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KLEMENT v. HUNGARY - 31701/02 [2006] ECHR 748 (27 July 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/748.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 748
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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF KLEMENT v. HUNGARY
(Application
no. 31701/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
27
July 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Klement v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr J.-P. Costa, President,
Mr A.B.
Baka,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mrs A. Mularoni,
Mrs E.
Fura-Sandström,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D. Popović,
judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 6 July 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 31701/02) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by three Hungarian nationals, Mr Tibor Klement jr. (“the first
applicant”), his father Mr Tibor Klement sr. (“the second
applicant”) and his brother Mr Attila Klement (“the third
applicant”) (altogether “the applicants”), on 6
August 2002.
The
Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
On
5 October 2005 the
Court decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of
the proceedings in respect of the second and third applicant.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
The
applicants were born in 1955, 1934 and 1968 respectively, and live in
Miskolc, Hungary.
In
1993 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicants and
other suspects. In the context of a series of complicated economic
offences, they were charged with several counts of aggravated fraud,
tax fraud, forgery of documents, bribery, fraudulent bankruptcy and
accounting crimes. In the ensuing proceedings the applicants were
assisted by defence counsel of their choice.
On
25 November 1996 the first applicant’s bank accounts were
frozen in order to secure the eventual confiscation of any criminal
profit he might have made. Simultaneously, the applicants’
homes were searched. On 10 June 1997 the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén
County Regional Court changed the decision of 25 November 1996 and
extended the freezing measure to include all of the first applicant’s
assets.
On
23 June 1995 the Miskolc District Public Prosecutor’s Office
preferred a bill of indictment. The charges concerned altogether
eight defendants.
After
having held 30 hearings between 17 June 1997 and 7 July 1998, on
8 July 1998 the Miskolc District Court convicted the applicants of
several counts of fraud, tax fraud, fraudulent bankruptcy, forgery of
documents as well as accounting crimes, while acquitting them of
other charges. The first applicant was sentenced to seven years’
imprisonment and to the confiscation of his frozen property in the
value of 300 million Hungarian forints; the second and the third
applicants were sentenced to three and a half years’ and three
years’ imprisonment respectively. In the reasoning of its
76-page judgment, the District Court relied on evidence given by
numerous witnesses, several opinions prepared by expert accountants,
tax advisers and engineers, and documentary evidence.
In
October 1998 the applicants submitted their initial and, on
14 May 1999, their detailed appeal. Meanwhile, on 6 January
1999 the Heves County Regional Court was appointed to hear the case,
for reasons of incompatibility, instead of the competent
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Regional Court.
After
having held a hearing on 22 June 1999, on 20 September 2000 the Heves
County Regional Court re-characterised part of the offences committed
by the applicants, acquitted them of some charges, and reduced the
first applicant’s prison term to five years and six months, and
the second applicant’s term to three years. For the remainder,
it upheld the first-instance judgment.
On
29 December 2000 the second and third applicants filed a petition for
review. On 6 March 2002 the Supreme Court acquitted them of the
charge of tax fraud and upheld the remainder of the second-instance
judgment in their respect.
The
first applicant’s repeated requests for a retrial were finally
refused on 21 May 2002.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION (IN RESPECT OF THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING
THE SECOND AND THIRD APPLICANTS)
The
second and third applicants complained that the length of the
proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
period to be taken into consideration began in 1993 and ended on 6
March 2002. It thus lasted some nine years for three levels of
jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities (see,
among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France
[GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Pélissier and Sassi, cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court
considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was
excessive in respect of the second and third applicants and failed to
meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 6 § 1
AND 7 OF THE CONVENTION (IN RESPECT OF THE LENGTH AND UNFAIRNESS OF
THE PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING THE FIRST APPLICANT)
The
first applicant complained that the proceedings conducted against him
had lasted an unreasonably long time and had been unfair, in breach
of Article 6 § 1. In the latter respect, he also relied on
Article 7 of the Convention.
The
Court observes that the case in its part concerning the first
applicant ended with the Regional Court’s judgment of 20
September 2000. However, the application was lodged only on 6 August
2002, i.e. more than six months later. The first applicant’s
unsuccessful requests for retrial did not qualify as an effective
remedy and, therefore, did not influence the running of the six-month
time-limit, laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application has been lodged out of time
and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of
the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 6 § 1
AND 7 OF THE CONVENTION (IN RESPECT OF THE UNFAIRNESS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE SECOND AND THIRD APPLICANT)
The
second and third applicant also complained that they had been wrongly
convicted in unfair proceedings, in breach of Articles 6 § 1 and
7, without substantiating their grievances.
In
so far as the second and third applicant’s complaint concerns
the assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings
before the domestic courts, the Court reiterates that, according to
Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of
the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the
Convention. It is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law
allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they
may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention.
Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a
fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of
evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore
primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national
courts (García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28,
ECHR 1999 I).
In
the present case, the Court considers that there is nothing in the
case file indicating that the courts lacked impartiality or that the
proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. Moreover, the
applicants’ submissions do not disclose any appearance of a
violation of their rights under Article 7 of the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected
pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
IV. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Lastly,
the first applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
of the freezing of his assets, and all the three applicants
complained under Article 8 of the Convention of the searches of their
homes in 1996.
The
Court observes that the freezing and confiscation of the first
applicant’s assets became final with the Regional Court’s
judgment of 20 September 2000. Moreover, the house searches
complained of took place on an unspecified date in 1996. However, the
application was only lodged on 6 August 2002, i.e. more than six
months later.
It
follows that this part of the application likewise failed to comply
with the six-month rule prescribed by Article 35 § 1, and must
be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
second and third applicant each claimed 60,000 euros (EUR) in respect
of pecuniary and EUR 25,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The
Government contested these claims.
On
the one hand, the Court does not discern any causal link between the
violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore
rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers that the second
and third applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage.
Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards them each EUR 5,000 under
that head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicants claimed altogether EUR 76,420 for the costs and expenses
incurred before the domestic courts. For the expenses incurred before
the Court, the second and third applicant each claimed 457,500
Hungarian forints.
The
Government contested these claims.
According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court
rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings
and considers it reasonable to award the second and third applicants,
who were not represented by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 500 each under
this head.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings conducted in respect of the second and
third applicants admissible, and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the second and third applicants, each,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final
in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) in respect of
non-pecuniary damage and EUR 500 (five hundred euros) in respect of
costs and expenses, to be converted into the national currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement,
plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 July 2006, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Dollé J.-P. Costa
Registrar President