23 June 2001 the Bailiff’s Service discontinued the
enforcement proceedings and returned the execution writ to the
applicant on the grounds that it had not been possible to find the
Debtor at its address and the latter had no bank accounts.
The
applicant did not challenge the decision of the Bailiffs’
Service of 23 June 2001 before the domestic courts.
The
judgment in the applicant’s favour remains unenforced.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
1. Constitution of Ukraine, 1996
Article 124 of the Constitution provided as follows:
“... Judicial decisions are adopted by the courts
in the name of Ukraine and are mandatory for execution throughout the
entire territory of Ukraine.”
2. Law of Ukraine of 21 April 1999 on
Enforcement Proceedings
Under Article 2 of the Law, the enforcement of
judgments is entrusted to the State Bailiffs’ Service. Under
Article 85, the creditor is entitled to file a complaint against
actions or omissions of the State Bailiffs’ Service with the
head of the competent department of that Service or with a local
court. Article 86 entitles the creditor to institute court
proceedings against a legal person responsible for the enforcement of
a judgment, for inadequate enforcement or non-enforcement of a
judgement, and to receive compensation.
At the material time, in particular during the period
from 9 February until 23 June 2001, Article 11
obliged the state bailiff to replace a party to the enforcement
proceedings by its successor. On 28 November 2002 this
provision was changed so that the question of such replacement was
within the competence of the courts, to which the bailiff and a party
to the proceedings could apply.
3. Law of Ukraine of 24 March 1998 on the
State Bailiffs’ Service
Article
11 of the Law provides for the liability of bailiffs for any
inadequate performance of their duties, as well as compensation for
damage caused by a bailiff when enforcing a judgment. Under Article
13 of the Law, acts and omissions of the bailiff can be challenged
before a superior official or the courts.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF
PROTOCOL NO. 1
The
applicant complained about the State authorities’ failure to
enforce the judgment of the Leninskyy District Court of Vinnytsya of
12 December 2000. He invoked Article 6 § 1
of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,
which provide, insofar as relevant, as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law. ...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest ....”
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the Committee, as well as its liquidation
commission, ceased to exist, its successor being the Ministry of the
Fuel and Energy of Ukraine. In this respect, the Government noted
that the applicant neither applied to the Bailiffs’ Service or
to the domestic courts to have the debtor in the enforcement
proceedings replaced by the Ministry of the Fuel and Energy of
Ukraine, nor challenged the decision of the Shevchenkivskyi Local
Bailiffs’ Service of 23 June 2001 to discontinue the
enforcement proceedings before the domestic courts.
The
Government, therefore, contended that the applicant had not
exhausted, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the
remedies available to him under Ukrainian law. The Government
maintained that such remedies were effective both in theory and in
practice.
The
applicant disagreed. In particular, he argued that it had been the
duty of the Bailiffs to change the debtor in the enforcement
proceedings on their own initiative under the domestic legislation in
force at the material time.
The
Court recalls that the purpose of Article 35 § 1
of the Convention is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity
to prevent or put right the violations alleged against them before
those allegations are submitted to the Court. However, the only
remedies to be exhausted are those which are effective. It is
incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the
Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and
in practice at the relevant time (see Voytenko v. Ukraine,
no. 18966/02, § 29, 29 June 2004).
Turning
to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that at the
material time the Bailiffs were obliged, under Article 11 of the Law
of Ukraine on Enforcement Proceedings, to replace a party to
enforcement proceedings if the latter ceased to exist. Under the same
Law, the applicant was entitled to challenge the omissions or
inactivity of the Bailiffs and to claim compensation before the
domestic courts.
However, the Court recalls that it has already held in
similar cases that the enforcement of the judgments against the State
authorities could only be carried out if the State foresees and makes
provision for the appropriate expenditures in the State Budget by
taking the appropriate legislative measures (see, for instance,
Voytenko, cited above, § 30, and Glova and Bregin
v. Ukraine, nos. 4292/04 and 4347/04, § 14, 28 February
2006). In the Ukrainian legal system, neither the courts nor the
bailiffs have power to overrule the law or to compel the State to
amend its Budget laws. Accordingly, even assuming that the national
courts could rule for the applicant in the proceedings against the
bailiffs, the enforcement of the judgment against the debtor would
still remain within the responsibility of the State.
The
Court further considers that having obtained a judgment and an
execution order against a particular State authority the applicants
should not be required to institute, on their own initiative, other
proceedings against different State agency to meet their claims (see,
mutatis mutandis, Plotnikovy v. Russia, no. 43883/02,
§ 16, 24 February 2005).
Therefore,
the Court finds that, in the particular circumstances of this case,
the applicant should not have been required to initiate court
proceedings against the bailiffs.
In
view of the above considerations, the applicant cannot be reproached
for not using the remedies invoked by the Government and has
therefore complied with the requirements of Article 35 § 1.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s contentions.
The
Court concludes that this application raises serious issues of fact
and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an
examination of the merits. It finds no ground for declaring it
inadmissible.
B. Merits
The
Court notes that to date the judgment of the Leninskyy District Court
of Vinnytsya of 12 December 2000 has remained unenforced
for more than five years and four months.
The
Court recalls that it has already found violations of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
in cases raising issues similar to the present application (see, for
instance, Plotnikovy, cited above, §§ 25-29).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present case. There has, accordingly, been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that he had no effective
domestic remedies for his complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. He
invoked Article 13 of the Convention, which provide as
follows:
Article 13
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
The Court refers to its reasoning in relation to
Article 35 § 1 (paragraphs 29-33 above), which is
equally pertinent to the applicant’s Article 13 claim.
Consequently, the Court finds that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded or indeed inadmissible on any other ground cited in
Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government contended that the applicant had had effective channels of
complaint on the same basis that they had argued that the applicant
had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of his complaints
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
The
applicant objected to this view.
The
Court refers to its findings (at paragraphs 31-33 above) in the
present case concerning the Government’s argument regarding
domestic remedies. For the same reasons, the Court concludes that the
applicant did not have an effective domestic remedy, as required by
Article 13 of the Convention, to redress the damage created by the
delay in the present proceedings. Accordingly, there has been a
breach of this provision.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed UAH 19,672
in respect of pecuniary damage, which included the amount of the
judgment debt and a sum to which the applicant has allegedly been
entitled due to the non-payment of his salary arrears. The applicant
further claimed UAH 50,000
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government maintained that the applicant had not substantiated the
amount claimed and submitted that the finding of a violation would
constitute sufficient just satisfaction.
In
so far as the applicant claimed the amount awarded to him by the
judgment at issue, the Court considers that the Government should pay
him the outstanding debt in settlement of his pecuniary damage.
As
to the applicant’s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
the Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required
by Article 41 of the Convention, awards the applicant EUR 1,600
under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant did not submit any claim under this head. The Court
therefore makes no award.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the application admissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 13 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention,
the judgment debt still owed to him, as well as EUR 1,600 (one
thousand six hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus
any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of
the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of
settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 July 2006, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Peer Lorenzen
Registrar President