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SACILOR LORMINES v. FRANCE - 65411/01 [2006] ECHR 1168 (9 November 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/1168.html
Cite as:
54 EHRR 34,
[2006] ECHR 1168,
(2012) 54 EHRR 34
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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF
SACILOR LORMINES v. FRANCE
(Application
no. 65411/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9
November 2006
This judgment is final
but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Sacilor Lormines v. France,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič,
President,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr V. Zagrebelsky,
Mrs A. Gyulumyan,
Mr E. Myjer,
Mr David Thór Björgvinsson,
judges,
Mr M. Long, ad hoc judge,
and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 12 May 2005 and on 11 July and 12 October
2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last mentioned
date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 65411/01) against the French
Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a company incorporated in that State, Société
des Mines de Sacilor Lormines (“the applicant”), on 18
October 2000.
The
applicant was represented by Mr Schmitt, a lawyer practising in
Strasbourg. The French Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Ms E. Belliard, Director of Legal
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The
applicant company alleged, in particular, that the proceedings before
the Conseil d'Etat had been unfair, on the grounds that it was
not an independent and impartial tribunal and that the Government
Commissioner (Commissaire du Gouvernement) had participated in
or attended the deliberation. It also complained about the length of
the various proceedings, relying on Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
The
application was allocated to the Court's Third Section (Rule 52 § 1
of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would
consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was
constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1. Following the withdrawal
of Mr Costa, the judge elected in respect of France (Rule 28), the
Government appointed Mr Marceau Long to sit as an ad hoc
judge.
In
a decision of 12 May 2005, the Court declared the application partly
admissible. In a decision of 17 November 2005 it adjourned the
examination of the case pending the decision that was to be taken by
the Grand Chamber in the case of Martinie v. France (no.
58675/00).
The
applicant and the Government each filed further written observations
(Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant is a limited company (société
anonyme), which, in accordance with a resolution of its general
meeting of 3 March 2000, is in voluntary liquidation. It was
represented by its liquidator Mr Jean-Luc Sauvage, who was appointed
by a decision of the Nanterre Commercial Court dated 6 March 2000.
A. Background to the case
The
company Société des Mines de Sacilor Lormines, a
sub-subsidiary of Usinor, was set up in 1978 to take over, by virtue
of a transfer decree of 28 March 1979, the concessions and leases of
the Sacilor iron-ore mines in Lorraine.
The
applicant subsequently took over other concessions, in particular
those of the company Société des Mines du Nord-Est and
its subsidiary Société de Droitaumont-Giraumont. It
thus held a total of 63 iron-ore mining concessions in Lorraine on
the date when it announced that it was to shut down its mining
operations. Iron-ore mining had been in constant decline since 1963.
The company was forced to discontinue its mining activity because
worldwide competition meant that it was no longer profitable to mine
iron-ore in Lorraine. The applicant company's iron-ore production had
thus fallen from 13,940,000 tonnes in 1978 to 4,300,000 tonnes in
1991. As the demand for the applicant company's phosphoric pig iron
had slowly dwindled away, it decided in 1991 to halt production. The
closure of the various pits was staggered between 30 June 1992 and 31
July 1993. The applicant company had to stop all extraction
operations in July 1993. It underwent privatisation in 1995 and in
1997.
With
a view to the complete cessation of its activity, the applicant
company initiated the appropriate procedures for the abandonment and
renunciation of its concessions. The abandonment procedure, for the
purpose of decommissioning and stabilising disused mining
installations, entails the implementation of an order (arrêté)
in which the requisite abandonment operations are stipulated by the
prefect having territorial jurisdiction. It ends when the authorities
are able to confirm that the requirements have been fulfilled. The
renunciation procedure terminates the concession with the result that
its holder is no longer bound by the special mining regulations and
is released from the presumption of liability in respect of any
damage which occurs above ground. At the time when the cessation of
the company's operations was announced, the abandonment and
renunciation procedures were governed by Articles 83 and 84 of the
Mining Code and by Decree no. 80-330 of 7 May 1980 concerning
mining and quarrying regulations. Law no. 94-588 of 15 July 1994,
amending certain provisions of the Mining Code, repealed Articles 83
and 84 and replaced them by Articles 79 and 84. Decree no. 95-696 of
9 May 1995, issued after consultation of the Conseil d'Etat,
pertaining to the opening of mines and mining regulations, was
adopted for the implementation of those provisions. Lastly, Law no.
99-245 of 30 March 1999 concerning liability for damage
resulting from mining and the prevention of mining-related risks
after discontinuance, brought about further amendments to mining law
(see paragraphs 29 to 33 below).
Numerous
regulatory measures (over twenty) were taken in this connection
against the applicant company, which challenged them all in the
Administrative Courts of Strasbourg and Nancy. The applicant company
also lodged numerous appeals seeking the annulment of refusals by the
Minister responsible for mining to accept its renunciation of a
number of concessions; it requested that the Minister be ordered to
accept the renunciation of those concessions and sought compensation
for the loss it had sustained as a result of the refusals.
B. Inter-prefectoral orders of 26 May and 18 July 1997
laying down regulatory measures in the mining sector
The
inter-prefectoral order (prefectures of the Lorraine region, the
département of Moselle and the département
of Meurthe-et-Moselle) of 26 May 1997, laying down regulatory
measures in the mining sector, imposed certain obligations on the
applicant company:
...
“It is hereby decided as follows:
Article 1: The company Lormines ... shall be required,
in a prompt manner, to appoint a panel of three specialists from
outside the company, having submitted the composition of the panel
for the prior approval of the prefects, and having regard to the
opinion of the Regional Director for Industry, Research and the
Environment of Lorraine, to carry out the following assignment:
- analysis of the parts of the mining installations
referred to in the penultimate paragraph of the preamble, located
between elevations NGF 115 and 172 in the municipalities (communes)
of Auboue, Briey, Homecourt, Joeuf and Moutiers (Meurthe-et-Moselle),
Moyeuvre-Petite, Moyeuvre-Grande, Roncourt, Sainte-Marie-aux-Chênes
and Saint-Privat-la-Montagne (Moselle);
- classification of the parts of the mining
installations thus enumerated according to the presence of both
aggravating instability factors and vulnerability related to the type
of dwelling at risk.
The company Lormines shall make available to the
specialists any technical documents and archives in its possession
concerning the operations in question. The company shall transmit to
the prefect, within a period of ten days after the notification of
the present order, the report issued by the said specialists on the
completion of their assignment.
Article 2: The company Lormines ... shall take all
necessary measures to ensure the permanent availability of an
adequate and sufficiently large network of surveyors, in order to be
in a position to implement, upon the request of the prefects, any
monitoring and observation measures that may be required by the
situation.”
Moreover,
in an order of 18 July 1997, the prefects of Moselle and
Meurthe-et-Moselle imposed the following on the applicant company:
...
“Having regard to the urgency;
Acknowledging the report of the experts appointed by the
company Sacilor Lormines in accordance with the above-mentioned
prefectoral order;
Recognising that, in the light of current knowledge, the
appearance of cracks in buildings may be a preliminary indication of
subsidence;
Upon the proposal of the Regional Director for Industry,
Research and the Environment of Lorraine;
It is hereby decided as follows:
Article 1
The company Lormines ... shall take all necessary
measures to ensure the permanent availability of an adequate and
sufficiently large network of building experts, so that it is able to
carry out, promptly and upon the request of the prefects, analysis of
the cracks in buildings in the “yellow”, “orange”
and “red” zones, the lower parts of buildings included,
within the perimeter of the iron-ore mining concessions held by the
company Lormines ... in the municipalities of Auboue, Briey,
Homecourt, Joeuf and Moutiers (Meurthe-et-Moselle), Moyeuvre-Petite,
Moyeuvre-Grande, Roncourt, Sainte-Marie-aux-Chênes and Saint
Privat (Moselle);
The assessments carried out by those experts shall be
reported in writing to the prefects concerned, in the appropriate
time-frame and form such as to be compatible with the triggering of
the alert procedure, should that prove necessary, or within 48 hours
in other cases.
...”
In
letters of 2 July and 17 September 1997 the applicant company lodged
administrative appeals with the Minister for Economic Affairs,
Finance and Industry, requesting that he rescind the orders of 26 May
and 18 July 1997 and seeking the reimbursement of the sums incurred
in order to meet the requirements of those orders. The applicant
company claimed that the order had failed to take account of the fact
that it no longer operated the mines at issue and that the sites
referred to in the order had undergone an abandonment and
renunciation procedure.
On
29 September 1997, acting upon an application from the Secretary of
State for Industry, the Public Works Division of the Conseil
d'Etat, under the presidency of Mr Le Vert, the reporting judge
being Mr de la Verpillière, gave an advisory opinion
concerning the “work of stabilising and rehabilitating the
sites of disused mines – Powers of the authority vis-à-vis
the mine operator – application of the Law of 15 July 1994”.
... That opinion was published in the annual report of the Conseil
d'Etat for the year 1998 and reads as follows:
“The Conseil d'Etat (Public Works
Division), has been called upon by the Secretary of State for
Industry to answer the following questions:
1. Does not the immediate application of the new Article
84 of the Mining Code impair the established rights of the holders of
mining concessions or licences, in so far as work commenced prior to
this legislation is at issue? Should or could a limit be set on the
regulatory obligations that may be imposed on them, since the
objectives now enshrined in the mining regulations were clearly not
envisaged when the operations were first started?
2. Should the principle of the proportionality of acts
of the administrative authorities be construed as requiring the
prefect to take account of the human, financial or technical means
available to the operator when he imposes specific measures on the
latter?
To what extent, should it prove impossible for the mine
operator to implement the prefect's instructions, would the
obligations thus imposed be assumed by the State and then performed
and financed by the latter?
3. Could the possible extension introduced by the use of
the term “measures” rather than “work” in
Article 84 of the Mining Code lead to the imposition of other
requirements, apart from those whose result is attainable within a
period that is consistent with the need to bring an end to the
special mining regulations, for example a pumping requirement, which
could only be fulfilled in the long term, or in a period that would
be difficult to foresee?
In the latter case, is there not a contradiction with
Articles 46 and 49 § 2 of the decree of 9 May 1995, which seem,
at least implicitly and for mines operated normally, to limit the
imposition of mining regulations to the term of the mining
concession?
Moreover, should the prefect confine himself to physical
measures or is he entitled to impose financial measures such as
payment to an organisation by way of performance?
