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BAHCEYAKA v. TURKEY - 74463/01 [2006] ECHR 699 (13 July 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/699.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 699
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF BAHÇEYAKA v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 74463/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 July 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Bahçeyaka v. Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič,
President,
Mr J. Hedigan,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr C.
Bîrsan,
Mr V. Zagrebelsky,
Mrs A. Gyulumyan,
Mr David
Thór Björgvinsson, judges,
and Mr V. Berger,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 22 June 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 74463/01) against the
Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Turkish national, Ms Feriştah Bahçeyaka, on 8 June
2001.
The
applicant was represented by Mr E. Kuloğlu, a lawyer practising
in Aydın. The Turkish Government (“the
Government”) did not designate an Agent for the purposes of the
proceedings before the Court.
On
14 June 2005 the Court
decided to communicate the application. Applying Article 29 § 3
of the Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits
of the applications at the same time.
The
applicant and the Government each filed observations on the
admissibility and the merits.
THE FACTS
The
applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Wesel, Germany.
On
12 February 1980 the applicant and her husband established a joint
bank account with a German bank.
On
an unspecified date, the applicant’s husband withdrew all of
the money from their joint account without the applicant’s
consent and placed it into another account in a Turkish bank.
On
23 October 1992 the applicant filed an action with the Aydın
Civil Court of first-instance to recover half the money that her
husband had withdrawn from their joint bank account.
On
14 September 1999 the Aydın Civil Court of first-instance
dismissed the applicant’s case on the ground that she had
failed to substantiate her claims. The court reasoned that the
applicant had not furnished any bank document, such as receipts
indicating withdrawal of money, capable of supporting her
allegations. It also noted that the documents kept by the bank had
been destroyed at the end of six years’ retention period and
that therefore there was no document available on which to conclude
that the applicant was right in her assertions.
On
27 December 1999 the applicant appealed.
On
5 April 2000 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s
request for appeal. It opined that the applicant had failed to prove
that her husband had withdrawn all the money from their joint bank
account and placed it into another bank account.
On
16 November 2000 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s
request for rectification.
On
15 December 2000 the Court of Cassation’s decision was served
on the applicant.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings at issue had
been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement,
provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds.
B. Merits
The
Court notes that the period to be taken into consideration began on
23 October 1992 and ended on 16 November 2000, when the Court of
Cassation dismissed the request for appeal. The proceedings lasted
approximately eight years before three levels of jurisdiction.
The
Government maintained that the case was of a complex nature given
that the first-instance court had to examine all the evidence
provided by the parties. Upon the applicant’s request, the
court had asked the Ministry of Justice to obtain the affidavits of a
number of witnesses living in Germany. After receiving the
statements, the court had asked their translation into Turkish.
Furthermore, the applicant had contributed to the length of the
proceedings in question since she had failed to attend eight
hearings. The Government therefore concluded that there were no
delays attributable to the judicial authorities.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see Frydlender v.
France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
As
regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court observes that, it
does not appear from the case-file that she contributed to the
prolongation of the proceedings.
As
to the conduct of the authorities, the Court observes that there is a
substantial delay at the proceedings before the first-instance court.
In this connection it points out that the first-instance court took
more than six years to render a decision on the case. During this
period, the court requested information from the authorities and
suspended the hearings in order to wait for their replies. The
authorities had failed to deal with the case diligently and had
caused a substantial delay. In the Court’s opinion, six years
before one instance is an excessively long period which cannot be
justified with reference to the considerations of complexity. The
Court therefore considers that no convincing justification for these
excessive delays had been offered by the respondent Government.
Having
regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in
the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that there had been no effective remedy
in domestic law whereby she could challenge the excessive length of
the civil proceedings in question. She relied on Article 13 of the
Convention, which provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth
in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had filed an action for her
pecuniary damage raised from a civil dispute. However, her case had
been dismissed by the national courts. They submitted that the
effectiveness of a remedy for the purposes of Article 13 did not
entail the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant.
The
Court notes that this objection is closely linked to an examination
of the merits of the complaint, thus it joins it to the merits.
B. Merits
The
Court observes that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees an
effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of
the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a
reasonable time.
For
the purposes of Article 13, it is necessary to determine in each case
whether the means available to the applicant in domestic law are
“effective” in the sense that they either prevent an
alleged violation or its continuation, or provide adequate redress
for any violation that has already occurred (see Kudła
v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 156-158, ECHR
2000 XI). Article 13 therefore offers an alternative: a
remedy is “effective” if it can be used either to
expedite a decision by the courts dealing with the case, or to
provide the litigants with adequate redress for delays that have
already occurred (see Hartman v. Czech Republic, no.
53341/99, § 81, ECHR 2003 VIII (extracts)).
The
Court observes that the Turkish legal system does not provide any
remedy to accelerate the proceedings or to provide litigants with
adequate redress for the delays that have already occurred. In the
present case, the applicant did not have personal rights to compel
any other authority to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over the
trial court to expedite the proceedings (see Hartman, cited
above, § 66).
The
Court therefore concludes that Turkish law does not provide an
effective remedy whereby the applicant could have contested the
length of the proceedings.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 13.
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The
applicant complained under Article 17 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 that the national courts had abused her rights and
unjustly denied awarding her the amount of money that she had had
requested. She further submitted under Article 5 of Protocol No. 7
that the decisions of the national courts were in violation of her
right to equality between spouses.
The
Government contended that the applicant’s complaints under
Article 17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 did not
raise any separate issue apart from her complaints under Articles 6
and 13 of the Convention. The Government further maintained that
Turkey had not ratified Protocol No. 7 and that therefore the
applicant’s complaint under this heading should be declared
inadmissible.
As
to the applicant’s complaint under Article 17 the Court notes
that the applicant has failed to substantiate her allegation and to
lay the basis of an arguable claim of a breach of Article 17 of the
Convention.
As
to the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
the Court reiterates that the future income constitutes a
“possession” only if the income has been earned or where
an enforceable claim to it exists (see Ian Edgar (Liverpool)
Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 37683/97, ECHR 2000-I,
p. 475; Alfredo Casotti and Others v. Italy, no. 24877/94,
Commission decision of 16 October 1996, Decisions and Reports (DR)
87 A, p. 63; Storksen v. Norway, no. 19819/92, Commission
decision of 5 July 1994, DR 78-A, p. 89). Having regard to the
facts and documents submitted by the applicant, the Court observes
that the applicant did not have a “possession” within the
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 since she was not awarded the
amount of money that she had claimed.
In
the light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the
complaints under Article 17 of the Convention and Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
As
regards the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 of Protocol
No. 7 the Court notes that Turkey has not ratified this
Protocol. It follows that the applicant’s complaint is
incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the
Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 200,000 German marks (DM), [EUR 102,258], in
respect of pecuniary damage. She further claimed a total of 20,000
Euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested this claim.
The
Court considers that there is no causal link between the violation
found and the pecuniary damage claimed before the Court. However, the
Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary
damage. Taking into account the circumstances of the case and having
regard to its case-law, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,400
under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant also claimed EUR 10,000 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and the Court.
The Government contested this claim too.
On
the basis of the material in its possession and having regard to the
details of the claims submitted by the applicant the Court awards the
applicant EUR 1,000 for the cost and expenses.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings and the lack of effective remedy before a
national authority admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
13 of the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be
converted into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date
of settlement:
(i) EUR
3,400 (three thousand four hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage;
(ii) EUR
1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii) any
taxes that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 July 2006, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Vincent Berger Boštjan M. Zupančič
Registrar President