4. Would it be feasible to arrange for part of the
obligations imposed under mining regulations (for example those
concerning the pumping of water or maintenance of equipment) to be
assigned to a third party (company, consortium of public
institutions, etc.)? Could the formal confirmation be issued once the
prefect is able to observe that the operator has set up a structure
providing for the performance of its obligations – or, on the
contrary, can it only be issued once it has been observed that the
prescribed measures have actually been carried out or completed?
5. In matters of ordre public (public policy), is
the court entitled, and on the basis of what criteria, to consider
that section 17 of the Law of 15 July 1994 has an immediate effect on
contracts in progress? Would it be possible, if necessary, in the
light of the Constitution, to enact legislation giving retrospective
effect to the abovementioned section 17?
6. On the basis of what criteria is the court entitled
to rule out the application of a clause releasing the mine operator
from liability in respect of damage caused by its mining activity, in
the event of transfer of ownership? In particular, is the court
entitled to find such a clause null and void when the foreseeable or
inevitable nature of the damage has been established? In such cases,
is it necessary to prove that the operator was aware of the risk or
does the existence of the risk suffice, in so far as the operator
should have been aware of it? Moreover, may the seriousness of the
damage be taken into account in the court's interpretation of the
validity of such clauses?
[The Conseil d'Etat] is minded to answer the
foregoing questions as follows:
1. As to the mining abandonment procedure (Article 84 of
the Mining Code):
(a) A new legal rule will not apply to legal situations
which have already become final on the date it enters into force.
Accordingly, the abandonment of mining operations which began before
the entry into force of the Law of 15 July 1994 will not be governed
by the new Article 84 of the Mining Code, introduced by the said Law,
if on that date the particulars of the work required for the
stabilising and rehabilitation of the site have been irrevocably
decided, pursuant to the former Article 83 of the Mining Code and to
Articles 22 to 29 of Decree no. 80-330 of 7 May 1980, by the
acceptance of the declaration of relinquishment or abandonment
submitted by the operator, or by virtue of a prefectoral order
prescribing the work to be carried out. In other cases the new
Article 84 will be applicable, and it will of course govern the
abandonment of mining work started after 15 July 1994.
(b) The principle of the “proportionality of acts
of the administrative authorities” entails that the authorities
require the operator to take only those measures that are necessary
in order to fulfil the objectives and preserve the interests
enumerated in Articles 79 and 84 of the Mining Code. In assessing
what is necessary, the authorities are not bound by the human,
financial or technical capacities of the operator.
(c) The authorities have an obligation to ensure
compliance with the measures that they have prescribed pursuant to
the abovementioned provisions. In the event of any failure to act on
the part of the operator, for any reason whatsoever, they must assume
their powers of substitution under the eighth and ninth paragraphs of
Article 84. Failing that, the State's responsibility may be totally
or partially engaged in the event of non-performance.
(d) It follows from all the provisions of Article 84 of
the Mining Code that, unless otherwise agreed by the operator, the
authorities cannot impose measures without fixing a time-limit. The
performance of such measures cannot be required to continue in the
long term, after the mining concession has expired, except in the
case provided for under Article 48 of the decree of 9 May 1995.
(e) In order to obtain formal confirmation, the operator
must have performed the prescribed measures itself and is not
entitled to have them performed by a third party, even if it provides
that party with the requisite financial means.
2. As to the validity of clauses in property transfer
agreements which exclude the liability of the mining or prospecting
company (section 17 of the Law of 15 July 1994):
(a) Subject to the independent findings of the competent
courts, it would appear that section 17 of the Law of 15 July 1994,
which renders null and void on public policy grounds any clause, in
property transfer agreements between mining companies and local
authorities or natural persons outside the profession, which excludes
the liability of the company for any damage related to its mining
activity, does not apply to agreements entered into before the entry
into force of the said Law. Unless retroactive effect is expressly
stipulated by the legislature, a new law will not affect the terms
and conditions of an agreement that has become final prior to the
entry into force of that law.
(b) Except in penal matters, the principle of
non-retrospectivity of laws is not binding on the legislature, which
may therefore decide to give retrospective effect to section 17
of the Law of 15 July 1994.
(c) It is not possible to give a general answer to the
question concerning the possibility for the court to rule out the
application of clauses releasing the vendor from liability. It will
be for the competent courts to assess such clauses on a case-by-case
basis in the light of Article 1643 of the Civil Code.”
On
31 December 1997 and 17 March 1998 the applicant company applied to
the Conseil d'Etat for a judgment declaring ultra vires
and annulling the above-mentioned prefectoral orders and the implied
decisions of 3 November 1997 and 18 January 1998 by which the
Minister had refused to withdraw those orders. The applicant company
sought the reimbursement of the expenses that it had paid out for the
implementation of those orders. It claimed, in particular, that it
was for the authorities to bear the cost of missions for the
monitoring and verification of the measures that they themselves had
imposed on the operator for the closure of the mines. Moreover, it
argued that it no longer operated the mines at issue since 1993 and
that, having complied with the requirements laid down by the prefect
with regard to the abandonment of mining operations, it had been
released from its obligations as concession-holder. In this
connection it pointed out that for two concessions the renunciation
had been accepted (Valleroy and Moutiers), whilst in the other cases,
the abandonment had become effective after the completion of the work
prescribed by the prefect in 1995 and 1996 or was still in progress.
It lastly considered that, in respect of the former concessions in
question, the declarations of abandonment and applications for
renunciation had been filed with the prefecture before the entry into
force of the Law of 15 July 1994 (see paragraph 31 below) amending
certain provisions of the Mining Code and that those concessions
could only therefore fall within the statutory and regulatory
framework that existed prior to the entry into force of that Law
(former Articles 83 and 84 of the Mining Code, see paragraph 29
below).
On
21 March 2000 the President of the Judicial Division of the Conseil
d'Etat wrote to the director of legal affairs of the competent
ministry to express his concern about the ministry's shortcomings in
the preparation of judicial cases which had been set down on a list
of the Conseil d'Etat for hearing on 20 March 2000 and which
had had to be struck out at the very last minute on account of
belated production by the ministry. He gave the following
explanations:
“As regards case no. 192947, you were notified of
it on 9 March 1998. In the absence of any response on your part, you
were again invited to adduce your observations on 16 July, 27 August
and 29 September 1998 and on 8 April 1999.
Since a case has to be heard even if the authority fails
to reply, the case was entrusted to a reporting judge, examined at
the preparatory stage, transmitted to a Government Commissioner and
set down for hearing on 20 March, with notice of the hearing being
issued on 13 March 2000.
It was not until after that notice of hearing that you
produced observations which were received by facsimile in the Conseil
d'Etat on 18 March.
As the principle of adversarial proceedings required
that your observations be communicated to the applicant company, the
striking-out of the case was inevitable. This also happened, with a
few minor differences, in case no. 194925. Such a situation is
difficult to accept. For the purposes of preparing the case properly
the judge sets time-limits for the parties. In some cases, if
requested, an extension of the time-limit may be granted.
In the present case, however, it was only after two
years and in spite of a number of reminders that you filed your
observations, and you did so after the case had been set down for
hearing, placing the Conseil d'Etat before the fait
accompli and obliging it to strike out the case.
In 1998 the Prime Minister adopted specific measures to
ensure the defence of the State in good conditions and the proper
operation of judicial proceedings. It is regrettable that in this
case his instructions were disregarded so patently.”
In
a judgment of 19 May 2000 (nos. 192947 and 194925), notified on
20 June 2000, the Conseil d'Etat, after joining the
two cases, ruled as follows:
“... Under the first paragraph of Article 34 of
the ... decree [of 9 May 1995 pertaining to the opening of mines and
mining regulations]: 'The prefect shall decide, by way of an arrêté
(order), on regulations applicable to mining. Except in cases of
urgency or imminent danger he shall first invite the mine operator to
submit its observations and shall set a time-limit for that purpose'.
In view of the seriousness of the subsidence which occurred on 14
October 1996, 18 November 1996 and 15 March 1997 above various mines
that had been operated by the company Société des Mines
de Sacilor Lormines and having regard to the report filed on 20 May
1997 by the scientific advisory board set up on 25 March 1997 for
that purpose, the prefects of Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle were
legally entitled to issue the urgent order of 26 May 1997 requiring
the applicant company to entrust to a panel of experts the analysis
and risk assessment of a number of mining sites, and to have a
network of surveyors permanently available in order to carry out the
requisite supervisory measures. They were also entitled, on account
of the urgency, without consulting the mine operator and as soon as
the report had been issued by the experts appointed in the order of
26 May 1997, to require the company, in the order of 18 July
1997, to ensure that a network of building experts was permanently
available. Accordingly, the arguments to the effect that those orders
were issued without complying with the lawful procedure, in breach of
the provisions of Article 34 of the decree of 9 May 1995, cannot be
upheld.
Article 79 of the Mining Code, in the version deriving
from the Law of 15 July 1994, reads as follows: 'prospecting and
mining work shall comply with the restrictions and obligations
pertaining to ... / public health and safety, ... [and] to the
solidity of public or private edifices ... / When the interests
mentioned in the previous paragraph are put at risk by such work, the
administrative authority may require the prospector or mine operator
to take any measures for the purposes of ensuring the protection of
those interests within a given time-limit'. The last paragraph of
Article 84 of the Mining Code, which lays down the rules
governing the discontinuance of mining operations, provides as
follows: 'When the measures provided for by the present Article, or
those prescribed by the administrative authority pursuant to the
present Article, have been executed, the administrative authority
shall issue the prospector or operator with its formal confirmation
of completion ...'. Article 49 of the decree of 9 May 1995
provides: 'the administrative supervision and the mining regulations
shall cease to take effect on the date that the operator is issued
with formal confirmation that the work has been completed ... /
However, the prefect shall be empowered ... to take ... any measures
that may be rendered necessary by incidents or accidents that can be
attributed to former mining work, when such events are capable of
damaging the interests protected by Article 79 of the Mining Code,
until the expiry of the mining concession'.
First, contrary to what has been contended, the Law of
15 July 1994 entered into force as soon as it was
published; subsequently, and notwithstanding the fact that the
applications for abandonment of operations were submitted before the
entry into force of that Law, the prefects of Moselle and
Meurthe-et-Moselle legally implemented it.
Secondly, it follows from the combination of the
provisions cited above that the completion by the operator of the
work prescribed by the administrative authority for the purposes of
closing a mine does not suffice to exonerate if from all liability
unless and until it has been issued with formal confirmation of
completion and, as regards any incidents and accidents that may
interfere with the protection of the interests provided for under
Article 79 of the Mining Code, for as long as the operator holds the
mining concession. It follows from the documents in the case file
that, with the exception of the concessions of Valleroy and Moutiers,
the prefects of Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle had not issued formal
confirmation of the completion of work in respect of the mines
abandoned by [the applicant company], nor had they accepted the
proposed renunciation of the concessions concerned. Subsequently, the
prefects ... were lawfully entitled, except in respect of those parts
of the municipalities that were located above the Valleroy and
Moutiers concessions, to impose on the operator the necessary
measures to prevent repetition of subsidence.
Under Articles 79 and 84 of the Mining Code, the
administrative authorities are entitled to require the operator to
take any measures for the purposes of guaranteeing public health and
safety and the solidity of edifices, as provided for in Article 79 of
the Code. These measures may consist both in studies for the
assessment and enumeration of risks and in work to prevent or put an
end to incidents.
It is hereby decided as follows:
Article 1: The implied decisions of 3 November 1997 and
18 January 1998 of the Minister for Economic Affairs, Finance and
Industry and the orders of 26 May 1997 and 18 July 1997 are annulled
in so far as they imposed on the [applicant company] measures of
prevention, supervision and verification in respect of the areas of
the municipalities located above the concessions of Valleroy and
Moutiers of which the renunciation had been accepted by the
authority.
Article 2: The State shall reimburse to Société
des Mines de Sacilor Lormines, with interest, the sums pertaining to
the sites in respect of which the decisions of the Minister are
annulled by the present decision;
Article 3: The State shall pay to Société
des Mines de Sacilor Lormines the sum of 20,000 francs under
section 75-I of the Law of 10 July 1991.
...
After deliberation on 26 April 2000 in the presence of:
Mrs Aubin, Deputy President of the Judicial Division, presiding; Mrs
Moreau, Mr Durand-Viel, Section Presidents; Mr Dulong, Mr Pêcheur,
Mr Levis, Senior Members of the Conseil d'Etat; and Miss
Bonnat, Auditeur-rapporteur.”
By a decree of 26 May 2000, the President of the
Republic appointed Mr Pêcheur, a member of the Conseil
d'Etat who had sat in the deliberation of 26 April 2000, to the
post of Secretary General of the Ministry for Economic Affairs,
Finance and Industry.
On
17 January 2001 the applicant company brought proceedings in the
Paris Administrative Court seeking the annulment of the implied
decision of rejection resulting from the failure by the Minister for
Economic Affairs to respond to its request for payment of the sum of
20,000 francs pursuant to Article 3 of the judgment of the Conseil
d'Etat of 19 May 2000. By an order of 28 February 2001, the
president of the Administrative Court transmitted the application to
the Conseil d'Etat.
Concurrently,
the applicant company requested the Conseil d'Etat to order
the State to pay a coercive fine of 2,000 francs per day to guarantee
execution of the entire decision of 19 May 2000.
In
a judgment of 5 April 2002 (nos. 229499 and 231060), notified on
23 May 2002, the Conseil d'Etat found that the
execution in question was incomplete:
“... the Minister for Economic Affairs, Finance
and Industry ... ordered, on 23 July 2001, the payment of the sum of
71,745.60 francs for the reimbursement of the expenses incurred on
the sites in respect of which the Minister's decisions had been
annulled by the judgment of 19 May 2000. It follows from a
calculation note produced by the authority that this sum consists of
an indemnity of 66,000 francs, being the capital, which has not been
disputed, and interest amounting to 5,745.60 francs. As regards the
interest .... [it] should have run not from 19 May 2000, the date of
the decision in which payment was ordered, but from the date on which
[the applicant company] had actually paid the invoice of 31 October
1997 issued by the National Institute for the Industrial Environment
and Risks. In view of the foregoing, [the applicant company] is
justified in arguing that the judgment of 19 May 2000 has not been
fully executed.
In the circumstances of the case it is appropriate to
require the State ... to take, within a period of two months from
notification of the present decision, as regards the start date for
calculation of interest at the statutory rate, the necessary measures
in order to ensure full execution of Article 2 of the judgment of 19
May 2000, and to order it to pay a coercive fine of 10 euros per day
from the expiry of the said period if it has not by then fulfilled
the said obligation.
...
After deliberation on 15 March 2002 in the presence of:
Mr Labetoulle, President of the Judicial Division, presiding; Mr
Durand-Viel, Mr Bonichot, Section Presidents; Mr Dulong, Mr Hoss, Mr
Levis, Mr de Froment, Senior Members of the Conseil d'Etat;
Mr Thiellay, Maître des Requêtes and Miss
Vialettes, Auditeur-rapporteur.”
C. Inter-prefectoral order of 24 July 1998
Further
to the above-mentioned orders of 26 May and 18 July 1997 and other
orders of 12 August 1997 requiring the analysis of the parts of
mining installations that were located in several municipalities
which had not been covered by the expert's report prescribed by the
inter-prefectoral order of 26 May 1997, and the classification of the
parts of mining installations thus enumerated according to the
presence of both aggravating instability factors and vulnerability
related to the types of dwelling, the prefects of Moselle,
Meurthe-et-Moselle and Meuse made an order dated 24 July 1998
containing the following requirements:
“ ...
Article 1
The company Lormines ... shall take all necessary
measures, promptly and at the request of the prefects for the places
concerned, to carry out an analysis of cracks in buildings or
facilities located within the “yellow, orange and red”
zones, which are indicated as being at risk from significant soil
movements in the maps issued showing degrees of potential delayed
subsidence, and which are situated within the ground areas of the
iron-ore mining concessions held by the company Lormines on parts of
the départements of Moselle, Meurthe-et-Moselle and
Meuse.
The assessments shall be reported in writing to the
prefects concerned, in the appropriate time-frame and form such as to
be compatible with the triggering of the alert procedure, should that
prove necessary, or within 48 hours in other cases.
...”
The
applicant company was unable to execute this order (non-execution at
Moyeuvre-Grande) and execution was thus initiated by the State at the
company's expense. In respect of this execution the applicant company
was required to pay the sum of 18,572 francs, by a payment order of
7 February 2000 which it disputed before the Strasbourg
Administrative Court.
On
17 September 1998 the applicant company lodged with the Conseil
d'Etat an application seeking the annulment of the
inter-prefectoral order of 24 July 1998, for being ultra
vires, and sought a stay of execution of that order.
On
23 March 1999 the company applied to the Conseil d'Etat
seeking the annulment of the implied decision of rejection resulting
from the Minister's failure to reply to its request for the
withdrawal of the inter-prefectoral order of 24 July 1998 and for
payment by the State of an indemnity of 450,455 francs to compensate
for the expenses it had incurred in implementing the impugned order.
In
its submissions of 21 February 2001 the applicant company asked to
receive, prior to the hearing, copies of the mining-related opinions
given by the administrative divisions of the Conseil d'Etat
over the previous few years, as well as the submissions of the
Government Commissioner.
On
25 April 2001 the applicant company stated that it did not wish to
maintain its requests for the withdrawal of the Government
Commissioner and for disqualification of the section of the Conseil
d'Etat to which the case had been assigned.
In
a judgment of 5 April 2002 (nos. 199686 and 205909), the Conseil
d'Etat (with the same bench as for the above-mentioned judgment
of 5 April 2002, nos. 229499 and 231060), after joining the two
applications, dismissed the applicant company's clams:
...
“...
Concerning the submissions seeking the annulment of
the inter-prefectoral order of 24 July 1998 laying down
regulatory measures in the mining sector and the implied decision of
rejection by the Minister for Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry
further to an administrative appeal against that order:
... Fifthly, Article 79 of the Mining Code, in the
version deriving from the Law of 15 July 1994, reads as follows:
'Prospecting and mining work shall comply with the restrictions and
obligations pertaining to ... / public health and safety, ... [and]
to the solidity of public or private edifices ... : When the
interests mentioned in the previous paragraph are put at risk by such
work, the administrative authority may require the prospector or mine
operator to take any measures for the purposes of ensuring the
protection of those interests within a given time-limit'. The last
paragraph of Article 84 of the Mining Code, which lays down the
rules governing the discontinuance of mining operations, provides as
follows: 'When the measures provided for by the present article, or
those prescribed by the administrative authority pursuant to the
present article, have been executed, the administrative authority
shall issue the prospector or operator with its formal confirmation
...'. Article 49 of the decree of 9 May 1995 provides: 'The
administrative supervision and the mining regulations shall cease to
take effect on the date that the operator is issued with formal
confirmation that the work has been completed ... / However, the
prefect shall be empowered ... to take ... any measures that may be
rendered necessary by incidents or accidents that can be attributed
to former mining work, when such events are capable of damaging the
interests protected by Article 79 of the Mining Code, until the
expiry of the mining concession'. Article 119-4 of the Mining Code
provides: 'renunciation, whether total or partial, of rights to mine
or quarry prospecting or exploration shall become final only after
being accepted by the minister responsible for mining'. Article 34 of
the decree of 19 April 1995 provides: 'Applications for renunciation
of a mining concession shall be lodged with the minister responsible
for mining. / ... Acceptance of renunciation shall be given in an
order of the minister responsible for mining'.
Contrary to what has been contended, the Law of
15 July 1994 entered into force as soon as it was published
and was to be applied to all mining concessions currently valid at
that date. Subsequently, and notwithstanding the fact that the
applications for abandonment of work and renunciation of concessions
were apparently submitted before the entry into force of that Law,
the prefects of Moselle, Meuse and Meurthe-et-Moselle legally
implemented it. The applicant company cannot, in any event,
appropriately rely on an argument based on a breach of the principles
of legitimate expectation and legal certainty when the order appealed
against was not made for the purposes of implementing European
Community law.
Moreover, it follows from the combination of the
provisions cited above that the completion by the operator of the
work prescribed by the administrative authority for the purposes of
closing a mine does not suffice to release it from all liability
unless and until it has been issued with formal confirmation of that
completion. In addition, when, as in the present case, any incidents
or accidents occur, such as subsidence capable of undermining the
solidity of public or private edifices, the prefect remains empowered
to intervene, even if he has already issued formal confirmation of
completion of the work required for the closure of the mine, for as
long as the operator holds the mining concession. It follows from the
documents in the case file that, whilst some of the mines enumerated
in Article 2 of the order appealed had been the subject of an
abandonment procedure, as had been confirmed by the Regional Director
for Industry, Research and the Environment, none of the corresponding
concessions, at the date of the order appealed, had expired or had
been the subject of a renunciation procedure accepted by the
minister, such express acceptance alone being capable, contrary to
what has been argued in a new memorial filed the day before the
hearing, regardless of the date of that acceptance, of giving full
effect to any renunciation. Accordingly, the prefects of Moselle,
Meuse and Meurthe-et-Moselle were lawfully entitled to require the
operator to take the necessary measures to prevent repetition of land
subsidence.
Sixthly, in accordance with Articles 79 and 84 of the
Mining Code, the administrative authorities are entitled to require
the operator to take any measures that may be required for the
protection of the objectives of public health and safety and the
solidity of edifices, as provided under Article 79 of that Code.
Those measures may consist both of studies for the purpose of
analysing and enumerating the risks of incidents and of work for the
purposes of prevention or remediation.
...
The company Société des Mines de Sacilor
Lormines is not justified in seeking the annulment of the
inter-prefectoral order of 24 July 1998 and the Minister's implied
decision of rejection ...”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Mining regulations and successive reforms of mining
law
In
1991, when the discontinuance of the applicant company's mining
operations was announced, the procedures of abandonment and
renunciation were governed by Articles 83 and 84 of the Mining Code
and Decree no. 80-330 of 7 May 1980 concerning mining and
quarrying regulations. Article 83 of the Mining Code stipulated at
the time as follows:
“When operations are abandoned on the expiry of a
concession or of a prospecting or operating licence, or, in the case
of segment-based operations, at the end of the operations in each
segment, the holder of the concession or licence shall be required to
carry out work for the purpose of protecting the interests mentioned
in Article 84, as stipulated by the prefect on the proposal of the
mining service after consultation of the municipal council for the
locality concerned. The rehabilitation, in particular for
agricultural purposes, of the sites and places affected by the work
and by installations of any kind that have been erected for
operations and prospecting, may be prescribed; this shall be
mandatory in the case of quarries. These provisions shall be
applicable to the work provided for in Article 80.
In the event of failure to carry out the prescribed
work, it shall be completed on the initiative of the authorities and
at the expense of the concession-holder or offender.
Municipalities and départements shall have
a right of pre-emption in the event of the sale of disused quarries
that have been operated on their territories.”
Article
84 of the Mining Code provided as follows:
“If work related to mine prospecting or operating
is capable of undermining public health and safety, essential
features of the surrounding environment, whether land or sea, the
conservation of the mine or another mine, the security, health and
safety of mine workers, the conservation of communication routes, the
solidity of public or private edifices, or the use, flow or quality
of water of any kind, provision shall be made by the prefect, if need
be of his own motion and at the expense of the prospector or
operator.”
Section
17 of the Water Act (Law no. 92-3) of 3 January 1992 amended Article
83 of the Mining Code by inserting, after its first paragraph, two
paragraphs which read as follows:
“In all cases, the holder of the concession or
licence shall make an assessment of the cumulative effects of the
work on the presence, accumulation, emergence, volume, drainage and
quality of water of any kind, shall assess the foreseeable
consequences of the abandonment of the work or of the operations for
the situation thus created and for the uses of the water, and shall
indicate the remedial measures envisaged.
After consulting the local authorities concerned and
hearing representations from the concession or licence holder, the
prefect shall prescribe the work required of the holder in order to
restore to their previous state, preserve in their current state or
adapt as needed, the essential characteristics of the aquatic
environment and the hydraulic conditions for the purposes of
fulfilling the objectives provided for in section 1 of the Water Act
(Law no. 92-3) of 3 January 1992.”
In
addition, the second paragraph of Article 83 of the Mining Code was
supplemented by a sentence which read as follows:
“Payment into the hands of a public accountant of
the sums necessary for the performance of the work imposed in
accordance with the previous paragraph may be demanded under the
conditions provided for in section 17 of the above-mentioned Law no.
92-3 of 3 January 1992.”
Subsequently,
Law no. 94-588 of 15 July 1994, amending certain provisions of the
Mining Code, removed those two provisions and replaced them by
Articles 79 and 84 as follows:
Article 79
“Prospecting and mining work shall comply with the
restrictions and obligations pertaining to the health and safety of
workers, public health and safety, the essential features of the
surrounding environment, whether land or sea, the solidity of public
or private edifices, the conservation of communication routes, the
mine and other mines, and more generally archaeological interests and
the interests enumerated in the provisions of section 1 of the
Historic Monuments Act of 31 December 1913, section 4 of the Law
of 2 May 1930 reorganising the protection of natural
monuments and sites of an artistic, historical, scientific, legendary
or picturesque nature, section 1 of Law no. 76-629 of 10 July
1976 concerning the protection of nature, section 2 of the Water Act
(Law no. 92-3) of 3 January 1992, as well as to the agricultural
interests attaching to sites and places affected by such work and by
mining installations.
When the interests mentioned in the previous paragraph
are put at risk by such work, the administrative authority may
require the prospector or mine operator to take any measures for the
purposes of ensuring the protection of those interests within a given
time-limit.
In the event of failure to fulfil these obligations by
the expiry of the allotted period, the administrative authority shall
take the initiative of having the prescribed measures executed, at
the expense of the prospector or operator.”
Article 84
“If appropriate, at the end of each segment of
work and, at the latest, when the operations are discontinued and the
work halted, the prospector or operator shall give notice of the
measures that he intends to take in order to protect the interests
mentioned in Article 79, for the purpose of putting an end, in
general terms, to any adverse effects, disorder or disturbances of
any kind that may be generated by the said activities and to make
provision, if appropriate, for the possible resumption of operations.
In all cases, the prospector or operator shall make an
assessment of the effects of the work on the presence, accumulation,
emergence, volume, drainage and quality of water of any kind, shall
assess the consequences of the discontinuance of the work or of the
operations for the situation thus created and for the uses of the
water, and shall indicate the remedial measures envisaged.
The declaration shall be made no later than the date of
expiry of the mining concession.
Failing that, the administrative authority shall remain
empowered after the said date to prescribe the necessary measures.
Having regard to that declaration, and after consulting
the municipal councils of the localities concerned and hearing
representations from the prospector or operator, the administrative
authority shall prescribe, as necessary, any requisite measures taken
and conditions of execution that have not been sufficiently indicated
or that have been omitted by the declarant ...
Any failure to take the measures provided for in the
present article shall result in their execution on the initiative of
the authorities, at the expense of the prospector or operator.
Payment into the hands of a public accountant of the
sums necessary for that execution may be demanded and, if necessary,
collected in the manner of debts other than those related to taxation
or State property.
When the measures provided for by the present article,
or those prescribed by the administrative authority under the present
article, have been executed, the administrative authority shall issue
the prospector or operator with its formal confirmation.
That formality shall put an end to the supervision of
the mines, as provided for in Article 77.
However, as regards the activities governed by the
present Code, the administrative authority may intervene, in the
context of the provisions of Article 79, until the expiry of the
mining concession.”
Decree
no. 95-696 of 9 May 1995, issued after consultation of the Conseil
d'Etat, pertaining to the opening of mines and mining
regulations, was adopted for the implementation of those provisions.
Article 47, paragraph 3, and Article 49 of that decree provide as
follows:
Article 47, paragraph 3
“After arranging for verification of the measures
taken by the operator, and if appropriate indicating their compliance
or prescribing additional measures, the prefect shall issue formal
confirmation, by way of an order (arrêté), of the
final discontinuance of the work and the decommissioning of the
installations.”
Article 49
“The administrative supervision and the mining
regulations shall cease to take effect on the date that the operator
is issued with formal confirmation that the work has been carried
out, or when the work executed on the initiative of the authority has
been completed.
However, the prefect shall be empowered, except in cases
where activities other than those covered by the Mining Code are
substituted in the place of the discontinued work or decommissioned
installations, to take, in the context of the present part hereof,
any measures that may be rendered necessary by incidents or accidents
attributable to former mining work, when such events are capable of
damaging the interests protected by Article 79 of the Mining Code,
until the expiry of the mining concession.”
Article
34 of Decree no. 95-427 of 19 April 1995 pertaining to mining
concessions provided as follows:
“Applications for renunciation of a mining
concession shall be lodged with the minister responsible for mining.
They shall be processed, depending on each case, as
stipulated in Articles 26 and 27 above.
Acceptance of renunciation shall be subject, if
appropriate, to the prior execution of the prescribed regulatory
measures. Subject to this proviso, it shall be automatic in the event
of total renunciation. Acceptance of renunciation shall be given in
an order of the minister responsible for mining.”
Lastly,
under Law no. 99-245 of 30 March 1999 concerning liability for damage
resulting from mining and the prevention of mining-related risks
after discontinuance, the presumption of mining liability has been
extended in so far as the permanent liability of the former
concession-holder is now presumed. The said Law further imposes an
obligation on the former mine operator to pay an equalising
contribution to the financing of public expenses for a period of ten
years. Article 75-1 of the Mining Code now provides as follows:
“The prospector or operator, or failing that the
holder of the mining concession, shall be liable for any damage
caused by its activity. It may, however, be released from liability
if it can adduce evidence of an external cause. Such liability shall
not be confined to the area covered by the mining concession, nor to
the term of validity of that concession. In the event of the
disappearance or default of the liable party, the State shall stand
surety for the reparation of the damage mentioned in the first
paragraph; it shall be subrogated to the rights of the victim against
the liable party.”
B. The Conseil d'Etat
1. Provisions governing status
The relevant domestic law and practice are partly described in Kress
v. France ([GC], no. 39594/98, ECHR 2001 VI), and the
status of members of the administrative courts is dealt with in some
detail in paragraphs 31 to 37 of that judgment. The provisions
governing their status are laid down in Book 1 of the Administrative
Courts Code, Title III of which specifically concerns the Conseil
d'Etat. Under that Title, Chapter 1, which is headed “General
Provisions”, provides as follows:
Article L. 131-1
“The status of members of the Conseil d'Etat
shall be governed by the present Book, and, in so far as they are not
in contradiction therewith, by the provisions governing the civil
service.”
Article L. 131-2
“No member of the Conseil d'Etat shall be
entitled, in support of a political activity, to invoke his or her
membership of the Conseil d'Etat.”
Article L. 131-3
“All members of the Conseil d'Etat, whether
serving in the Conseil or assigned to external duties, shall
avoid expressing views of a political nature that are incompatible
with the duty of discretion inherent in their functions.”
Chapter
3 under the same Title is headed “Appointments” and
codifies the rules concerning the recruitment of members of the
Conseil d'Etat described in the Kress judgment (§
33). Articles L. 133-1, 133-2 and 133-3 restate that the
Vice-President of the Conseil d'Etat, the division presidents
and the senior members (conseillers d'Etat, who have to be at
least 45 years of age) are appointed by a decree adopted in Cabinet,
on the proposal of the Minister of Justice. Article L 133-7 concerns
appointments directly from outside and reads as follows:
“Direct appointments from outside to positions of
senior member (conseiller d'Etat) and of maître des
requêtes may be made only after the opinion of the
Vice-President of the Conseil d'Etat has been obtained.
That opinion shall take into account the previous
functions performed by the nominee, his or her experience, and the
requirements of the institution, as reported on an annual basis by
the Vice-President of the Conseil d'Etat; the substance of
that opinion in respect of appointments made shall be published in
the Official Gazette at the same time as the notice of appointment.
The opinion of the Vice-President shall be transmitted
to the person concerned, at his or her request. ...”
Chapter
6 under the same Title is headed “Discipline” and
stipulates in Article L. 136-2 that disciplinary measures are taken
by the authority responsible for making appointments upon the
proposal of the Minister of Justice, after obtaining the opinion of
the advisory board. However, warnings and reprimands may be issued,
without consulting the advisory board, by the Vice-President of the
Conseil d'Etat.
The
regulatory provisions concerning the status of members of the Conseil
d'Etat are to be found in Articles R 131-1 et seq. of the
Administrative Courts Code.
2. Functions
The
relevant provisions of the Administrative Courts Code concerning the
judicial, administrative and legislative functions of the Conseil
d'Etat read as follows:
Article L. 111-1
“The Conseil d'Etat is the supreme
administrative court. It shall rule independently on appeals on
points of law lodged against last-instance decisions by the various
administrative courts, and on appeals falling within its
first-instance jurisdiction or jurisdiction to hear full appeals.”
Article L. 112-1
“The Conseil d'Etat shall participate in
the preparation of Acts (lois) and Ordinances (ordonnances).
Draft texts emanating from the Government shall be referred to it by
the Prime Minister. The Conseil d'Etat shall give its opinion
on draft decrees and on any other draft texts in respect of which its
intervention is required by constitutional, legislative or regulatory
provisions, or which are submitted to it by the Government. When a
draft text is submitted to it, the Conseil d'Etat shall give
its opinion and propose any amendments that it may deem necessary. In
addition, it shall prepare and draft texts in response to specific
requests.”
Article L. 112-2
“The Conseil d'Etat may be consulted by the
Prime Minister or ministers on any difficulties that may arise in
administrative matters.”
Article L. 112-3
“The Conseil d'Etat shall be entitled, of
its own motion, to draw to the attention of the executive any reforms
of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature that it may
deem to be in the public interest.”
Article L. 112-4
“The Vice-President of the Conseil d'Etat
may, at the request of the Prime Minister or a minister, appoint a
member of the Conseil d'Etat to carry out a fact-finding
mission. The Vice-President may, at the request of ministers, appoint
a member of the Conseil d'Etat to assist their officials in
drafting specific texts.”
3. Organisation
The
relevant provisions of the Administrative Courts Code concerning the
organisation and functioning of the Conseil d'Etat are as
follows:
Article L. 121-1
“The presidency of the Conseil d'Etat shall
be held by the Vice-President. The General Assembly of the Conseil
d'Etat may be presided over by the Prime Minister, and, in his
absence, by the Minister of Justice.”
Article L. 121-3
“The Conseil d'Etat shall consist of a
Judicial Division and administrative divisions.”
Article R. 121-3
“Senior members (conseillers d'Etat) in
permanent service shall be assigned to an administrative division or
to the Judicial Division, or simultaneously to an administrative
division and the Judicial Division, or simultaneously to the Report
and Research Division and another administrative division, or to
three divisions including the Judicial Division and the Report and
Research Division. The deputy presidents and the presidents of
sections of the Judicial Division shall be assigned solely to that
Division; they may however be assigned to the Report and Research
Division.”
Article R. 121-4
“The maîtres des requêtes and
auditeurs shall be assigned both to an administrative division
and to the Judicial Division. However, (a) the maîtres
des requêtes and auditeurs responsible for running
the documentation centre may, as appropriate, be assigned only to the
Judicial Division or only to an administrative division; (b) the
maîtres des requêtes and auditeurs who have
served for less than three years in the Conseil d'Etat shall
be assigned only to the Judicial Division.”
Article R. 121-5
“The assigning of a member of the Conseil
d'Etat to an administrative division shall entail, in addition to
his or her contribution to the work of that division, his or her
participation in the performance of the administrative activities
referred to under Title III, Chapter 7, of the present
Book.”
Article R. 123-2
“The Conseil d'Etat shall consist of five
administrative divisions:
Interior, Finance, Public Works, Social, and Report and
Research.”
Article R. 123-3
“Cases originating from the various ministries
shall be distributed between the first four of those divisions in
accordance with the provisions of an order of the Prime Minister and
of the Minister of Justice.
All cases involving a particular ministry shall be
referred to the same division.
However, the examination of certain categories of cases,
in particular those concerning the civil service, may be assigned to
a specific division, regardless of the ministry from which they
originate.”
...
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant alleged that there had been a number of violations of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established
by law.”
A. The independence and impartiality of the Conseil
d'Etat
The
applicant company argued firstly that the Conseil d'Etat was
not independent or impartial on account of the plurality of its
functions, but also as a result of the appointment and status of its
members. In particular, the applicant explained that the Conseil
d'Etat had fully participated in the legislative reforms of
mining law and that it could not be independent or impartial with
regard to questions concerning the implementation of those reforms.
The applicant further stated that this lack of independence and
impartiality was illustrated by the fact that, on 26 May 2000, one of
the members of the bench which delivered the judgment of 19 May
2000 had been appointed to the post of Secretary General in the
ministry responsible for mining. Secondly, the applicant company
complained that the Conseil d'Etat had consecutively exercised
advisory and judicial functions, explaining that the Public Works
Division had issued an advisory opinion in response to a request from
the Secretary of State for Industry concerning various questions of
mining law, whilst it had also been requested to rule on an
administrative appeal against the order of 18 May 1997, and that the
Judicial Division had then simply adopted the findings of the
administrative division. The applicant company thus concluded that
the Conseil d'Etat, in its judgments of 19 May 2000 and 5
April 2002, had not given an independent and impartial ruling.
1. The parties' submissions
(a) The independence and impartiality of the members
of the Conseil d'Etat
(i) The applicant company
The
applicant company drew attention to the growing importance in the
Court's case-law of the notion of separation of powers between the
executive and the judiciary (see Stafford v. the United
Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, § 78, ECHR
2002 IV, and Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC],
nos. 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98 and 46664/99, ECHR
2003 VI), particularly in connection with proceedings between a
litigant and executive authorities. The applicant company observed
that the Conseil d'Etat concurrently exercised a number of
functions – legislative, regulatory, administrative, judicial
and that of adviser to the Government – and that it had been
confronted with the exercise of all those functions.
Firstly,
the Conseil d'Etat had been involved in the drafting of a
number of bills, in accordance with Article 39 of the Constitution,
which had resulted in major amendments to the Mining Code, and the
applicant company considered that it had been particularly penalised
by the new Article 84 of the Mining Code, stemming from the 1994
reform and enshrined in the Law of 30 March 1999. The function in
question was exercised by the largest formation, the General
Assembly, made up at least of the six division presidents and
thirty-five senior members (conseillers d'Etat). The applicant
pointed out that it was not disputed by the Government that the
members of the benches which delivered the judgments of 19 May 2000
and 5 April 2002 had also participated in the work of the
administrative arm which prepared those legislative reforms. In the
applicant's submission, it was realistic and pragmatic to consider
that the position adopted by the administrative arm would inevitably
have influenced the Judicial Division. The Conseil d'Etat
could not be privy to government secrets and then rule as an
independent and impartial tribunal on appeals against administrative
decisions taken by the executive on the basis of legislation that it
had helped to prepare. An institution which exercised a legislative
function and prepared enactments that drastically amended the Mining
Code, thereby imposing unforeseeable constraints and excessive
burdens on the holders of mining concessions, could not then rule as
an independent and impartial tribunal on questions concerning the
implementation of such reforms. This was also the case where the
institution intervened in secondary legislation: it considered itself
to be the co-author of government decrees, as was apparent from legal
writings and confirmed by the case-law of the Conseil d'Etat
itself, since, where it had not been properly consulted, a decree
would be set aside because of disregard for the “authority
exercised by the Conseil d'Etat jointly with the Government”
(see Conseil d'Etat, full court, 9 June 1978, SCI Boulevard
Arago, Recueil, p. 237). Given the close relationship
between the Government and the Conseil d'Etat, the applicant
considered that the lack of independence and impartiality verged on
failure to comply with the separation of powers (see McGonnell v.
the United Kingdom, no. 28488/95, ECHR 2000 II) and
went far beyond the basic lack of impartiality identified in
Procola v. Luxembourg (judgment of 28 September 1995,
Series A no. 326). In the present case, the Conseil
d'Etat had itself decided, jointly with the French Government, on
the regulatory measures applying to the legislation that it had
prepared.
The
applicant company argued that its foregoing analysis was confirmed by
an examination of the careers of members of the Conseil d'Etat.
Within the Conseil d'Etat there was no group of civil servants
acting exclusively in a judicial capacity. During their careers,
members of the Conseil d'Etat held other senior positions in
the civil service. Decree no. 63-766 of 30 July 1963 concerning
the organisation and functioning of the Conseil d'Etat provided
for an intermingling of its members between the administrative
divisions and the Judicial Division. This principle of operation
meant that a litigant could not be guaranteed a truly independent
judge. Thus, in the present case, Mr Bernard Pêcheur, a senior
member of the Conseil d'Etat who sat on the bench which
delivered the judgment of 19 May 2000, had been appointed, by a
decree of 26 May 2000, to the post of Secretary General in the
Ministry for Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry, the very
ministry which bore responsibility for mining policy, at a time when
the judgment had not even been notified. In the applicant's
submission, such a practice by the Government was likely to cast
serious doubt on the independence of the Conseil d'Etat when
ruling in its judicial capacity, thus undermining the necessary
confidence that justice should inspire in the public. It could be
inferred that, while the deliberation was in progress, one of the
members of the bench had been under consideration for appointment to
a particularly senior position in the ministry against which the
concession-holder had brought proceedings. There had thus been a lack
of separation between the executive and the Conseil d'Etat –
a situation which, to be sure, constituted one of the essential
features of the institution. The problem stemmed from the absence of
any statutory definition of a status capable of guaranteeing the
independence and impartiality of the members of the Conseil d'Etat
when acting in their judicial capacity. That shortcoming constituted
in itself a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see
Coëme and Others v. Belgium, nos. 32492/96,
32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96, § 98, ECHR
2000 VII).
Similarly,
the applicant company asserted that the members of the Conseil
d'Etat were not members of the national legal service
(magistrats); they were appointed by the Cabinet and the only
condition for appointment of senior members of the Conseil d'Etat
was a minimum age of 45, without there being any particular
requirement of competence in legal matters, unlike in the Conseil
d'Etat of Luxembourg, whose mode of operation had been criticised
by the European Court (see Procola, cited above). The
applicant company argued that, generally speaking, members of the
Conseil d'Etat were not protected by any particular safeguards
against extraneous pressure.
(ii) The Government
The
Government replied that the independence of the administrative court
was guaranteed at the highest level in the hierarchy of domestic
norms, the Constitutional Council having recognised it in 1980 as a
constitutional principle by nature. As regards the members of the
Conseil d'Etat, they enjoyed a status enshrined in legislative
and regulatory provisions of the Administrative Courts Code which
were underpinned by a strong tradition of independence. The
Government referred to the guarantees of independence inherent in the
status of the members of the French Conseil d'Etat, as
described by the Court in the above-mentioned Kress judgment.
They submitted that this status entailed sound safeguards that could
be compared to those of the Council of State in the Netherlands,
which the Court had examined in connection with the right to be heard
by an independent tribunal in its above-mentioned Kleyn and Others
judgment. In that judgment the Court held that “in the absence
of any indication of a lack of sufficient and adequate safeguards
against possible extraneous pressure, [it had] found nothing in the
applicants' submissions that could substantiate their concerns as to
the independence of the Council of State and its members”.
Mutatis mutandis, the Government requested the Court to apply
this case-law to the question of the status of member of the French
Conseil d'Etat.
As
regards the appointment of Mr Pêcheur, a senior member of the
Conseil d'Etat, to duties in the Ministry for Economic Affairs
and Finance, the Government did not consider that this revealed any
lack of independence or impartiality on the part of the Conseil
d'Etat. They firstly pointed out that “the personal
impartiality of a judge [had to] be presumed until there [was] proof
to the contrary” (see Morel v. France,
no. 34130/96, § 41, ECHR 2000 VI). They
explained, moreover, that the member in question was admitted to the
Conseil d'Etat in 1985 and that he had initially acquired
considerable experience within the administrative Finance Division,
then as a member of the sixth section of the Conseil d'Etat
responsible for supervising financial-market authorities, public
finance courts, planning law and environmental matters. It was solely
on the basis of this judge's experience that the new Minister for
Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry proposed to the President of
the Republic, in April 2000, that he be appointed to the
newly-created post of Secretary General in the ministry concerned.
The Government added that the process of judicial review in the
Conseil d'Etat comprised a series of individual examinations
(by the reporting judge, reviser, Government Commissioner and the
president of the bench) and collegiate examinations (preparatory
stage and judgment stage) which were spread over a period of time.
Thus, in view of the safeguards arising from the actual organisation
of this process and the secrecy of the voting in deliberations, a
connection between the collegiate resolution of a dispute and the
subsequent assignment of one of the members of the bench to a post
outside the Conseil d'Etat could not be regarded as a factor
capable of influencing the opinions of persons participating in that
resolution. Lastly, and more generally, the Government claimed that
the participation of members of the Conseil d'Etat in other
public-service duties, far from undermining the independence or
impartiality of the Conseil d'Etat, in fact enhanced its
capacity for supervision of the executive as it gave its members
precise knowledge of the workings of the civil service.
As
to the advisory function of the Conseil d'Etat, in particular
when consultation was mandatory, it consisted mainly in a preliminary
review by which it ensured that any defects in legislative texts
submitted to it would be removed prior to adoption. This function
therefore provided an important safeguard for everyone to whom the
proposed texts would be applicable. Moreover, it could not be
inferred from the advisory role of the Conseil d'Etat that it
was itself the author of the primary or secondary legislation
submitted to it for consideration. The Government pointed out that
the SCI Arago precedent cited by the applicant company was no
longer relevant and that more recent decisions had omitted reference
to authority being exercised by the Conseil d'Etat jointly
with the Government. The lack of proper consultation of the Conseil
d'Etat, when mandatory, vitiated the very authority of the text's
author (see Conseil d'Etat, full court, 15 April 1996, Union
nationale des pharmacies et autres, Recueil, p. 127), thus
maintaining the possibility for this ground to be raised proprio
motu without any need to treat the Conseil d'Etat as a
co-author of the text, which it was not. That position was consonant
with two fundamental constitutional principles in a State upholding
the rule of law: the independence of the judiciary and the separation
of powers.
(b) The duality of the advisory and judicial
functions of the Conseil d'Etat and the significance of the
opinion of 29 September 1997
(i) The applicant company
As
regards the opinion given on 29 September 1997 by the Public Works
Division, the applicant company considered that its analysis, in
particular concerning the extent of the administrative measures that
could be imposed on holders of mining concessions, had been espoused
by the Judicial Division in its judgments of 19 May 2000 and 5 April
2002. The applicant explained that the legal questions raised in that
opinion coincided with those addressed by the Conseil d'Etat
in its judicial capacity, with regard in particular to the
interpretation of the Law of 15 July 1994 and the new Article 84 (of
the Mining Code) which it had created. The applicant disputed the
Government's argument as to the notion of a purely legal question,
because such questions always related to factual situations.
Moreover, according to the case-law of the administrative courts of
appeal, a court which gave an opinion on a purely legal question put
to it by a prefect (a similar procedure to that in which ministers
sought an opinion on a legal question from the Conseil d'Etat)
could not subsequently rule on an appeal concerning that same legal
question (see Administrative Court of Appeal, 23 March 1999, Sarran;
Administrative Court of Appeal, 4 March 2003, département
of Deux-Sèvres).
The
applicant company argued on this basis that the fact of having
addressed a certain legal question in an advisory capacity, as
advisor to the public authorities, precluded the possibility of
subsequently ruling on claims in which that legal question was called
into question. It considered that the Court's case-law was clear on
that point (see Procola and McGonnell, both cited
above).
The
applicant company added that it had had no chance of winning its case
since “conventionally ... a judicial bench [was] not entitled
to take a contrary legal position to that of the administrative
divisions except at its highest level, when sitting as a Judicial
Assembly” (Le Conseil d'Etat, Notes et études
documentaires, 1988, La Documentation française, p. 78).
This situation had moreover been implicitly confirmed by the
Government because they had cited a judgment of 30 June 2000 in which
it was precisely the Judicial Assembly that had set aside the
provision of a decree issued after consultation of the Conseil
d'Etat.
In
the applicant's submission, the Government had not shown that the
convention whereby the Judicial Assembly alone could depart from the
solution adopted by an administrative division was no longer
applicable at the time of the judgments of 19 May 2000 and 5 April
2002, because on that point they had only cited judgments of 2003 and
2005.
For
the applicant company, the publication of the impugned opinion in the
public annual report of the Conseil d'Etat for 1998
constituted an aggravating factor in the lack of impartiality and
independence of the Conseil d'Etat when ruling in its judicial
capacity. It referred in this connection to the Conseil d'Etat's
finding that the Court of Audit could not lawfully give a judicial
ruling, for lack of impartiality, when it had previously referred in
its public report to the underlying subject-matter (see Conseil
d'Etat, full court, Société Labor Métal,
23 February 2000). Whether a factual or a legal question, once it had
been mentioned in a public report without any judicial formalities
having been observed, in particular the adversarial principle, it was
difficult to see how the question could subsequently be adjudicated
by the institution which had published the report without breaching
the obligations of independence and impartiality.
Lastly,
the applicant company was of the opinion that the circumstances of
the Kleyn and Others judgment were different from those of the
present case, where the Conseil d'Etat had participated in the
preparation of laws amending the Mining Code, in the context of its
mine closures, and in the imposition of regulatory measures for the
implementation of that legislation. One of the members of the
judicial bench had been appointed to the post of Secretary General at
the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry, and the
Public Works Division had issued an advisory opinion, as requested by
the Minister, which directly concerned the measures of mining
administration that could be imposed on holders of mining concessions
upon the termination of their activity. The applicant company
concluded that the Conseil d'Etat had thus become the
co-author of mining policy and the Government's advisor in the
drafting, implementation and interpretation of the texts arising from
that policy. As a result, the Conseil d'Etat had not been an
independent and impartial tribunal and the Government could not argue
that the various functions of the Conseil d'Etat were
inseverable because, by virtue of the principle of the separation of
powers, a judicial body was to act first and foremost as a judicial
body, without assuming additional functions of a different nature.
(ii) The Government
Concerning
the consecutive exercise of advisory and judicial functions by the
Conseil d'Etat, the Government pointed out that the Court
assessed the right to an impartial tribunal by applying two tests,
first seeking to ascertain the personal conviction of a particular
judge, which was not at issue in the present case, and second,
verifying that the court afforded sufficient safeguards to exclude
any legitimate doubt as to its impartiality.
In
this connection the Government principally emphasised that the
impugned opinions given by the administrative divisions of the
Conseil d'Etat, and cited in support of the complaint, only
concerned the texts of primary and secondary legislation under which
the decisions which gave rise to the dispute had been taken, not the
impugned administrative orders. In those circumstances, and since it
had not been argued that the advisory divisions had been called upon
to examine the actual decisions taken against the applicant company
and forming the subject-matter of the dispute, the applicant was not
entitled to complain that it had been affected by a lack of
impartiality on the part of the Conseil d'Etat.
In
the alternative, the Government pointed out that neither the Procola
judgment nor the Kleyn judgment had ruled out the idea that a
single institution could exercise both advisory and judicial
functions. As regards the French Conseil d'Etat, they
explained that the role of the administrative divisions was to act as
legal advisor to the Government (being competent to give an opinion
on bills and certain decrees, and to respond to requests from the
Government for an opinion on a difficult point of law or on the legal
framework of decisions that the Government had to take). Through its
opinions, the Conseil d'Etat in fact sought to prevent any
illegality that, in any event, a court would only be able to condemn
subsequently, once the administrative decisions had been taken and
perhaps also implemented. The aim of such prior scrutiny of legality
was to improve the quality of the decision and it was also a
guarantee of greater stability in the legal rule.
In
the Government's submission, the exercise by the Conseil d'Etat
of advisory functions and the simultaneous assignment of its members
to the two missions presented numerous advantages which did not call
into question the impartiality of the institution.
In
cases where the advisory opinions concerned purely legal questions,
that is so say where the Conseil d'Etat was called upon to
give an opinion on draft laws or decrees, as in the situation
complained of by the applicant company, the compatibility of the
subsequent judicial procedure could not be called into question. A
member of the Conseil d'Etat who gave an opinion was no less
independent and no more biased in favour of the authorities than a
member who deliberated in a judicial capacity, as the unity of status
was a guarantee of independence in the opinions given by the
administrative divisions. The opinion would moreover lose any
usefulness in the eyes of the Government if it were not given by an
independent and impartial body. In addition, Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention did not prevent judges who had previously ruled once
on a legal question from hearing any other dispute that raised the
same question. This represented a guarantee of legal certainty.
Furthermore,
the Government contended that the Judicial Division never considered
itself bound by the content of the opinions given by the
administrative divisions, and the case-law regularly provided
examples of the annulment of acts further to an opinion by the
Conseil d'Etat (see, for example, Conseil d'Etat, 30
June 2000, Ligue française pour la défense des
droits de l'homme et du citoyen, Recueil, p. 253). The
Government therefore considered that the submission of the same legal
question first to an advisory division of the Conseil d'Etat
and then to its Judicial Division could not give rise, in view of the
independence of both types of division, to any objective doubt in the
mind of an applicant that might undermine the impartiality of the
court in question. The examination of such questions differed
significantly between the context of the advisory function and that
of the judicial function, and a difference of position between the
two could not be seen as the overruling of one by the other. The
Government quoted the President of the Judicial Division of the
Conseil d'Etat from 1967 to 1976 who had stated that “the
adversarial judicial procedure [brought] out more clearly all the
aspects of a question that the unilateral procedure before the
administrative divisions [did] not always reveal”.
Lastly,
the Government argued, with regard to the publication of the opinion
of 29 September 1997 in the annual report of the Conseil d'Etat,
that the position taken by its members in the advisory opinion did
not concern the facts of the case which the applicant company had
brought against the authorities, but rather a purely legal question
(which distinguished the case from that of Société
Labor Metal, cited above); unless it were to be rendered
impossible for justice itself to be done, the taking of such a
position could not be regarded as undermining the objectively
impartial nature of the court.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) General principles
In
order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered “independent”
within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, regard must be had, inter
alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term
of office, the existence of safeguards against extraneous pressure
and the question whether the body presents an appearance of
independence (see Findlay v. the United Kingdom, judgment of
25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 I,
p. 281, § 73, and Brudnicka and Others v. Poland,
no. 54723/00, § 38, ECHR 2005 II). As to the
question of independence being defined as the separation of powers
between the executive and the judiciary, neither Article 6 nor any
other provision of the Convention requires States to comply with any
theoretical constitutional concepts regarding the permissible limits
of the powers' interaction (see Kleyn and Others, cited above,
§ 193). The Court would however emphasise that the notion of the
separation of powers between the political organs of government and
the judiciary has assumed growing importance in its case-law (see
Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, § 78,
ECHR 2002-IV).
There
are two aspects to the requirement of impartiality. First, the
tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias.
Secondly, it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that
is, it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate
doubt in this respect. Under the objective test, it must be
determined whether, quite apart from the judges' personal conduct,
there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to their
impartiality. In this respect even appearances may be of a certain
importance. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a
democratic society must inspire in the public and above all in the
parties to proceedings (see Kleyn and Others, cited above, §
191).
In
“civil matters”, the mere fact that a judge has already
taken pre-trial decisions cannot by itself be regarded as justifying
concerns about his impartiality. What matters is the scope of the
measures taken by the judge before the trial. Likewise, the fact that
the judge has detailed knowledge of the case file does not entail any
prejudice on his part that would prevent his being regarded as
impartial when the decision on the merits is taken. Nor does a
preliminary analysis of the available information mean that the final
analysis has been prejudged. What is important is for that analysis
to be carried out when judgment is delivered and to be based on the
evidence produced and argument heard at the hearing (see Morel,
cited above, § 45, and Didier v. France (dec.), no.
58188/00, 27 August 2002).
The
concepts of independence and objective impartiality are closely
linked and the Court will accordingly consider both issues together
as they relate to the present case (see Findlay, cited above,
§ 73, and Kleyn and Others, cited above, § 192). The
Court will then address the question whether, in the circumstances of
the case, the Conseil d'Etat had the requisite “appearance”
of independence, or the requisite “objective”
impartiality (ibid., § 193).
Lastly,
it should be borne in mind that in deciding whether in a given case
there is a legitimate reason to fear that these requirements have not
been met, the standpoint of a party is important but not decisive.
What is decisive is whether the fear of the party concerned can be
held objectively justified (see, mutatis mutandis, Hauschildt
v. Denmark, judgment of 24 May 1989, Series A no. 154,
§ 48).
(b) Application to the present case
The
Court notes that the applicant's fear of a lack of structural
impartiality on the part of the Conseil d'Etat is based above
all on an infringement of the principle of the separation of powers
between the executive and the judiciary.
The
Court observes that the status of the members of the administrative
courts has been described in the Kress judgment (cited above)
and is now provided for in Articles L. 131-1 and R. 131-1 of the
Administrative Courts Code (see paragraph 34 above). The members are
governed by the general rules on the civil service. They are
recruited in one of two ways: through competitive examination or
directly from outside (au tour extérieur). About one
third of the members of the Conseil d'Etat are on release,
engaged in outside activities. As regards the practice of recruiting
directly from outside, the President of the Republic is empowered to
appoint one third of the senior members (conseillers d'Etat),
subject to a minimum age of forty-five (the prior opinion of the
Vice-President of the Conseil d'Etat is required in such
cases). Even though there is no written provision guaranteeing the
irremovability of members of the Conseil d'Etat, that
guarantee exists in practice, in the same way as their independence
is guaranteed by longstanding conventions such as internal management
by the Executive Committee (bureau) of the Conseil d'Etat,
without outside interference (its members are not subject to the
authority of the Minister of Justice, unlike the members of the
public prosecution service), and promotion based on seniority, a
practice which guarantees independence vis-à-vis both
the political authorities and the authorities of the Conseil
d'Etat themselves (ibid., §§ 31-35). Mention should
also be made of the duty of discretion imposed on members of the
Conseil d'Etat in their action and public representations
(Article L. 131-3 of the Administrative Courts Code, see paragraph 34
above).
The
Court notes that the particular status of the Conseil d'Etat
among French institutions connects it organically to the executive.
However, it is of the opinion that this situation is not sufficient
to justify the argument that the Conseil d'Etat lacks
independence. As the Court has already found in the Kress
judgment, for other purposes, the specific nature of this institution
does not preclude the existence of guarantees as to its members'
independence (ibid., §§ 31-37 and 71).
Furthermore,
the Court reiterates that the very fact that legal officers are
appointed by a member of the executive, or in some cases by
Parliament, does not render them subordinate to the authorities if,
once appointed, they receive no pressure or instructions in the
performance of their judicial duties (see Campbell and Fell v. the
United Kingdom, judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A no. 80,
§ 79; Loyen v. France (dec.), no. 46022/99, 27 April
2000; and Filippini v. San Marino (dec.), no. 10526/02,
26 August 2003). Similarly, whilst the irremovability of judges
during their term of office must in general be considered as a
corollary of their independence, the absence of a formal recognition
of this irremovability in the law does not in itself imply lack of
independence provided that it is recognised in fact and that the
other necessary guarantees are present (see Campbell and Fell,
cited above, § 80). It can be seen from the provisions of the
Administrative Courts Code and from practice that this is indeed the
case.
Whilst
the Court thus has no cause, in general, to call into question the
manner in which members of the Conseil d'Etat are appointed or
the organisation of their career, it nevertheless remains for it to
assess whether, in the present case, the Judicial Division possessed
the “appearance of independence” required by the Court's
case-law in terms of safeguards against extraneous pressure (see
paragraph 59 above). In this connection, the applicant company
claimed that the appointment of a senior member, who had participated
in the deliberation of 26 April 2000, to the post of Secretary
General of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry
(see paragraph 18 above), was capable of casting serious doubt on the
independence of the bench of the Conseil d'Etat which
delivered the judgment of 19 May 2000 (see paragraph 17 above).
The
Court observes that the appointment of the senior member of the
Conseil d'Etat in question was subsequent to its deliberation
on 26 April 2000 in which he had sat. However, it takes note of the
Government's statement that discussions concerning the appointment to
a newly created post were already underway in April 2000 and had
probably begun at least a certain time before the deliberation in
view of the importance of the vacancy to be filled. The Court finds
it likely that those discussions would have continued until a few
days before the appointment decree was signed on 26 May 2000. It
is of the opinion that the impugned appointment was capable of
casting doubt on the impartiality of the Conseil d'Etat. At
the time of the deliberation in question, or even perhaps well
before, one of the members of the bench had been under consideration
for appointment to a senior position in the very ministry with which
the applicant had a large number of significant disputes (see
paragraph 11 above). The Court thus finds that the said member could
not have the appearance of neutrality vis-à-vis the
applicant company, given the lack of safeguards against possible
extraneous influence, since his appointment was already envisaged at
the time he sat in his judicial capacity in April 2000. The applicant
company, in the Court's opinion, thus had objectively justified
misgivings ex post facto about the independence and
impartiality of the bench on which the member in question had sat.
The
Court therefore considers that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
There
remains the question of the independence and impartiality of the
Conseil d'Etat having regard to the concurrent exercise of
judicial and administrative functions as provided for in Article L.
112-1 et seq. of the Administrative Courts Code (see paragraph 35
above).
As
to the participation of the Conseil d'Etat, through its
advisory opinions – which are not, however, binding on it –
in the preparation of all draft legislation concerning mining policy
and of implementing decrees, since the end of the mining activities
in question, the Court acknowledges that such participation raises a
purely structural question since, if the mandatory consultation of
the Conseil d'Etat is dispensed with, the administrative court
itself will not fail to declare the act void for incompétence
(lack of authority), on grounds of public policy (moyen d'ordre
public). However, the Court reiterates that the Convention does
not require States to comply with any theoretical constitutional
concepts regarding the permissible limits of interaction between the
powers of the executive and the judiciary (see Kleyn and Others,
cited above, § 193). As in the case of the Council of State
in the Netherlands, there is no cause to apply a particular
constitutional law theory to the situation of the French Conseil
d'Etat and to rule in abstracto on the organic and
functional compatibility with Article 6 § 1 of the consultation
of the Conseil d'Etat with regard to draft legislation and
implementing decrees. The Court reiterates that the principle of the
separation of powers is not decisive in the abstract (see Pabla Ky
v. Finland, no. 47221/99, § 34, ECHR 2004 V).
The Court must ascertain only whether the opinion given by the Public
Works Division on 29 September 1997 in any way prejudged the findings
of the Judicial Division of the Conseil d'Etat on 19 May 2000
and 5 April 2002, thus casting doubt on the “objective”
impartiality of the bench on account of the consecutive exercise of
advisory and judicial functions in the present case.
The
Court first observes that the questions raised in the advisory
opinion concerning the “work of stabilising and rehabilitating
the sites of disused mines”, following the entry into force of
the Law of 15 July 1994 amending certain provisions of the Mining
Code, and in the proceedings concerning the inter-prefectoral orders
of 26 May and 18 July 1997 providing for regulatory measures in the
mining sector, cannot be regarded as totally identical “decisions”.
Nor is there any evidence in the case file that the members of the
judicial bench had previously participated in the adoption of the
opinion of 29 September 1997. The Court infers from this that the
present circumstances are different from those of the Procola
case.
The
issue is whether the questions submitted to the Public Works Division
and the disputes examined by the Judicial Division can be regarded as
involving the “same case” or “same decision”
(see Kleyn and Others, cited above, § 200), or as
“analogous issues” (see Morel, cited above, §
47). In the Kleyn and Others case, the French Government,
intervening as a third-party, considered that “the fact that
the same point of law [had been] submitted successively to the
Conseil d'Etat in its advisory capacity and its judicial
capacity did not as such constitute a ground, given its independence
in both capacities, for an objective doubt in the mind of an
appellant that could undermine the impartiality of the Judicial
Division. The impartiality of a body where advisory and judicial
responsibilities coexisted did not pose a problem where an advisory
opinion concerned merely a point of law. Where it concerned a
question of fact, the assessment of the question whether an appellant
could have objectively justified fears of bias depended on the merits
of each case” (see Kleyn and Others, cited above, §
189). The Government has reiterated that view. The applicant company
has replied that legal questions always relate to a factual situation
and that, in the present case, those raised in the opinion coincided
with those raised in the litigation.
The
Court observes that the advisory opinion of 29 September 1997
concerned the interpretation and application of the Law of 15 July
1994 at the time, the question of the extent of the administrative
authorities' powers vis-à-vis mining companies, and the
sharing of responsibility between those companies and the State as
regards the prevention of mining-related risks. The litigation in
question consisted in examining whether mining regulatory measures
could still be imposed on the applicant company since it had claimed
that declarations of abandonment and applications for renunciation
had been made in respect of its concessions. Without denying the
existence of a relationship between the legal questions raised in the
opinion of 29 September 1997 and those arising in the litigation
brought by the applicant company, the Court is unable to find that
the issues involved in the opinion, having been addressed in a
general and abstract manner, entailed any bias on the part of the
members of the Judicial Division when they came to examine, three
years later, the issues concerning the applicant company's concrete
interests in the management of the termination of its mining
operations, its disused mines being numerous and in different legal
situations. Under those circumstances, the advisory opinion and the
subsequent proceedings involving appeals against the
inter-prefectoral orders providing for regulatory measures in the
mining sector cannot be regarded as representing the “same
case” or the “same decision” (see, mutatis
mutandis, Kleyn and Others, cited above, §§ 200
and 201). For this reason neither the request referred to the
administrative division by the minister with whom the appeals had
been lodged, nor the publication of the opinion in the 1998 public
report of the Conseil d'Etat, were capable of arousing
objectively justified fears on the part of the applicant company.
In
conclusion, the consecutive exercise by the Conseil d'Etat of
judicial and administrative functions has not, in the present case,
entailed a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
...
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Holds by four votes to three that there has been
a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,
in so far as it secures the right to an independent and impartial
tribunal, on account of the applicant company's objectively justified
misgivings about the bench of the Conseil d'Etat which
delivered the judgment of 19 May 2000;
Holds unanimously that there has been no
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in
so far as it secures the right to an independent and impartial
tribunal, on account of the consecutive exercise by the Conseil
d'Etat, in the present case, of its judicial and advisory
functions;
...
Done in French, and notified in writing on 9 November 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Vincent Berger Boštjan M. Zupančič
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the joint partly dissenting opinion
of Judges Zupančič,
Bîrsan and Long is annexed to this judgment.
B.M.Z*.
V.B.*.
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES ZUPANČIČ,
BÎRSAN AND LONG
(Translation)
It
is with great regret that we are unable to agree with the first
operative paragraph of the judgment which reads: “there has
been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention, in so far as it secures the right to an independent and
impartial tribunal, on account of the applicant company's
objectively justified misgivings about the bench of the Conseil
d'Etat which delivered the judgment of 19 May 2000”.
The
applicant company argued, among other things, that the Conseil
d'Etat was not an independent and impartial tribunal on account,
first, of the plurality of its functions and, second, of the manner
of appointment and the status of its members, as illustrated in the
present case by the appointment, on 26 May 2000, of one of the
members of the bench which delivered the impugned judgment of 19 May
2000 to the post of Secretary General at the ministry responsible
for mining, when the company's activities, which had given rise to
its litigation against the Government, fell within the purview of
that very ministry.
Whilst,
on the first point, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the
successive exercise by the Conseil d'Etat of its
administrative functions and judicial jurisdiction was not capable
of entailing a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,
thus adhering to the Kleyn v. the Netherlands case-law –
a conclusion with which we fully agree – on the second point,
by contrast, the majority in the Chamber found a violation of that
same provision.
Admittedly,
on that second point, the Court, not departing from its settled
case-law in such matters, did not wish to call into question,
generally speaking, the method of appointment of members of the
Conseil d'Etat or the organisation of their careers. That
being said, in so far as the applicant company had argued that the
appointment of a member of the judicial bench to the post of
Secretary General of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Finance and
Industry had been such as to cast “serious doubt” upon
the independence of the Conseil d'Etat in its decision of 19
May 2000, the Court had to examine whether in the present case the
supreme administrative court of France had presented the “appearance
of independence” required by the Court's case-law, having
regard to the “existence of safeguards against extraneous
pressure” (paragraph 59 of the judgment).
In
this connection, the majority in the Chamber took, as the
starting-point of their reasoning, an undeniable fact: the
appointment in question post-dated the deliberation of the Conseil
d'Etat of 26 April 2000. However, they bore in mind, as the
Government had indicated, that discussions concerning the
appointment were apparently “already underway” in April
2000, and had thus begun “probably” at least a certain
time before the deliberation of the judicial bench. Accordingly,
agreeing with the applicant company, the majority were of the
opinion that the impugned appointment was “likely to cast
doubt on the impartiality of the Conseil d'Etat”. They
consider that, in view of the fact that during the deliberation, “or
even perhaps well before” – and we emphasise that point
– one of the members of the judicial bench had been under
consideration for appointment to a senior position in the ministry
which was its opponent in a large number of major disputes, he could
not appear as a neutral figure in the eyes of the applicant company.
The majority considered that in the circumstances the company had no
safeguards “against possible extraneous influence” on
account of the impugned appointment “at the time he exercised
his judicial function in April”, and that this was capable of
giving rise to “objectively justified misgivings ex post
facto about the independence and impartiality of the bench on
which the member in question had sat” (paragraph 69).
In
fact, the point on which we disagree with the majority concerns the
application to the situation at issue of the notions of independence
and objective impartiality, which in the circumstances of the case
are closely linked (paragraph 62). In this connection, the Court has
constantly held that the objective test consists in determining
whether, irrespective of the judge's personal conduct, there are
ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his impartiality.
In this respect even appearances may be of a certain importance.
What is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic
society must inspire in the public. Accordingly, any judge in
respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of
impartiality must withdraw. In deciding whether in a given case
there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular judge lacks
impartiality, the standpoint of a party is important but not
decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be
objectively justified (see, among other authorities, Castillo
Algar v. Spain, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports
1998 VIII, § 45, and Morel v. France,
no. 34130/96, § 42, ECHR 2000 VI). Similarly,
the Court has held with equal consistency that a judge's final
analysis in a given case is carried out when judgment is delivered
and is based on the evidence produced and argument heard at the
hearing (see, for example, Hauschildt v. Denmark,
judgment of 24 May 1989, Series A no. 154, § 50;
Nortier v. the Netherlands, judgment of 24 August
1993, Series A no. 267, § 332; Saraiva de
Carvalho v. Portugal, judgment of 22 April 1994, Series A
no. 286 B, § 35; and Morel, cited above,
§ 45).
How
then does this apply to the present case? First, we consider that
the applicant company did not produce any evidence to suggest that
the guarantees of independence of members of the supreme French
administrative court, as emphasised by the Court in Kress v.
France (§§ 31-37 and 71), could be called into
question in the present case. On the contrary, as the present
judgment points out, the position of the Conseil d'Etat among
French institutions does not preclude the existence of guarantees as
to its independence (paragraph 66). Secondly, we consider that,
appearances notwithstanding, the appointment of the member of the
Conseil d'Etat in question cannot in itself undermine the
finding concerning the general judicial practice of the Conseil
d'Etat for the simple reason – which is not in dispute and
indeed unquestionable – that it took place after the member
had exercised his judicial function. In addition, the applicant
company failed to show how that appointment could have aroused
suspicion of a link between the member of the Conseil d'Etat
and the other party in the proceedings, or could have revealed the
existence of any extraneous influence on the performance of his
duties. In our opinion, the factors on which the majority have based
their finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
in this respect – that is to say the fact that discussions
concerning the appointment were said to have begun “probably”
at least a certain time before the deliberation, in view of the
importance of the vacancy to be filled, “or even perhaps well
before”, and that those discussions concerned a member of the
bench who was under consideration for a senior post in the ministry
against which the applicant company had brought proceedings –
appear to us to amount to pure conjecture. Appearances have their
own limits and have to be based on objective facts, which we
consider not to be the case here. In conclusion, it would have been
better for the Court, in a case where it did have the opportunity to
do so, to have set limits on an extreme attachment to the theory of
appearances – a theory that could result in a form of general
suspicion and, in the end, generate legal insecurity.